Madras High Court
T.K. Subramania Pillai vs The Pennington Committee Through Its ... on 12 December, 1986
Equivalent citations: (1987)2MLJ39
JUDGMENT Srinivasan, J.
1. The only question that arises in the second appeal and the civil revision petition is whether the appellant, who was the defendant in the suit is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'. That in turn depends upon the question whether the subject-matter of the lease in his favour by the respondent-plaintiff was a land or a building?
2. The trial Court held that the subject-matter of the lease was a land and that the defendant was entitled to purchase the land under Section 9 of the Act. Consequently, the trial Court dismissed the suit and passed an order in favour of the defendant in his petition (O.P. No. 5 of 1977) for purchasing the land at the market value in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The lower appellate Court reversed the said conclusion of the Court and held that the subject-matter of the lease was a land and building and that it was not a lease of a mere vacant land and therefore, the defendant was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Consequently, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit.
3. The admitted facts are as follows: Prior to the date when the defendant became a lessee under the plaintiff his brother by name Durai was a lessee and before him the property had been leased to a veterinary dispensary, Srivilliputur. The first document to which the defendant's brother is a party is Ex.A6, dated 4.12.1945. That is an application by Durai to the Secretary of the plaintiff Committee for leasing out land and the building which was rented out to the veterinary dispensary. He has stated therein that he wanted it for purpose of putting up oil Mills. On the reverse of Ex.A6 there is an endorsement by a member of the Committee that the place may be let out at the rate of Rs. 40 per month. That was approved by the Committee and a draft lease deed was prepared accordingly. The lease deed which came into existence immediately thereafter is Ex. A7, dated 28.12.1945 which describes the property as land and building. There is a clause in the lease deed which permits the lessee to instal the mill etc., in the demised property without causing any harm to the buildings which belonged to the Committee. This indicates that what was leased was not a vacant land but it included some buildings. That lease was for a period of three years. With regard to the other clauses in the lease deed I will make a reference later.
4. The next lease deed in favour of Durai was of 1.3.1952 evidenced by Ex. A1. It is on similar lines to Ex. A7. Here again, we find reference to both the land and the building.
5. Durai has transferred his rights to his brother, the defendant herein and also wrote a letter to the plaintiff-Committee on 4.11.1958 which is marked as Ex.A8. In that letter, Durai has referred to the rice mill shop bearing No. C-27 and he has stated that he has transferred the shop to his brother, the defendant herein and that the latter may be accepted as a tenant of the plaintiff-Committee. There is no reference whatever in this letter to any lease of land being transferred to the defendant. At the bottom of the letter the defendant has endorsed his consent for being a tenant of the plaintiff and assured the plaintiff that he would pay the rent without any default.
6.In addition to these documents which are relied upon by the lower appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the lease was of land and building, the lower appellate Court has also referred to Exs.A9 to All which were plans sent to the Srivilliputtur Municipality by the plaintiff. The plans show that the plaintiff applied for permission to construct some additional structures in the disputed property. The plans also show that there were some constructions already existing on the land. The lower appellate Court has also referred to Exs. A23 to A27 which were signed by the defendant himself. Those documents purported to be the accounts maintained by the plaintiff for expenses incurred in connection with the construction of a rice shop. When these documents were put to the defendant in the witness box he had admitted his signatures but would claim that no money was received by him in spite of the fact that the documents bear revenue stamps on which he had himself signed. The lower appellate Court has rightly refused to accept his evidence with regard to the non-receipt of money under Exs.A23 to A27.
7. In view of the aforesaid documents, the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court that the subject-matter of the demise in favour of the defendant was both the land and building cannot be assailed. The evidence of D.W.I may also be referred to in this connection. He has admitted in the course of cross-examination that what was leased to him originally was both the building and land. Hence I agree with the findings of the lower appellate Court that the subject-matter of the demise was building and land.
8. Mr. Chandramouli, learned Counsel for the appellant places reliance upon Ex. B1, which is a letter written by the Secretary of the plaintiff-Committee to the Commissioner,' Srivilliputhur Municipality. The relevant portion of the letter reads as follows:
We have leased out the (sic)ite mentioned hereunder to Mr. T.K. Durai, C/o. Govindan School of Commerce, West Street, Srivilliputtur, to instal a rotary oil and flour mills there. Necessary permit may be issued to him in this connection.
