Jharkhand High Court
Dhrub Narayan Parihast @ Dhrub Narayan ... vs Union Of India Through C.B.I on 7 November, 2023
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 2575 of 2021
Dhrub Narayan Parihast @ Dhrub Narayan Parihast
.. ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India through C.B.I.
..... ...Opp. Party
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
For the Petitioner : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Nishant Kr. Roy, Advocate
For the C.B.I. : Mr. Anil Kumar, A.S.G.I.
Ms. Chandana Kumari, A.C. to A.S.G.I.
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10/ Dated:-07.11.2023 Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned A.S.G.I. appearing on behalf of the C.B.I.
2. This petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including order dated 26.05.2017 whereby cognizance has been taken under Sections 120-B r/w 201, 379, 409, 461, 462 & 477 of the I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)
(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 in connection with R.C. Case No. 13(S) 2013-D, pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, C.B.I. Dhanabd-cum-III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad.
3. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that for the identical transaction police has registered case being Degohar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 corresponding to G.R. No. 217 of 2011. He further submits that in W.P.(PIL) No. 5575 of 2011 the High Court issued direction to C.B.I to take investigation of that case and pursuant to that R.C. Case No. 13(S)/2013-D was registered by the C.B.I on 04.10.2013 against the unknown persons. He submits that in the first case registered by the police being Degohar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 the petitioner was already convicted on 04.09.2013 for the charges 2 under sections 379/34 and 120B of the I.P.C. and thereafter another case investigated by the C.B.I. against the petitioner who already faced the trial for the same offences was conducted in which the learned court taken cognizance on 26.05.2017. He submits that in view of that the petitioner preferred W.P.(Cr.) No. 113 of 2017 seeking quashing of the charge sheet no. 08 of 2016 dated 30.09.2016 filed by the C.B.I., Dhanbad along with order taking cognizance dated 26.05.2017 in R.C. No. 13(S)/2013-D which was withdrawn vide order dated 07.02.2020 with liberty to avail the remedy available to the petitioner under law. He further submits that earlier judgment dated 04.09.2013 was set aside by the learned appellate court by judgment dated 11.07.2014 in Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 2013 with direction to retrial from the stage of section 313 of Cr.P.C. He submits that after remand the learned trial court has further convicted the petitioner vide judgement dated 18.01.2020. He submits that the matter was investigated by the C.B.I is still pending and thus both the cases are arising out of same transaction and to buttress this argument with regard to same transaction he draws the attention of the Court to judgment passed in G.R. Case No. 717 of 2011, T.R. No. 413 of 2020 and refers para
3. He further draws the attention of the Court to chargesheet of the C.B.I. brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit and refers para 2 and 3. By way of placing these two documents, he submits that for the same transaction two cases have been registered against the petitioner and one of the case tried by the learned trial Court being Degohar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 corresponding to G.R. No. 217 of 2011, the petitioner has already been convicted. He submits that the petitioner has completed two 3 and half years of sentence. On these grounds, he submits that in view the facts the case of the petitioner is covered in the light of Section 300 Cr.P.C. as well as Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. He submits that for the same transaction the petitioner has been charged in two cases and to buttress this argument he relied in the case of "T.P. Gopalakrishnan Vs. State of Kerala"
(2022) 14 SCC 323. He refers to para 17, 22, 27, 30, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the said judgment which are quoted hereinbelow:-
"17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, the following points would arise for our consideration: 17.1. (a) Whether the High Court was justified in confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial court? 17.2. (b) Whether the judgment [T.P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 18488] of the High Court calls for any interference or modification by this Court?
17.3. (c) What order?
22. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India reads as under: "20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.--
(1) * * * (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once."
27. Section 300CrPC bars the trial of a person not only for the same offence but also for any other offence on the same facts, vide Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar [Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 14 : AIR 1966 SC 911] .
30. What is to be noted here is that both these provisions i.e. Section 300CrPC and Article 20 of the Constitution of India use the term "same offence".
