Delhi District Court
M/S. Mars Industries & Anr. vs . State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr. on 14 July, 2022
M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIJAY SHANKAR,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE - 05, (CENTRAL DISTRICT)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CR NO.: 21/2022
UNIQUE CASE ID NO.: DLCT010072342022
IN THE MATTER OF :
1. M/s Mars Industries
(Through its Proprietor Sh. Vishal Sharma),
2. Vishal Sharma
S/o Late Sh. Ramesh Chand Sharma,
Proprietor of M/s Mars Industries
R/o 1/445, Naurangabad,
G. T. Road, Aligarh, U.P. .... Revisionists
VERSUS
1. State (NCT of Delhi)
2. Smt. Shama Rani,
W/o Sh. Praveen Kumar
R/o B1601, Shastri Nagar,
Delhi110052. .... Respondents
CR No. 21/2022 Page No.1/27
M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Date of institution of the revision petition : 30/04/2022
Date on which judgment was reserved : 02/07/2022
Date of judgment : 14/07/2022
JUDGMENT
1. By way of present judgment, this Court shall conscientiously adjudicate upon criminal revision petition under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") filed by the revisionists against the order dated 23/04/2022 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order') passed by Ms. Kratika Chaturvedi, Ld. MM, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Criminal Complaint No.516212/2016 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as "N.I. Act") titled as "Shama Rani Vs. M/s Mars Industry & Anr." thereby application of the revisionists for sending the cheques in question to the FSL was dismissed.
In the present revision petition, the revisionists have prayed to set aside the impugned order dated 23/04/2022 passed by the Ld. CR No. 21/2022 Page No.2/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Trial Court and to allow the application of the revisionists for sending the cheques in question to the FSL.
2. Brief facts necessary for just adjudication of the present revision petition as stated in the present revision petition are that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate material available on the judicial record. Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider the mandate of the legislature in letter and spirit. Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider that the accused has put cogent evidence in the judicial record to make out his case against the complainant. The impugned order is not tenable as same is bad in the eyes of law.
3. The revisionists have challenged the impugned order on the grounds, as mentioned in the present revision petition. Grounds of revision The application of the revisionists/accused for sending the cheques in question to the FSL was declined by the Ld. Trial Court. The complainant has altered the dates in the cheques, as in the cheques year was filled as 2011 but the complainant has altered the same as 2012 just to make out her case. The said alteration of the year is quite evident in cheques. The ink was also changed while CR No. 21/2022 Page No.3/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. alteration was made by the complainant in the cheques. The said alteration was not consented by the accused to the complainant.
4. This Court already heard the arguments on the maintainability of the present revision petition advanced by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists. Perused the material available on record.
During the course of arguments, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order and the present revision petition against the impugned order is maintainable and impugned order is liable to be set aside on the grounds, as mentioned in the present revision petition.
The counsel for the revisionists in support of his contentions has relied upon number of case laws on the maintainability and merits of the present revision petition. The counsel for the revisionists in support of his contentions has relied upon the following case laws:
(a) Kalyanaraman Vs. K.S. Jankiraman, (Crl. O.P. (MD) 4270/2009 of Hon'ble Madurai Bench of Madras High Court)
(b) Veera Exports Vs. T. Kalavathy, ( AIR 2005 SC 38 ) CR No. 21/2022 Page No.4/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(c) M/s Kumar Exports Vs. M/s Sharma Carpets, (AIR 2009 SC 1518)
(d) Loonkaran Sethia Vs. Ivan E. John, (AIR 1977 SC 336)
(e) Ramachandran Vs. Dinesan, (2005 Cr.L.J 1237)
(f) Basanagouda Channappa Vs. Karnataka Mining Industries, (Crl. Appeal No.345/2007 decided by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court)
5. By way of present revision petition, the revisionists have challenged the impugned order dated 23/04/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court. The impugned order is reproduced as under: "23.04.2022 Present: Complainant with Ld. counsel Mr. Rohit Sharma.
Mr. Mobeen, Ld. proxy counsel for accused.
Matter is fixed for DE.
An application for exemption has been moved on behalf of the accused on the ground that accused has gone Vaishno Devi.
