Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
W.W.A. Cossipore English School vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 31 July, 2018
Author: Shampa Sarkar
Bench: Debasish Kar Gupta, Shampa Sarkar
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
And
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Sarkar
M.A.T. No. 1912 of 2017
W.W.A. Cossipore English School
Versus
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Appellant/Applicant : Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta,
Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Madhusudan Datta,
Mr. Amiya Kumar Ruj.
For the Respondent no. 3
: Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya,
Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Jayanta Das Gupta,
Mr. L.C. Halder.
Mr. R. Guha Thakurta.
For the State : Mr. Susanta Pal,
Mr. Ananda Dulal Sarkar.
Heard on : 25/01/2018, 03/05/2018, 10/05/2018, 17/05/2018, 28/06/2018, 05/07/2018
Judgment on: 31/07/2018
Shampa Sarkar , J. :
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated September 8, 2017, passed in W.P. no. 23891 (W) of 2016 this intra-court appeal has been filed. By the said judgment the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging an order dated June 30, 2016 passed by the Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata in Case No. VIII-44 of 2009. By order dated January 25, 2018, it was directed that the application for stay would be treated as an informal paper book at the time of hearing of the appeal on the consent of parties.
2. The Government of West Bengal by an order dated December 9, 2009 referred a dispute between the appellant and the respondent no. 3, for adjudication on two issues, namely, whether the termination of service of the respondent no. 3 by way of refusal of employment by the management of the appellant school was justified and to what relief was the respondent no. 3 entitled.
3. The parties filed their respective written versions before the Tribunal and the concerned workman/respondent no. 3 had also filed an application under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes West Bengal (Second Amendment) Act 1980. The appellant filed a written objection to the said application and also raised an objection about the maintainability of the order of reference on various grounds. By an order dated August 26, 2013, the Tribunal refused to grant interim relief to the respondent no. 3. Aggrieved by the said order the respondent no. 3 filed a writ petition before this court being W.P. no. 17511 (W) of 2014.
4. The writ petition was disposed of by an order dated July 17, 2014, by a learned Judge of this Court, remanding the matter to the Tribunal for a re-hearing of the application on the point of maintainability as also for interim relief. The matter was, thereafter, heard and interim relief was granted to the respondent no. 3 and the reference was held to be maintainable by the Tribunal by an order dated June 30, 2016.
5. The appellant, aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal filed the aforementioned writ petition being W.P. no. 23891 (W) of 2016. According to the appellant, the respondent no. 3 an 'Ayah' of the school was terminated from service on April 14, 2004, and she accepted the financial benefits without raising any objection. It was the further case of the appellant that the reference was not maintainable because the respondent no. 3 had not raised any demand before the management of the school, challenging the termination. The other contention of the appellant was that the reference was also not maintainable as the dispute was a stale one, as the termination of the service took place as early as April 15, 2004, and the reference was made as late as on December 9, 2009.
6. The respondent no. 3 contested the said writ petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. It was her specific case that her termination from service was in violation of the mandatory provisions of law and the school forcefully prevented her from going to her work and attending her duties because she was objecting to various activities of the management of the school. She specifically alleged that the Principal of the school harassed her and other Group-D employees, for which the employees along with the respondent no. 3 filed a complaint before the appropriate authority and a criminal case was started on the basis thereof. It was her specific case that the Principal prevented '14 Ayahs' including her from entering the school premises and discharging their normal duties. She stated that due to refusal on the part of the school authorities in allowing her to join her duties on April 14, 2004, without assigning any reason, she filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, being Title Suit no. 141 of 2004 before the learned Civil Judge, Second Court at Sealdah. It was her case, that during the pendency of the suit the appellant school had taken a specific point that it was a case of termination, which was when, she realized that the suit was not the proper remedy and she withdrew the suit and approached the Labour Commissioner for intervention in the matter. The suit was withdrawn on May 8, 2007 and the respondent no. 3 approached the Conciliation Officer on November 7, 2007. She specifically stated that no enquiry was held against her and there were no allegations of misconduct against her at any point of time.
