Delhi District Court
Naresh Kumar vs Mamta Harjai on 5 December, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHILPI M JAIN : DISTRICT JUDGE-05,
SOUTH WEST DISTRICT, DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ/105/2025
DLSW010090342025
IN THE MATTER OF:
1. Naresh Kumar
S/o Late Munshi Ram,
2. Smt. Poonam
W/o Naresh Kumar,
3. Ms. Kanika Harjai
D/o Naresh Kumar,
4. Sh. Hitesh Harjai
S/o Naresh Kumar,
5. Sh. Divyanshu Harjai
S/o Naresh Kumar
All residents of:-
Flat No. S 2/135, Old No. WZ-137-C/1,
Ground Floor and First Floor, Old Mahavir Nagar,
Khasra No. 19, Revenue Estate of Village Nagli Jalib,
New Delhi-110018,
Presently Residing at:
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 1 OF 29
R/o A-28, 3rd Floor, Shankar Garden,
New Delhi-110018 .............APPELLANTS
Versus
1. Smt. Mamta Harjai
W/o Sh. Suresh Kumar Harjai,
R/o B-12, Ganesh Nagar,
New Delhi-110018 ...............RESPONDENTS
Date of Institution : 19.09.2025
Arguments concluded on : 03.12.2025
Date of decision : 05.12.2025
INDEX
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................4
ISSUES BEFORE TRIAL COURT ..................6
TRIAL COURT ORDER ......................7
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES ................12
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .................18
- Title & Effect of Registered Documents .................18
- Nature of Possession of Appellants .................22
- Maintainability of Suit for Mandatory
Injunction by Owner/Licensor .................27
- Requirement of Notice u/s. 106 TP Act .................28
- Benami & Family Courts Act .................28
- Rent Agreement & Quantum of Damages .................29
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 2 OF 29
CONCLUSION ..................29
1. Being aggrieved vide order dated 25.08.2025 passed by Ld. ASCJ- cum-JSCC-cum-Guardian Judge, South West District in CS SCJ No. 533/2021 whereby the Suit for permanent and mandatory injunction and damages for unauthorized use and occupation as filed on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent was decreed, present appeal preferred (hereinafter referred as 'impugned order'). In said suit, Plaintiff/Respondent sought following reliefs:
a) Pass a decree of mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants thereby directing the defendant and their legal heirs, family members, friends, agents, assignees etc. to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the flat bearing No. 8 2/135, old No. WZ-137-C/1, Ground Floor, built on plot No. 16, area measuring 100 Sq. Yds., out of Khasra No. 19, Khewat No. 12, Khatoni No. 30, situated in the revenue estate of Village Nagli Jalib. Colony known as Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018. i.e. the suit property more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan.
b) Pass a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants No.1 and 2, thereby restraining the above defendants, their legal heirs, family members, friends, agents, assignees etc., from parting with possession or any manner creating third party interest in suit property/flat bearing No. S2/135, old No. WZ-137-C/1, Ground Floor, built on plot No. 16, area measuring 100 Sq. Yds., out of Khasra No. 19, Khewat No. 12, Khatoni No. 30, situated in the revenue estate of Village Nagli Jalib, Colony known as Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018. as shown in red colour in site plan attached.
c) Pass a decree of damages/mesne profits towards unauthorized use and occupation charges and pendent-lite damages @ Rs. 25,000/- per month in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants with effect from the date of filing of this suit till handing over actual vacant and physical possession of the suit property in question to the Plaintiff alongwith with interest @ Rs.18% per annum thereon till its realization.
d) Costs of the present suit may also be awarded in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 3 OF 29
e) The expenses of the litigation charges i.e. lawyer fee etc., may also be awarded in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
f) Such other and/or further relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Facts which are imperative to be considered are succinctly recapitulated as follows: It is the case of the Plaintiff/Respondent that she is the sole and absolute owner of property/flat bearing No. S-2/135, old No. WZ-137- C/1, Ground Floor, built on Plot No. 16, area measuring 100 Sq. Yds., out of Khasra No. 19, Khewat No. 12, Khatoni No. 30, situated in the revenue estate of Village Nagli Jalib, Colony known as Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018. It is further stated that the Plaintiff/Respondent had purchased the aforesaid flat in October 2011, jointly with her sister-in-law Smt. Anjana Bedi, vide registered sale deed dated 08.11.2011, and subsequently became the sole owner of the said property through a registered release deed dated 19.06.2012 executed by the co-owner. It is further stated that, in the year 2013, Appellant/Defendant No.1, who is the brother- in-law (Jeth) of the plaintiff, and Appellant/Defendant No.2, who is the wife of Appellant/Defendant No.1 and sister-in-law (Jethani) of the plaintiff, requested the Plaintiff/Respondent and her husband for use of the said flat for study purposes of their children as their own residence on the first floor lacked a suitable environment.
