Madhya Pradesh High Court
Krishn Kumar Manjhi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 December, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224
1 WP-10769-2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
ON THE 4 th OF DECEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 10769 of 2020
KRISHN KUMAR MANJHI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ajeet Kumar Singh - Advocate and Shri Sampat Lal Kushwah -
Advocate through Video Conferencing.
Shri Gaurav Maheshwari - Advocate for Respondents no.2 to 4.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs :-
"(i) It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 6.7.2020, passed by the Respondent No.3, and direct the respondents to give compassionate appointment to the petitioner within a fixed period.
(ii) This Hon'ble Court be further pleased to pass any such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case."
2. It is the case of the petitioner that father of petitioner died in harness on 01.08.2001. It is submitted that earlier when the petitioner was minor, mother of the petitioner had approached this Court by filing W.P.No.62/2003(S) and this Court had disposed of the petition vide order dated 1.4.2004 directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner whenever the Scheme comes in force. It is submitted that the respondents had issued the compassionate appointment scheme in the year 2013 and on Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 2 WP-10769-2020 the basis of said policy, the petitioner, being the son, became major, had applied for grant of compassionate appointment on 8.4.2015 with all requisite documents. When the respondents had not taken any decision on the application, the petitioner filed W.P.No.5181/2020, which was disposed of vide order dated 3.3.2020 with direction to the respondents to decide the representation of the petitioner dated 8.4.2015 within three months. It is submitted that in compliance to the aforesaid order, the respondent no.3 has rejected the application filed by the petitioner vide impugned order on the ground that father of the petitioner was working in the erstwhile Gramin Vidyut Sahakari Samiti Amarpatan and died on 1.8.2001, whereas the said society had been taken over/acquired by the erstwhile M.P.E.B. on 15.8.2010, therefore, as per clause 1.1(iii) at the time when father of the petitioner died, he was not the employee of the MPSEB/Company, therefore, compassionate appointment could not be granted to the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per clause 1.2 of the Compassionate appointment policy, 2018, the employees who died due to sudden accident, electric accident, attack or vehicle accident, between 15.11.2020 and 10.4.2012 while working in the M.P. State Electricity Board/Company, then one of their dependents would be entitled for compassionate appointment as per clause 2 and 3 of the policy. He further submits that the petitioner continuously pursing his claim for grant of compassionate appointment, therefore, there is no delay in filing the application for grant of compassionate appointment.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 3 WP-10769-2020 the prayer and submitted that the application was filed belatedly with delay of around 7 years. The policy for compassionate appointment came into force in the year 2013. The petitioner's mother for the first time applied for compassionate appointment after death of father. At that point of time there was no Scheme for the employees of the society. Thus, this court in W.P.No.62/2003(S) filed by mother of the petitioner had directed that in case such Scheme is floated, mother of the petitioner may apply. But, thereafter petitioner being the son had applied in the year 2015. The present petition has been filed in the year 2020. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs. Debabrata Tiwari and Ors. Etc., decided on 3rd March, 2023 in Civil Appeal Nos.8842-8855 of 2022 in which it has been held as under:-
"7.2. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 4 WP-10769-2020 which can be exercised at any time in future.
Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source.
7.3. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration.
7.4. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter.
7.5. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 5 WP-10769-2020 financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this 6 W.P.No.19868/2023 Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.
8. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 PC 221 as under:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 6 WP-10769-2020 Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:
"9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC vs. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
9. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 7 WP-10769-2020 apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were made:
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time."
(emphasis by us) *******
13. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to the authorities of the Appellant-State as well as the Respondents-Writ Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the Respondents-Writ Petitioners have been able to eke out a living even though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this is therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the Respondents-Writ Petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained. "
7. Father of the petitioner had died in harness in the year 2001, and the petitioner had applied for appointment on compassionate ground in the year 2015. It is well established principle of law that if a family can survive for a considerable long time after the demise of breadwinner then the very purpose for grant of appointment on compassionate ground would automatically get frustrated. Fourteen long years have passed and the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be treated as an alternative mode of regular appointment. Appointment on compassionate ground is given by way of solace to the dependents of the deceased employee so that they may overcome the financial crunch on account of untimely demise of their breadwinner.Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 8 WP-10769-2020
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Arvindkumar T.Tiwari (2012) 9 SCC 545 has held that the compassionate appointment is not a vested right. Compassionate appointment is for the urgent financial need and survival of the family after the death of the government employee. It is held as under :
"8. It is a settled legal proposition that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is not simply another method of recruitment. A claim to be appointed on such a ground, has to be considered in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions governing the subject, taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. Such a category of employment itself, is an exception to the constitutional provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16, which provide that there can be no discrimination in public employment. The object of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased to overcome the sudden financial crisis it finds itself facing, and not to confer any status upon it. (Vide: Union of India & Ors. v. Shashank Goswami & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2294)."
