Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Vinod Kumar vs Revenue on 27 February, 2025
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Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
O.A. No.2862/2023
Reserved on: 03.02.2025
Pronounced on: 27.02.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Shri Vinod Kumar,
S/o Shri Norang Lal,
Aged 48 years,
Resident of 317, Adajan Income Tax Office,
Hazira Road Adajan, Surat Gujrat-395009.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. A. K. Behera, Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr.
Udit, Ms. Kashish and Mr. A. P. Singh )
Versus
1. Union of India through
The Secretary
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
North Block, New Delhi-110001.
2. Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance)
Dayal Singh Public Library Bldg.,
1, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg,
New Delhi-110002.
3. Department of Personnel and Training,
Through Secretary,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions,
Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the
Cabinet, Government of India.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. R. K. Jain)
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Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
ORDER
Per: Justice Ranjit More, Chairman:
By filing the present Original Application (OA) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-
"i. That this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to issue an order or direction quashing the Impugned Notification dated 05.06.2023 issued by the Respondents.
ii. That this Hon'ble Tribunal be please to issue an order or direction to re-draft the 'Promotion List for the post of Commissioner of Income Tax for the panel year 2023 issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, Government of India dated 30.12.2022' of the Applicants Batch.
iii. Pass any other orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case."
2. Brief and undisputed facts, giving rise to the present OA, are as follows:-
2.1 The applicant is an Indian Revenue Services (IRS) officer of the 2005 batch. In the year 2015, he was posted as Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (JCIT) Range 24(1), Mumbai. During this tenure, he was allotted an official mobile number (9969235099) by the office of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, which was extensively used for communication purposes. However, 3 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 the personal/private mobile number of the applicant was different from the official one.
2.2 On 21.11.2016, two incoming telephone calls were received on the official mobile number of the applicant, lasting for three seconds, followed by another incoming call of 23 seconds from mobile number (9829219646), which is alleged to belong to one Mr. Ram Kumar Soni, who allegedly owns a jewellery shop in Sikar, Rajasthan.
2.3 Subsequently, on 20.12.2016, an income tax search was conducted in the premises of the said Mr. Ram Kumar Soni, a business entity engaged in manufacturing and retail sale of jewelry. During the search, certain entries were discovered in a rokad/cash book (which are not the books of accounts), containing reference to different names, including:
i. Vinod ji Churu Income Tax, Deputy Commissioner Bombai ii. Vinod ji Income Tax iii. Vinod ji (ITO) iv. Vinod ji Praveen Income Tax v. Vinod ji Income Tax Nag (3) 2.4 Against the said different names, certain entries of alleged cash transactions were recorded in the rokad/cash 4 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 book on 28.11.2016, 03.12.2016, 06.12.2016, 06.12.2016, 14.12.2016 and 16.12.2016.
2.5 On 11.05.2018, i.e., nearly five months after the aforementioned search and seizure, the applicant, in the normal course, was promoted from Joint Commissioner to Additional Commissioner, and was posted in Surat, Gujrat.
2.6 On 11.07.2018, the Directorate of Income Tax (Vigilance) issued a version call notice to the applicant, calling for his version for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and for lapses noted during vigilance inspection of the work done while posted as JCIT, Range-24 (1), Mumbai during Financial Year 2016-2017. The applicant was called upon to explain the alleged cash transaction of Rs.80 lacs, as recorded against six different entries on 5 different dates. The allegation against him was that, while serving as Joint Commissioner of Income Tax Range 24(1), Mumbai, from 16.10.2015 to 09.06.2017, he had engaged in cash transaction of Rs.80 lacs for conversion of bank notes of Rs.500 and Rs.1000 with Mr. Ram Kumar Soni between 28.11.2016 and 16.12.2016. The said attribution was allegedly made by decoding the coded language used in the rokad/cash book of Mr. Ram Kumar Soni.5
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 2.7 In addition to the above, the applicant was called
upon to explain certain lapses and mistakes noted during the vigilance inspection of his work as JCIT Range 24(1), Mumbai, during the Financial Year 2016-17, particularly concerning seven quasi-judicial assessment orders. He submitted a reply to the version call notice on 05.02.2019, addressing each aspect elaborately.
2.8 On 30.12.2022, several of the applicant's batchmates, juniors, and seniors were promoted as Commissioner of Income Tax. However, despite being eligible and within the zone of consideration, he was not promoted, presumably due to the pending version call notice issued to him.