3. It is further submitted that, out of goodwill, the Plaintiff/Respondent allowed Appellant/defendants No.1 and 2 to use and occupy the said flat as licensees on a permissive basis, the Appellant/defendants being responsible only for electricity and water charges. It is further averred that, in March 2021, the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 4 OF 29 Appellants/defendants shifted to another premises situated at A-28, Third Floor, Shankar Garden, New Delhi-110018, and the suit property has remained locked since then. It is further stated that when the Plaintiff/Respondent and her husband requested the Appellants/defendants to hand over peaceful vacant possession of the property, Appellants/defendants No.1 and 2 unlawfully demanded a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- in lieu of handing over possession and threatened to let out the premises to unsocial elements if their demand was not met. It is further submitted that, on 14.03.2021, the Plaintiff/Respondent orally revoked and cancelled the license of the defendants and demanded the possession of the suit property, which the defendants refused to vacate and continued to threaten the Plaintiff/Respondent and her husband with false implication in criminal cases. It is further stated that, post revocation, the Appellants/defendants have no right, title, or interest in the suit property and are in illegal and unauthorized possession thereof. It is further submitted that the Plaintiff/Respondent claims damages of Rs.25,000/- per month towards unauthorized occupation of the suit property with effect from the date of institution of the suit till delivery of peaceful vacant possession. It is further stated that the Plaintiff/Respondent apprehends Appellants/defendants may create third- party interest to harass or blackmail her. It is further submitted that the cause of action first arose on 14.03.2021 upon revocation of the license and continues to subsist. The present suit for permanent and mandatory injunction has, therefore, been filed before the competent court having territorial jurisdiction over the suit property situated in Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi.
4. As per the trial court record, defendants/appellants filed WS. In WS, the contention of defendants/appellants are three fold. Firstly, the suit filed by the Plaintiff/Respondent is not maintainable as she has not approached the court with RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 5 OF 29 clean hands by concealing material facts, lacks cause of action, is barred by improper jurisdiction (territorial and pecuniary), insufficient court fee, absence of possession relief despite admitting defendants' possession, incorrect site plan, non- compliance with CPC rules including affidavit, and absence of locus standi, rendering it liable for dismissal under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Secondly, the Plaintiff/Respondent lacks ownership or title to the suit property as she paid no consideration to seller Anjana Bedi (Appellant/Defendant no.1's sister); Appellant/Defendant no.1 paid the full amount in cash, with Anjana Bedi acknowledging receipt, and documents were executed in plaintiff's name only due to unavoidable circumstances with an understanding for later transfer to Appellant/Defendant no.1, making any alleged transfer invalid without consideration. Thirdly, Appellants/defendants have been in continuous possession since 16.05.2012 as rightful owners post-payment, rendering the suit for injunction and damages frivolous, falsely alleging licensee status without proof like written notice, aimed at extortion amid unrelated family loan disputes, with all plaint allegations being concocted, vague, and liable for dismissal with costs.
ISSUES BEFORE LD. TRIAL COURT
5. Vide order dt. 27.03.2023, following issues were framed by Ld. Trial Court:
i. Whether the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands? OPD. ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of mandatory injunction as prayed for? OPP.
iii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of permanent injunction as prayed for? OPP.
iv. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages as prayed for? OPP.
v. Relief. RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 6 OF 29 LD. TRIAL COURT ORDER
6. Upon appreciating the material on record, Ld. Trial Court decreed the suit instituted by plaintiff/respondent in following terms:
a) Vacation of Property: Defendants are directed to vacate the suit property i.e. Flat No. 2/135 (Old No. WZ-137-C/1), Ground Floor, on plot no. 16 (area measuring 100 sq. yds., from Khasra No. 19, Khewat No. 12, Khatoni No.
30), situated in Revenue Estate of village Nagli Jalib, colony known as Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018, within 30 days, and defendants are further restrained from parting with possession or creating any kind of third- party interests in suit property.
b) Damages: Plaintiff is also entitled for the damages in sum of Rs.10,000/- per month from the suit filing date until defendants hand over possession.
c) Costs: Full suit costs awarded to plaintiff.
d) A copy of the judgment is also ordered to be forwarded to the Worthy Chief Commissioner of Income Tax regarding the alleged payment of Rs.
7,50,000/- in cash which was made by plaintiff and defendant no. 1 to Ms. Anjana Bedi as a consideration for execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012.
7. Broad finding of Ld. Trial Court can be reproduced as below:
'The root cause of dispute between the parties is that plaintiff is alleging that on execution of release deed dt. 16.05.2012, the plaintiff has become absolute owner of suit property and allowed the defendants to use the suit property as licensee in the year 2013 as per request of defendants.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 7 OF 29 The case of plaintiff is that plaintiff has already terminated the license of defendants on 14.03.2021 and instructed the defendants to vacate the suit property, which they have failed to vacate till date. Per contra, the case of defendant is that though registered release deed was executed by Ms. Anjana Bedi in favour of plaintiff, however, it was defendant no. 1, who had paid the consideration of Rs. 7,50,000/- to Ms. Anjana Bedi for execution of the said release deed dt. 16.05.2012, with the understanding that plaintiff being sister in law of defendant no. 1, shall transfer the suit property in the name of defendant no. 1. Defendant no. 1 has asserted that defendant no. 1 is in possession of suit property since 16.05.2012 in view of the aforesaid payment and settlement. It is asserted that defendant no. 1 has never been licensee of plaintiff.
