Madras High Court
R.Karmegam vs M.Hariharasudhan on 3 April, 2018
Author: R.Pongiappan
Bench: R.Pongiappan
1
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Date of Reserving the Judgment Date of Pronouncing the Judgment
12.03.2019 29.03.2019
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.PONGIAPPAN
A.S.(MD)No.143 of 2018
and
C.M.P(MD) No.7708 of 2018
1.R.Karmegam
2.Nagamani
3.Muthupillai ... Appellants / Defendants
Vs.
M.Hariharasudhan ... Respondent/ Plaintiff
Prayer: This Appeal suit is filed under Section 96 of the Civil
Procedure Code, to set aside the judgment and decree rendered in
O.S.No.186 of 2016 dated03.04.2018 on the file of the Additional
District Judge, Madurai and allow this appeal awarding damages as
claimed.
For Appellants : Mr.S.Sreenivasaraghavan
for Mr.M.Ramu
For Respondent : Mr.S.Natesh Raja
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
JUDGMENT
The unsuccessful defendants in O.S.No.186 of 2016 are the appellants herein. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit before the learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai seeking the relief to direct the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- towards damages and compensation to the plaintiff with interest at the rate of 12% p.a from the date of plaint till the date of realization with costs. By judgment and decree dated 03.04.2018 the learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai partly allowed the suit and directed the appellant/ defendants to pay a sum of Rs.18,28,941/- along with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of the suit till realization, with proportionate cost of the suit. Aggrieved over the said findings, the appellants/defendants filed the appeal and seeking the relief to set aside the judgment and decree passed on 03.04.2018.
2.For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as, as described by the trial Court.
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3.The averments made in the plaint, in brief, are as follows:
The plaintiff is running a hotel under the name and style of Hotel Gowri Krishna at Bye Pass Road, Madurai. He purchased the land to an extent of 5160 square feet vide sale deed dated 19.11.2012. The property purchased by the plaintiff lies on the north of his father's property adjoining to it. In the said property, the plaintiff started construction in the year 2014. While so, the first defendant put up the construction in front of the plaintiff's property and thereby obstructing the ingress and egress of the property of the plaintiff's father from main road. The plaintiff's father has filed a suit in O.S.No.783 of 2014 against the first defendant for the relief of injunction restraining the first defendant from putting up any construction obstructing free access to his property. The learned Principal District Munsif, Madurai on 22.12.2014 passed an order of status quo and after knowing the details of the said order, the first defendant hurriedly completed the construction without obtaining plan approval from the local bodies. On knowing this, the Electricity Board has disconnected the service connection. Thereafter, the plaintiff legally took steps to demolish the building constructed by the first defendant which http://www.judis.nic.in 4 was situated in the national highways. For his construction, the plaintiff purchased the marbles and granites for Rs.2,27,065/- and kept in front of his father's property. Aggrieved with the filing of the suit, the first defendant on 24.07.2015 at about 10 a.m., along with henchman came in a Nissan car and has then pulled down and demolished the materials, which was collected by the plaintiff for the construction purpose. For the said reasons, the plaintiff preferred a complaint before the SS Colony police station and the case has been registered against the first defendant. The first defendant caused extensive damage to the property of the plaintiff to the tune of Rs.2,27,065/-. Due to heavy lose, the plaintiff is not in a position to complete the construction. The defendants again damaged the show-case glass by pelting stones and by driving car into the hotel and damaged the automatic glass door etc. The defendants 2 and 3 trespassed into the hotel and took away the cash of more than Rs.1 Lakh. In order to restore the original position, the plaintiff was forced to spend huge amount and for the injuries sustained to the employees, he has spent Rs.73,000/-
towards medical expenses. Hence, the suit. http://www.judis.nic.in 5
4.The averments made in the written statement filed by the defendants, in brief, are as follows:-
There is no cause of action for the suit. The suit is barred by statute. In earlier, the disputed property originally belonged to one Rakkayee Ammal, who is the great-grandmother of the first defendant. Then, she mortgaged the property of 60 cents on 04.11.1954 and then gifted the same to her son Rakkappa Konar under a settlement deed dated 22.03.1957, who is the grandfather of the first defendant. The said Rakkappa Konar executed a Will on 30.10.1992 in favour of the first defendant and his brother one Nallamani. In the Will, it has been stated as the first defendant should perform Pooja and administrate the family deity, namely, Arulmigu Karuppanasamy Temple. The first defendant duly complied the ancestor Rakkappakonar Will as the Managing trustee of the temple, who traces his title from 1938 and found that presently in Tirupparankundram Taluk S.No.226/4 total extent 60 cents out of which sub divided as 226/4A extent 19 cents and S.No. 226/4B-14 cents running bye pass road and remaining 27 cents belongs to the temple. Since the said land is disputed, the first defendant made various application before various forums. Since things are being so, the neighbor of the first defendant, Palanivel, http://www.judis.nic.in 6 has started to give disturbance to the first defendant and attempted to encroach the first defendant's land. Hence, he filed a suit and got injunction against the wrongdoers. The first defendant filed a writ petition in W.P(MD)No.4487 of 2004 and obtained an order of interim stay for one week and the Government has filed a vacate stay petition and the stay granted was made absolute. The plaintiff got plan approval for residential purpose, but they deviated the plan and constructed a huge multi storied commercial complex and it is violated the town planning order. The criminal cases foisted by the plaintiff are on the strength of police power. The plaintiff has put to discharge the onus of issues strictly and in accordance with law. It is further averred that the malice suit constructed upon alleged offence committed by the first defendant alone and misjoinder of other defendants 2 and 3 and sought attachment to the properties of defendants 2 and 3 no way connected with the suit or alleged criminal offence. The plaintiff is confusing and abusing this Court for his unjust gain. According to the defendants, the plaint itself deserves to be struck down from the file of the Court.