7. The principal dispute before the learned Single Judge was regarding the maintainability of the reference made by the Government for adjudication by the Second Industrial Tribunal. The appellants urged before the learned Judge that as the respondent no. 3 could not produce a single document showing that she had approached the management of the school challenging her termination, the dispute did not qualify as a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).
8. It was further urged on behalf of the appellant that the dispute was a stale one as the termination took effect from April 15, 2004, but the respondent no. 3 had approached the Labour Commissioner in November 2007, that is, after a lapse of more than three and half years and the appropriate Government issued the order of reference two years thereafter. According to him, the delay was not properly explained by the respondent no. 3 before the Tribunal and as such the order of the Tribunal was totally perverse, inasmuch as, the Tribunal had held that although there was some delay the same had been properly explained. According to the appellant there was nothing on record, to show that the delay had been properly explained.
9. The learned Single Judge upon contested hearing was pleased to dismiss the writ petition by order dated September 8, 2017. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge this intra-court appeal has been filed.
10. Before us, Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant school assailed the order of the learned Single Judge on three grounds. Firstly, that the learned Judge failed to consider the point that the respondent no. 3, not having raised any demand at all before the management of the school, the Conciliation Officer could not have entertained the matter, and, as such, the reference by the appropriate Government was not maintainable. Secondly, the reference was a stale one as the same was made five years after the termination of service of the respondent no. 3. Thirdly, it was a case of termination of service and the respondent no. 3 had received her terminal benefits, and thus the matter had reached its finality and there was no dispute at all.
11. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that the Tribunal did not have any reason to hold that the delay had been properly explained, inasmuch as, in the application filed by the respondent no. 3 before the Tribunal there has been no explanation for the delay. The Tribunal according to him had mechanically held that although there was some delay, the delay had been properly explained. According to Mr. Sengupta such a finding by the Tribunal was perverse as the same was not backed by any reason. He submitted that although the respondent no. 3 had filed a suit alleging refusal by the appellant to allow her to join, the said suit was not filed alleging termination and as such the explanation for delay that she was perusing a remedy in another forum as held by the learned Single Judge, could not be accepted as a ground for condonation of delay. He submitted that refusal to allow the respondent no. 3 to join her duties was not a dispute covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A demand has to be raised before the employer by the employee, for a dispute to partake the nature of an Industrial Dispute within the meaning of the said Act. Mr. Sengupta, urged that the learned Single Judge made out a third case by holding that, as the petitioner, was pursuing a civil suit, that fact itself was sufficient explanation for the delay in approaching the Conciliation Officer, although according to Mr. Sengupta that was not the explanation for delay given by the respondent no. 3 before the Tribunal.
12. Mr. Sengupta has relied on Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd., vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 529, Nedungadi Bank Ltd., Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others., reported in 2000 (1) LLJ 56, Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 in Capital Ltd. Vs. Eighth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal and Others, reported in 2006 (3) CHN 180, Management, Ludlow Jute Mills vs. Sheikh Moymur and Others, reported in 2005 LLR 606, and C.E.S.C. Limited vs. State of West Bengal & Others, reported in 2008 (3) CHN 329.
13. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 3 submitted that aggrieved by the refusal by the appellant to allow the respondent no. 3 to join her duties, the respondent no. 3 and the other Ayas had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Civil Court. He submitted that when the respondent no. 3 realized that she had approached the wrong forum, she withdrew the suit on May 8, 2007, and thereafter approached the Conciliation Officer. Refuting the point of acceptance of terminal benefits by the respondent no. 3, Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that from the bank statement it appeared that a sum of Rs.61,590/- had been deposited in the account of the respondent no. 3 but the said amount was not the full and final settlement of the terminal benefits. He next draws our attention to the letter dated April 23, 2008 written by the Principal of the appellant/school to the Labour Commissioner, Government of West Bengal, wherein, the Principal denied the contentions of the respondent no. 3 and answered the queries raised by the Labour Commissioner to meet the allegations made by the respondent no. 3 before the Labour Commissioner.