In the case at hand, the plaintiff is alleging his rights on the suit property on the basis of registered sale deed dt. 08.11.2011 and release deed dt. 16.05.2012 both exhibited as part of Ex.PW1/1 (colly). As per registered release deed dt. 16.05.2012 Ms. Anjana Bedi has released her one half undivided share in the suit property for a sum of Rs. 7,50,000/- in favour of plaintiff and has also received the said sum of money from plaintiff in cash before signing the release deed, which is part of Ex.PW1/1 (colly). The said relinquishment deed on the face of it makes the plaintiff absolute owner of the suit property. The defendant though has not disputed the relinquishment deed dt. 16.05.2012, however, has proved the receipt Ex.DW1/1 and asserted that the consideration for execution of release deed was paid by defendant no. 1 and there was understanding between defendant no. 1, plaintiff and Anjana Bedi that plaintiff shall transfer the suit property in the name of defendant no. 1 after execution of release deed dt. 16.05.2012.
The court has to consider now whether the receipt Ex.DW1/1 as well as the alleged oral understanding between defendant no. 1, plaintiff and Ms. Anjana Bedi, will make the defendant no. 1 owner of the suit property and will disentitle the plaintiff from seeking the relief in the present suit. In this regard, it is worth considering section 94 and 95 of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023.
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 8 OF 29 The bare perusal and consideration of these sections make it clear that if terms of a contract or agreement have been reduced in the form of a document, except bare exceptions mentioned above permit, no proof of that agreement or contract shall be accepted as proof of the said contract or agreement except the document itself or its secondary evidence, where permissible as per rules of evidence. Further, where, a contract or agreement has been proved in accordance with section 94 of BSA has enumerated above, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as evidence between the parties to such instrument or their representatives, for contradicting, varying, adding to or substracting from its terms except as provided in 7 provisos to section 95 of BSA. In the case at hand, the registered release deed dated 16.05.2012 which has been proved by plaintiff as part of Ex.PW1/1 (colly), contains the agreement between plaintiff and Anjana Bedi, with regard to the release/relinquishment of her share by Ms. Anjana Bedi in favour of plaintiff in the suit property. Anjana Bedi or her representative in interest i.e. defendant no. 1 is precluded from proving any oral contradiction or variation or addition or any agreement, which deviates from the terms of release deed dated 16.05.2012, by section 95 of BSA. As a result of which, the defence evidence led to assert that there was a understanding between plaintiff, defendant no. 1 and Ms. Anjana Bedi that on payment of the consideration amount by defendant no. 1, for which a receipt Ex.DW1/1 was issued by Ms. Anjana Bedi in favour of defendant no. 1, the plaintiff shall transfer the suit property in favour of defendant no. 1 has not been proved being inadmissible. Though, Ex.DW1/1 prove by defendant is in writting, however, it only mentions that Ms. Anjana Bedi has received a consideration amount of Rs. 7,50,000/- in cash from defendant no. 1. The said receipt Ex.DW1/1, neither mentions the alleged said understanding between plaintiff, defendant no. 1 and Ms. Anjana Bedi nor plaintiff is executant, witness or consenting party to the said receipt Ex.DW1/1. Accordingly, the receipt Ex.DW1/1 cannot be considered to be proof of the alleged said understanding between plaintiff, defendant no. 1 and Ms. Anjana Bedi to the effect that the alleged consideration amount of Rs.7,50,000/- has been paid by D-1 to Ms. Anjana Bedi for execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012 and plaintiff will transfer the suit property to the defendant no. 1 after execution/registration of the said release deed. As far as the authenticity of receipt Ex.DW1/1 is concerned, it is noted RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 9 OF 29 that receipt Ex.DW1/1 is prepared on a plain piece of paper and has neither been registered nor notarized. Except the date mentioned in Ex.DW1/1, there is no documentary proof to show that receipt Ex.DW1/1 was executed on 15.05.2012 itself i.e. before execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012. As the receipt Ex.DW1/1 mentions the receiving of the alleged consideration amount in cash(and not through any banking channel), there is also no proof to verify the date of payment and receiving the said consideration amount. On the other hand, the release deed dated 16.05.2012, is a registered document specifying that Ms. Anjana Bedi i.e. releasor has receive the consideration amount of Rs. 7,50,000/- from releasee i.e. plaintiff in cash. In fact, the said release deed dated 16.05.2012 has been witnessed by defendant no. 1 as well as the husband of plaintiff, from which, an inference can be drawn that defendant no. 1 was aware about the development of event at the time of execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012. If the receipt Ex.DW1/1 would have been true and genuine, the defendant no. 1 would have made the plaintiff either witness or consenting party to Ex.DW1/1 and there would have been a clear enumeration of the condition that plaintiff shall transfer the suit property in favour of defendant no. 1 within specific period of time. In the absence of plaintiff been the witness or consenting party to Ex.DW1/1 and in the absence of enumeration of any specific condition in Ex.DW1/1 about transfer of suit property by plaintiff to defendant no. 1, it is found that Ex.DW1/1 was not created on the date mentioned in Ex.DW1/1 and has been created later on by Ms. Anjana Bedi and attesting witnesses.