38. PW 13 is the Deputy Superintendent of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kozhikode who registered the FIR in the present case on 5-12- 2001 and seized the documents. This witness carried out the investigation and laid the charges against the accused. The certified copies of the documents showing cases pending against the accused in the present case were also recovered. In his cross-examination, PW 13 stated that he came to know of the previous three cases where the accused was named; he was convicted in two cases and acquitted in one case, and he informed the higher authorities of the same.
39. On perusal of the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses, what emerges is that there are vital discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. PW 5 in his testimony stated that he gave the amount to the appellant herein whereas in his cross- examination, he stated that he does not know to whom he handed over the money. As per the statement made by PW 11 in his cross- examination, the staff of the Seed Farm used to handle the matters in the absence of the officers therein. The testimony of this witness supports the case of the appellant herein since the appellant has also contended the same. PW 12 in his cross-examination has stated that he did not know the reasons as to why the cash book and other documents were not in office. PW 12 has nowhere stated that the same were in the custody of the appellant herein.
40. It is further the case of the appellant herein that the previous three cases, CCs Nos. 12, 13 and 14 of 1999 pertained to the period from 28-3- 1994 to 2-4-1994, 15-12-1992 to 31-3-1993 and 5-3-1994 to 8-3-1994, respectively. Admittedly, the charge in CC No, 24 of 2003 is for 4 misappropriation of an amount of Rs 20,035 during the period from 27-4- 1992 to 25-8-1992; the charge in CC No. 25 of 2003 is for an amount of Rs 58,671, allegedly misappropriated during the period from 1-3-1993 to 12-4-1994. It is the appellant's case that he has already faced trial in the previous three cases and the present two cases pertain to the same period. Section 300 CrPC places a bar wherein, a person who has already been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence arising out of the same facts, and has either been acquitted or convicted of such offence cannot be tried again for the same offence as well as on the same facts for any other offence as long as such acquittal or conviction remains in force. The appellant herein was earlier charged for the offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act and Sections 409 and 477-A IPC and was convicted in two cases and acquitted in one case. The present two cases arise out of the same set of facts and the same transaction as that in the previous three cases wherein the appellant was tried and convicted/acquitted, respectively. As already discussed above, for an offence to be considered as the "same offence" as the last offence, it is necessary to show that the offences are not distinct and the ingredients of the offences are identical. The previous charge as well as the present charge is for the same period of misappropriation. The matter of offences in all the previous three cases and the present case are the same and are said to be committed in the course of same transaction while holding the one and same post of Agricultural Officer by the appellant.
41. The trial court has erred in holding that the facts of previous case and misappropriation committed by the accused are not the same as the facts relevant to the present case. The trial court has held that in the present case, the allegation is that after conducting the auction of coconuts and half-filled grains, two-thirds of the amount collected from the successful bidder was not remitted to the treasury, however, in the earlier cases, the allegations were that the accused misappropriated some amount to be paid to the proprietor of Agricultural Marketing Corporation, Kozhikode, Kerala State Coir Marketing Corporation, Kozhikode from the State Seed Farm, Perambra by forging and falsifying records. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that the present cases were based on the re-audit conducted by PW 9 the Assistant Sub-Inspector, Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Bureau, Kozhikode. The re-audit was done for the period from 1-4-1992 to 31- 12-1994. The charges in the present case are for relevant period from 27-4-1992 to 25-8-1992 and 1-3-1993 to 12-4-1994 which time period is same as in the previous three cases, that is, 28-3-1994 to 2-4-1994, 15-12-1992 to 31-3-1993 and 5-3-1994 to 8-3-1994, respectively. Thus, it can be said that the present cases pertain to the same set of facts and are in respect of same offences, for the same period, committed in the same capacity as the previous three cases wherein the appellant herein was already prosecuted in the year 1999. The core allegation in all these five cases pertains to misappropriation by making false entries in the cash book. The allegation of the prosecution that two-thirds of the auction amount was not remitted to the treasury would be covered under the allegations of misappropriation of funds, that the appellant has already been prosecuted for in the year 1999. The appellant is right in contending that the charges in the first three cases were framed on 17-8-1999 which is much after the audit and the prosecution would have been well aware of the misappropriation in respect of the present cases on 17-8-1999."