Consequently, his case for promotion was not considered. 2.9 Subsequently, on 05.06.2023, a memorandum of charge containing two articles of charge was issued to the applicant under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The two charges were unconnected to each other, and the same are as follows:
Article 1 of the charge pertained to the six entries against five different names in the rokad/cash book of Mr. Ram Kumar Soni. The respondents' department alleged that all five names referred to one individual, 6 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 i.e., the applicant and, based on this assumption, framed the charge after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 7 years.
Article 2 of the charge related to alleged lapses and mistakes in the quasi-judicial assessment orders passed by the applicant in the Financial Year 2016- 2017. The applicant contended that these orders had already been subjected to challenge under Income Tax Act, and had been upheld. He argued that the mere allegation of lapses and mistakes does not constitute a misconduct.
2.10 On 04.09.2023, the applicant submitted his reply to the memorandum of charge, inter alia, stating that:
The seven-year delay in issuing the memorandum of charge rendered it unsustainable in view of various judicial pronouncements.
He denied all allegations made against him.
As far as Article 2 of the charge was concerned, it pertained to quasi-judicial orders already upheld under the Income Tax Act. Thus, merely pointing out alleged lapses and mistakes did not amount to misconduct.7
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 2.11 Despite the aforesaid, the respondents are going ahead with the enquiry, and aggrieved by the same, the applicant has approached this Tribunal seeking the reliefs mentioned hereinabove.
3. Mr. A. K. Behera, learned senior counsel for the applicant, submitted that the applicant has approached this Tribunal seeking two specific and interconnected reliefs, namely:
(i) the denial of promotion to the grade of Commissioner as on 30.12.2022, when no charge memorandum was pending against him, which renders the respondents' action unsustainable in law;
and the grant of promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax for the panel year 2023 with all consequential benefits.
(ii) the applicant has sought quashing of the memorandum of charge dated 05.06.2023 on the ground that it has been issued after an inordinate and unexplained delay. Additionally, he has challenged Article 2 of the charge on the ground that it does not constitute misconduct under service jurisprudence. 8
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
4. Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, further submitted that the law relating to the promotion of an officer under cloud has already been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. K. V. Janakiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109, based on which the DoP&T OM dated 14.09.1992 was issued. He contended that the sealed cover procedure can be adopted only under the following three conditions:
a. If the officer is under suspension at the time his junior is promoted.
b. If there are any disciplinary proceedings pending, and c. If there is any criminal charge pending trial.
5. Admittedly, as on 30.12.2022, the applicant was not covered under any of these three disqualifications.
Therefore, he could not have been denied promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax. In support of this contention, Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the matter of Union of India vs. K. V. Janakiraman (1991) 4 SCC
109. 9
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
6. Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, further argued that both the articles of charge alleged against the applicant under the impugned charge memorandum are distinct from each other and were issued after inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately seven years. He submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court, various High Courts, and this Tribunal, in number of cases, have held that a charged officer cannot be expected to have a computer-like memory, and an inordinate delay in issuing charges prejudices the charged officer. To substantiate his arguments, Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, relied upon the following case laws:
i. UCO Bank vs. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, (2018) 14 SCC 92 ii. Dinesh Awasthi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. in W.P. No.4145/2019 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.
iii. Union of India vs. Central Administrative Tribunal in W.P. No.16651/2019 passed by the Madras High Court.
7. So far as Article 2 of the charge is concerned, Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, argued that the allegation 10 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 does not allege that the applicant passed any order with corrupt motive to favour any assessee. Instead, the entire charge is based on alleged lapses and mistakes. He further submitted that such allegations concerning quasi-judicial orders are not maintainable and the same cannot be construed as misconduct under service jurisprudence. In this regard, he relied upon the following judicial precedents:
i. Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India (1999) 7 SCC 409.
ii. Ramesh Chander Singh vs. High Court of Allahabad (2007) 4 SCC 247.
iii. Akshay Bipin vs. Union of India (2018) SCC Online Del 11624.
iv. Union of India vs. Akshay Bipin (20190 SCC Online Del 9525.
v. Union of India vs. P. Parameswaran (2008 SCC Online 1174.
vi. Union of India vs. S. Rajguru (2014) SCC Online Del 4123.
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Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 vii. Union of India vs. S. Rajguru in SLP (C) No.33895/2014 dismissed on 16.01.2015. viii. Dr. G. Shreekumar Menon Vs. Union of India (2009 SCC Online 324.
8. Mr. Behera, learned senior counsel, lastly submitted that the present OA is required to be allowed in terms of both prayers.
