Bombay High Court
Standard Chartered Bank vs A.B.F.S.L. And Ors. on 1 August, 2001
Equivalent citations: (2001)4BOMLR520
Author: S.H. Kapadia
Bench: S.H. Kapadia
JUDGMENT S.K. Kapadia, J.
REASONS FOR THE RULING DATED 31ST JULY, 2001 ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE REPORT OF JPC IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT
1. Learned Counsel for Can Bank Mutual Fund tenders the Report of JPC. Mr. Cooper for Standard Chartered Bank objects. The matter was argued threadbare. Two points arise for determination. Firstly, whether the Report of Joint Parliamentary Committee is a public document as defined under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Secondly, even if it is a public document, whether the findings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee constitute evidence as defined under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.
ARGUMENTS
2. Mr. Harish Salve, Solicitor General of India contended that the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, (hereinafter referred to as "JPC"), is the Report of the Parliament. That, JPC consisted of the members of both Houses of Parliament. That, the entire object of the Report was to keep the Parliament informed of the events which took place and the circumstances under which the scam took place. He contended that the scam became public in April, 1992. That, the Parliament wanted to know the details of the financial irregularities which arose on account of irregular practices-followed by institutions, contrary to the guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India. That, the Report contains the facts of notoriety. Mr. Salve contended that the Report is a public document as defined under Section 74(1)(iii) of the Evidence Act. He contended that in several cases, the Parliament is required to probe into certain state of affairs of public concern before enacting a law. For this purpose, the Legislature has the power to probe into such state of affairs. For that purpose it can constitute a Committee. He contended that JPC is one such Committee. He pointed out that when the scam became public, the Parliament decided to probe the scam. Therefore, they constituted the Committee so that further steps could be taken and so that such occurrence do not recur. He contended that when the members of the JPC, who are also members of the Parliament, entered into a legislative enquiry, then such an enquiry is an integral part of the legislative work of the Parliament. He relied upon the word "legislative" in Section 74(1)(iii) to be read in conjunction with the expression "public officers". He contended that every act, which has a flavour of legislation, constitutes a legislative act. He contends that the debate in the Parliament is one such act. It is a legislative act. It is an activity of the Legislature. Similarly, when the Legislature probes into a given state of affairs, that probe constitutes a legislative activity of the Legislature. He contends that a scam of this magnitude is a matter of public concern. That, the Parliament took note of the scam and constituted a Committee under its Rules. JPC is that Committee. That, it carried out a legislative probe. Mr. Salve contended that one must read the provisions of the Evidence Act in the background of the above facts. He contended that when the Parliament, which is the highest law making authority, constitutes a Committee empowering it to make a legislative probe, the members of the Committee arc public officers under Section 74(1)(iii) of the Evidence Act and the documents forming the act or record of the act of such public officers, even in their legislative capacity, constitute a public document. He contended that in large number of cases even the judicial branch has taken cognizance of such Reports in order to ascertain the reasonableness of the legislation. Similarly, in the present case, the judicial branch can certainly take note of such a legislative probe in the present proceedings. He contended that the Report of the JPC is the result of such a legislative probe into a given state of affairs of public concern. He, therefore, contended that when the members of the JPC function as Committee members, which Committee was constituted by Parliament, they acted as public officers within the meaning of Section 74(1)(iii) of the Evidence Act. He contended further that the Report of the JPC is a journal published under the authority of the House. In this connection, he relied upon Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act. He, therefore, contended that the Report is a public document and it can always be tendered without calling upon the Secretary General to produce it before the Court. Mr. Salve clarifies that at this stage we are only concerned with the admissibility of the Report. That, at this stage we are not concerned with how much weight should be given to the Report. He points out that mere admission of the Report does not mean that the contents thereof stand proved. He contended that the journals of the Parliament do not require formal proof. He pointed out that under the Rules, (report of) JPC was empowered to record evidence. That JPC recorded statements of various officers from various Banks and other institutions. That what the said officers stated before the JPC, can be looked at. That, inculpatory admissions of the officers can be looked at. He gives an example in support of his above contention. That an officer from Bofors stated before the JPC that commission was paid to a person and if the Government alleges that such a person was paid commission by Bofors, but that person denies the allegation of the Government and at the same time such a person refuses to produce evidence in support of his denial, then the Court may draw an adverse inference in a civil matter. Mr. Salve made it clear that this example will not operate in a criminal matter. He contended that in such a civil matter, the Government can rely upon the Report of the JPC to prove its allegation that there was a practice of paying commission to the agents