Madhya Pradesh High Court
Runabai And Ors. vs Mannalal And Ors. on 13 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003ACJ1493
JUDGMENT A.K. Gohil, J.
1. Appellants-claimants have filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), against the award dated 5.3.2001, passed by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kukshi, District Dhar, in Claim Case No. 104 of 2000, whereby the Tribunal has rejected the application under Section 140 of the Act, for grant of interim compensation under no fault liability, simply on the ground that the tractor in question was not in a running position, but it was standing, therefore, the application cannot be decided without evidence of the parties and listed the case for evidence.
2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
3. Submission of Mr. Jain, the learned Counsel for the appellants, is that the learned Tribunal erred in dismissing the application, holding that the same cannot be decided without recording the evidence, because when the application is dismissed, no case is left for recording evidence on that application and his further submission is that the trial court has not considered the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, which are applicable in a case of accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles and has also not considered that the insurance company cannot take any defence, including as has been mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act for grant of compensation under no fault liability.
4. I have considered the submissions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, for the consideration of the submissions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 140 for grant of compensation, under no fault liability. The relevant Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 140 of the Act, read as under:
(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
5. For the disposal of the applications filed under Section 140 of the Act for grant of compensation under no fault liability, in case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More 1991 ACJ 777 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court, in the light of the provisions of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that:
Section 92-A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act. See Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi 1981 ACJ 507 (SC) and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 (SC).
It has been further held that:
In our opinion, the word 'use' has a very wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident.
The object underlying the said enactment of Section 92-A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 15,000 in case of death and Rs. 7,500 in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under Section 110-A of the Act. This would be apparent from the provisions of Section 92-B of the Act. Section 92-B(2) of the Act provides that a claim for compensation under Section 92-A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92-A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92-A shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.... The said object would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating the claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act.
It was further held that:
For awarding compensation under Section 92-A of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters:
(i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle:
(ii) the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is making the claim:
(iii) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
6. The Division Bench of M.P. High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thaglu Singh 1995 ACJ 248 (MP), in a case of interim award for no fault liability, has held that the defence available to the insurance company under Section 149(2) can be raised at the time of adjudicating claims and not at the time of considering the application under Section 140 of the Act for grant of interim award under no fault liability. Otherwise, it would frustrate the legislative object in introducing the concept of no fault liability and has held as under:
The statutory scheme envisages that if there is a motor accident and death or permanent disablement results from such an accident, owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles involved shall be liable to pay the prescribed compensation without proof of negligence and irrespective of any contributory negligence of the deceased or the injured and the amount so paid has to be adjusted out of the compensation found due under the final award. There is no provision requiring the recipient of compensation of no fault liability to refund any part of the amount received at any stage. The legislative intent is to ensure that some succour reaches the victim or the dependants without going into the questions which may arise for consideration while passing the final award. If the vehicle is insured, naturally the liability would fall on the insurer; permitting the insurer at that stage to raise any defence other than that there is no insurance policy in force at the relevant time or to raise the statutory defences contemplated in the succeeding Chapter would be to frustrate the legislative object in introducing the concept of no fault liability. The insured is duly protected inasmuch as if ultimately in the final award the insurer is exonerated, the Tribunal can issue appropriate direction enabling the insurer to collect the same from the owner of the vehicle. This could be the only legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the peremptory language of Section 92-A of the 1939 Act or Section 140 of the 1988 Act.
