Madhya Pradesh High Court
Radhkishan vs Secretary The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 January, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228
1 WP-14130-2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 9 th OF JANUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 14130 of 2009
RADHKISHAN
Versus
SECRETARY THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Awadhesh Kumar Singh - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Jubin Prasad - Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed assailing the orders dated 13.10.2004, 10.03.2005, 11.08.2005 and 30.11.2007 passed by the respondents/authorities.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1978 in the respondent establishment as Constable, thereafter he was promoted on the post of Havildar in the year 1983. The petitioner has discharged his duties with honesty, sincerity and integrity upto the satisfaction of his superior authorities. He was further promoted on the post of Head Constable. The petitioner was posted at Thana Dehgaon District Raisen. The petitioner was subjected to harassment and ill attitude of his senior officers Shri G.S.Malviya, A.S.I. and T.I. Shri C.M.Dwivedi. The said officers with ulterior motive have registered a false and fabricated case against the petitioner. On 26.12.2003, the petitioner has misbehaved with the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 2 WP-14130-2009 officers and used abusive language with his senior officer. The petitioner has damaged the motor cycle and removed the telephone cables. Thereafter a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the authorities and the same was forwarded to the respondent No.4. The respondent No.4 after appreciating the preliminary enquiry report has framed charges against the petitioner. It is submitted that the respondents/authority has examined the witnesses but none of the witnesses has supported the prosecution case. The petitioner has also filed a complaint against the Shri G.S.Malviya for misbehaving and doing mental torture to the petitioner. However, the respondents/authorities have not taken any action on the complaint filed by the petitioner. The Inquiry officer under the pressure of Shri C.M. Dwivedi and Shri G.S.Malviya, A.S.I. in utter biased manner has submitted the Inquiry report, in which by mis-appreciating the evidence of eye witness produced by the prosecution only on the statement of Shri G.S.Malviya, the Inquiry officer has given finding just opposite to the material placed on the record and the evidence produced by the prosecution. The respondent No.4 Superintendent of Police, Raisen without perusing the record of the case has wrongly passed the order of removal of the petitioner on 13.10.2004 on the ground that three criminal cases are pending against the petitioner. However, in a criminal case registered at Crime No.213/2003 offence punishable under Sections 294, 353, 506 of Indian Penal Code, the Chief Judicial Magistrate Raisen vide judgment dated 18.10.2011 has acquitted the petitioner as the prosecution has failed to establish its case. Against the order dated 13.10.2004, the petitioner has filed an appeal before the respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 vide Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 3 WP-14130-2009 order dated 10.03.2005 has affirmed the order passed by the respondent No.4. Against the order dated 10.03.2005, the petitioner has submitted a representation to the respondent No.2 but the respondent No.2 has not scrutinized any of the documents and passed the order dated 11.08.2005 rejecting the representation of the petitioner. It is submitted that petitioner has approached the respondent No.1 by filing a Mercy Petition, however, the said petition was dismissed by the respondent No.1. It is submitted that while conducting the departmental enquiry, the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice. The respondents have initiated a departmental enquiry on the basis of the complaint filed by one Shri G.S.Malviya A.S.I. on the incident taken place on 26.12.2003. The petitioner has contended that merely three cases is registered against him. A closure report was filed by the authorities on the ground that there was no sufficient material for prosecuting the petitioner. The respondents have failed take notice that he was promoted twice. It is submitted that the enquiry officer has not properly assessed the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the respondents/authorities have wrongly passed the impugned orders. Hence, this petition.
3. On notice being issued, the respondents have filed their return denying all the averments made in the petition. It is submitted that a charge sheet was served upon the petitioner on 04.02.2004 and a single charge was levied against the petitioner with respect to misbehaviour with one Shri G.S.Malviya (A.S.I.). In pursuance to the charge sheet, a regular departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. The charge which Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 4 WP-14130-2009 was levied against the petitioner was proved in the departmental enquiry. It is submitted that as the charge has been found proved after conducting the departmental enquiry. Therefore, the order of removal was passed on 13.10.2004 by the Superintendent of Police, i.e. respondent No.4. It is argued that the respondent No.4 has considered all the aspects of the matter and, therefore, the order impugned has rightly been passed by the respondent No.4. Against the order dated 13.10.2004, the petitioner has filed an appeal which was dismissed on 10.03.2005. The Appellate Authority has rightly considered all the aspects of the matter and dismissed the appeal. The Mercy appeal filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed. The allegations against the petitioner were found to be proved. The disciplinary authority has observed that there are three criminal cases registered against the petitioner which are pending consideration as is reflected from the impugned order. Placing reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, he has prayed for dismissal of the petition.
4. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.