It is argued by learned Counsel that the letter makes specific reference to the site as the subject-matter of the lease and therefore, what was leased out was only the site and not any building. But, there is a description of the property leased out at the bottom of the letter as if it is a schedule to the letter. The description of property therein reads. "All that piece or parcel of land bearing Town Survey No. 454, IV Ward and Door No. 138 IX, situate in. North Srivilliputhur". That clearly shows that there was a building on the site which was given a door number by the municipality. The word 'site' has been construed to include building and land in Subramania Odayar v. Board of Revenue, (1958)1 M.LIJ. 410: 71 L.W. 344, When the word 'site' is used with reference to building, say for example, shops or factories, it will have the meaning that it includes the site of the building concerned in the context of the situation; it will also indicate the land appurtenant to the building, concerned, e.g., if the word 'site of a factory' is used it will not only mean the factory building but also the land appurtenant thereto. In the present case, when Ex. B1 refers to the site it must be read along with the description of the property in the bottom of the letter which refers to the building also. I do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of learned Counsel by relying upon Ex. B1.
9. Learned Counsel places reliance upon the fact that the Municipal registers showed the defendant and his brother as the owners of the superstructure and the plaintiff-Committee as the owner of the site. If there had been any evidence to prove the subject-matter of the demise, the evidence afforded by the Municipal records could have been accepted as conclusive. When there is documentary evidence to prove the subject-matter of the demise, the registers maintained by the Municipality cannot be helpful to the defendant.
10. Learned Counsel for the appellant next contends that even if the lease comprised of both land and building it should be considered whether the land was appurtenant to the building or independent of the building. According to him, the land was of an extent of 13,000 sq.ft. and the building was only occupying a very small portion of about 800 sq.ft. or so and therefore, the land should not be treated as appurtenant to the building. He relies upon the observations made in J.H. Irani v. Chidambaram Chettar (1952) 2 M.L.J. 221 : 65 L.W. 713 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 650. There, the Division Bench had occasion to consider the definition of building as found in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946). The said Act defined a 'building' as meaning "any building or hut or part of a building or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes: (a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut, and let or to be let along with such building or hut, (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut." While considering the said definition, the Bench had to deal with the question whether, in that case, the site was appurtenant to the building or not. The observations that are relied upon are as follows:
Obviously, the letting of the land was for the purpose of carrying on cinema business and it was well-known to the parties that the structure of the theatre owned by the first defendant was already there and what was being granted in substance and in effect under the lease was the right to continue the structure on the land as a building, as without the land the structure cannot stand. Taking all the facts into consideration, what was leased under Ex. P9 was the entire property with its compound walls and with the buildings of the lessor shown in the plaint plan, Ex. P1, together with the site on which the superstructure was erected and which gave continuous support to the building and the other vacant space round it. This undoubtedly, is part of the building known as the Gaiety Theatre, So, the lessor leased not only his building but also part of the building of the Gaiety Theatre under the document. What was leased therefore was not merely a vacant land, the small shed In the east of the site belonging to the lessor being only an insignificant portion to be left out of consideration altogether, as contended On behalf of the appellant. The object of the lease was to run the cinema business in. the buildings then in existence together with the other buildings used as booking office, office rooms, garages, latrines and so on. It is impossible therefore to escape the conclusion that what was let out to the first defendant under Ex. P9 was a "building."
Learned Counsel for the appellant wants to stress upon the portion of the observation extracted above which refers to the 'insignificant portion' to be left out of consideration'.
11. Again, learned Counsel refers to the observations of Justice Raghava Rao in the same judgment (p. 232) which runs follows:
...Etymologically "appurtenant" means "pertaining" or "relating to", and that is the wider sense in which the word may sometimes have to be understood and applied apart from the stricter sense of "belonging to". Ordinary Dictionaries, Law Lexicons as well as cases in the books do refer to both the senses, and the question which sense should be adopted depends upon the circumstances of the particular case in which it arises...But the word "appurtenant" may be used in a secondary sense a equivalent to such phrase as "usually enjoyed with".