There is one more reason to disbelieve the defence of defendants. The defendants have been alleging transfer of suit property by plaintiff to the defendants as defendant no. 1 has paid the consideration amount for execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012 to Ms. Anjana Bedi. However, it is worth noting that Anjana Bedi has transferred/released half of the ownership in the suit property in favour of plaintiff by way of release deed dated 16.05.2012, for which the alleged consideration of Rs. 7,50,000/- has been paid by defendant no.1 to the plaintiff. As per admitted case, the plaintiff was one of the co-owner of the property in question as both Ms. Anjana Bedi and plaintiff has jointly purchased the property in question from Smt. Kamlesh vide registered sale deed registered on 08.11.2011. Even if it is believed for the sake of arguments(though could not be proved by RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 10 OF 29 defendants), that defendant no. 1 has paid the consideration amount for execution of release deed dated 16.05.2012, there is no logic in believing that plaintiff would have transferred the suit property to defendant no. 1 as it has not been even alleged that defendant no. 1 has paid the consideration for purchasing the share of plaintiff as well.
Further, to assert the truthfulness of its version and defence, defendants have alleged themselves to be in possession of the suit property from 16.05.2012 itself and not from the year 2013, when the plaintiff had alleged to allow the defendants to reside in the property on license basis. However, no proof of any sort has been brought by defendants during defence evidence to corroborate their version of occupation of property in question from 16.05.2012.
In view of above said discussion, the plaintiff has been able to prove her case that she has become the absolute owner of suit property i.e. Flat bearing no. 2/135, Old no. WZ-137-C/1, Ground Floor, built up on plot no. 16, area measuring 100 sq. yds., out of khasra no. 19, Khewat no. 12, khatoni no. 30 situated in Revenue Estate of village Nagli Jalib, colony known as Old Mahavir Nagar, New Delhi-110018, on registeration of release deed dated 16.05.2012, on 19.06.2012. As discussed above, defendant could not proved their version that plaintiff was duty bound to transfer the suit property in favour of defendant no. 1 on execution and registeration of release deed dated 16.05.2012.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX Though plaintiff has allegedly pleaded in the plaint that plaintiff has terminated the license of defendant on 14.03.2021, however, there is nothing on record to determine the parameters according to which the damage should be decided. There is no doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, however, as plaintiff has not brought any admissible evidence to prove the damages, the court deems it appropriate to grant the damages in sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month from the date of filing of present suit (as sought by plaintiff in prayer clause no. c) till the actual handing over the possession of suit property by defendant to the plaintiff. This issue is decided accordingly.' (Emphasis is mine) RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 11 OF 29 SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
8. Ld. Counsel for appellants/defendants submitted that, Ld. Trial Court gravely erred while decreeing the suit in favour of respondent/plaintiff. Submissions of Ld. Counsel for appellants/ defendants may be summarized as follows:
Firstly, as per release deed dated 16.05.2012 (registered on 19.06.2012 Ex.
PW1/1 Colly) possession was stated to be handed over by Anjana to plaintiff/respondent but in actual neither Anjana nor plaintiff/respondent was in possession of suit property rather it was in possession of appellants/defendants only;
Secondly, plaintiff/respondent failed to produce any material on record to show that she or Anjana was ever in possession of suit property. More specifically, no house tax receipt, electricity/water bill or any other statutory document is produced on record to show the possession. Thirdly, there is no licensor/licensee relationship between the parties. No specification of license is given in the plaint but Ld. Trial Court wrongly given finding on licensor/licensee relationship without any specific issue.
Fourthly, Ld. Trial Court gravely erred while decreeing possession despite the fact that plaintiff/respondent only prayed for decree of mandatory injunction. It is submitted that suit for mandatory injunction cannot be termed as suit for possession.
Fifthly, no compliance of mandatory provision under Section 106 TPA was made by plaintiff/respondent but Ld. Trial Court wrongly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 12 OF 29 Sixthly, main suit was barred under Section 7 of The Family Court Act but wrongly decided by Ld. Trial Court without any jurisdiction.