14. According to him, the said letter was sufficient proof of the fact that there was a dispute raised by the respondent no. 3 and the same was contested by the appellant and as such there was no requirement for the respondent no. 3, under the law, to raise a separate demand with the management prior to approaching the Labour Commissioner. According to Mr. Bhattacharya there was always a dispute subsisting between the school authorities and the Ayahs, who had filed civil suits, criminal proceedings etc., and the matter was a 'live' one. In view of the admitted fact that there was a constant acrimony between the respondent no. 3 and the appellant leading to initiation of civil and criminal proceedings the dispute was not a stale one but very much alive and the ground of non-maintainability of the reference had no basis.
15. He submitted that refusal of employment was also a dispute in terms of the said Act. He submitted that under the said Act no period of limitation has been prescribed within which a workman must raise an Industrial Dispute, as such, the question of non-maintainability of the proceedings before the Tribunal on the ground of delay was not sustainable in law.
16. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya relied on Sadhu Ram Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in 1983 (8) SC 383 wherein it has been held that the Tribunal was competent enough to decide whether a dispute existed and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not constitute itself as a court of appeal over the Tribunal. It was held in the said case that once there was a conciliation proceeding and the conciliation officer reported the same to the Government, and the Government was satisfied that there was Industrial Dispute, no further challenge could be made on the point of maintainability of the reference. Mr. Bhattacharya relied on Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 IV LLJ 171 (SC) wherein it has been held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act had no application in making a reference by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court for adjudication and the workman could not be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute.
17. He submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Shambu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda, reported in 1978 (1) LLJ 484 after consideration of the decision of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd., vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 529, held that, to insist that making a demand before the employer was a sine- qua-non for an Industrial Dispute to come into existence would tantamount to re-writing the section.
18. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties. Admittedly, the respondent no. 3 filed a civil suit before the Civil Judge, Junior Judge at Sealdah after being prevented from joining her duties, and had alleged refusal of employment. In the application for injunction annexed to the stay application before us, the facts as pleaded, reveal that there was a continuous dispute between the 'Ayahs' and the management of the school. The respondent no. 3 and other plaintiffs in the said suit also pleaded that the school authorities were interfering with the rights and interest in respect of their employment and that they had been debarred from entering the school. It also appears that the Conciliation Officer had sought for explanation from the school on the basis of the allegations made by the respondent no. 3 and the principal of the school had categorically denied those allegations and offered their explanation to such allegations.
19. On the recommendation of the Conciliation Officer, the Government of West Bengal referred the dispute on December 9, 2009, on the following issues:-
1. Whether the termination of service of Smt. Archana Prasad, C/o. Shri Sohan Lal Prasad, P.O. Nimta, Kolkata-700049 by way of refusal of employment by the management W.W.W.A. Cossipur English High School w.e.f. 14.04.2004 was justified?
2. To what relief, if any, is she entitled?
20. The pleadings of the respondent no. 3 before the Tribunal is noted below:-
"That on 14th April, 2004 the principal of the school did not allow the workwoman, Archana Prasad to do her normal duties and forcefully terminated the service of the workwoman without showing reason/s even verbally.
That the workwoman made repeated request for reinstatement and persuaded through the guardians and other co-employees but had no effect. The workwoman protested against such highhanded action of termination of her service but the management of the said school was sided with false acquisitions made by the principal and for which the workwoman had no other option left but to raise an Industrial Dispute.
That the management of the said school was adamant in their decision and in spite of best effort of Conciliation Officer, no settlement was possible for which the present reference has been made for adjudication of the following issues:
1. Whether the termination of service of Smt. Archana Prasad, C/o. Shri Sohan Lal Prasad, P.O. Nimta, Kolkata-700049 by way of refusal of employment by the management W.W.W.A. Cossipur English High School w.e.f. 14.04.2004 was justified?
2. To what relief, if any, is she entitled?
That the workwoman became misguided and filed a Title Suit and when found relief of reinstatement cannot be made by the Civil Court, the workwoman did not persue the case and the learned Court dismissed the suit as non-prosecution."