It is significant from the passages extracted above, that the meaning should depend upon the circumstances of the particular case in which it arises. In the present case, we find from the evidence that before the defendant's brother become a lessee the property was used as a veterinary dispensary. For the purpose of using the property as a veterinary dispensary there should be a building in order to keep medicines and other implements. For examining the sick cattle there must be a large open space. Therefore, it can be said without fear of contradiction that the vacant land around the building was used as appurtenant to the building before the defendant's brother became a lessee. Even when the defendant's brother became a lessee he wanted it for installing an oil mill and floor mill. For the installation of the machinery a building is required. But for other purposes viz., drying paddy and other like purposes vacant land would be required, No doubt, as pointed out by learned Counsel there should be cement platform, etc., for using it as drying place. But still, platforms would be used as appurtenant to the building in which the machinery is installed. Therefore, reference to the above cannot help the appellant in the present case to contend that the lease in his favour was that of a land and not that of a building. It cannot be said that the land is not appurtenant to the building just because the building was in a small portion of the land.
12. Learned Counsel submits that the very purpose of the lease in favour of the appellant's brother in 1945 was for installation of a rice mill and the building which was in existence at the time of the lease could not be sufficient for installation of a rice mill. He wants the Court to draw an inference that when the purpose of the lease was to instal a rice mill it should be treated as a lease of the land in spite of the fact that there was a building In the land. In other words, he submits that it should be treated as two leases, one of land and another of building, though they are contained in the same paper. In this connection he relies upon an unreported decision of this Court in Jayaramulu Naidu v. Parthasarathy C.R.P. No. 2089 of 1971, dt. 5.5.1972. That was a case which arose under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. That was a case where the property described as house and ground was leased, out to the petitioner therein. After sometime the tenant utilised the vacant land for the purpose of manufacturing slates. The landlord did not raise any objection thereto. When the landlord sought for eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act on the ground that the building was required for demolition and reconstruction, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had ordered eviction. In the revision petition by the tenant it was contended that even if eviction could be ordered with regard to the building portion, the land should be considered separately and no eviction could be ordered under the provisions of the Rent Control Act with reference to the land. The learned Judge took the view that the land should not be treated as appurtenant to the building in that case inasmuch as the landlord had permitted the tenant to use the land for the purpose of manufacturing slates. The building as such was used for residential purpose and the land was used for non-residential purpose. In such circumstances the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the lease could be split up and the order of eviction and the order of eviction under the Rent Control Act could be confined only to the building and there could be no eviction with regard to the land. I am of the opinion that the said decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. As stated above, that was a case of the land being carved out by the tenant for a non-residential purpose when he was using the building for residential purpose and such carving out was approved by the landlord. In that situation the learned Judge held that it could be split up into two leases.
13. Learned Counsel relied on the decision of Pandrang Row, J., in C.C.C.A. Nos. 83 and 84 of 1975, (1938) 2 M.L.J. 18, Short Notes. The facts of the case are not clear from the report in the Short Notes. The report as it is found reads as follows:
Where the defendant is not entitled by the law of succession to the rights possessed in certain property by the previous tenant, nor has he got a document of transfer in respect of the rights of the previous tenant and the previous tenant left a will and had a son, Held, that the defendant is a trespasser and not entitled to any protection under the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act.
Where a person entered into possession under a document which purported to be a counter-part of a lease, the sub-tenants under that original lessee are not mere licensees but must be deemed to be tenants as defined in the above Act.
Where the properties demised were described as the market, houses, shops and vacant land in a garden and there was no evidence to show that the vacant land was appurtenant to the shops.
Held, that the lease must be regarded as a lease of land, so far as the land in the garden was concerned.
While in the first portion of the notes it is seen that the defendant in that case was held to be a trespasser and not entitled to protection under the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, in the third paragraph of the notes it is seen that the learned Judge had held that the lease of the vacant land was a separate lease and the land could not be treated as appurtenant to the shops. The reasoning of the learned Judge does not appear from the short notes. It may be, on the facts of that case the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge was justified. But it is clear that the observation made by the learned Judge was obiter inasmuch as he had held that the defendant therein was a trespasser and the Act did not apply.