Perusal of record shows that vide order dated 28.09.2021, last opportunity was given to the accused for filing application under Section 315 Cr.P.C. However, the same has not been filed till date.
Ld. proxy counsel for accused submits that as per instructions from the main counsel, accused does not wish to lead DE. In view of the same, DE stands closed. CR No. 21/2022 Page No.5/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
At this stage, an application for sending the cheques in question to the FSL has been moved on behalf of accused. Copy supplied.
It is stated by the counsel for accused that there is alteration on the date of the cheque and it is very much evident on the cheques in question.
Submission heard on the aforesaid application. Record perused.
A bare perusal of cheques shows that there is no alteration on the date of the cheques. Further, a reliance be placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar 2019(4) SCC 197, wherein it has been held that a material reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, sections 20, 87, and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of his legal liability. It further laid down that it is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer.
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the cheque was signed by the accused. In view of the same, the application moved on behalf of the accused for sending the cheques to FSL stands dismissed.
List the matter on 12.05.2022 for final arguments.
(Kratika Chaturvedi) MM, NI Act04, Central District, THC 23.04.2022"
6. For the sake of ready reference, section 397 Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under: CR No. 21/2022 Page No.6/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Section 397: Calling for records to exercise powers of revision: (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
7. A plain reading of Section 397 Cr.P.C. makes it manifest that Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. enables the aggrieved parties to question CR No. 21/2022 Page No.7/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by the inferior court before the revisional court i.e. the High Court or the Sessions Judge as concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court and the Sessions Judge by the Section. Now, it is significant to note that Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. mandates that the power of revision conferred by subsection (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, express bar is created by the legislation under section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. to entertain revision against an interlocutory order.
The term "interlocutory order" as mentioned in section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. An order which is pure and simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against that interlocutory order is maintainable under section 397(1) Cr.P.C. in view of the express bar imposed under section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
There are three categories of orders that a Court can pass CR No. 21/2022 Page No.8/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order. An intermediate order is one which is interlocutory order in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.
8. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " Amar Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.", {(1977) 4 SCC 137} that: "The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in subsection (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of wellknown legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the CR No. 21/2022 Page No.9/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to CR No. 21/2022 Page No.10/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I", (AIR 1980 SC 962] that: (1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained, in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter; (5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against CR No. 21/2022 Page No.11/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.
It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Poonam Chand Jain and Anr. Vs. Fazru", {(2004) 13 SCC 269} that: "Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
"An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties."
Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all."
CR No. 21/2022 Page No.12/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. The principles/guidelines regarding the scope of criminal revision petition have also been laiddown by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation", {(2017) 14 SCC 809} and it was held that, "15. While the text of subsection (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by subsection (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition on a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction - that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of CR No. 21/2022 Page No.13/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Maharashtra by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceeding would continue.
22. The view expressed in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye was followed in K.K. Patel V. State of Gujarat wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process. It was said: (K.K.Patel case, SCC p.201, para11) "11. ..... It is now wellnigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged CR No. 21/2022 Page No.14/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra, V.C. Shukla v. State and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v.
Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition - such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an CR No. 21/2022 Page No.15/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of para 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising the extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 Cr.P.C."
It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as " Neelam Mahajan and Anr. Vs. The State & Ors.", {(2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29} that: "........ In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue CR No. 21/2022 Page No.16/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order."
9. By way of present revision petition, the revisionists have challenged the impugned order dated 23/04/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court thereby application of the revisionists/ accused for sending the cheques in question to the FSL was dismissed.
Now this Court has to see as to whether the impugned order is interlocutory, intermediate or final order.
During the course of arguments, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order and the present revision petition against the impugned order is maintainable. Counsel for the revisionists in support of his contentions in this regard has relied upon case law titled as Kalyanaraman Vs. K.S. Jankiraman, (Crl. O.P. (MD) 4270/2009 of Hon'ble Madras High Court).
On the other hand, it was held by Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in case titled as "Goli Satyanarayana Reddy Vs. CR No. 21/2022 Page No.17/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. G. Mahesh & Anr.", { Crl. Revision Case Nos.175, 2235, 2584 and 2880 of 2018 and 194, 621, 622 and 975 of 2019} that order passed under section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act seeking expert opinion is an interlocutory order. Similar proposition of law was also laid down in cases titled as "Sakamuri Avinash Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh", (Crl. RC No.2795/2018 decided by Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court) and "S.S. Ahmad & Anr. Vs. Asha Sharma", (Cr.R.No.1345/2019 decided by Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court).