9. Ld. Counsel for appellants/defendants has also relied upon the judgment i.e. The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. R. Mahadevan, J. in Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025 (arising from SLP (C) No. 13679 of 2022) of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in which it was held that, "15.1. Undoubtedly, a sale deed, which amounts to conveyance, has to be a registered document, as mandated under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. On the other hand, an agreement for sale, which also requires to be registered, does not amount to a conveyance as it is merely a contractual document, by which one party, namely the vendor, agrees or assures or promises to convey the property described in the schedule of such agreement to the other party, namely the purchaser, upon the latter performing his part of the obligation under the agreement fully and in time. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 explicitly lays down that a contract for sale will not confer any right or interest. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 offers protection only to a proposed transferee who has part performed his part of the promise and has been put into possession, against the actions of transferor, acting against the interest of the transferee. For the proposed transferee to seek any protection against the transferor, he must have either performed his part of obligation in full or in part. The applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is subject to certain conditions viz., (a) the agreement must be in writing with the owner of the property or in other words, the transferor must be either the owner or his authorised representative, (b) the transferee must have been put into possession or must have acted in furtherance of the agreement and made some developments, (c) the protection under Section 53-A is not an exemption to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in other words, a transferee, put into possession with the knowledge of a pending lis, is not entitled to any protection, (d) the transferee must be in possession when the lis is initiated against his transferor and must be willing to perform the remaining part of his obligation, (e) the transferee must be entitled to seek specific performance or in other words, must not be barred by any of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 from seeking such performance. The protection under Section 53-A is not available against a third party who RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 13 OF 29 may have an adversarial claim against the vendor. Therefore, unless and until the sale deed is executed, the purchaser is not vested with any right, title or interest in the property except to the limited extent of seeking specific performance from his vendor. An agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession. In such cases, the vendor will have to approach the court and not the proposed transferee.
15.2.4. Further, the respondents are not in possession of the property. Whereas, the appellant's possession since 1905 is admitted in the plaint itself. In such circumstances, where the plaintiffs are not in possession and the defendant is in settled possession for over a century, a suit for bare injunction by a proposed transferee is clearly not maintainable".
10. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff/respondent vehemently objected the submissions made on behalf of appellants/defendants. It is submitted that admittedly neither sale deed dated 09.11.2011 nor release deed dated 19.06.2012 is ever challenged by appellants/defendants till date. Hence, present appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit as Ld. Trial Court has rightly decided in favour of plaintiff/respondent. It is further submitted that plaintiff/respondent jointly purchased suit property with Anjana and same was never partitioned. Hence, plaintiff/respondent is always in constructive possession of suit property and defendants/appellants have no right, title or interest qua suit property. It is further submitted that before Ld. Trial Court, appellants/defendants strongly relied upon receipt wherein Rs.7,50,000/- was purportedly paid to Anjana Devi in cash by the appellants/defendants but same has nothing to do with the present matter as appellants/defendants could have taken legal recourse against Anjana. Lastly, it is submitted that present appeal may be dismissed being without any merit. Ld. Counsel for respondent/plaintiff has also relied upon following judgments :-
i. Shashank Shekhar v. Surinder Kumar Jain & Anr. in RSA No. 115/2011 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in which it was held that:
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 14 OF 29 "47. The First Appellate Court was also impressed by the fact that neither in the plaint nor in the deposition of PW-3 any date, month or termination of the license has been disclosed. It is rather well settled that mere filing of a suit for possession/ ejectment/ dispossession, and service of summons in the said suit tantamounts to termination of a lease/license. In this regard, reference may be made to Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr., 2011 (182) DLT 402".
ii. Shri Rajinder Kumar Sethi v. Shri Sushil Kumar Sethi in CS (OS) No.2134/2006 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi wherein it was held:
"69. The onus of this issue was on the defendant. Plaintiff has proved his ownership over the suit property as discussed hereinabove. The defendant has claimed that the original defendant had invested money and the property was purchased in the name of the plaintiff but it is barred under the Benami Transaction Act".
iii. Sham Lal v. Ramesh Kumar in 1971. R.L.R. (Note) 65 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi wherein it was held:
"the Court-fees paid in such a suit shall be not less than Rs. 13/-. Supreme Court in Sthappa Chettiar Vs. Ramanathan AIR. 1958. S.C. 245, and Punjab High Court in Jaikishan Das Vs. Babu Ram 1967. PLR. (D) 52 have held that for determining the question of Court-fees only the plaint should be looked into and the pleas in W/S should be ignored. Respondent relied on Jugal Kishore Vs. Desh Raj 1968. DLT. 571 to emphasise that the substance instead of form of the plaint should be considered. That the instant suit is by aa allottee against a licensee for injunction to stop overstay as user of room was given for a limited purpose to the licensee. The -concealed motive behind the suit or the benefit likely to be attained as a result of the decision is not relevant. A suit for mandatory injunction directing a licensee- defendant to vacate the premises is maintainable in view of Pooran Chand Vs. Malik Mukhbain Singh 1963. PLR. 490. Suit was thus properly valued and framed".
iv. Smt. Saraswati v. Smt. Archana Bichpuria in AIR 2008 (NOC) 130 (MP) wherein it was held:
"Licensee is neither a trespasser nor a tenant - Suit for mandatory injunction by plaintiff directing defendant/licensee to surrender and given vacant possession of suit premises to plaintiff".
