Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
A.P. Power Transmission Corporation, ... vs Mohd. Khaleel Pasha And Ors. on 2 November, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(6)ALD708, 2001(6)ALT623, [2002(92)FLR1209]
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, G. Raghuram
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This appeal is before us, in view of the reference made by a Division Bench of this Court observing:
A contention has been raised with regard to the correctness or applicability of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P. LTD. v. R. VENKATA RAMANA AND ORS. in the light of the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and in terms of the notification issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Ms.No. 107, Women Development, Child Welfare and Labour (Labour-II) Department, dated 31-10-1998, under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act.
Having considered the rival submissions made at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the said decision requires reconsideration, in the light of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, as to whether in relation to the scheme issued by the appellant-Board vide B.P. (P&G-Per) Ms.No. 36, dated 18-05-1997 is independent of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 or not.
Let the matter be referred to a Larger Bench.
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2. A short question as regards interpretation of a Memorandum issued by the appellants herein is the subject matter hereof.
FACTS:
3. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 29-08-2000 by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 17715 of 1999 whereby and whereunder the learned Judge while allowing the writ petition directed the appellants herein to consider the case of the writ petitioners - respondents herein for regular appointment in accordance with B.P.Ms.No. 36 dated 18-05-1997, provided they fulfil other conditions as mentioned in para 5 thereof. The learned Judge further directed the appellants herein to complete the exercise within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order.
4. The writ petitioners who are seven in number filed the writ petition questioning a Memorandum vide reference No. Addl.Secy/DGM(IR)/AS(IR)/PO.II/1833 of 1998, dated 11-08-1999 in terms whereof the prayer of the petitioners for their regular appointment was refused.
5. The appellants issued B.P. (P & G-Per) Ms.No. 36 dated 18-05-1997 in terms whereof a policy decision was taken to the effect that the services of the contract labour would be taken over. As the said policy decision was not implemented in the case of the petitioners, they filed a writ petition before this Court bearing W.P.No. 26843 of 1998, wherein a learned single Judge allowed the same directing the respondents therein to consider the case of employment, by considering their cases according to seniority. Despite the said order, the representation of the petitioners was rejected, in terms of the Memorandum referred to supra.
6. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification vide G.O.Ms.No. 107, Women Development, Child Welfare and Labour (Labour-11) Department, dated 31-10-1988 in terms whereof the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulations and Abolition) Act, 1970 ('1970 Act' for brevity) have also been extended to the contractors employing more than 20 workers in the State.
7. By reason of B.P.Ms.No. 36 dated 18-05-1997 the appellants-Board took a policy decision to fill up 50% of the existing vacancies in initial recruitment cadres for ex-casual labour. As regards the contract labour, it was directed:
iii) Contract Labour.
The contract labour other than those engaged in 33 abolished categories in Generating Stations shall be considered for selection and appointment against 50% existing vacancies.
8. The Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.O.Ms.No. 107 dated 31-10-1998 approving the report of the State Advisory Contract Labour constituted under Sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the 1970 Act, applied the provisions of the 1970 Act inter alia:
i) to every contractor who employs or who employed on any day of the preceding twelve months five or more workmen in any establishment to which the provisions of the said Act applies;
SUBMISSIONS:
9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants-Board would submit that B.P.Ms.No. 36 dated 18-05-1997 was required to be read along with G.O.Ms.No. 107 dated 31-10-1988. The learned counsel would urge that as the provisions of the 1970 Act does not apply in the instant case, the question of considering their cases for absorption in terms of B.P.Ms.No. 36 dated 18-05-1997 does not and cannot arise.
10. The learned counsel would further submit that B.P.Ms.No. 36 must be read as a whole and so read, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the said order shall apply only in relation to those contractors who were registered under the 1970 Act. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to the provisions for seniority contained in Clause 5 (c) thereof, which reads thus:
5. The guidelines for selection of the candidates from the above categories shall be as follows:
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c) Seniority:
The seniority shall be reckoned based on the total period of service rendered by the respective candidates in the Unit as per muster rolls/wages registers or as per the records maintained under the Contract Labour (Regulations and Abolition) Act, 1970. Separate seniority list shall be prepared for each category as per their eligibility. The continuous period of working shall be taken for purpose of reckoning seniority in respect of Village Electricity Workers.
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11. The impugned Memorandum dated 11-8-1999 has been passed only on the ground that unlicensed contractor do not come within the purview of the aforementioned circular stating:
3. The issue has been examined carefully with reference to the order contained in the Writ Appeal mentioned above, provisions of the contract labour (R & A) Act, 1970 and the notification issued in G.O.Ms.No. 107, dated 31-10-1988. It is clarified that the cases of the contract labour who are engaged by the unlicensed contractors under Chit Agreements may be considered provided the number of such contract labour supplied by the particulars unlicensed contractor is 5 or more than five for a given work, That means if the number of contract labour supplied by an unlicensed contractor for executing any work covered by Chit Agreements falls below five workmen and who discharged piece rate work will not have the status of contract labour. The contract labour working as on 18-5-1997 are only eligible for consideration.