http://www.judis.nic.in 7
5.Based on the above said pleadings, the learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai had framed necessary issues and tried the suit.
6.Before the trial Court, during trial, on the side of the plaintiffs four witnesses have been examined as P.W.1 to P.W.4 and marked 28 documents as Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.8. On the side of the defendants, first defendant was examined himself as D.W.1 and marked 12 documents as Ex.B.1 and Ex.B.12.
7.After concluding the trial, the learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai came to the conclusion that the plaintiff entitled to a sum of Rs.18,28,941/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the suit to the date of realization to the plaintiff, with proportionate costs. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appellants/defendants have filed the present appeal.
8.Considering the factual aspects and on considering the judgment rendered by the Court below, this Court decided to dispose the appeal on framing the following points:-
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i) Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the alternative remedy available in TNPPDL Act?
ii) Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party?
iii) Whether the suit is premature and whether any cause of action is available for filing the suit?
9.Before entering into merits and demerits of the appeal, it is necessary to see the factual background available from the case on either side. The defendants, plaintiff and father of the plaintiff are the neighboring land owners. Both of them started to construct the buildings in their respective lands in 2014. Thereafter, the dispute was arose between them. Consequently, the father of the plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.783 of 2014 and obtained an order of statu quo. Only thereafter, on 24.07.2015 the alleged criminal offence was committed by the defendants and others. For which, the cases have been registered in crime No.681 of 2015 and Crime No.485 of 2016 and the same were referred and protest petitions are pending. As of now, after completing the investigation, charge sheet have been filed in the case registered against the defendants and trial is in progress. Only in the said circumstances, the plaintiff filed a suit. http://www.judis.nic.in 9 Point No.1
10.The first and foremost contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that after occurrence, the case has been registered against the defendants under the provision of IPC and also as per the provision of TNPPDL Act (herein after called to as 'the Act'). Since the said Act contained the provision for claiming the damages, the plaintiff is impliedly barred in instituting the suit for damages. The learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai, without considering the provision available in the Act, allowed the suit. Therefore, filing of the suit before the Civil Court itself, is not maintainable. For the said reasons, the appeal may be allowed.
11.On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that in the Act, there is no specific bar restraining to file a suit under Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code. The provision available in the said Act is for the fast remedy. Since there is non-availability of specific bar in filing the suit before the Civil Court is no way against the Act and thereby, the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable one. http://www.judis.nic.in 10
12.Upon considering the arguments advanced by either side, it is true in the Act now quoted by the appellants, there is no specific bar and there is no ousting of civil jurisdiction. In this occasion it is necessary to see Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, which reads as follows:-
“9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred— The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature expecting suits of which their cognizance is either impliedly or explicitly barred”
13.Now it is not in dispute that if no specific bar is available in the special enactment, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all the suits of civil in nature. Of course, the suit filed by the plaintiff is in civil nature.
14.However in order to find out the intension of legislature, it is necessary to see Section 10, 11 of Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992 and Rule 4 of the said Act, which reads as follows:-
10. Claim for Compensation:- [(1)Any claim for compensation for damage or loss caused to the property shall be made by-
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(i) any person who has been affected by such damage or loss; or
(ii) such officer empowered by the authorities specified in sub-clauses (a) to (j) of clause (4) of section2.] (2) Every application for claim for compensation for damage or loss caused to the [property] shall be in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
11.Authority to decide compensation:- [(1) Every claim for compensation for damage or loss caused to the property shall be made to such authority as may be prescribed.] (2) In arriving at the quantum of compensation for damage or loss caused to the 1[property], the authority prescribed under sub-section (1) shall have regard to-
(a) the value of the property;
(b) the extent of damage to the [property]; and
(c) such other matters as may be prescribed. (3) The authority prescribed under sub-section(1) in deciding the claim for compensation shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed.