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 15 OF 29 v. Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh in AIR 1985 SC 857 wherein it was held:
"7. In the present case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had come to the court with the suit for mandatory injunction after any considerable delay which will disentitle him to the discretionary relief. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds is possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction".
vi. Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathey in 2005(7) SCC 667 wherein it was held: "7. There was no specific plea taken by the defendants that the suit should be one for recovery of possession and the suit for injunction is not maintainable. In fact, before the trial court and the first appellate court the stress was on something else i.e. the effect of Section 60(b) of the Easements b Act, 1882 (in short "the Easements Act") and the alleged non- maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. Before the High Court the plea was taken for the first time that the suit was not maintainable being one for mandatory injunction and for prohibitory injunction and not one for recovery. Strictly speaking, the question is not a substantial question of law, but one whose adjudication would depend upon factual adjudication of the issue relating to reasonableness of time. The correct position in law is that the licensee may be the actual occupant but the licensor is the person having control or possession of the property through his licensee even after the termination of the licence. The licensee may have to continue to be in occupation of the premises for sometime to wind up the business, if any. In such a case the licensee cannot be treated as a trespasser. It would depend upon the facts of the particular case. But there may be cases where after termination or revocation of the licence the licensor does not take prompt action to evict the licensee from the premises. In such an event the ex-licensee may be treated as a trespasser and the licensee will have to sue for recovery of possession. There can be no doubt that there is a need for the licensor to be vigilant. A licensee's occupation does not become hostile possession or the possession of a trespasser the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 16 OF 29 moment the licence comes to an end. The licensor has to file the suit with promptitude and if it is shown that within reasonable time a suit for mandatory injunction has been filed with a prayer to direct the licensee to vacate the premises, the suit will be maintainable".
11. In rebuttal, Ld. Counsel for appellants/defendants raised two additional grounds i.e. firstly, plaintiff/respondent has not filed/paid any court fees for the relief of damage hence, no damages can be granted in absence of court fees.
12. Secondly, there is material contradictions in the testimony of PW1 and PW2 which was wrongly ignored by Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Counsel for appellants/defendants further relied upon Section 38 and 39 of The Specific Relief Act and submitted that since the appellants/defendants are in possession of suit property for more than twelve years, impugned order may be set aside and present suit may be remanded back to the Ld. Trial Court for fresh adjudication on the point of licensor/licensee relationship and limitation as well as court fees.
13. In reply to rebuttal arguments, Ld. Counsel for respondent/plaintiff submitted that arguments for adverse possession is beyond the pleadings and cannot be looked into.
14. It is worthwhile to mention here today, in morning session, Ld. Coun- sel for respondent/Plaintiff submitted that he has paid deficient Court fees before the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Counsel had also filed copy of order dated 04.12.2025 passed by Ld. ASCJ-cum-JSCC-cum-Guardian Judge in this regard alongwith cal- culation of Court Fee on damages, same is as under:
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 17 OF 29 Court fee on rest Rs. Total Court Total amount Damages Court fee on 1,03,333/- (as fee required Total Court of damages grant by Rs. per schedule to pay on fee paid/ sub-
for 50
Ld. Trial 4,00,000/- as court fees Rs. amount of mitted in Ld.
months 10
court per schedule 48.80/- on damages Rs. Trial court
days
per Rs. 5,03,333/-
50000/-)
Rs. 6248/-
Rs.10,000/ + Rs.
Rs.
- per Rs.6248/- Rs.1024.80/- 1024.80 Rs.7500/-
5,03,333/-
month =
Rs.7,272.80
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
15. Now, this court shall adjudicate each point as follows:
Point No. 1 - Title & Effect of Registered Documents
16. The Respondent/plaintiff's title rests on two registered documents (Ex.PW-1/1 colly). Appellant No. 1 is himself a witness on the release deed dated 16.05.2012, which clearly recites that the consideration of ₹7,50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff (releasee) to Anjana Bedi (releasor).
17. Sections 94 & 95 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231 (corresponding to old Sections 91 & 92 Evidence Act) completely bar oral evidence 1 Section 94. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document.
When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 18 OF 29 to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a registered document relating to immovable property worth more than ₹100/-.
18. Thus, the alleged oral family arrangement that "plaintiff would later transfer the flat to appellant No. 1" directly contradicts the recital in the release deed that the plaintiff herself paid the consideration. Such oral evidence is wholly inadmissible. Reliance placed by the trial court on these provisions is impeccable.
19. Further, the plain-paper receipt Ex.DW-1/1 is not registered, the Respondent/plaintiff is neither executant nor witness thereto, and it does not even mention any obligation on the plaintiff to re-convey the property. In any case, release deed dated 16.05.2012 have no mention about receipt rather, it specifically mention that 'That the releasor is releasing her one half undivided share of the said property for a sum of Rs. 7,50,000/- (Rupees Seven Lac And Fifty Thousand Only) which has already been received by the RELEASOR from the RELEASEE in cash before signing of this deed." For the purpose of clarification Ex.DW-1/1 is reproduced herein below:
or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
Section 95. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.