9. The respondents contested the OA by filing a counter affidavit/written statement. Mr. R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, at the outset, submitted that the instant OA is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed under Rule 10 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, as both reliefs claimed by the applicant arise from different causes of action. So far as the applicant's submissions concerning delay in issuing the charge sheet is concerned, Mr. Jain, learned counsel, relied upon the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision passed in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Jha, (2021) 12 SCC 460, particularly the observations made in para 15. He contended that Akhilesh Jha (supra) is a recent judgment delivered by three Judges Bench, and therefore, it prevails over the judgments relied upon by the applicants referred 12 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 to hereinabove. He further submitted that the chronology of steps taken by the respondents is annexed to the additional affidavit filed on 14.10.2024. Hence, it is wrong to say that the respondents had failed to explain the delay.
10. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, also relied upon the case of Union of India vs. Kunishetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28, and Shiv Narayana Singh Mehra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P. No.2592/2018 decided on 16.10.2025 by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court), to argue that the present OA challenging the charge sheet is not maintainable. Additionally, he also cited decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the matter of Union of India vs. K. K. Dhawan, (1993 (2) SCC 56, submitting that the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary action if there is proof that the Commissioner acted with gross recklessness in discharging his duties or failed to act honestly and in good faith.
11. Mr. Jain, learned counsel, further submitted that this Tribunal, in Alka Rajvanshi Jain vs. Union of India (O.A. No.1895/2018 vide order dated 20.04.2022), had dismissed a similar case in which the applicant therein had challenged charge sheet on the ground that she had acted 13 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 in quasi-judicial capacity. The said order of this Tribunal was affirmed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 17.10.2023 in W.P. (C) No. 10191/2022. Mr. Jain, learned counsel, lastly submitted that the present OA is devoid of merits and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
12. We have carefully examined the pleadings of the parties and have given due consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties. We will first deal with the applicant's prayer regarding the denial of promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income tax. The law relating to the promotion of an officer under cloud has already been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in K. V. Janakiraman (supra). In this case, the following questions came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court:
i. What is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against an employee?
ii. What is the course of action when the employee is held guilty in such proceedings, if the guilt merits a punishment other than dismissal?14
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 iii. To what benefits an employee, who is completely or partially exonerated entitled to, and from which date?
The Hon'ble Apex Court answered the first question as regards when disciplinary/criminal proceedings are considered to be pending against an employee by making the following observations:
"16. On the first question, viz., as to when for the purposes of the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to have com- menced, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a chargesheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that the departmental proceed- ings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to prepare and issue charge- memo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the purity of administration to reward the employee with a promotion, increment etc. does not impress us. The acceptance of this contention would result in injustice to the employees in many- cases. As has been the experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an inordinately long time and particularly when they are initi- ated at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/chargesheet. If the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordi- narily it slould not take much time to collect the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a ,remedy. It was then contended on behalf of the authorities that conclusions nos. 1 and 4 of the Full Bench of the Tribunal are inconsistent with each other. Those conclusions are as follows:15
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 "(1) consideration for promotion, selection grade, crossing the efficiency bar or higher scale of pay cannot be withheld merely on the ground of pendency of a disciplinary or crimi-nal proceedings against an official;
( ) ................................................ (4) the sealed cover procedure can be resorted only after a charge memo is served on the concerned official or the charge sheet filed before the criminal court and not before;"
17. There is no doubt that there is a seeming contradiction between the two conclusions. But read harmoniously, and that is what the Full Bench has intended, the two conclusions can be reconciled with each other. The conclusion no. 1 should be read to mean that the promotion etc. cannot be withheld merely because some disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against the employee. To deny the said benefit, they must be at the relevant time pending at the stage when charge- memo/charge-sheet has already been issued to the employee. Thus read, there is no inconsistency in the two conclusions.
18. We, therefore, repel the challenge of the appellant- authorities to the said finding of the Full Bench of the Tribunal."
13. In pursuance of the above decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the DoP&T issued an OM dated 14.09.1992, clarifying that the sealed cover procedure can be adopted in the following three contingencies:
i) Government servants under suspension;
ii) Government servants in respect of whom a charge sheet has been issued and the disciplinary proceedings are pending; and
iii) Government servants in respect of whom prosecution for a criminal charge is pending.
14. In the present case, the memorandum of charge which is impugned in the OA was admittedly issued only on 05.06.2023, i.e., nearly five months after the applicant's 16 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 juniors were promoted to the post of Commissioner. It is an undisputed fact that when the applicant's juniors were promoted on 30.12.2022, he was not covered under any of the conditions mentioned in K. V. Jankiraman (supra) or the contingencies contained in the DoP&T OM dated 14.09.1992.