9 . Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary to Government, Department of Education (Primary) and others vs. Bheemesh @ Bheemappa (2021) 20 SCC 707 has held :
"18. ... This is fundamentally due to the fact that compassionate appointment was always considered to be an exception to the normal method of recruitment and perhaps looked down upon with lesser compassion for the individual and greater concern for the rule of law.
19. If compassionate appointment is one of the conditions of service and is made automatic upon the death of an employee in harness without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the same would be treated as a vested right in law. But it is not so. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict scrutiny of various parameters including the financial position of the family, the economic dependence of the family upon the deceased employee and the avocation of the other members of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 9 WP-10769-2020 family. Therefore, no one can claim to have a vested right for appointment on compassionate grounds. This is why some of the decisions which we have tabulated above appear to have interpreted the applicability of revised Schemes differently, leading to conflict of opinion. Though there is a conflict as to whether the Scheme in force on the date of death of the employee would apply or the Scheme in force on the date of consideration of the application of appointment on compassionate grounds would apply, there is certainly no conflict about the underlying concern reflected in the above decisions. Wherever the modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this Court applied those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable."
(emphasis supplied) 1 0 . Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority Of India Limited vs Gouri Devi (2022) 17 SCC 531, has held thus :
10. As held by this Court in Punjab State Power Corpn.
Ltd. v. Nirval Singh [Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Nirval Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 774 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 210] delay in pursuing claim/approaching court would militate against claim for compassionate appointment as very objective of providing immediate amelioration to family would stand extinguished. Before this Court, there was a delay of 07 years in approaching the Court and this Court observed and held that on the ground of delay itself, the heir/dependant of the deceased employee shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate ground.
11. In State of J&K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir [State of J&K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1195] , this Court had occasion to consider the delay and laches in case of appointment on compassionate ground. By dismissing the claim for appointment on compassionate ground, which was made after a period of four-and-a-half years of death of the deceased employee, it was held that appointment on compassionate ground is an exception to general rule that appointment to public office should be made on the basis of competitive merits. It is further observed that once it is proved that in spite of the death of the breadwinner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no need to make appointment on compassionate ground at the cost of the interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.
12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 10 WP-10769-2020 applying the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions and considering the fact that in the present case the second application was made after a period of 18 years, the impugned judgment and order [SAIL v. Central Administrative Tribunal, 2021 SCC OnLine Ori 2509] passed by the High Court and that of the Central Administrative Tribunal directing the appellant to re- consider the case of the second son of the respondent is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside and accordingly the same are hereby quashed and set aside. It is observed and held that the second son of the respondent shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate ground as observed and held by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment and order [SAIL v. Central Administrative Tribunal, 2021 SCC OnLine Ori 2509] . Present appeal is allowed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs."
11. In the present case, father of the petitioner was working in the erstwhile Gramin Vidyut Sahakari Samiti Amarpatan and died in harness on 1.8.2001 whereas the said society had been taken over by the erstwhile M.P.E.B. on 15.8.2010, therefore, at the time when father of the petitioner died, he was not the employee of the MPSEB/Company. The policy for grant of compassionate appointment came into force in the year 2013 and the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment on 8.4.2015. Thereafter, the policy was modified and amended policy came in vogue vide order dated 27.7.2018, annexure P/6. However, the application of the petitioner remained pending. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred W.P.No.5181/2020 which was disposed of vide order dated 3.3.2020, annexure P/7, with direction to the respondents to decide the application of the petitioner dated 8.4.2015 within three months. By way of impugned order, the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment has been rejected.
12. The contention of the petitioner that clause 1.2 of the 2018 policy would be applicable in the case of the petitioner is unsustainable in law as Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 11 WP-10769-2020 clause 1.2 specifically provides for the benefit of appointment to the employees of M.P. State Electricity Board/Company who died in harness between 15.11.2000 and 10.4.2012 whereas father of the petitioner at the time of his death was the employee of Gramin Vidyut Sahakari Samiti, which got merged with the MPSEB vide order dated 15.8.2010. Thus, in any case, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to avail the benefit of the policy floated by the MPSEB/Company. Moreover, as per the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Bheemesh (supra); wherever the modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this Court applied those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable.
13. Under these circumstances and in view of the preposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondents have rightly held that the petitioner is not entitled for grant of compassionate appointment as father of the petitioner died in harness on 1.8.2001 when he was not the employee of the MPSEB/Company and, therefore, the policy is not applicable to him. Moreover, since the family survived for a considerable long period of time after the death of breadwinner, the very purpose of appointment on compassionate ground has already stood frustrated, accordingly, no case is made out warranting interference.
14. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(DEEPAK KHOT) JUDGE Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:63224 12 WP-10769-2020 HS Signature Not Verified Signed by: HEMANT SARAF Signing time: 12/15/2025 5:58:15 PM