When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to section 94, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:
Provided that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law:
Provided further that the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document:
Provided also that the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved:
Provided also that the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents:
Provided also that any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved:
Provided also that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract: Provided also that any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 19 OF 29
20. Bare perusal of Ex.DW-1/1 reveals that, Rs. 7,50,000/- is purportedly paid by Defendant/Appellant No. 1 to Anjana Bedi as sale consideration of one half undivided share in the property.
21. In Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (2012 SCC
656) Hon'ble Supreme Court reaffirmed an important legal position i.e. "Sale" is a RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 20 OF 29 transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised and said transfer can be made only a registered instrument2 and indispensability of registering a sale deed during transfer. In fact, in Shakeel Ahmed vs Syed Akhlaq Hussain3, Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that:
'10. Having considered the submissions at the outset, it is to be emphasized that irrespective of what was decided in the case of Suraj Lamps and Industries(supra) the fact remains that no title could be transferred with respect to immovable properties on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell or on the basis of an unregistered General Power of Attorney. The Registration Act, 1908 clearly provides that a document which requires compulsory registration under the Act, would not confer any right, much less a legally enforceable right to approach a Court of Law on its basis. Even if these documents i.e. the Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney were registered, still it could not be said that the Respondent would have acquired title over the property in question. At best, on the basis of the registered agreement to sell, he could have claimed relief of specific performance in appropriate proceedings. In this regard, reference may be made to Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
11. Law is well settled that no right, title or interest in immovable property can be conferred without a registered document. Even the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) lays down the same proposition. Reference may also be made to the following judgments of this Court:
(i). Ameer Minhaj v. Deirdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Ors. MANU/SC/0685/2018 : 2018:INSC:578 : (2018) 7 SCC 639
(ii). Balram Singh v. Kelo Devi MANU/SC/1241/2022 :
2022:INSC:10111
(iii). M/S Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra and Anr. MANU/SC/1051/2023 : 2023:INSC:8542 2 Section 54, Transfer of Property Act.3
MANU/SC/1257/2023 RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 21 OF 29
12. The embargo put on registration of documents would not override the statutory provision so as to confer title on the basis of unregistered documents with respect to immovable property. Once this is the settled position, the Respondent could not have maintained the suit for possession and mesne profits against the Appellant, who was admittedly in possession of the property in question whether as an owner or a licensee.'
22. Thus, in view of the above authoritative judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India juxtaposed with the facts of present case, Ex. DW1/1 cannot be considered in evidence as title documents. Thus, Ex.DW-1/1 is of no legal consequence against the Respondent/plaintiff as via registered Release Deed, Anjana Bedi released her one half undivided share in the property. The Ld. trial court has rightly discarded it and this finding calls for no interference.
Point No. 2 - Nature of Possession of Appellants
23. Ld. counsel for Appellant strongly argued that, as per release deed dated 16.05.2012 (registered on 19.06.2012 Ex. PW1/1 Colly) possession was stated to be handed over by Anjana to plaintiff/respondent but in actual neither Anjana nor plaintiff/respondent was in possession of suit property rather, it was in possession of appellants/defendants only. It is also argued that, plaintiff/respondent failed to produce any material on record to show that she or Anjana was ever in possession of suit property. More specifically, no house tax receipt, electricity/water bill or any other statutory document is produced on record to show the possession.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 22 OF 29
24. In nutshell, main contention of Appellant is that, Ld. trial court gravely erred while holding that, appellant is in permissive possession of the suit property. It is submitted that, respondent/plaintiff has no right title or interest suit property as Appellant has paid Rs. 7,50,000/- to Anjana and even otherwise, by virtue of continues and uninterrupted possession of Appellant/defendant since 2011-12, said possession, asserted into adverse title to him.
25. At this juncture, it would be imperative to discuss law on adverse possession:
LAW ON ADVERSE POSSESSION
26. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three "nec" -- nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that, his possession is adequate in continuity in publicity and in extent. Animus possidendi indicates a specific positive intention, on the part of the adverse possessor, to dispossess the actual owner. It is only where such positive intention to dispossess the actual owner exists that, the title shifts from the actual owner to the adverse possessor. A person claiming adverse possession is required, therefore, to show (i) the date on which he came into possession, (ii) the nature of his possession, (iii) whether the factum of possession was known to the true owner, (iv) the period for which he remained in possession and (v) that, his possession was open and undisturbed. As adverse possession was an essential inequitable plea, seeking to divest a true owner of his right, all these elements have necessarily to be pleaded and proved. Adverse possession, therefore, requires animus possidendi under hostile colour of title.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 23 OF 29
27. It is also settled law that, mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the possession into adverse possession. What is essential is that, there must be intention on the part of person claiming adverse possession to dispossess the true owner. The intention needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge of true owner and he should have an opportunity to object. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that, possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person, constitutes adverse possession regard must be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of the case. The crux of the matter is that, the possession must start with a wrongful dispossession of a rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.4
28. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam5, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that '22. Claim by adverse possession has two elements : (1) the possession of the Defendant should become adverse to the Plaintiff; and (2) the Defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well settled principle of law that, mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi 4 S. M. Karim Vs. Bibi Sakina (AIR 1964 SC 1254) 5 AIR 2008 SC 346 RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 24 OF 29 and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title.'