15. In their counter affidavit, the respondents have taken a stand that the applicant's case was deferred in view of contemplated departmental proceedings against him. This stand is not acceptable, as there is no provision under the law that allows an officer's promotion to be deferred when he is not suffering from any of the aforesaid disabilities, even if his juniors have been promoted. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to promotion to the post in question from the date his juniors were promoted, along with all consequential benefits, of course subject to his being found fit.
16. We now deal with the challenge to the impugned memorandum of charge on the ground of inordinate delay. In Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, while considering the unexplained inordinate delay in issuing the charge sheet, made the following observations:
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Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 "12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by learned counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance.
13. What compounds the default on the part of the Bank is that Shukla was placed in a higher category as a Manager on 19 th July, 1994 while all these discussions were going on in the Bank. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar on 12th August, 1996 again while the discussions were going on. Surely, if the Bank was serious about proceeding against Shukla for misconduct, they would not only have taken prompt action in issuing a charge sheet but would not have granted him the benefit of being placed in a higher category or crossing the efficiency bar.
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19. Under the circumstances, we have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal filed by the Bank also on the ground that the punishment of dismissal could not have been imposed on Shukla after his superannuation."
17. The Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Dinesh Awasthi (supra), after surveying various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of inordinate delay, observed as under:
"8- Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the charge-sheet was issued on 12.05.2014 for the misconduct pertaining to the year 2002-03 and 2003-04. Thereafter, preliminary enquiry was also got conducted by the then Deputy Collector and District Vigilance Officer. Thereafter, no action was taken against the petitioner for more than 10 years. It is only in the year of 2014 charge-sheet 18 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 has been issued and the petitioner has been asked to participate in the enquiry and to conclude the same within a period of 03 months. Moreover, as per the notification No.C/5-2/87/3/11 dated 16.04.1987, the State Government has specifically asked all the departments to conclude the departmental enquiry within a year. Pendency of the departmental enquiry for more than 18 years has caused great prejudice to the petitioner and had to suffer mental agony as well as monetary loss. Hence, this case is squarely covered by the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Pratap Singh Chouhan (supra). No explanation for issuance of charge- sheet after a delay of more than 10 years has been putforth by the respondents in their reply."
18. The Hon'ble Madras High Court has also dealt with the issue of inordinate delay in issuing a charge memorandum in Union of India vs. Central Administrative Tribunal (supra), observing as under:
"7. In the present case on hand, though a complaint has been received from the Assessee immediately, there is no need to wait for seven long years to issue a charge memo and therefore, it is obvious that there is a delay in issuance of charge memo. It is true that the Hon-ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 3 SCC 157 in the case of Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excised Department Vs L.Srinivasan, while deciding the case of delay in issuance of charge memo, held that in the nature of charges, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. The matter may take time and that sufficient evidence have got to be taken before the issuance of charge memo and the limitation cannot be applicable in those cases and that the charge memo cannot be interfered on the ground of delay. But, at the same time, the present case on hand does not fall in that category for the simple reason that the Department, inspite of receipt of the complaint from the Assessee, failed to act upon it with an immediate effect, proceed with the enquiry by issuance of charge memo and the Department would have completed the said exercise well before seven years instead of sleeping over for seven years. In a recent judgment of the Hon-ble Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank and others Vs Rajendra Shankar 19 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 Shukla, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92, it was held in Paragraph Nos.12 & 13, which are extracted below:~ "12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submission made by the learned counsel. the first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge~sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge~sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance.
13. What compounds the default on the part of the Bank is that Shukla was placed in a higher category as a Manager on 19.07.1994 while all these discussions were going on in the Bank. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar on 12.08.1996 again while the discussions were going on. Surely, if the Bank was serious about proceeding against Shukla for misconduct, they would not only have taken prompt action in issuing a charge-sheet but would not have granted him the benefit of being placed in a higher category or crossing the efficiency bar."
8. In view of the above dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, we find substance in the argument advanced by the Applicant, who is the 2nd respondent herein and in view of the inordinate delay involved in issuance of charge memo, we are of the view that the order of the Tribunal is liable to be upheld."
19. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, heavily relied on Akhilesh Jha (supra) to argue that unless prejudice is shown, delay alone cannot be a ground to set aside the charge memorandum.