5. Undisputed facts of the case are that registration of criminal cases against the petitioner being (i) Crime No. 113 of 2003 registered at Police Station Raisen, (ii) Crime No. 213 of 2003 registered at Police Station Dehgaon and (iii) Crime No. 228 of 2004 registered at Police Station Raisen, which are pending consideration before the trial Court. In other cases being Crime No. 336 of 2000, Crime No. 44 of 2003 and Crime No. 45 of 2003 registered at Police Station Raisen, the police filed closure report after due Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 5 WP-14130-2009 investigation into the matter. The fact remains that there are specific allegations against the present petitioner to the effect that he has misbehaved with the superior officers. Furthermore, the respondent/department which is a disciplined police force, a person to be recruited to police service must be worthy of confidence of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. Person having criminal antecedents would not fit into said category since even if he is acquitted or discharged. Persons likely to erode credibility of police, ought not to enter police force. During the entire service tenure, the petitioner received 56 punishments, out of which 6 punishments were major which is reflected from the appellate order. The authorities found that despite receiving several punishments, there is no improvement in the working of the petitioner.
6. As far as participation of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry is concerned, there is no dispute with the fact that he duly participated in the departmental enquiry. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity in the departmental enquiry, therefore, no interference could be made in the present case. In the writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot sit over as an appellate authority and cannot enter into correctness of the factual aspects. The scope of interference in such cases is limited.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force vs Rajendra Kumar Dubey, (2021) 14 SCC 735 has held as follows :
Discussion and analysis
21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record, and written submissions filed on their behalf.Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 6 WP-14130-2009 21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant.
21.2. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723], a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however, interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. 21.3. These principles were further reiterated in State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349]. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 7 WP-14130-2009 fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
21.4. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , RPF v. Sai Babu [RPF v. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 464] , Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 :
(2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha [Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 334 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 316] , these principles have been consistently followed.
21.5. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh [State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569] this Court has summed up the law in following words : (SCC para 37) "37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy -- deference to the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 8 WP-14130-2009 position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain."
21.6. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (SCC pp. 616-17, para
12) "(a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority;
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 9 WP-14130-2009
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence." 21.7. In para 13 of the judgment [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , the Court held that : (P. Gunasekaran case [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 :
(2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , SCC p. 617) "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 10 WP-14130-2009 same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
21.8. In the present case, there is no allegation of mala fides against the disciplinary authority i.e. Chief Security Commissioner, or lack of competence of the disciplinary authority in passing the order of compulsory retirement, or of a breach of the principles of natural justice, or that the findings were based on no evidence.
21.9. We find from the record of this case that the charges under Charges 1(b) and 1(c) have been concurrently found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority the Chief Security Commissioner, RPF and the Director General of the RPF Railway Board. The issue under Charge 1(b) was the non-registration of an FIR pertaining to a theft case of CST-9 plates of the Railways. The finding was that even though the respondent had prepared the FIR after conducting investigation, he did not sign the FIR, and thereafter proceeded on leave without sanction. As a consequence, the FIR was not registered, and the investigation got thwarted right at the threshold. After some delay, a second panchnama was prepared by Nirmal Toppo, who was the in- charge of RPF Thana, who visited the spot, and then registered the FIR. It is relevant to note that the High Court has not disturbed the finding with respect to Charge 1(b). 21.10. With respect to Charge 1(c), this charge was a case of a Special Report, which are covered by Rule 229 of the Railway Protection Rules which reads as under:
"229. Special Reports.--In cases of thefts registered at the post involving loss of booked consignments or railway material exceeding the value fixed by the Director General from time to time, the Divisional Security Commissioner shall submit special report to the Director General with copy to the Chief Security Commissioner and to the concerned officer as may be specified through the Directives."
Charge 1(c) pertained to the theft of one coach trolley of the Railways which was to be sold as scrap and had been valued at Rs 28,000. The allegation was that the respondent had taken Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 11 WP-14130-2009 sick leave, so as to avoid being present at the time of handing over the trolley on 4-12-2006. This charge was found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority, and the Director General of Police-RPF Railway Board.
21.11. With respect to this charge, the High Court has given a contradictory finding. In para 24 of the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] , the Court held that the theft of the trolley was detected by another officer prior to the writ petitioner proceeding on leave. Hence, the question of delay in reporting the theft by the writ petitioner was held to have lost its significance. In para 25, the High Court, however, took a contrary view by holding that it concurred with the view taken by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner in the order dated 5-9-2007, wherein the charge was held to be proved. The High Court concluded by holding that the charge was not so serious so as to warrant the extreme punishment of removal from service, as there was no imputation of connivance or corrupt practices. 21.12. In our view, the aforesaid findings are erroneous, since the respondent has not been awarded the punishment of removal from service, but compulsory retirement from service vide order dated 5-12-2007.