14. The next decision that is relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant is reported in Pariaswami Naicker v. Sivagnanam (1971) 84 L.W. 97. In that case, Ramanujam, J., had to consider whether the lease of certain shops and three separate vacant lands situate in another street and separated by a lane was a lease of a building and appurtenance thereto. The learned Judge took the view that inasmuch as the vacant lands were situate in another street and separated by a lane, they could not by any stretch of imagination be considered to be appurtenant to the building. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the learned Judge. The facts of the present case will not warrant the application of the principle laid down in that case.
15. Mr. Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent draws my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanyal v. Gian Chand . That, case arose under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court to evict a tenant under Section l3(1)(e)(of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952) may be exercised only when the premises were let out for residential purposes, and not when the premises were let out for composite purposes viz., residential and non-residential purposes. While dealing with that question the Supreme Court observed that the contract of tenancy was a single and indivisible contract, and, in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it was not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting out for residential purposes and the other for non-residential purposes and to grant relief under the section in respect of that portion of the property which was being used for residential purposes, i.e., in respect of the portion to which the section would apply, I am of the opinion that in the present case the lease cannot be split up into two, as one of a lease of land and another as a lease of the building. In my view it is not even necessary to consider the question whether the land should be appurtenant to the building for the purpose of deciding whether the benefits of the Act can be extended to the tenant. As the Act will apply only to a case of lease of vacant land, it will not apply to a case of lease of land something else.
16. The Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act is applicable only to tenancies of land. Section 1(3) of the Act reads that the Act shall apply "only to tenancies of land..." The emphasis is on the word "only", and if the lease comprises something other than a land, the Act will not be applicable. That is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Sait v. J.M.S. Charity (1969) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 16. As there is sufficient evidence in this case to prove that what was leased out to the defendant was not merely a land but it comprised a building also, the defendant cannot invoke the benefits of the City Tenants' Protection Act.
17.Before concluding, I should refer to one other aspect of the matter. The lease deeds Exs. A1 and A7 entered into between the defendant's brother and the plaintiff are unregistered lease deeds. In the beginning of the argument learned Counsel for the defendant submitted that they being unregistered documents were not admissible in evidence. But he also fairly admitted that the objection was not raised in the Courts below. To this, the answer of Mr. Lakshminarayana Reddy is that the lease deeds do not require any registration as they contain a clause enabling the landlord to terminate the lease whenever it wants to do so. In both the lease deeds, there are clauses to the effect that whenever the landlord wanted the property for his purpose, the tenancy could be terminated and the tenant should vacate within a period of three months after the intimation from the landlord. Of course, it must be pointed out that both the lease deeds prescribe a period of three years as the life of the lease. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent if there is a clause which provides for termination of the lease at any time when the landlord so desires that would make it a tenancy at will and it will not require registration. He relies upon the decisions of this Court in Ratnasabhapathi v. Venkatachalam : Indian Decision New Series, 14 Mad. 271 and Chittilappalli Kochouseph . The former is that of a Division Bench. It was held by the Division Bench that if a lease deed contained a clause whereby the tenancy there under was absolutely determinable at any moment at the option of the lessor then the deed was not compulsorily registrable, notwithstanding that it also contained provisions for an "annual rental", and for, payment of "rent in advance each year". That decision has been followed by a single Judge in the latter case. There is also a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kishori v. Ram Swarup I.L.R. (1966) 1 All. 229 to the same effect. That was also a case where the lease deed fixed the annual rent but stipulated that in case of default the tenant would be liable to ejectment and that the lessor would always have a right to eject the tenant after giving him one month's notice. The Court held that the document did not require registration.
18. Hence the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant that Exs. A1 and A7 are not admissible in evidence for want of registration cannot be sustained.
19. I find that I have to agree with the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act. Both the second appeal and the civil revision petition fail and are dismissed. The appellant will pay costs of the respondent in the second appeal. There will be no order as to costs in the civil revision petition.
20. The appellant will have three months from to-day to hand over possession to the respondent in accordance with the decree passed by the lower appellate Court.