20. In Akhilesh Jha vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & anr., 2016 SCC OnLine CAT 4628, this Tribunal vide order 20 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 dated 05.01.2018 quashed the charge sheet mainly on the following three grounds:
i. There was a delay of nearly two years;
ii. The charges were ambiguous; and iii. The High Court had expunged the remarks on the basis of enquiry conducted by the Magistrate, which was held to enquire into the custodial death.
However, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Akhilesh Jha (supra), while quashing the aforesaid Tribunal's order made the following observations:
"The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in our view, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court."21
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
21. In our considered opinion, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Akhilesh Jha (supra) as relied upon by the respondents, is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, there was a delay of two years in the issuance of the memorandum of charge in disciplinary proceedings, whereas the cases cited by the applicant, as referred to hereinabove, are related to a delay of seven years in issuing the charge sheet. Moreover, there was no explanation for the inordinate delay whatsoever. It is the stand of the respondents that the delay is explained by filing an additional affidavit, in which the following observations have been made:
"a. That in the case of Ram Kumar Soni Group a search was conducted by the Investigation Wing, Jaipur on 20.12.2016. The DGIT (Inv.), Rajasthan, Jaipur, had shared with this office, information vide their letter dated 10.01.2018 in respect of public servants found to be associated with the said group. As per the information, the applicant, IRS (Mob. No. 9969235099) was one such public servant who was found to have undertaken transactions with the said group.
b. That subsequently, a Vigilance Inspection of the work done by the applicant, both as Assessing Officer (AO) as well as the Range Head for F.Y. 2016-17 was carried out. Vide report dated 08.06.2018 of ADG (V) WZ, certain lapses/irregularities were noticed on the part of the applicant.
c. That based on the report of ADG (V) WZ and first stage advice of the CVC, the Major Penalty Proceedings for lapses noted in the vigilance inspection and on the possession of assets, disproportionate to known sources of income was initiated against the applicant and the Charge Memorandum dated 05.06.2023 was issued. The Chronology of the case has been annexed as Annexure-A."22
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
22. On perusal of the above averments, we find that there is hardly any explanation, much less a satisfactory one.
Therefore, in the above circumstances, we are of the considered view that both the Articles of charge are liable to be quashed and set aside purely on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay of about seven years.
23. This leads us to consider the applicant's challenge to the second Article of charge concerning seven quasi-judicial orders passed by him in the Financial Year 2016-2017.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we will reproduce the position of law, as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, various High Courts, and this Tribunal, with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer discharging quasi-judicial/judicial functions.
24. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court made the following observations:
"41. When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits. But it cannot be said that by not levying the penalty the officer has favoured the assessee or shown undue favour to him. There has to be some basis for the disciplinary authority to reach such a conclusion even prima facie. Record in the present case does not show if the disciplinary authority had any information within its possession from where it could form an opinion that the appellant showed 'favour' to the assessee by not imposing the penalty. He may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction. But that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings for an officer while 23 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 he is acting as quasi judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal.
42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on an information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty.
43. If, every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi judicial officers like the appellant. Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on any legal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge- sheet, if sustained, will thus impinge upon the confidence and independent functioning of a quasi judicial authority. The entire system of administrative adjudication whereunder quasi judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings.
44. Considering whole aspects of the matter, we are of the view that it was not a case for initiation of any disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Charge of misconduct against him was not proper. It has to be quashed."
25. In Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court made the following observations:
"15. In Kashi Nath Roy v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240, this Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our system appellate and revisional courts have been set up with the 24 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 presupposition that the lower courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision making in law and in fact. The higher courts have been established to correct errors. In cases where intolerable error is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the error in an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of the court and independence of the judiciary. The higher court should convey its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed but clear and result oriented and rarely a rebuke.
xxxxxxx
17.In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881, this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the Judicial Officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Art. 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."
26. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Akshay Bipin (supra) made the following observations:
"27. The boundaries of permissible disciplinary action, against officers exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers, have been examined, and delineated, in a number of decisions.
28. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. U.O.I., (1999) 7 SCC 409, the Supreme Court, dealing with the said aspect observed as follows:
25
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 "40. When we talk of negligence in a quasi-judicial adjudication, it is not negligence perceived as carelessness, inadvertence or omission but as culpable negligence. This is how this Court in State of Punjab v. Ex- Constable Ram Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 54 interpreted "misconduct" not coming within the purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty. In the case of K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 the allegation was of conferring undue favour upon the assessees. It was not a case of negligence as such. In Upendra Singh case, (1994) 3 SCC 357 the charge was that he gave illegal and improper directions to the assessing officer in order to unduly favour the assessee. The case of K.S. Swaminathan, (1996) 11 SCC 498 was not where the respondent was acting in any quasi-judicial capacity. This Court said that at the stage of framing of the charge the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the court to see whether they support the charge of the alleged misconduct. In M.S. Bindra case, (1998) 7 SCC 310 where the appellant was compulsorily retired this Court said that judicial scrutiny of an order imposing premature compulsory retirement is permissible if the order is arbitrary or mala fide or based on no evidence. Again in the case of Madan Mohan Choudhary, (1999) 3 SCC 396 which was also a case of compulsory retirement this Court said that there should exist material on record to reasonably form an opinion that compulsory retirement of the officer was in public interest. In K.N. Ramamurthy case, (1997) 7 SCC 101 it was certainly a case of culpable negligence. One of the charges was that the officer had failed to safeguard government revenue. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. Case (1969) 2 SCC 627 it was said that where proceedings are quasi-judicial penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party charged had acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. This Court has said that the penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful so to do. In the present case, it is not that the appellant did not impose penalty because of any negligence on his part but he said it was not a case of imposition of penalty. We are, however, of the view that in a case like this which was being adjudicated upon by the appellant imposition of penalty was imperative. But then, there is nothing wrong or improper on the part of the appellant to form an opinion that imposition of penalty was not mandatory. We have 26 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 noticed that the Patna High Court while interpreting Section 325 IPC held that imposition of penalty was not mandatory which again we have said is not a correct view to take. A wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for misconduct. Of course it is a different matter altogether if it is deliberate and actuated by mala fides.
41. When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits. But it cannot be said that by not levying the penalty the officer has favoured the assessee or shown undue favour to him. There has to be some basis for the disciplinary authority to reach such a conclusion even prima facie. The record in the present case does not show if the disciplinary authority had any information within its possession from where it could form an opinion that the appellant showed "favour" to the assessee by not imposing the penalty. He may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction. But that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an officer while he is acting as a quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi-judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal.
42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty.
43. If every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers like the appellant. Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on any legal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi-judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the nature of some 27 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 extraneous consideration influencing the quasi-judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge- sheet, if sustained, will thus impinge upon the confidence and independent functioning of a quasi- judicial authority. The entire system of administrative adjudication whereunder quasi-judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings." (Emphasis supplied) xxxxxxxx
30. Subsequently, however, another bench, of three Hon‟ble judges, reiterated Nagarkar (supra), in Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad, (2007) 4 SCC 247. The following passages, from the said judgment, crystallize the legal position:
"11. We fail to understand as to how the High Court arrived at a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings solely based on the complaint, the contents of which were not believed to be true by the High Court. If the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. The appellant officer was well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in the TADA Act or the NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this power freely and independently.
12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking 28 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution.
13. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of P&H, (1988) 3 SCC 370, this Court observed that while exercising control over subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect subordinate judicial officers. An honest and strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints are entertained in trifling matters and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel secure and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect honest judicial officers by ignoring ill- conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
14. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540 where the High Court reversed the order passed by the lower court making remarks about interestedness and motive of the lower court in passing the unmerited order, this Court observed that one of the functions of the higher court is either to modify or set aside erroneous orders passed by the lower courts. Our legal system acknowledges fallibility of judges. It has to be kept in mind that a subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure-- contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. He does not enjoy the detached atmosphere of the higher court. Every error, however gross it may be, should not be attributed to improper motives. The Judges of the High Court have a responsibility to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. No greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary if the higher courts express lack of faith in the subordinate judiciary for some reason or the other. That amounts to destruction of judiciary from within.
15. In Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar, (1996) 4 SCC 539, this Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our system appellate and revisional courts have been set up with the presupposition that the lower courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision- making in law and in fact. The higher courts have been established to correct errors. In cases where intolerable error is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the 29 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 error in an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of the court and independence of the judiciary. The higher court should convey its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed but clear and result oriented and rarely a rebuke.
16. In a series of other cases also, this Court disfavoured the practice of passing strictures or orders against the subordinate officers. (See Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India, (1997) 4 SCC 65; Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 453.)
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409 this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. It is relevant to note that, though it did not specifically deal with the case of an allegedly delinquent quasi-judicial or judicial officer, another Bench of the Supreme Court, albeit of two Hon‟ble judges, categorically approved Nagarkar (supra), in Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt of N.C.T. of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC
566.