21.13. It is further relevant to note that Charges 1(b) and 1(c) fall under Rule 146.2 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 which provides:
"146.2 Neglect of duty.--No member of the Force without good and sufficient cause shall--
(i) neglect or omit to attend to or fail to carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which is his duty as a member of the Force to attend to or carry out; or
(ii) fail to work his beat in accordance with orders or leave the place of duty to which he has been ordered or having left his place of duty for a bona fide purpose fail to return thereto without undue delay; or
(iii) be absent without leave or be late for any duty; or
(iv) fail properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of any money or property received by him in the course of his duty."
(emphasis supplied) The various allegations made against the respondent arise out of gross neglect of duty with respect to theft of railway property. The findings of gross neglect of duty under Charges 1(b) and (c) have been concurrently upheld. The findings of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 12 WP-14130-2009 the EO and the disciplinary authority are based on materials on record. The High Court was not justified in reappraising the entire evidence threadbare as a court of first appeal, and substituting the order of punishment, by a lesser punishment, without justifiable reason.
21.14. Section 11 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 provides that it shall be the duty of every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. The primary object of constituting the Railway Protection Force is to secure better "protection and security of the railway property". The restricted power of arrest and search conferred on members of this Force is incidental to the efficient discharge of their primary duty to protect and safeguard railway property, and to uphold the law. A police officer in the Railway Protection Force is required to maintain a high standard of integrity in the discharge of his official functions. In this case, the charges proved against the respondent "were of neglect of duty" which resulted in pecuniary loss to the Railways. The respondent was a Sub- Inspector in the Railway Police discharging an office of trust and confidence which required absolute integrity. The High Court was therefore not justified in setting aside the order of compulsory retirement, and directing reinstatement with consequential benefits, and payment of back wages to the extent of 50%.
21.15. With respect to the registration of a criminal case by the CBI Nagpur, the High Court held that it was an irrelevant consideration taken note of by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner. On this issue, we were informed during the course of hearing that the respondent had been convicted by the Special Judge, Wardha vide judgment and order dated 2-8- 2017 for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo RI for one year with fine. The Counsel for the respondent informed the Court, that an appeal has been filed against the said judgment, which is pending consideration. We have therefore considered it appropriate not to advert to the findings in the CBI case, lest it prejudices the case of the respondent which is pending in appeal against the order of conviction. We have decided the issue of the validity of the order of compulsory retirement on the basis of the material in the enquiry proceedings, and the orders passed by the statutory authorities in this regard.
21.16. The respondent was compulsorily retired pursuant to Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 13 WP-14130-2009 the order dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner. The order of compulsory retirement took effect on 5-12-2007. The respondent is being paid pension after he has been compulsorily retired. The direction of the High Court for payment of back wages was consequent upon the reinstatement of the respondent employee. Since we are upholding the order of compulsory retirement dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner, there is no question of granting back wages. In any case, the respondent is being paid pension after his compulsory retirement.
22. We order and direct that:
22.1. The appeal is allowed, and the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] of the High Court is set aside for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, and the order of compulsory retirement passed on 5-12-2007 by the Chief Security Commissioner, as affirmed by the Director General, RPF vide order dated 19-5-2008/21- 5-2008 is restored.
22.2. The respondent has stated in his written submissions that the gratuity which was payable to him, has not been released by the Department so far. We direct the appellant-department to release gratuity, if due and payable to the respondent from 5-12-2007, within a period of six weeks from today, along with interest as provided by Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 read with the applicable Office Memorandum/Notification issued by the Government of India.
23. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above terms, with no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any are disposed of accordingly.
8. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police Vs. Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685 has considered the aspect that police force is a disciplined force shouldering the great responsibility of maintaining the law and order in the society. The people repose great faith and confidence in them. In such circumstances, the person having a criminal antecedent will not fit in this category, even if he is acquitted. It is the domain and within the discretion of the employer to grant him appointment or not. In case the employer is having a better option and a Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25228 14 WP-14130-2009 better candidate he can always opt for appointment of a better candidate having no criminal past. Similarly in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs Parvez Khan reported in (2015) 2 SCC 591 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that candidate to be recruited to police service must be worthy of confidence of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. Person having criminal antecedents would not fit into said category since even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons likely to erode credibility of police ought not to enter police force. The petitioner was indulged in criminal activities and three criminal cases were registered against him which are pending consideration. In absence of any procedural defect in the departmental enquiry, no interference can be caused in the matter. Under these circumstances, since the authorities have rightly passed the impugned orders, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
10. The petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE AM Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANINDYA SUNDAR MUKHOPADHYAY Signing time: 31-05-2025 18:55:22