(4) The authority prescribed under sub section (I) shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) for the purpose of -
(a) taking evidence on oath;
(b) inforcing the attendance of witnesses;
(c) discovery and production of documents and material objects; and http://www.judis.nic.in 12
(d) for such other purposes as may be prescribed.
4. Authority to Decide compensation;- [(1) Every application under sub rule (1) of rule 3 shall be made in person or by his counsel to the commissioner for Revenue Administration or to such authority authorised by him [on his behalf] to receive such application.] (2) Every decision of the Commissioner of Revenue Administration as to the amount of compensation for damage or loss caused to a public property shall, be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law.
(3) The Commissioner of Revenue Administration in arriving at the quantum of compensation for damage or loss caused to a [property] shall, in addition to the matters specified in sub section (2) of section 11 of the Act, have regard to the following matters, namely;-
(i) Age of the building or other property either immovable or movable to which damage or loss is caused.
(ii) Location of the building or other property to which damage or loss is caused.
(iii) Type of construction of the building or the type of other property, either immovable or movable, to which damage or loss is caused.
15.So, culled out from the entire, the said provisions referred above in the said Act, there was a specific provision for claiming compensation and also the Officer who is competent to fix http://www.judis.nic.in 13 the damages, also available. It shows that the object of the legislature is nothing, but if the damage is caused either by the act of violence or criminal offence, the sufferer may file an application before the Commissioner of Revenue Administration praying to fix the compensation and pray for a direction to pay the same. After enactment of the said Act, the applicability of the said Act is extended to the properties owned by the private person also.
16.Even though, there is no specific bar for ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the provisions in the said Act excluded the jurisdiction vested with the civil Court. In the said circumstances, it is relevant and useful to see the judgment of our Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., Vs. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-
35. It is well settled that where a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner (vide Chandra Kishore Jha V. Mahavir Prasad (SCC para 17 : AIR para 12), Dhanajaya Reddy V. State of Karnataka (SCC para 23 : AIR para 22), etc.] Section 86(1)(f) provides a special manner of making references to an arbitrator in disputes http://www.judis.nic.in 14 between a licensee and a generating company. Hence by implication all other methods are barred.
17.Now applying the said principle with the case in our hand, in this case also, the statute provides in a particular manner, i.e., Sections 10, 11 of the Act and Rule 4 of the Act. Therefore, the TNPPDL Act specifically provides for performance of an Act including the claim of compensation in a particular manner and the same cannot be done as otherwise.
18.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants further relied the order of this Court in W.P.Nos.20765 to 20767 of 1998 in the case of P.Maragathamani Vs. General Manager (In- charge) and others and made a submission that since there was a statutory provision is available for claiming compensation, the jurisdiction of civil Court is impliedly excluded. In this regard, in the Judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, this Court has held as follows:-
(i) 1996 (2) SUPREME 165 (S.SWVIGARDOSS v. ZONAL MANAGER, FCI) : In this case, the petitioner's parents got converted into Christian religion. Petitioner married http://www.judis.nic.in 15 according to the Christian rites in a Church. He joined the service of Food Corporation of India in the Scheduled Caste quota. A notice was given to show cause as to how the petitioner would be entitled to benefits extended to Scheduled Castes. Against the said show cause notice, he filed a suit. The trial Court decreed the same. On appeal, it was reversed. The High Court confirmed the same. Hence, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Supreme Court would make the following observation :
"8.... In view of the admitted position that the petitioner was born of Christian parents and his parents also were converted to be Adi Dravida, a Scheduled Caste, for the purpose of Tirunelveli District in Tamil Nadu as notified by the President, petitioner cannot claim to be a Scheduled Caste. In the light of the constitutional scheme, civil court has no jurisdiction under Section 9 of CPC to entertain the suit. The suit, therefore, is not maintainable."
