Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.08.2025 vs State Of H.P on 18 September, 2025
2025:HHC:32441 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 138 of 2015 Reserved on: 28.08.2025 .
Date of Decision: 18.09.2025
Basso Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 28.02.2015, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Circuit Court at Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) whereby the judgment of conviction dated 26.08.2008 and order of sentence dated 27.08.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CISPage |2 2025:HHC:32441 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that informant Dalip Singh (PW-1) was handed over a warrant of attachment. He, alongwith Kusum Lata (PW-3) went to the house of Bihari Lal, judgment-debtor. At that time, Basso Devi (the present accused) was present at her residence. The informant inquired the accused about Bihari Lal, and she replied that Bihari Lal had gone to work. The informant apprised the accused about the warrants of attachment, and the accused dared the informant to attach the property. She abused him and threatened to beat him with a shoe. Consequently, the warrant could not be executed due to the conduct of the accused.
3. The informant made a report (Ext.PW5/B) to the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Baijnath, who held that the matter required investigation by the police. HC Sampuran Singh (PW-4) conducted the investigation. He recorded the statements ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS Page |3 2025:HHC:32441 of witnesses as per their version and filed a complaint before the Court.
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4. Learned Trial Court found sufficient grounds to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to her for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. She pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Dalip Singh (PW-1) is the informant, Dalip Kumar (PW-2) and Kusum Lata (PW-3) are the eyewitnesses, Suresh Bhardwaj (PW-4) is the Additional Ahlmad, who prepared the report, and Sampuran Singh (PW-4) conducted the investigation.
6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the proceedings were pending against her husband for the recovery of the money. She admitted that the Court had issued the warrant of attachment of moveable property.
She admitted that she had told the informant that her husband had gone to work. She denied the rest of the prosecution's case. She stated that her husband had supported the Pardhan's rival candidate, the witnesses belong to the same department, and she ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS Page |4 2025:HHC:32441 had met the informant outside her home. She did not produce any defence evidence.
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7. Learned Trial Court held that the informant's testimony was duly supported by independent witnesses. Their statements established that the accused had obstructed a public official in the discharge of his official duty and had abused him. Hence, the accused was convicted for the commission of offences punishable follows:
r to under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC and was sentenced as Section Sentence 186 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month 189 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, to pay a fine of ₹500/-
and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month.
Both sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.
8 Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS Page |5 2025:HHC:32441 that the accused had obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duty. There was no reason why the witnesses would .
depose falsely against the accused. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
9. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below misread and misappreciated the evidence. The accused was falsely implicated. The informant and decree holder were working in the same office. The husband of the accused had political differences with the Pardhan, and she had a motive to depose against the accused. There were major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which were ignored by the learned Courts below. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
10. I have heard Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
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11. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the offence punishable under .
Section 186 of IPC is non-cognisable and the Court could not have taken cognisance of its commission without a complaint in writing of a public servant concerned or the public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Section 189 of IPC was committed in the course of the same transaction, and it was impermissible to r to split the offences and take cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC. The learned Courts below proceeded without jurisdiction. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission:
Devendra Kumar vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr 2025 INSC 1009;
State of H.P. vs. Neeraj Sharma 2019:HHC:3788; and Amit Agarwal & another vs. State of H.P. & others 2023:HHC 889.
12. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC is cognisable and the police ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS Page |7 2025:HHC:32441 could have filed the complaint in the matter. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
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13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS
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15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC .
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
"14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
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13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an .
interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 10 2025:HHC:32441 power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on .
the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 11 2025:HHC:32441 or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the .
courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
19. The police filed a complaint under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC against the accused regarding a single incident transaction in which the accused had obstructed the informant from executing the warrant issued by the Court. Section 195(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 12 2025:HHC:32441 offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of IPC (both inclusive) except upon a complaint in writing made by the public servant .
concerned, or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. In the present case, the informant had not made any written complaint to the learned Trial Court.
Learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, to whom the informant was administratively subordinate, had also not filed any complaint before the learned Trial Court. Instead the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, passed an order directing the Superintendent of Police, Kangra, H.P., to investigate the matter. Pursuant thereto, police investigated the case and filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court. It was impermissible as the CrPC mandates that the complaint must be filed by the concerned public servant and not by the police. A similar provision exists in the Antiquities and Arts Act, 1972, which prohibits a Court from taking cognisance except upon a written complaint. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka vs. P Gopalakrishna Panikar, ILR 1991 Kant. 1539, that cognisance cannot be taken on a police report. It was observed:
"3. It may be noticed that Section 26(2) of the Act puts a blanket bar against cognisance of the offences punishable under Section 2 or Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act by ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 13 2025:HHC:32441 any Court except upon the complaint in writing made by an officer generally or specially authorised in that behalf by the Central Government. As we are on the aspect of prosecution of the offender and also the Court taking cognisance of the .
same, we should take it that the word "complaint" in this Section has been used as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the 'complaint' as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action under the Code that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. The way in which the word complaint is defined herein would make it clear that any report made by the aggrieved person to the police requesting them to take action cannot be construed as a complaint as defined in the Code. The learned Magistrate has taken cognisance of the offence only on the report made by the concerned police after investigation of the report made to them. Therefore, it is clear that the learned Magistrate has taken cognisance of the offence under Section 27(2) of the Act, not on the complaint as enjoined in Section 26(2) of the Act, but on the report of the police under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is clear that the very taking cognisance of the offence under the provisions of the Act is illegal. In that view of the matter, we do not propose to deal with the merits of the case so far as the violation of the provisions of the Act is concerned.
20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court could not have taken cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC based on the police complaint.
21. It was submitted that the offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC was cognisable; the Court could have taken its cognisance, and a conviction recorded under Section 189 of the IPC is not bad. This submission is not acceptable. As per the ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 14 2025:HHC:32441 prosecution's case, both the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC were committed in the course of the same .
transactions. In State of Himachal Pradesh versus Hirda Ram 1998 (1) Crimes (HC) 89, a complaint was filed for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 181, 420 and 468 of IPC. This Court held that no cognizance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of IPC could have been taken based on the police challan because of the prohibition contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:-
[9] Admittedly, the respondent was sent up for trial for the offences under Sections 181, 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it is relevant for the present case, reads:
1. No Court shall take cognisance (i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence. Except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.
The offence under Section 181 of the Indian Penal Code falls within the ambit of clause (a) (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted above. Therefore, no court could have taken cognisance of such an offence except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.
::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CISP a g e | 15 2025:HHC:32441 [10] In the present case, admittedly, no complaint in writing has been made to the Court by the concerned public servant or by some other public servant to whom such concerned public servant is subordinate. The cognisance taken by the .
Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of the police report submitted to him under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such cognisance was, therefore, bad and the entire trial of the respondent stood Vitiated."
22. It was contended that the Court could have taken cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC, as these were cognisable. However, this submission was not accepted, and it was held that it is not permissible for the Court to split up the challan and take cognisance of the commission of a cognizable offence while leaving the non-cognisable offence. It was observed:-
"[11] It was contended by the learned. Assistant Advocate General that even though the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence under Section 181, Indian Penal Code on the basis of a police report in view of the specific bar under Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate was fully competent and justified in taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 420 and 468, Indian Penal Code which are not covered by the bar envisaged under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention raised by the learned Assistant Advocate General is without any merit.
[12] In Jit Kumar v. The State of Punjab 1987 SLJ 156, a police challan for the offences under Sections 186, 353 and 379, the Indian Penal Code was put up for trial against the accused therein. It was held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana that since the Court could not take cognizance for an offence punishable under Section 186, Indian Penal Code in view of ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 16 2025:HHC:32441 the specific bar provided under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court could not have also entertained the challan in respect of the offences under Sections 353 and 379, Indian Penal Code as well since it was .
composite challan. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy and another AIR 1981 SC 1417, also had the occasion to deal with a similar situation and it was held that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by the court is necessary under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which such a complaint to the Court is necessary, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.