21. From the averments in the written statement filed before the Tribunal it appears that the respondent no. 3 mentioned about the long standing dispute between the appellant and herself and also mentioned that, challenging the actions of the school a civil suit was filed which was subsequently withdrawn. Moreover, in the examination-in-chief before the Tribunal the respondent no. 3 categorically stated that on April 14, 2004 she had gone to the school to discharge her duties but, she was not allowed and was terminated on and from April 14, 2004. She further stated that the school authority did not give her any termination letter nor a show cause was issued to her. A monthly sum of Rs. 3228 at the time of termination, was sent to her bank. She had not joined the school thereafter. In the cross-examination also, the respondent no. 3 categorically mentioned that she was not allowed to the join the school and that was why she had filed a civil suit before the Civil Judge at Sealdah. She further stated that after withdrawal of the civil suit she went before the Labour Commissioner. Before the Tribunal series of letters, which were exchanged between the appellant and the respondent no. 3 were exhibited and proved.
22. All these facts go to show, that there was a subsisting dispute between the employer and employee from the very beginning with regard to her employment and the dispute at the time of reference was a 'live' one. It also appears from the records and evidence before the Tribunal that challenging the refusal by the employer to join the services, a civil suit had been filed. The respondent no. 3 claimed to have filed the suit in ignorance of the law as stated by her in evidence. Subsequently, when she came to know that reinstatement could not be directed by the civil court, she withdrew the suit and approached the Labour Commissioner. In our view, the respondent no. 3 may not have prayed for reinstatement in the suit and may not have categorically stated that she was terminated but there were pleadings and evidence to the effect that after the refusal by the employer to allow her to join work on April 14, 2004, the respondent no. 3 filed a civil suit and that itself would be sufficient explanation, in our view, of the delay in approaching the Labour Commissioner by raising a dispute. The learned Single Judge rightly held that as the respondent no. 3 was pursuing a civil suit before the Sealdah Court she had sufficient explanation as to why she did not approach the appropriate forum immediately after the termination.
23. In Prabhakar (supra), relied upon by Mr. Sengupta, after a period of 14 years the workman had raised a dispute and it was held that there was no 'live' dispute. It was held that after inordinate delay of 14 years there could not have been a reference as the dispute ceased to exist. In the facts of the said case, the explanation for the delay was that the workman had approached the management several times with the request to reinstate him and the management initially had assured him that he would be reinstated and that was why the workman had waited of 14 years. The facts of the case is distinguishable and the decision in Prabhakar (supra) does not apply. In this case before us on and from April 14, 2004 after the alleged termination and even prior to that, the respondent no. 3 has been agitating against the appellant. She also initiated civil proceedings and criminal proceedings and the dispute was always alive according to us and not a stale one.
24. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others (supra) relied on by Mr. Sengupta it was held as follows:-
'A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstan-ces they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.'
25. The facts of the above case are also different and as such has no application, in view of the fact that, the reference in this case before us did not revive a matter which was already finally settled.
26. The question which is now required to be answered is as to whether, without raising a demand with the management an Industrial Dispute could be raised. In Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd., vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Others (supra). It has been held follows:-
"If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer cannot become an industrial dispute."
27. According to the said judgment a mere demand to a Government without a dispute being raised by the workman with the employer could not be an Industrial Dispute. A similar view was reiterated in Management, Ludlow Jute Mills vs. Sheikh Moymur and Others, C.E.S.C. Limited vs. State of West Bengal & Others (supra).
28. On the other hand, the ratio of the decision in Raghubir Singh (supra) relied upon by the Bhattacharyya applies in this case wherein it has been held as follows:-
"In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer."
29. In Sadhu Ram (supra) as submitted by Mr. Bhattacharya it has been held that the High Court shall not be an appellate court over the Tribunal constituted under a special legislation to resolve disputes qualitatively different from a civil suit. The relevant portions of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:-
"2. We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management. There was a conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to the Government. The Government was justified in thinking that there was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court.