(ii) 1997 (5) SUPREME COURT CASES 120 (PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ANOTHER v. ASHWINI KUMAR) This case arises out of a suit filed by a consumer for permanent injunction restraining the Electricity Board from collecting and recovering the amount demanded. http://www.judis.nic.in 16 The Supreme Court, in this case, held that the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred by necessary implication. The relevant observation is as follows :
"8....The question then arises whether the civil court would be justified in entertaining the suit and issue injunction as prayed for ? .... Section 9 of the CPC provides that the civil court shall try all suits of civil nature, subject to pecuniary jurisdiction, unless their cognizance is expressly or by necessary implication barred. Such suit would not be maintainable. It is true that ordinarily, the civil court has jurisdiction to go into and try the disputed questions of civil nature, where the fundamental fairness of procedure has been violated. The statutory circulars adumbrated above do indicate that a fundamental fairness of the procedure has been prescribed in the rules and is being followed. By necessary implication, the cognizance of the civil cause has been excluded. As a consequence, the civil court shall not be justified in entertaining this suit and giving the declaration without directing the party to avail of the remedy provided under the Indian Electricity Act and the instructions issued by the Board....
9.....When the provision for appeal by way of review has been provided by the statutory instructions, and the parties are directed to avail of the remedy, the authorities are enjoined to consider all the objections raised by the consumer and to pass, after consideration, the reasoned http://www.judis.nic.in 17 order in that behalf, so that the aggrieved consumer, if not satisfied with the order passed by the Board/appellate authority, can avail of the remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, by necessary implication, the appropriate competent authority should hear the parties, consider their objections and pass the reasoned order, either accepting or negativing the claim....In our view, by necessary implication, the suit is not maintainable...."
(iii) 2003 (10) SUPREME COURT CASES 38 (NDMC v. SATISH CHAND): This case would relate to the question regarding the maintainability of a civil suit challenging the assessment and levy of property tax on a property, owned by the plaintiff. The Department took a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the suit based on Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act.
While dealing with Section 9 of CPC, the Supreme Court would make the following observation :
"5... The opening words of the section give a very wide jurisdiction to the civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature, however, this wide power is qualified by providing an exception i.e., excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be http://www.judis.nic.in 18 excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit.
It is well recognised that where a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded.
An express bar is where a statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred. An implied bar may arise when a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal."
(iv) In 1996 (7) SUPREME COURT CASES 218 (LAXMI CHAND v. GRAM PANCHAYAT), while dealing with the Land Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court would make the following observation :
"The scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary http://www.judis.nic.in 19 power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self- imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court."
(v) In AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 2076 (S.P.SUBRAMANYA SHETTY v. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPN.), while dealing with the acquisition proceedings and the maintainability question under Section 9 CPC, the Supreme Court would hold as follows :
"Civil Suit relating to acquisition proceedings is not maintainable and by implication, cognizance under Section 9 CPC is barred. The Court cannot issue mandatory injunction against the State to denotify the acquisition under Section
48. Therefore, the question of granting an injunction against the authority from proceeding in accordance with law does not rise. It is for the Government to consider the same on merits and keeping in mind subservience of public interest."
(vi) In 2002 (2) SUPREME COURT CASES 542
(CHANDRAKANT TUKARAM NIKAM v. MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION OF AHMEDABAD), while dealing with the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court would observe as follows:
"The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and the http://www.judis.nic.in 20 employers, the underlying idea being to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts which the workmen can ill-afford. It cannot be disputed that the procedures followed by civil courts are too lengthy and consequently are not an efficacious forum for resolving the industrial disputes speedily. The power of the Industrial Courts also is wide and such forums are empowered to grant adequate relief as they think just and appropriate.... Therefore, we conclude that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been impliedly barred and the appropriate forum for resolution of such dispute is the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act."
In RAJA RAM KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA, reported in AIR 1988 SC 752, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the bar on the civil court's jurisdiction, would make the following observation:
"Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations for determining whether civil court jurisdiction is excluded are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If however a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statute and http://www.judis.nic.in 21 a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence."
31.The guidelines given in the decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, to find out whether a suit is impliedly barred under Section 9 CPC or not, in short, are as follows:-
(1) When the provision for appeal by way of review has been provided by the statutory instructions, the parties are directed to avail of the remedy before the competent authority, namely, the appellate authority, and if the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the order passed by the appellate authority, it can avail of the remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This would mean, by necessary implication, the suit is barred.
(2) When a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal, an implied bar arises, and when the statutory instruction provided for a person aggrieved a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and the mode of seeking remedy from other forums, namely, Civil Court is impliedly excluded.
(3) It cannot be disputed that the procedure followed by Civil Court is too lengthy and, consequently, is http://www.judis.nic.in 22 not an efficacious forum for resolving the industrial disputes speedily. Therefore, the jurisdiction of Civil Court must be held to have been impliedly barred.
(4) The broad guiding considerations for determining whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute or the statutory instructions giving a special procedure and special remedy for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality, is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred.