It was also held by Hon'ble Madras High Court in case titled as "P. Pattabiraman Vs. S. R. Eswar", {Crl. O.P. (MD) 17441/2017 and 11447/2017} that criminal revision is not maintainable as against the order passed under section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act.
As per case law titled as Kalyanaraman (Supra) relied upon by counsel for the revisionists, the order on the application Section 45 of the Evidence Act is not an interlocutory order. On the other hand, as per case laws titled as Goli Satyanarayana Reddy, Sakamuri Avinash and S.S. Ahmad, order passed under section 45 of the Indian CR No. 21/2022 Page No.18/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Evidence Act seeking expert opinion is an interlocutory order.
In view of the aforesaid judgment relied upon by counsel for the revisionists and judgments as referred by this Court,now this Court has to see as to whether order passed under section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act seeking expert opinion is an interlocutory order or not.
It is not disputed that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court during the pendency of the case and proceedings of the case before the Ld. Trial Court is still subsists and continues. In view of the same, it is clear that the impugned order does not decide anything finally relating to the complaint case pending before the Ld. Trial Court. The impugned order will not have the effect of terminating the proceedings of the case pending before the Ld. Trial Court.
From the law laid down in cases titled as Amar Nath, V.C. Shukla, Poonam Chand Jain, Girish Kumar Suneja and Neelam Mahajan (Supra), it is clear that interlocutory order is an order which is of a purely interim or temporary in nature and do not decide anything finally and only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. From the aforesaid case laws, it is clear that CR No. 21/2022 Page No.19/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. the impugned order is also an interlocutory order as the same is purely interim or temporary in nature and do not decide anything finally and if the impugned order is set aside, then there would be no culmination of the proceedings.
10. Even otherwise, the present revision petition of the revisionists is not maintainable on the merits of the case.
By way of present revision petition, the revisionists have challenged the impugned order dated 23/04/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, thereby application of the revisionists/ accused for sending the cheques in question to FSL was dismissed.
Contents of aforesaid application of the revisionists/accused for sending the cheques in question to FSL, which was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned order, are perused. It is mentioned in the aforesaid application that the complainant had altered the dates as mentioned on the face of cheques and the said alteration of the dates on the cheques is very much evident.
Before the Ld. Trial Court, the accused had filed an application u/s. 145(2) of N.I. Act wherein it is mentioned that the CR No. 21/2022 Page No.20/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. blank cheques were given to the complainant against the security for the rent charges and complainant filled all the contents of the cheques.
Statement of the accused u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. (1) (b) read with section 281 Cr.P.C. recorded by the Ld. Trial Court is also perused. The accused in his statement u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. (1) (b) read with section 281 Cr.P.C. had stated that cheques Ex.CW1/2 and Ex.CW1/3 were signed by him but rest of the portion were filled wrongly by the complainant and cheques in question were blank signed cheques and were given by him to husband of the complainant as security cheques towards rent.
11. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to discuss about the relevant provisions of N.I. Act.
Section 6 of the N.I. Act has prescribed the definition of cheque and cheque is Negotiable Instrument within the meaning of section 13 of the Act. Section 30 of the N.I. Act talks about the liability of the drawer.
Section 20 of the N.I. Act talks about inchoate instruments. Section 87 talks about effect of material alteration of a Negotiable CR No. 21/2022 Page No.21/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Instrument.
Section 118 of the N.I. Act talks about presumptions as to consideration, date, time of acceptance, time of transfer, order of endorsement, stamps and holder in due course.
Section 139 of the N.I. Act deals with presumption of law in favour of the holder of the cheque. It provides that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability. It is a rebuttable presumption of law and the burden of proving that a cheque has not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused.
The presumptions u/s. 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act are rebuttable and burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption which can be discharged by the accused by preponderance of probabilities. It is well settled law that presumptions u/s. 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act have to be rebutted by cogent evidence and mere plausible explanation is not enough.