who procure arms from Bofors for the Government. He, therefore, contended that it was open to Can Bank Mutual Fund to prove that there was such a practice followed by Standard Chartered Bank of entering into 15% arrangement with the broker. He contended that the contents of the JPC could be read as recitals. He contended that recitals in public document may be proof of the contents. He contended that in search of truth the Court should look at the Report of JPC. He relied upon various judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that JPC is a public document under Section 74(1)(iii). However, at this stage it may be mentioned that those cases dealt with challenge to the validity of the Act enacted by the Parliament pursuant to the Report of the High Power Committee. We are not concerned with such cases. Mr. Salve contended that if Report of public officers are public documents then surely the Report of the House has to be treated as a public document. He contended that JPC is a Committee consisting of members of the Parliament, who were required to carry out the legislative probe so that the Parliament is kept well informed about a given state of affairs concerning public at large. He pointed out that on this Report, there was a debate in the Parliament. He contended that the said Report of the Committee is the Report of the Parliament and that it has a legislative flavour. That the Report of JPC is made under the Constitution of India. It is published under the Rules framed under Article 105 of the Constitution of India. He contended that the Parliament has power to frame its own Rules. He contended that the Parliament has the power to regulate its own procedure in the House. He contended that such Rule indicates how the business of the Parliament should be run. He contended that although, giving a verdict is the function of the Court and legislating is the function of the Parliament, on certain occasions, the Court is required to make an enquiry into events which led to the enactment of a Statute by the Parliament. Similarly, there are enactments of the Parliament which require the Parliament to enquire into the facts before legislating. He contended that in the circumstances, the Report of the JPC is an important piece of evidence regarding the practice followed by the Banks of entering into 15% arrangement with the brokers. He clarifies that admissibility should not be confused with the probative value of the Report. He contended that how much weight should be given to the Report is a different matter. That at this stage his only contention is that the Report is a public document and that Can Bank Mutual Fund should be permitted to tender the said document as evidence in support of its case that there was such a practice followed by Banks at the relevant time, including Standard Chartered Bank, of entering into 15% arrangement with the brokers. In the end of his argument, Mr. Salve relied upon Parliament Functions, Practice and Procedures by Griffith--page 269. The relevant portions read as follows :
"As the work of the House has grown, and issues have, in various ways, become more complex, the House has, increasingly, come to rely on the use of various forms of Committees. These Committees fall into four categories : Committees of the Whole House; Private Bill Committees; Standing Committees and Select Committees. Some of these carry out functions that the House itself could do, but where the use of a number of Committees enables more work to be done, others do the work that the House as a whole could not do effectively."
Mr. Salve relied upon page 280of the above authority which refers to the object and functions of the Select Committee. However, it is not necessary for me to examine working of the Select Committee. We are not concerned with such Committee. However, the important fact to be noted is that a similar Committee has been constituted by the Parliament known as JPC to make a legislative probe in a state of affairs which is a public concern and which activity has a legislative flavour. He also relies upon various Rules in Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. He invited my attention to Chapter XX VI of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabhaand, in particular, Rule 269 to Rule 272. Rule 269 deals with the power to take evidence or call for the documents. Rule 270 deals with the power to send for persons, papers and records. Rule 272 deals with power of the Committee to administer oath to a witness to be examined before it. Similarly, Rule 273 deals with examination of witnesses. He further points out that in the present matter, the introduction to the Report of the JPC shows that large number of persons came to be examined by JPC. That large number of representatives from the organisations gave evidence before the JPC. He, therefore, contended that sanctity is attached to the evidence received by the Parliament. That such evidence is given on oath and, therefore, the Court can take notice of the Report and that Court should do so in public interest, particularly as the Report contains facts of notoriety. He pointed out that as per the Report of the JPC under Rule 272 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, evidence was recorded by the Committee [see page ii]. He further pointed out that under Rules 368 and 369 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, all documents which are required to be laid on the Table shall be duly authenticated by the member presenting it and all such documents shall be considered public, [see Rule 369(2)]. Similarly, under Rule 382 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker may authorise printing, publication, distribution or sale of any document or Report in connection with the business of the House or any document or Report laid on the Table or presented to the House or the Committees thereof. Mr. Salve pointed out that in the present case the JPC Report has been published under Rule 382 of the Rules of Procedure. He, therefore, contends that the Report of the JPC is a public document.