QUESTION:
12. The only question, which arises for consideration would be as to whether the definition of the word 'contract labour", as defined in the 1970 Act in the aforementioned terms, is relevant for passing the impugned order.
FINDINGS:
13. Before proceeding to answer the said question, it is suffice to notice Section 2(1)(b) of the 1970 Act wherein the word "contract labour" has been defined:
2. Definitions:- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--
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(b) a workman shall be deemed to be employed as "contract labour" in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection with such work by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer;
14. The definition of contract labour, therefore, is of wide amplitude.
15. Regularisation of contract labour had been the subject matter of dispute from the last more than four decades. In STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. v. NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS, 2001 (5) Scale 636 = 2001 (4) DT (SC) 414, the apex Court held that the history of exploitation of labour is as old as history of civilization. The 1970 Act was enacted both for regulation, as also prohibition, in the matter of engagement of contract labour.
16. Irrespective of the definition of the term 'contract labour' in the 1970 Act, its commonsense meaning is well-known. A principal employer normally appoints a contractor, who in turn appoints the labour. No relationship of employer and employee in law exists between a principal employer and contract labour. Although in terms of the provisions of the 1970 Act a contractor may have to be registered, he may not get himself registered for one reason or the other or by taking recourse to some dubious methods. The parties may for similar purpose divide and sub-divide the work and would not engage more than five workmen for keeping themselves outside the purview of the said Act.
17. Industrial law, it is trite, must be interpreted liberally in favour of the workman. So should be any policy decision, in terms whereof, a benefit is extended to a workman.
18. What therefore is relevant is the nature of employment. A contract labour remains the contract labour despite the fact that as to whether the provisions of the 1970 Act are applicable in his case or not. Determination of inter-se seniority could be a matter, which has to be looked into only after contract labourers are taken in service. If they do not come within the purview of the aforementioned clauses, as regards determination of their respective seniority, the general rule of seniority in their cases may apply. But the same by itself may not deprive the contract labourers engaged by the contractors from the benefit of aforementioned B.P.Ms.No. 36. Admittedly, the contractors who have not registered their names in terms of the provisions of the 1970 Act engaged the petitioners herein and the petitioners cannot be faulted only because of the mischief done by the contractors. The contract labourers for the purpose of obtaining benefit of the social welfare scheme taken by the Board, which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, cannot stand on an inferior footing than the contract labourer engaged by a licensed contractor. Further more, the very fact that such contractors were not licensed and/or registered may in a given situation attract the penal provision contained in Section 24 of the 1970 Act, which reads:
24. Other offences:
If any person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or of any rules made thereunder for which no other penalty is elsewhere provided, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
19. We may notice that even in STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA (supra) the apex Court has directed that even in the case of abolition of contract labour, upon issuance of notification under Section 10(1) of the 1970 Act, the principal employer should give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.
20. Keeping in view the expression 'contract labour" used in the provisions of the 1970 Act, we are of the opinion that the applicability thereof in terms of the provisions of the 1970 Act cannot be a ground for denying the benefit to a workman. In any event the definition of 'contract labour" under the said Act must be given its contextual meaning.
21. It is now a well-settled principle of taw that the principle of liberal construction should be made applicable while interpreting the provisions of a beneficial statute.
22. In DADI JAGANNADHAM v. JAMMULU RAMULU, 2001 AIR SCW 3051, the Apex Court held:
The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction, which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not here, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.
23. In GURUDEVDATTA VKSSS MARY ADIT v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, , the Apex court held that the words used in a provision should be literally considered in the following terms:
It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the lawgiver.
24. A construction of a statute, which make a rule redundant, it is trite, should be avoided. In RESERVE BANK OF INDIA v. PEERLESS CO., , it was held:
All that is necessary for us to say is this: Legislatures resort to inclusive definitions (1) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it, (2) to include meanings about which there might be some dispute, or, (3) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain similar features but going under different names. Depending on the context, in the process of enlarging, the definition may even become exhaustive.
Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then Section by section, clause-by-clause, phrase-by-phrase and word-by-word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.
25. Referring to STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD v NATIONAL UNION WATER FRONT WORKERS, , it has been held in TATOBA BHAU SAVAGAVE v. VASANTRAO D. DESHPANDE, 2001 AIR SCW 4016:
....there can be no gainsaying the fact that while interpreting a beneficial legislation like the Act under consideration, the Directive Principles of State policy contained in Article 38 and Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution should be uppermost in the mind of a Judge.
26. In any event, the circular issued in B.P.Ms.No. 36 being a policy, which is beneficial to the concerned workman, the principles of liberal interpretation of statutes should be applied. In the instant case, it must be held that all the contract labourers would be entitled to derive benefit from the said scheme irrespective of the applicability of the 1970 Act.
27. For the aforementioned observations, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.