32. All these decisions were noted and considered, by a Division Bench of this Court, in U.O.I. v. S. Rajguru, MANU/DE/1941/2014. The Articles of Charge, against the allegedly delinquent respondent in that case, read thus: 30
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 "ARTICLE-I Shri S. Rajguru, while functioning as Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Kochi, committed irregularity in the appeal order passed by him on 01.09.2005 in the case of M/s. Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. (Block Period 01.04.1996 to 09.10.2002) by deleting additions which had been made by the assessing officer without proper verification of the facts and examination of records.
By his aforesaid act, Shri S. Rajguru failed to maintain devotion to duty and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the CSS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE-II Shri S. Rajguru, while functioning as Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Kochi committed irregularity in the appeal order passed by him on 25.08.2005 in the case of M/s. Skyline Builders (AY 2002-
03) by allowing the assessee's appeal in disregard of the provisions of section 145(3) of the I.T. Act, 1961. By his aforesaid act, Shri S. Rajguru failed to maintain devotion to duty and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE-III Shri S. Rajguru, while functioning as Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Kochi committed irregularity in the appeal order passed by him on 23.08.2005 in the case of Shri M.M. Rasheed (Block Period- 01.04.1989 to 17.09.1998) by deleting additions which had been made by the assessing officer without proper verification of the facts and examination of records. By his aforesaid act, Shri S. Rajguru failed to maintain devotion to duty and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE-IV Shri S. Rajguru, while functioning as Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-II, Kochi committed irregularity in the appeal order passed by him on 01.09.2005 in the case of Shri Jose Cyriac (Block Period- 01.04.1989 to 23.09.1998) by allowing the assessee's appeal in disregard of the directions given by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in its order dtd. 30.07.2003. By his aforesaid act, Shri S. Rajguru failed to maintain devotion to duty and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
(Emphasis supplied)
31
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
32. In view of the above discussion, the impugned memorandum/chargesheet dated 28th March, 2018, issued to the petitioner, as also all proceedings that follow thereupon, are held to be unsustainable on facts as well as in law and, consequently, quashed and set aside."
The aforesaid Single Bench decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was upheld by the Division Bench in LPA 428/2019.
27. In P. Parameswaran (supra), the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Madras High Court made the following observations:
"10. In Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and another [2007 (4) SCC 247, the Nagarkar's case came to be considered. Speaking for the three Judges Bench, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ observed in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows:
Para 12: "This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution."
11. In the same judgment, while referring to Nagarkar's case, in paragraph 17, it was observed as follows:
Para 17: "In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his 32 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level. But, however, there was no reference to Duli Chand's case in this decision."
12. Once again, another two Judges Bench in Inspector Prem Chand v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others [2007 (4) SCC 566] considered the decision in Nagarkar's case. While referring to Nagarkar's case, the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 observed as follows:
Para 15: "A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has been made out against him. This Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India has categorically held:
42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty."
28. In Sh. S. Rajguru (supra), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court made the following observations:33
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 "25. It can be seen from the above that the gravamen of the charges levelled against the respondent are not based on his conduct. Although it has been alleged that certain decisions rendered indicate a lack of devotion to duty, but a bare perusal of the statement of imputation and the Articles of Charge indicate that the gravamen of the charges is only that the respondent had rendered decisions which, according to the Revenue, were erroneous. This is certainly not the basis on which the proceedings for misconduct can be commenced against a officer who is charged with a quasi-judicial function. In K.K. Dhawan's case (supra) there was a specific allegation that the Officer had completed the assessment "apparently with a view to confer to undue favour upon the assessee's concern". The test laid down by the Supreme Court in that case must be read in the context of the facts placed before the Court. Although, the Court had held that where an officer had acted in a manner which would reflect upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, a disciplinary action could be initiated.
However, an act of an Officer which would reflect on his devotion to duty must be read in the context of his conduct and not the correctness of the decisions rendered by him in a multi-tiered appellate structure. The conduct of an officer must be alleged to be one, which reflects recklessness or complete disregard for the function that he is performing. Mere erroneous decisions on account of a mistake of law or facts, cannot be the basis of commencing proceedings for misconduct.
26. The decision in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) cannot be read to mean that misconduct proceedings can be commenced, alleging lack of devotion of duty, in cases where the decisions rendered by quasi-judicial authority are alleged to be erroneous. There has to be something more than mere allegation of erroneous decisions to charge an employee for misconduct; the conduct of an employee must be alleged to be reckless or for motives. In absence of such imputations, a charge made solely on the basis of a decision rendered by a quasi-judicial authority would not be sustainable.