3. Per contra, Mr. K.S. Cooper, learned Counsel for Standard Chartered Bank submitted that assuming for the sake of argument for the time being, that the Report of the JPC is a public document under Section 74(1)(iii), the Report cannot be tendered merely because it is a public document. It can only be tendered if it is evidence. He contended that in the present case, the basic controversy is whether there was a 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and HPD and whether the suit transaction came under such an arrangement. Mr. Cooper contended that the entire exercise of tendering the Report is to rely on certain findings of JPC which implicates Standard Chartered Bank in the context of the suit transaclion. Mr. Cooper vehemently contended that the first question which one must ask is: whether the Report of the -JPC is evidence and if so, whether it is relevant. Mr. Cooper contended that by no stretch of imagination, the Report of JPC could constitute evidence. It is not even, prima facie, evidence of the truth of the contents of the documents. In this connection, Mr. Cooper placed heavy reliance on the ruling of Variava, J. [as he (hen was] in Suit No. 9 of 1994 where the learned Judge has held that the Report of Janakiraman Committee did not even, prima facie, establish the truth or the accuracy or the correctness of the contents thereof. Mr. Cooper also relied upon the judgment in the case of Rt. Bon. Gerald Lord Strickland v. Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, AIR 35 Privy Council 34, in which it has been held that Reports of the debates in the Legislative Assembly can only be evidence of what was stated by the Speakers in the Legislative Assembly, and are not evidence of any facts contained in the speeches. He, therefore, contended in the present case that Can Bank Mutual Fund can only rely on the Report of the JPC as evidence of what is stated therein. He illustrated his submission by giving an example. He contended that the Report could be relied upon as evidence indicating what the JPC states. That JPC has stated in the Report that various individuals and representatives of organisations came to give evidence before it. This is what the Report says. To that extent, one can rely upon the Report as evidence of what it states. However, such a Report cannot be tendered to prove whether actually such individuals and representatives attended the hearings before the Committee. He contended that aspect needs an independent collaboration. He contended that there is a difference between proof of contents and proof of the truth of the contents. He contended that the Report cannot prove the truth and correctness of the individual and the representative of the organization actually attended the hearing before the Committee. Hence, he contended that the Report can be tendered in evidence of what is stated by JPC and it cannot constitute evidence of facts contained in the said Report. To continue our discussion on the above illustration, Mr. Cooper argued that, in fact, evidence will have to be led to show that such an officer actually attended the hearing before the Committee. That such a circumstance cannot be proved merely by producing the Report, That by production of Report, one can only prove what is stated by JPC in the Report and not that an individual actually appeared at the time of the hearing before the Committee. He, therefore, contended that truth of the contents cannot be proved by mere production of the Report. He contended that Section 35 is an exception to the above Rule. He contended that Section 35 has no application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Cooper vehemently urged that the findings given in the Report against Standard Chartered Bank is merely an opinion of JPC. He contended that except for limited exception named in Sections 45 to 49 of the Evidence Act, such opinion does not constitute evidence. He contended that the findings of JPC is not a fact. He contended, therefore, that the Report of JPC is not evidence and, therefore, it cannot be tendered. He contended that even if it is a public document, it cannot be tendered as evidence. He further pointed out that the findings of JPC cannot be considered as evidence in the present suit. That on such findings, the Report can only be tendered as evidence of an issue. He submitted that in the present case, the main issue which