19.So the judgment now relied by the appellants is fully in support to the case of the appellants. Therefore, the first point raised by the appellants that the Civil Court is not having any jurisdiction is substantiated with the precedent. Thereby, I am of the considered opinion that in respect to the offence committed under the provision of TNPPDL Act, the filing of the suit for damages before the Civil Court is impliedly barred and under such circumstances, the suit filed by the plaintiff before the trial Court is not maintainable one.
http://www.judis.nic.in 23 Point No.2:-
20.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants made a submission that after completing the occurrence, the case has been registered against the defendants along with four accused. Further in the above said case, the offence under Section 120 (b) of IPC has also been added. But at the time of filing the suit, the plaintiff filed a suit only against these appellants by name, Karmegam, Nagamani, Muthupillai and left out the other accused. So the suit filed by the plaintiff barred by mis-joinder of necessary parties. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff made a submission that without any pleadings in respect to the mis-joinder of parties, in earlier stage of proceedings arguing as above before the appellate Court is not at all appreciable.
21.It is true that, before the trial Court in the earlier stage the defendants has not taken a plea that the suit is barred under mis-joinder of necessary parties. Now, on go through the Order 1 Rule 13 CPC, which reads as follows:-
“All the objections on the ground of non joinder or mis joinder of party shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity during and, in all cases where issues are settled, http://www.judis.nic.in 24 at or before such settlement. Unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived.
22.So the said provision is very clear in respect to the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that he has to raise the said plea at the time of filing written statement itself. Accordingly, due to the non-inclusion of other accused as a party to the suit is no way affected the case of the plaintiff.
Point No.3:-
23.The contention raised by the appellants is that since the criminal case is pending, filing of the suit for damages does not arise. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that since the limitation for filing the suit for damages is not prescribed specifically, under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, a suit has been filed within a period of three years, so the plaintiff cannot wait till the disposal of the criminal case. Further the cause of action for the suit will arose at the time of occurrence itself. Accordingly, the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants has not diluted the case of respondent/plaintiff.
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24.Now on go through the submission made on either side, it is true, no limitation is prescribed for filing the suit for damages. Hence, as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is calculated as three years for filing the suit for damages. More than that, it is a well settled principle that the date of occurrence itself the part of the cause of action was arosed. In this regard it is relevant to see the judgment of this Court in the case of Ranganathan Vs. Narayanan reported in 2015 (3) CTC 1, wherein this Court has held as follows:-
11.The next question is as to whether the period of limitation will commence from the date of judgment of the criminal court or from the date of the occurrence.
Indisputably, the limitation in respect of the suits relating to tort is dealt with in Part VII Schedule II of the Limitation Act in Article 72 to 91. But the present suit does not fall under any one of these Articles. It squarely falls within Article 113. As per Article 113, the period of limitation is 3 years i.e. from the date when the right to sue accrues. Here in this case, admittedly, the right to sue accrues, on the date, when the injuries were caused to the appellant on 06.10.1997. Therefore, the suit should have been filed on or before 05.10.2000.
http://www.judis.nic.in 26 Further in the said judgment, this Court has observed as follows:-
A Criminal case cannot be equated to a Civil proceeding for the purpose of Section 14 of the Act. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that Section 14 of the Act is not applicable to the present case and therefore, any amount of time spent before the Criminal Court shall not be excluded while computing the period of limitation for the purpose of the present case. Accordingly, the third substantial question of law is also answered in favour of the defendant.
25.So applying the said principle with the case in our hand, we would necessarily hold that any amount of time spent before the criminal Court, shall not be excluded, while computing the period of limitation. So filing the suit by the plaintiff before disposal of the criminal case, is no way affected the case of plaintiff. Accordingly, the point No.3 is answered as above.
26.In the said circumstances, even though the point Nos.2 and 3 are answered in favour of the plaintiff, in view of the answer arrived to the point No.1, I am of the considered opinion that the civil Court alternatively excluded jurisdiction in trying this type of cases, i.e., claiming compensation in respect to the property http://www.judis.nic.in 27 damaged during the time of committing criminal offences punishable under the provisions of TNPPDL Act.
27.In the result, this Appeal suit is allowed and the Judgment and Decree dated 03.04.2018 passed in O.S.No.186 of 2016 by the learned First Additional District Judge, Madurai is set aside and O.S.No.186 of 2016 is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
29.03.2019 Index : Yes/No Internet: Yes/No cp To:
1.The First Additional District Judge, Madurai
2.The Section Officer, Vernacular Records, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
http://www.judis.nic.in 28 R.PONGIAPPAN, J.
cp Judgment Made in A.S.(MD)No.143 of 2018 and C.M.P(MD) No.7708 of 2018 29.03.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in