4. On these grounds, he submits that the case arising out of C.B.I. investigation is for the same transaction which is abuse of process of law and the same may kindly be quashed.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Kumar, learned A.S.G.I. 5 appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. submits that the police investigation was not with regard to Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and section 201 I.P.C. He submits in view of that Section 300 of Cr.P.C. as well as Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India are not attracted as in the first case Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 201 of I.P.C. was not subject matter. He distinguishes the judgment relied by Mr. Mazumdar, by way of referring para 43 on the ground that in that case earlier case as well as later case was tried under the Prevention of Corruption Act. On these grounds, he submits that judgment is not in favour of the petitioner. He submits that identical case are not there in view of that fact this petition is fit to be dismissed.
6. In view of above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the court has gone through the materials on record and finds that the police has registered Deoghar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 which was tried by the learned court and the petitioner was convicted under sections 379/34 and 120B of the I.P.C of the I.P.C by judgment dated 04.09.2013. In the appeal the said judgment was set aside and appellate court remanded the matter for retrial the case from the stage of section 313 Cr.P.C and pursuant to that retrial was done by the learned trial court and the petitioner was again convicted by judgment dated 18.01.2020.The said F.I.R. was also taken over by the C.B.I. on the direction of this Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 5575 of 2011 thereafter chargesheet was submitted by the C.B.I. and the learned court took cognizance vide order dated 26.05.2017.
7. In the light of above facts, the Court is required to consider as to whether both the cases are arising out of same 6 transaction or not.
8. Deoghar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 was registered on the basis of written report of the informant Mithilesh Kumar Jha, In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Deoghar, to O/C, Deoghar Town P.S. on 30.08.2011 as informed by the Head Clerk of District Record Room, Sri Amal Kumar Barai that the important documents relating to revenue, which were the subject matter of Vigilance Inquiry, were kept in a sealed steel box inside the archives of District Record Room building. Those were stolen away by breaking the sealed box. He immediately went to the Place of Occurrence, inspected it and made inquiry from the staffs whereby it became evident that the D.C., Deoghar had kept important revenue documents relating to the land of Deoghar urban area for further inquiry in the record room on 19.08.11 in a sealed box which were removed by breaking the box, details of the documents were annexed with a written report. On inquiry, he learned that the box was intact at the closure of the office on 29.08.11 but on 30.08.11 when the office was opened the box was found broken and the documents kept therein were missing. The head clerk told that he had locked all the four locks in the office on the evening of 29.08.11 which were intact on 30.08.11 at the time of opening of office. The D.C. had kept some sale certificates and registers which were called for from the registry office, Dumka so that further inquiry in the disputed land could be done. The informant has further alleged that the interests of some land mafias of the town were being affected due to the inquiry therefore, the possibility was there that those persons hatched a conspiracy and had got stolen those documents.