arises for determination is whether the finding of JPC involving Standard Chartered Bank is correct or incorrect. He contended that correctness of the finding of JPC cannot be proved by merely tendering the Report of JPC. He contended that the findings contained statements of facts. Such statements are required to be proved. Such statements cannot be proved by merely tendering the Report. He contended that if the correctness of such findings can be proved by tendering the Report, then it would lead to violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly when Standard Chartered Bank will have no right to cross-examine the witnesses. He, therefore, contended that such a Report cannot be tendered in evidence even if it is held to be a public document. Mr. Cooper next contended that a judicial enquiry cannot be undertaken by the House of the Parliament. That, this function is given only to the judiciary. He contended that even the statements of witnesses before the Commission under the Commission of Enquiry Act are not admissible. He contended that even in easels of private documents, evidence of the contents of a document is hearsay, unless the author is examined. He contended that even internal evidence can be relied upon only to prove the authorship of a document and not [he truth of the contents thereof. He contended that there is a difference between proof of making of statement and proof of truth of such statement. He contended that the Report can certainly be relied upon as proof of making a statement. But, it cannot be relied upon as proof of the correctness of such a statement. He further contended that in the present case, judicative facts of a dispute cannot be gathered by a legislative process and that too, behind the back of the parties. He contended that the findings given by the JPC against Standard Chartered Bank, as being involved with the broker- HPD in a 15% arrangement vis-a-vis the suit transaction, are judicative facts which can be gathered only in a judicial proceeding and not by a legislative process and, therefore, the findings of the Committee cannot be construed as evidence. Mr. Cooper next contended that the Report of the Committee is not a public document under Section 74(1)(iii). He contended that the members of the Parliament are not public officers. He invited my attention to Section 2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code. He submitted that by no stretch of imagination members of the Parliament could be called as public officers. He contended that it is not the duty of the members of the Parliament to investigate the scam. He contended that judicial enquiry is not their function. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, , which lays down, inter alia, that judicative facts of an election dispute cannot be gathered by a legislative process behind the back of the parties. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mr. Ram Krishna Dalmia and Others v. Mr. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors., , in support of his contention that findings of the JPC are not statements of facts That they are merely opinions expressed by JPC. He pointed out that only opinions falling under Sections 45 to 49 of Evidence Act are relevant. That no other opinions, outside the above Sections, are relevant. That the opinion of JPC do not come under Sections 45 to 49. He also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sir Mohammed Yusuf and Another v. D and Another, , which lays down that the opinion of Counsel is not evidence and which also lays down that internal evidence can be relied upon only to prove the authorship and not the truth of the said letter. It also lays down further that evidence of the contents is hearsay, unless the writer is examined. He also relied upon the judgment in the case of Emperor v. Ch. Mohd. Hassan, AlR 1943 Lahore 298, which states that there is a difference between proof of making a statement and proof of truth/correctness of such a statement. To the same effect is the judgment in the case of Government of Bengal v. Shantiram Mondal . Mr. Cooper also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Om Prakash Berlia and Anr. v. Unit Trust of India and Ors., , which lays down that a public document can be admitted as evidence only to prove what the document states and the truth of what the document states must be separately established.