7. Again in the case of Samir Chanda v. Managing Director, Assam State Trans. Corporation 1998 ACJ 1351 (SC), the Supreme Court held that even in a case of bomb blast, passengers sustained injuries when they were alighting from a stationary bus at the bus stop due to bomb blast in the bus. In such circumstances it was held that the accident arose out of use of motor vehicle and the claimant is entitled to compensation. Similar is the argument, by learned Counsel for the appellants, in this case that the said tractor was carrying some explosive substance for the use of agriculture purposes and prima facie there was no case for holding any inquiry, as required under Section 140 for deciding a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Act.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants also cited a decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi 2001 ACJ 910 (Kerala), in which it has been held that:
It has to be noted that jurisdiction under Section 165 of the Act is attracted if there is an accident involving death of or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The primary fact which, therefore, attracts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the use of a motor vehicle. The word 'use' is used in the section in a wide sense. It covers all employment of the motor vehicles, so that whenever the vehicle is put into action or service, there is user of the vehicle within the provisions of Section 165 of the Act, whether the vehicle was being driven, or repaired or simply parked or kept stationary or left unattended. In that sense, the vehicle is used, whenever the vehicle is driven out for some purpose or it is kept stationary. This, without anything more, is sufficient to attract Section 165 of the Act. Therefore, whenever an accident occurs causing the death of or injury to persons because of the vehicle or its user, the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal is attracted. Any accident occurring in the course of the user for carriage of passengers or otherwise is liable to be compensated through the forum provided under Section 165 of the Act. The basic requirement of such claim is only that it should arise out of the use of motor vehicle. There is no warrant for the contention that the accident should take place at a time when the vehicle was in motion or the accident has resulted in damage to the vehicle. All that is required is that there should be an accident, viz., something unexpected and unintended and that should arise out of the user of the vehicle.
Such use need not necessarily be so intimate and closely direct as to make it a motor accident in the sense in which that expression is used in common parlance. The expression employed by the legislature is accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in the place of accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle. Evidently, the legislature wanted to enlarge the scope of the word 'use' and not to restrict it for denying compensation in deserving cases. The test should be whether the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle, whether or not the motor vehicle was in motion then. After all the provisions for dealing with the compensation cases are intended for a sublime social objective. We are, therefore, not inclined to adopt a restrictive interpretation for the word use in the present context.
We take note of the fact that we are dealing with a benevolent legislation and being a benevolent legislation it is a well-known canon of interpretation that in interpreting such a legislation, the court will normally adopt an interpretation which would favour persons sought to be benefited by the legislation. Where the courts are faced with a choice between a wider meaning which carries out what appears to have been the object of the legislature more fully and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, they will often choose the former. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., page 92. This Court as well as the Apex Court have consistently adopted beneficial constructions in such situation and held that the expression 'use' in Section 110 of the Act should be given a wider interpretation. Vide Sharlet Augustine v. K.K. Raveendran 1992 ACJ 1131 (Kerala) and Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More. 1991 ACJ 777 (SC).
9. In the case of Copal Lal v. Tulsibai 2002 ACJ 1278 (MP), I have already considered various decisions cited on behalf of the parties and by passing a detailed order held that if the vehicle is insured the insurance company is liable to pay the interim compensation under no fault liability, except in a case when the vehicle is not insured and insurance company cannot take any kind of defence. Therefore, now it is settled position under law that under Section 140 of the Act at the stage of deciding application for interim compensation under no fault liability no defence is available to the insurance company either under Section 140 or Section 149(2) of the Act or on the violation of terms and conditions of policy or on the ground that the driver was not having a valid driving licence. This objection too is also not available to the insurance company that the vehicle was not in motion or in running condition or it was standing. In fact, what is necessary for the Tribunal while deciding the application under Section 140 of the Act for grant of interim compensation under no fault liability whether death or permanent disablement has resulted, in an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle and the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle. Therefore, if the motor vehicle is used in an accident then under no fault liability insurance company is liable and the Tribunal also cannot either reject the application or defer it for consideration after recording the evidence. It is the duty of the Tribunal to follow the mandate of law and to dispose of the application by a summary inquiry immediately after service of notice on the respondents. Supreme Court, this High Court and other High Courts have already highlighted the intention of this benevolent legislation including the provisions of no fault liability in various decisions and also social object behind this provision.
10. Thus, this appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned Tribunal is set aside and it is directed that the Tribunal shall consider and dispose of the aforesaid application in accordance with law, within a period of 30 days from the date of communication of this order.