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9. In the chargesheet filed by the C.B.I. in R.C. Case No. 13(S) 2013-D it was alleged in the Town Police Station FIR No. 260/2011 dated 20 August, 2011, which was registered on the basis of complaint dated 30.08.2011 of Shri Mithilesh Kumar Jha, the then In-charge District Record Room, Deoghar, that "Shri Amal Kumar Barai, then Head Clerk, District Record Room has informed on 30.08.2011 that important revenue records were stolen from sealed steel box kept in the District Record Room by breaking open it. Shri Mithilesh Kumar Jha has immediately inspected the place of incidence and enquired about the matter with concerned officials. His enquiry revealed that a sealed box containing important Revenue Records pertaining to Deoghar Urban Arna Land was kept in the District Record Room on 19.08.2011 by Dy. Commissioner, Deoghar. The aforesaid records were stolen by breaking open the said box. The list of records kept in the said box was enclosed with the complaint. Enquiry revealed that the said sealed box was intact till closure of the office in the meeting of 29.08.2011 and it was found brakes and the records were found stolen on 30.08.2011 after opening of office. Head Clerk (Shri Amal Kumar Barai) informed that 04 locks were put by him in the office in the meeting of 29.08.2011 and all the said locks were found intact at the time of opening of office on 30.08.2011. Dy Commissioner had called for certain Sale Registers and other related records/ registers and it was kept securely so that further detailed enquiry in the matter related to disputed land. From this action, interests of certain land mafia's of the city were getting affected and therefore, it was suspected that the said land mafia's may have got the said revenue records stolen under conspiracy. In this matter, Dy Commissioner gave permission 8 for lodging FIR. It is requested that FIR may lodged in the matter and necessary action may be taken " Said complaint enclosed the letter no. 1647/Confidential dated 18.08.2011 of Dy. Commissioner, Deoghar (Shri Mast Ram Meena), addressed to In- charge District Record Room, Deoghar (Shri Mithilesh Kumar Jha).
Investigation revealed that vide office letter no. 543/Confidential dated 23.03.2011, Shri Mast Ram Meena, then DC, Deoghar, ordered for an enquiry in respect of illegal sale of land plot no. 155 situated at village Madarichak in Deoghar District on the complaint of one Smt. Mala Singh, District Secretary, Women Sale, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha who had alleged that land had prepared forged documents and they were trying to grab said land violating Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act. Enquiry in this matter was entrusted to Shri Bhogendra Thakur, District Land Acquisition Officer, Deoghar and Shri Mithilesh Kumar Jha, Executive Magistrate, Deoghar. Both the Enquiring Officer had submitted joint report dated 25.05.2011 to DC, Deooghar mentioning therein that transfer of the alleged land must be stopped immediately and it was also mentioned that such illegal transfers of land plots are done in connivance with concerned Government Revenue officials. Similar enquiry was ordered by Shri Mastram Meena, the then DC, Deoghar, vide his office letter no. 361/Confidential dated 24.02.2011, to Shri Sanjay Kumar the then DCIR, Deoghar on the complaint of one Shri Rajeshwar Das who had alleged illegal transfer of Government land plots situated at Plot No. 54A & 48 at Vill-Baidhnathpur in Deoghar district. Shri Sanjay Kumar submitted his report dated 18.06.2011 mentioning therein, inter alia, that Shri Dev Narayan Parihast and his son Shri Dhruv Narayan Parihast (accused) has challenged the notice of Mohanpur 9 Circle for vacating the encroached land at Plot No. 54. In the conclusion Shri Sanjay Kumar had recommended for cancellation of Jamabandi account nos related to the said plot. In the same matter Addl. Collector, Deoghar (Shri Ajit Shankar) had also reported DC, Deoghar recommending therein for cancellation of said Jamabandi. Apart from above, similar enquiry was conducted by Shri Uday Shankar Sinha (Kanungo, Deoghar), Shri Ajir Shankar (Addl. Collector, Deoghar) etc. Further, on the order of DC, Deoghar (Shri Mastram Meena) various records, including alleged revenue records which were reported to have been stolen from District Record Room, were gathered from the office of Sub-Registrar, Dumka for enquiring the aforesaid matter as well as other related matters. These documents were initially kept in the Confidential Section of Dy. Commissioner, Deoghar which is located at the residence of DC, Deoghar, Shri Bhogendra Thakur was the In-charge of said confidential section during the period between 16.03.2009 to 18.08.2011.
10. Reading the contents of first F.I.R. and chargesheet, it is crystal clear that for the same transaction both the cases have been registered and in one of the cases the petitioner has already been convicted and has undergone two and half years sentence.
11. Section 300 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.
(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-
section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub- section (2) thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been 10 made against him at the former trial under sub- section (1) of section 220.
(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last- mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.
(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first- mentioned Court is subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 , (10 of 1897 ) or of section 188 of this Code. Explanation.- The dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.