FINDINGS
4. At the outset, I may state, as a prelude, that the scam became public on 26th April, 1992. As a result of irregularities in securities and Banking transactions, the loss to the economy was to the extent of rupees four thousand crores. This was in 1991 -92. Hence, the Parliament decided to constitute Joint Parliamentary Committee (hereinafter referred to as "JPC"), This was on 6th August, 1992. The Chairman of the Committee was appointed by the Honourable Speaker on 10th August, 1992. The Committee consisted of members from both the Houses of the Parliament. The Committee was expected to submit its Report within a time-bound programme. The Committee held 96 sittings. The Committee took evidence of Ministers, officials of the Banks, officials of non-Banking Financial Corporations, officials from RBI, SEBI, etc. The Committee undertook tours to Bombay and visited Bombay Stock Exchange. The Committee also collected information from the representatives of Indian Banks Association. In the Report, a list of individuals and Organisations, whose representatives gave evidence before the Committee, has been annexed. Under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, vide Chapter XXVI, appointment of Committee is contemplated. This is under Rule 254( 1). Under Rule 258, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee is required to be appointed by the Speaker from amongst the members of the Committee. Under Rule 269( 1), the Parliamentary Committee is empowered to take evidence or call for documents. Under Rule 269(2), the Committee is empowered to treat any evidence given before it as confidential. Under Rule 271, the Committee may permit a witness to be heard by a Counsel appointed by him. Under Rule 272(1), the Committee is empowered to administer oath or affirmation to a witness examined before it. Under Rule 273, the Committee is empowered to examine the witnesses. Under Rule 276 the Committee may make a Special Report on any matter which comes to light in the course of its work which it may consider necessary to bring to the notice of the House. Under Rule 277, the Report of the Committee is required to be signed by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee. Under Rule 279(1), the Report of the Committee is required to be presented to the House by the Chairman. Under Rule 280, the Speaker is empowered to order the printing, publication or circulation of the Report of a Committee. Under Rule 289, the recommendations of the Committee are required to be presented to the House in the form of a Report. Under Rule 290, a Motion is required to be moved in the House as to whether the House agrees or disagrees with the Report. There are different Committees, like Standing Committee, Committee of the Whole House, Private Bill Committees, etc. In the present case, the Committee recorded the evidence under Rule 272. This is indicated in the Report of the JPC. Under Rule 369(2), all papers and documents laid on the Table of the House shall be considered to be public. Under Rule 382( 1), the Speaker is authorised to order printing, publication, distribution or sale of any document or Report in connection with the business of the House or any paper, document or Report laid on the Table or presented to the House or a Committee thereof. Under Rule 382(2), a document or Report printed or published under Rule 382(1) shall be deemed to have been printed, published, distributed or sold under the authority of the House within the meaning of Article 105(2) of the Constitution. In the present case, the Report of the Joint Committee is published under Rule 382 of the above Rules. Taking into account the above Rules, it is clear that the Parliament appointed JPC to probe into the state of affairs in the economy which led to scam. It is for this reason that the Committee was empowered to summon witnesses and to record evidence. This was done. The Committee was also required to come to Bombay. The Committee recorded statements of the representatives of the Bombay Stock Exchange. Section 74(1)(iii) of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that the documents forming the acts or records of the acts of public officers to be treated as public documents. The short point which arises for consideration in the present case is whether the Report of JPC is a public document under Section 74(1)(iii). It is true that Members of Parliament are legislators; that it is not their duty to adjudicate into matters which require adjudication. However, when a Committee is appointed by the Parliament to look into the state of affairs in the economy and to submit its Report so that the Parliament could take further steps, the members of the Committee who are empowered to call for documents and witnesses and to record their evidence as also to administer oath, would certainly constitute public officers. It is for this reason that under Section 74(1)(iii), documents forming the acts of public officers whose functions may fall under legislative, judicial or executive work are the documents forming the acts of public officers. In numerous cases, the Parliament appoints a Committee before enacting a law. For example, Wanchoo Committee suggested certain recommendations pursuant to which amendments were made to the Income Tax Act. When the reasonableness of the enactments becomes the subject matter of challenge before the judicial forum, the Courts can look at the Reports of such Committees in order to ascertain the reasons and the objects of enacting laws. Similarly, if the Parliament is faced with a financial scam of a huge magnitude, it constitutes a Committee to probe into the state of affairs and, on the Report of the Committee being placed before the Parliament, debates take place and on the basis of such Reports, the Parliament not only obtains information, but the Parliament further takes steps to implement the recommendations of the Committee. Numerous cases have been cited before me by both sides. It is not necessary to discuss all these cases. Suffice it to state that it is well settled that when an authority is given a statutory duty to perform pursuant to which he makes a