28. The petitioner's contention that the tribunal erred in relying on the statement of law in Nagarkar (supra) as the law stated by the Supreme Court in that case is no longer good law, also cannot be accepted. In the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court referred to the decision in the case of Nagarkar (supra) and held as under:-
"17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India [(1999) 7 SCC 409] this Court held that wrong exercise of 34 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."
29. It is relevenat to note that the decision in Ramesh Chand Singh (supra) was delivered by a bench of three judges on 26.02.2007, is subsequent to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Duli Chand (supra)."
29. In Dr. G. Sreekumar Menon (supra), the Hon'ble Madras High Court made the following observations:
"16. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2007) 4 SCC 247 (RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD AND ANOHER) has observed as follows :-
"17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi- judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the 35 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."
(Emphasis added)
30. We have examined Article 2 of the memorandum of charge and also reviewed the statement of imputation in respect of this article. The allegation in Article 2 is not that the applicant passed any order with a corrupt motive to favour any assessee; rather, the entire article is based on the allegations of lapses and mistakes simpliciter. In light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court and various High Courts, as reproduced hereinabove, we are of the opinion that such allegations in respect of quasi- judicial orders are not maintainable, as the same cannot be construed as misconduct in service jurisprudence. At this stage, we must take note of the applicant's argument that, out of seven quasi-judicial orders which were the subject matter of the second Article of Charge, in four cases, the orders passed by the applicant were upheld by Principal 36 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 CIT, and three of them are pending before higher authorities.
31. We must refer to the decision of this Tribunal in O.A. No.1895/2018, titled Alka Rajvanshi Jain vs. Union of India, wherein this Tribunal, vide order dated 20.04.2022, dismissed the case of the applicant therein regarding the challenge to the charge sheet on the ground that the applicant therein had acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. This order of this Tribunal was further upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 17.10.2023, in W.P. (C) No.10191/2022.
32. We have examined the decision of this Tribunal in the matter of Alka Rajvanshi Jain (supra) as well as the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on the said subject. It is true that the challenge in this OA to the charge sheet was on the ground that the applicant had acted in a quasi-judicial capacity, which was dismissed by this Tribunal and upheld by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. However, these decisions are distinguishable on the following three counts:
i. The allegations in this case pertained to the disposal of the appeal by the applicant on 13.02.2015. The 37 Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023 applicant was given notice on 06.04.2016 by the respondents, calling upon her to submit her version in connection with the said appeal, and thereafter, a charge memorandum was issued on 26.09.2017.
Therefore, the charge sheet was issued within the period of two years.
ii. In this case, the enquiry had already been completed, and the UPSC's advice regarding the misconduct of the applicant had already been examined. Accordingly, the approval of the disciplinary authority had already been obtained.
iii. This was a case of culpable negligence and failure to maintain absolute devotion to duty.
vi. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the Division Bench of this Tribunal, relying upon the decision in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra), held that if an order passed by an officer reveals culpable negligence while discharging quasi- judicial functions, then such conduct can be made the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings.38
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
33. Before rendering any judgment on the subject matter, we must refer to the following decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents:
a. Union of India vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayan, (2006) 12 SCC 28.
b. Shiv Narayan Singh Mehra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No.2592/2018 decided on 16.10.2025 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh. c. Union of India vs. K. K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC
56. Since we have concluded that lapses and mistakes do not constitute misconduct unless there is an element of quid pro quo alleged, the aforementioned decisions have no application in the present facts and circumstances of the case.
34. Insofar as the preliminary objection of the respondents that the OA is not maintainable on the ground of multiple reliefs prayed for by the applicant under Rule- 10 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 is concerned, we are of the view that since the reliefs claimed by the applicant are inter-linked, the same is overruled.
39
Item No.15 (C-1) O.A. No. 2862/2023
35. Having considered the totality of the facts and circumstances, we dispose of the present OA by passing the following order:
a. The impugned order dated 05.06.2023 is quashed and set aside.
b. The respondents are directed to convene a Review DPC to consider the case of the applicant for promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax. In the event he is found fit, he shall be granted promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax on notional basis from the date his immediate juniors were promoted to the said post, and actually from the date of his joining the said post, along with all consequential benefits.
c. This exercise shall be completed within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.
d. Pending MAs, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Justice Ranjit More) Member (A) Chairman /yy/