Illustrations
(a) A is tried upon a charge of theft as a servant and acquitted. He cannot afterwards, while the acquittal remains in force, be charged with theft as a servant, or, upon the same facts, with theft simply, or with criminal breach of trust.
(b) A is tried for causing grievous hurt and convicted. The person injured afterwards dies. A may be tried again for culpable homicide.
(c) A is charged before the Court of Session and convicted of the culpable homicide of B. A may not afterwards be tried on the same facts for the murder of B.
(d) A is charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, voluntarily causing hurt to B. A may not afterwards be tried for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to B on the same facts, unless the cage comes within sub- section (3) of this section.
(e) A is charged by a Magistrate of the second class with, and convicted by him of, theft of property from the person of B. A may subsequently be charged with, and tried for, robbery on the same facts.
(f) A, B and C are charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, robbing D. A, B and C may afterwards be charged with, and tried for, dacoity on the same facts."
12. Looking into above illustration (c) it is clear that A is charged before the Court or Sessions and convicted of the culpable homicide of B. A may not afterwards be tried on the same facts for the murder of B.
13. Section 300 of Cr.P.C. is an amplication of the well- known maxim of law 'nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa (no 11 person should be twice vexed for the same offence). This principle does not rest on any doctrine of estoppel but embodies the well- established rule of common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence.
14. In order to invoke the rule of estoppel, not only the parties in the two trials should be the same but also the fact in issue, proved or not, as present in the earlier trial, must be identical to what is sought to be reagitated in the subsequent trial. If the cause of action was determined to exist i.e. judgment was given on it, the same is said to be merged in the judgment. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does, he is estopped per remjudicatam. The principle of issue estoppel is also known as "cause of action estoppel" and the same is different from the principle of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit, as embodied in Section 300 Cr.P.C. Reference may be made to the case of "Ravinder Singh Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Others"(2013) 9 SCC 245 wherein para 25, 31, 33 it has been held as under:-
" 25. The principle of issue estoppel is also known as "cause of action estoppel" and the same is different from the principle of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit, as embodied in Section 300 CrPC. This principle applies where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion, and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused. Such a finding would then constitute an estoppel, or res judicata against the prosecution but would not operate as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused, for a different or distinct offence. It would only preclude the reception of evidence that will disturb that finding of fact already recorded when the accused is tried subsequently, even for a different offence, which might be permitted by Section 300(2) CrPC. Thus, the rule of issue estoppel prevents re-litigation of an issue which has been determined in a criminal trial between the parties. If with respect to an offence, arising out of a transaction, a trial has taken place and the accused has been acquitted, another trial with respect to the offence alleged to arise out of the transaction, which requires the court to arrive at a conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion reached 12 at the earlier trial, is prohibited by the rule of issue estoppel. In order to invoke the rule of issue estoppel, not only the parties in the two trials should be the same but also, the fact in issue, proved or not, as present in the earlier trial, must be identical to what is sought to be reagitated in the subsequent trial. If the cause of action was determined to exist i.e. judgment was given on it, the same is said to be merged in the judgment. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam. (See Manipur Admn. v. Thokchom Bira Singh [AIR 1965 SC 87 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 120] , Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [(1969) 1 SCC 379 : AIR 1969 SC 961] , State of A.P. v. Kokkiliagada Meerayya [(1969) 1 SCC 161 : AIR 1970 SC 771] , Masud Khan v. State of U.P. [(1974) 3 SCC 469 :
1973 SCC (Cri) 1084 : AIR 1974 SC 28] , Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 202 : AIR 1975 SC 856] , Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi [(1985) 4 SCC 628 : AIR 1986 SC 111] , Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar [(2005) 1 SCC 787 : AIR 2005 SC 626] and Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [(2005) 10 SCC 51 : AIR 2005 SC 2392] .)