record or an entry which is open to the public then, in such cases, the document is a public document. It is prepared by a public officer under a given enactment. That public officer may be working in the legislative capacity or a judicial capacity or the executive capacity. In the case of Maria Mangini Sturla & Ors. v. Filippo Tomasso Mania Freccia & Ors., V. Appeal Cases, Page 623, the Privy Council has laid down that public documents are documents made for the information of the Crown and they contain information to be made available to all the King's subjects. The principle upon which the entry by a public officer is presumed to be true is that the entry is made pursuant to a public enquiry and that it should be made by a public officer. Applying the above tests to the facts of our case, I hold that members of JPC, while preparing the Report, are public officers under Section 74(1)(iii). This is particularly in view of the Rules framed by the Parliament. This is particularly in view of Article 105 of the Constitution. Members of JPC are Members of the Parliament. However, on appointment as Members of JPC, they perform public duty. As members, they are required to carry out the duty given to them by the Parliament under the Constitution. A time has come when the Court should read provisions of Section 74(1) in the broadest possible terms. In such matters, Reports of JPC also lend assistance to the Courts. In cases of financial irregularities of this magnitude, number of Banking and market practices arc required to be investigated. To give a few illustrations, Banks used to give Routing facilities to their broker-clients. Similarly, they used to enter into arrangements with the brokers who assured the Banks and financial institutions with minimum fixed returns. Such Reports throw light on such practices. These practices are generally now known to the public. However, a high powered Committee like JPC can certainly call for information, it can record evidence and the material collected is looked into by JPC which submits the Report to the Parliament on such practices. These practices were looked into by JPC. How they were exploited is commented upon in the Report. All this information is available to the public at large. Hence, I hold that JPC is a public document under Section 74(1)(iii).
5. However, it has been vehemently urged on behalf Standard Chartered Bank that even if the Report of JPC is held to be a public document, it cannot be tendered as evidence in the present suit. On behalf of Standard Chartered Bank, it was contended that the Report is the evidence of what it states. To that extent, Standard Chartered Bank has no objection to the Report being taken on record. However, on behalf of Standard Chartered Bank, it has been vehemently argued that the findings of JPC on the 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and HPD needs to be proved by CanBank Mutual Fund independently and that by merely tendering the Report of JPC, the correctness of the findings cannot be established. It was urged that such findings constitute an opinion of JPC. That, such opinions do not come within the ambit of Sections 45 to 49 of the Evidence Act. It was, therefore, contended that the (Report of) JPC should not be permitted to be tendered as evidence of the truth or correctness of what is stated in the Report. In the present matter, one of the Issues which arises for determination is whether there was a 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and the broker HPD and whether the suit transaction between Standard Chartered Bank and ABFSL came under the purview of the said 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and HPD. The Report of JPC has recorded that there was an arrangement between the brokers and the Banks, including Standard Chartered Bank, under which the Banks were assured of a return of 15%. It was something like a minimum guaranteed return offered by the brokers to the Banks. As stated above, the Report has given findings on certain banking and market practices which led to the financial irregularities in security transactions. In that context, the JPC examined various Officers of the Banks and the brokers. After recording their evidence, as stated above, JPC came to the conclusion that there were certain practices followed by the Banks and the brokers like Routing facilities, margin trading and 15% arrangement. To this extent, the findings of JPC can be read as evidence in the present matter. However, the question as to whether the suit transaction was a part of 15% arrangement, has not been found by JPC. There is no finding to the effect that the suit transaction was part of such an arrangement. Therefore, I am of the view that CanBank Mutual Fund is entitled to tender the Report of JPC as evidence only to establish that there was a 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and HPD. The issue as to whether the suit transaction was a part of such a practice/arrangement will have to be established independently by CanBank Mutual Fund. However, in order to prove that issue, the Report will be one of the important pieces of evidence. At this stage, I am concerned with admissibility. The correctness of the findings will ultimately depend on the entire view of the matter. The question as to what weight the Court should give to the findings of JPC will ultimately depend on the totality of circumstances brought before the Court.
6. Accordingly. I hold that the Report of JPC is a public document under Section 74(1)(iii) of the Evidence Act. Secondly, that the said Report is admissible as evidence of the existence of 15% arrangement between Standard Chartered Bank and HPD. That subject to above, CanBank Mutual Fund will have to prove whether the suit transaction took place under such an arrangement as any other Fact. At the request of Mr. Cooper, it is clarified that this ruling is subject to my earlier ruling dated 27th June, 2001 on the argument of Standard Chartered Bank on inadmissibility of documents under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act and also in view of the provisions of the Benami Transactions Abolition Act.