29. Thus, considering the above settled law, this court does not find any merit in the submissions made on behalf of Appellant as a person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous - possession for 12 years which meets the requirement of being 'nec vi nec claim and nec precario'. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence.
30. In present Appeal, the stand taken by Appellant/Defendant No. 1 is wholly contradictory and mutually destructive. In his written statement, he claimed ownership over the suit property on the basis of an alleged oral agreement to sell coupled with a receipt. However, during arguments, he completely shifted his stand and pleaded title by adverse possession, which is in any event not made out as his admitted possession is less than 12 years.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 25 OF 29
31. Further, these two pleas are diametrically opposite and mutually destructive because: (a) a plea of title through oral agreement/receipt acknowledges the plaintiff and Anjana Bedi's original title and seeks protection, whereas (b) a plea of adverse possession proceeds on the foundation that the true owner had no title during the statutory period, as the defendant was in open, hostile, and continuous possession in denial of the true owner's title.
32. A party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time. Having admitted the plaintiff and Anjana Bedi's title in the written statement, Defendant No. 1 is estopped from subsequently denying the same title by pleading adverse possession. Both pleas, therefore, deserve to be rejected outright. Even otherwise protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (part- performance) can't be given in absence of registered document.
33. Reliance is placed upon Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant6 wherein it was held :
"15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that, a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that, his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that, other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation.6
1995 SCC (2) 543 RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 26 OF 29 Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that, title by pretending that, he had no title at all."
34. Ergo, The plea of adverse possession is wholly impermissible. It was never raised in the written statement and cannot be permitted to be taken for the first time in appeal. In any event, the appellant's possession, having admitted permissive possession under an alleged oral agreement and receipt, cannot convert the same into adverse possession without pleading and proving a clear, overt and unequivocal assertion of hostile title brought to the notice of the true owner which is neither pleaded nor proved. Moreover, the admitted duration of possession is admittedly less than 12 years. Thus, the plea of adverse possession is liable to be rejected on all counts.
Point No. 3 - Maintainability of Suit for Mandatory Injunction by Owner/Licensor
35. The law is well settled when a licensee overstays after revocation, the licensor can maintain a suit for mandatory injunction directing the licensee to vacate. Such a suit is, in substance, a suit for possession and is perfectly maintainable. The argument that the suit must be styled as "suit for possession" is wholly technical and stands rejected.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 27 OF 29 Point No. 4 - Requirement of Notice u/s. 106 TP Act
36. Ld. counsel for Appellant/defendant No. 1 argued that, no compliance of mandatory provision under Section 106 TPA was made by plaintiff/respondent but Ld. Trial Court wrongly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent.
37. However, this court is not inclined with the plea taken by Appellants, basic foundation of plaintiff/Respondent's matter is based upon the permissive user not on Landlord-tenant relationship. Even otherwise, it is settled preposition of law that filing of a suit for eviction under general law itself amounts to a notice to quit on tenant and service of summons of such suits can be taken as notice under Section 106 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Reliance can be placed upon decision of "M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. Vs. Santosh Singh" 2007 (14) SCALE 90 and "Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. Vs. M/s Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr." 182 (2011) DLT 402. Hence, the service of summons upon defendant amounted to termination of license from said date.
Point No. 5 - Benami & Family Courts Act
38. No plea of benami was taken in accordance with Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (as amended 2016). Mere relationship does not attract the Family Courts Act when the dispute is purely over eviction of a licensee from immovable property.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 28 OF 29 Point No. 6 - Rent Agreement & Quantum of Damages
39. Ld. trial court has already discarded the rent agreement (Ex.PW-2/1) and has independently fixed damages at ₹10,000/- p.m. considering the location, size and prevailing rents. The finding is reasoned, realistic and suffers from no perversity. No interference is called for in appellate jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
40. Ergo, in view of above discussion and well settled preposition of law, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by Ld. Trial Court. Hence, present appeal stands dismissed.
41. No order as to cost.
42. Decree Sheet shall be drawn accordingly.
43. TCR be sent back with copy of this order.
44. Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Announced in open court SHILPI Digitally signed by
SHILPI M JAIN
Date: 2025.12.05
on 05.12.2025 M JAIN 16:51:22 +0530
(SHILPI M JAIN)
District Judge-05, South West District
Dwarka Courts, New Delhi
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 105/25 NARESH KUMAR & ORS. V. MAMTA HARJAI PAGE NO. 29 OF 29