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3. The High Court appeared to think that the decision of this Court in the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat(1) justified its conclusion that the failure of the conciliation proceedings and the report of the Conciliation Officer to the Government were not sufficient to sustain a finding that there was an industrial dispute. This was also what was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. The High Court was in error in so thinking. In Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat(1), the question really was about the precise scope of the reference made by the Government for adjudication. Throughout it appeared that the only reference that the Government could have made related to the payment of retrenchment compensation which alone was the subject matter of dispute between the parties. The conciliation which failed had also concerned itself with the question of payment of retrenchment compensation and in their claims before the management, the workmen had requested for payment of retrenchment compensation and raised no dispute regarding reinstatement. It was in those circumstances that the court held that there was no industrial dispute regarding reinstatement. We do not see how Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat can be of any assistance to the respondents."
30. We are in agreement with the proposition of law that, when the Tribunal on the facts of the case had come to the conclusion that the reference was maintainable, the High Court sitting in judicial review should not interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal.
31. In Shambu Nath Goyal (supra) it has been held categorically held as follows:-
"6. ...........................****************.....................
But that apart the question whether an industrial dispute exists at the date of reference is a question of fact to be determined on the material placed before the Tribunal with the cautions enunciated in C. P. Sarthy's case (Supra). In the case before us, it can be shown from the record accepted by the Tribunal itself that there was in existence a dispute which was legitimately referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Undoubtedly, it is for the Government to be satisfied about existence of the dispute and the Government does appear to be satisfied. However, it would be open to the party impugning the reference that there was no material before the Government, and it would be open to the Tribunal to examine the question, but that does not mean that it can sit in appeal over the decision of the Government and come to a conclusion that there was no material before the Government.
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7. In this case the Tribunal completely misdirected itself when it observed that no demand was made by the workman claiming reinstatement after dismissal. When the inquiry was held, it is an admitted position, that the workman appeared and claimed reinstatement. After his dismissal he preferred an appeal to the Appellate forum and contended that the order of dismissal was wrong, unsupported by evidence and in any event he should be reinstated in service. If that was not a demand for reinstatement addressed to employer what else would it convey? That appeal itself is a representation questioning the decision of the Management dismissing the workmen from service and praying for reinstatement. There is further a fact that when the Union approached the Conciliation Officer the Management appeared and contested the claim for reinstatement. There is thus unimpeachable evidence that the concerned workman persistently demanded reinstatement. If in this background the Government came to the conclusion that there exists a dispute concerning workman S. N. Goyal and it was an industrial dispute because there was demand for rein- statement and a reference was made such reference could hardly be rejected on the ground that there was no demand and the industrial dispute did. not come into existence. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error in rejecting the reference on the ground that the reference was incompetent. Accordingly this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to tribunal for disposal according to law. The respondent shall pay costs of the appellant in this Court. As the reference is very old the Tribunal should dispose it of as expeditiously as possible."
32. Having regard to the ratio of the judgments stated hereinabove and the materials on record we are of the considered opinion that there existed a dispute as there was a refusal of employment, which falls within the definition of an industrial dispute under Section 2 (k) of the said Act. Moreover we are further of the opinion, that raising a demand with the employer was not a sine-qua-non for an Industrial Dispute to come into existence when, as in the case in hand, the respondent no. 3 had continuously agitated the issue with the management, initiated criminal proceedings and civil proceedings and also approached the Labour Commissioner. It was for the appropriate Government to satisfy itself that there was an Industrial Dispute. The School authorities/appellants contested the matter before the Conciliation Officer and denied the allegations made by the respondent no.3 and on the basis of such materials available before the appropriate Government the reference was made.
33. We do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge and we further hold that the writ court sitting in judicial review cannot sit as an appellate authority over the Tribunal.
34. The appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated January 25, 2018 stands vacated. The appellant/school shall pay to the respondent no. 3, the interim relief as prescribed by the West Bengal Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 from the date of filing of the application under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as directed by the Second Industrial Tribunal by its order dated June 30, 2016 within a period of four weeks from date. The appellant/school will be at liberty, to withdraw the amount, if any, lying with the learned Registrar General, Appellate Side of this Court.
35. Appeal is dismissed.
36. There shall be no order as to costs.
37. Urgent photostat Certified Copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.
I agree.
(Debasish Kar Gupta, J.) (Shampa Sarkar, J.)