It is the contention of the revisionists that cheques in question were blank signed cheques and the complainant has altered CR No. 21/2022 Page No.22/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. the dates in the cheques.
Section 20 of the N.I. Act talks about inchoate stamped instruments. Section 20 of the N.I. Act provides that where a person delivers a signed but a wholly blank or written incomplete negotiable instrument, he is deemed to have given primafacie authority to the holder to fillup the particulars in it or complete it and this makes him liable for the amount mentioned therein, in the capacity in which he signed the same, to any holder in due course of such amount. Thus, blank or incomplete written but signed cheque and filledup by any other person is a valid negotiable instrument and prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be initiated on the basis of such a cheque.
12. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar", {II (2019) SLT 129} that: "A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Section 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the CR No. 21/2022 Page No.23/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted."
It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in cases titled as "Jaipal Singh Rana Vs. Swaraj Pal Singh & Anr.", {149 (2008) DLT 682} and "Ravi Chopra Vs. State & Anr.", {CRL. M.C. 5211, 5217 and 5291 of 2006 and CRL. M.A. No. 8864/2006} that in a case involving the offence u/s. 138 N.I. Act, the Magistrate would be justified in declining to refer the cheques for opinion of the handwriting expert where the signatures of the drawer on the cheque were not disputed by the drawer.
It is the contention of the revisionists that the cheques in question were blank signed cheques. The revisionists/ accused have not disputed the signatures of the accused on the aforesaid cheques. In view of the law laid down in cases titled as Bir Singh, Jaipal Singh Rana and Ravi Chopra (Supra), the present revision petition of the revisionists is not maintainable as revisionists/accused have not disputed the signatures on the aforesaid cheques.
Even otherwise, in the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court CR No. 21/2022 Page No.24/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. has made the observation that "a bare perusal of cheques shows that there is no alteration on the date of the cheques". Since, the Ld. Trial Court has already made aforesaid observation/opinion on the alteration of the dates on the cheques, there is no reason to send the same to the FSL for expert opinion as it is well settled law that the Court can also give its opinion on any document.
On the one hand, it is the contention of the revisionists/ accused that he has given the blank signed cheques, on the other hand, it is the contention of the revisionists/ accused that the dates on the cheques were altered. The contentions of the revisionists/ accused in this regard are contradictory.
13. It is well settled law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited and same cannot be exercised in a routine manner. It is also well settled law that question/ issue of maintainability of the criminal revision can be examined by the Court at any stage.
In view of the law laid down in Amar Nath, V.C. Shukla, Poonam Chand Jain, Girish Kumar Suneja, Neelam Mahajan, Goli Satyanarayana Reddy, Sakamuri Avinash, S.S. Ahmad, CR No. 21/2022 Page No.25/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. P. Pattabiraman, Bir Singh, Jaipal Singh Rana and Ravi Chopra cases (Supra), it is clear that the present revision petition of the revisionists/accused against the impugned order is not maintainable.
On perusal of impugned order, it is clear that same is neither final nor intermediate but the same is purely an interlocutory order. The impugned order cannot said to be a final or intermediate order in any manner. If the impugned order is set aside, then there would be no culmination of the proceedings.
There is no dispute regarding the propositions laid down in the case laws relied upon by counsel for the revisionists, however, the same are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
14. Applying priori and posteriori reasonings and law laid down in Amar Nath, V.C. Shukla, Poonam Chand Jain, Girish Kumar Suneja, Neelam Mahajan, Goli Satyanarayana Reddy, Sakamuri Avinash, S.S. Ahmad, P. Pattabiraman, Bir Singh, Jaipal Singh Rana and Ravi Chopra cases (Supra), this Court is held that the present revision petition of the revisionists is not maintainable on the grounds as discussed CR No. 21/2022 Page No.26/27 M/s. Mars Industries & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. above. Accordingly, the present revision petition of the revisionists is dismissed, being not maintainable. No order as to costs. Nothing stated herein shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Trial Court Record be sent back alongwith the copy of this judgment. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
Announced in the open Court 2022.07.14
19:16:27
on 14/07/2022 +0530
(VIJAY SHANKAR)
ASJ05 (Central)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 21/2022 Page No.27/27