[13] In the present case, as well, the offences under Sections 181, 420, and 468 of the Indian Penal Code are alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, and a composite challan in respect of the three offences was submitted by the police under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, before the learned Magistrate. Therefore, such a police challan cannot be split up, and it cannot be said that the prosecution of the respondent for the offences not mentioned in Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was valid and is to be upheld.
[14] Consequently, the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the offence in view of the specific bar under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the entire trial of the respondent stood vitiated. The acquittal of the respondent, as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi, has, therefore, to be upheld."
23. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1753 that where the facts disclosed an offence for which a complaint of the Court or the public servant is required, it is not ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 17 2025:HHC:32441 permissible to evade Section 195 of Cr.P.C. by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other Section. It was .
observed:
"41...However, the position may be different when, during the course of the same transaction, offences falling within the two categories are committed. In such cases, it may not be possible to split up the transaction, and to hold that there can be valid prosecution for offences not mentioned in Section 195 of the Cr. P.C., without the written complaint of the public authority or the court, as the case may be. Courts must be able to see through any attempt to render Section 195 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory by hiding the real nature of the transaction by verbal jugglery. If, in principle and substance, the offence alleged falls within the categories mentioned in Section 195, the operation of the bar cannot be avoided; if, in essence, the alleged offence falls outside the categories, the bar would not operate. At the same time, if the facts give rise to distinct offences, some attracting the operation of Section 195 and others not so, the bar can operate only regarding the former and not regarding the latter.
42. Therefore, the courts must ascertain whether during the course of a single transaction, the offences falling within both categories are committed, in which case it would be difficult to split up the offences or whether there are two different transactions which occur successively, nevertheless separately and distinctively, in which case the offences may be split up. Another aspect that may be looked into is whether, apart from the offences committed in contempt of the lawful authority of public servants, or against public justice or relating to documents given in evidence which fall under the scope of Section 195 Cr. P.C., the other distinct offences are of such a nature that private individuals are aggrieved. In such a scenario, it would not be reasonable to bar a private prosecution by the aggrieved individual for the ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 18 2025:HHC:32441 reason that the public official or the court concerned has also not instituted a complaint.
43. Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr. P.C. bars the court from taking cognisance of the offence punishable under .
Section 186 I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant for voluntarily obstructing him from the discharge of his public functions. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of voluntarily obstructing a public servant from discharging his public functions. The court lacks competence to automatically take cognisance of certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill-will or frivolity of disposition and also to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 Cr. P.C. that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognisance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in the Cr. P.C. like sections 196 and 198 respectively do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognisance of an offence described in those Sections. [See: Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar, (1971) 3 SCC 329: AIR 1971 SC 1708; Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376: AIR 1971 SC 1935; Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2005) 7 SCC 352; Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370: AIR 2005 SC 2119]
44. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance of Section 195 Cr. P.C. or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS
P a g e | 19 2025:HHC:32441 Haq (supra) and Durgacharan Naik (supra), this Court cautioned that the provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of I.P.C., though in truth and .
substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Cr. P.C. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
24. In the present case, the offences were committed against the public servant in discharge of his official duties and could not have been split up to evade the bar created under Section 195 of the CrPC.
25. Therefore, the learned Courts below overlooked the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C., and the judgments and order passed by them cannot be sustained.
26. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the judgment of conviction dated 26.08.2008 and order of sentence dated 27.08.2008 passed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court vide judgment dated 28.02.2015, are set aside and the accused is discharged of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused, be refunded to her after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS P a g e | 20 2025:HHC:32441 appeal, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
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27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
28. In view of the above, the present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
29. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th September,2025 (ravinder) ::: Downloaded on - 18/09/2025 21:51:14 :::CIS