31. The complaint in dispute filed by Respondent 1 is based on the ground that there has been a false declaration by the appellant while filing the second writ petition as he suppressed the truth that earlier for the same relief a writ petition had been filed and it was done so to gain a legal advantage and therefore, it was a false, vexatious and malicious one attracting the provisions of Section 3(1)(viii) of the 1989 Act. The High Court while dealing with the contempt case did not record such a finding. The first writ petition was dismissed in limine while the second was dismissed in default. The issue of filing a false affidavit has been dealt with by the High Court in the contempt case which Respondent 1 did not press further.
33. The High Court has dealt with the issue involved herein and the matter stood closed at the instance of Respondent 1 himself. Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever to launch criminal prosecution on that basis afresh. The inherent power of the court in dealing with an extraordinary situation is in the larger interest of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. Thus, it is a judicial obligation on the court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice and to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. It may be so necessary to curb the menace of criminal prosecution as an instrument of operation of needless harassment. A person cannot be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in the inherent power of the court and the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which the courts exist. Thus, it becomes the paramount duty of the court to protect an apparently innocent person, not to be subjected to prosecution on the basis of wholly untenable complaint."
15. In the case relied by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner it has been held that concept of double jeopardy can also 13 be understood in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution. "Life" under Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. It does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider connotation; it includes the right to live with human dignity. Under the umbrella of Article 21, various rights like right to free legal aid, right to speedy trial, right to fair trial, etc. have been included. Similarly, protection against double jeopardy is also included under the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution. Prosecuting a person for the same offence in same series of facts, for which he has previously either been acquitted or has been convicted and undergone the punishment, affects the person's right to live with dignity.
16. Section 300 of Cr.P.C bars the trial of a person not only for the same offence but also for any other offence on the same facts as has been held in para 26 and 27 of the judgment in the case of "T.P. Gopalakrishnan"(supra) relied by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner.
17. In the case in hand reading the contents of F.I.R. as well as chargesheet of the C.B.I. it is crystal clear that for the same offence both the cases have been registered and merely because the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 201 of I.P.C. has been added in the chargesheet of C.B.I. it cannot be said that for the same offence the petitioner is not chargesheeted in both the cases. In the said case T.P. Gopalakrishnan (supra) it has also been held that there are three conditions for the application of the clause. Firstly, there must have been previous proceeding before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction in which the person must have been prosecuted. The said prosecution must 14 be valid and not null and void or abortive. Secondly, the conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the second proceeding in relation to the same offence and same set of facts, for which he was prosecuted and punished in the first proceeding. Thirdly, the subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding, where he is, for the second time, sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same set of facts. In other words, the clause has no application when the subsequent proceeding is a mere continuation of the previous proceeding, for example, where an appeal arises out of such acquittal or conviction. In order to sustain a plea of double jeopardy, it must be shown that all the aforesaid conditions of this clause are satisfied which has been held in paragraph no. 29 of the judgment in the case of "T.P. Gopalakrishnan"(supra) .
18. Both the cases being Deoghar (Town) P.S. Case No. 260 of 2011 and R.C. Case No. 13(S)/2013-D are on the same facts merely adding sections of Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 201 of I.P.C, it cannot be said that there is different transaction for which the petitioner has already been convicted and he has undergone two and half years sentence in the light of judgment of trial court.
19. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis, the Court finds that for the same facts and for the same transaction the petitioner is being prosecuted R.C. Case No. 13(S)/2013-D wherein cognizance has been taken by order dated 26.05.2017 for the offence under Sections 120-B r/w 201, 379, 409, 461, 462 & 477 of the I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the P.C. Act, 1988.
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20. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding including order dated 26.05.2017 whereby cognizance has been taken under Sections 120-B r/w 201, 379, 409, 461, 462 & 477 of the I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 in connection with R.C. Case No. 13(S) 2013-D, pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, C.B.I. Dhanabd-cum-III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, so far this petitioner is concerned, are quashed.
21. This petition stands allowed and disposed of. Pending I.A, if any, stands disposed of (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/A.F.R.