Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal
M/S Girnar Transformers Pvt. Ltd vs Cce, Kanpur on 20 February, 2014
CUSTOMS EXCISE & SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
West Block No.2, R. K. Puram, New Delhi, Court No. 1
Date of hearing: 04.02.2014
Date of decision: 20.02.2014
For Approval and Signature:
Honble Mr. Justice G. Raghuram, President
Honble Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Technical Member
1
Whether Press Reporter may be allowed to see the Order for publication as per Rule 26 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982?
2
Whether it should be released under Rule 26 of CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 for publication in any authoritative report or not?
3
Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the Order?
4
Whether Order is to be circulated to the Departmental authorities?
Service Tax Appeal No. 56146 OF 2013 with S. T. stay No. 56588 of 2013
(Arising out of order-in-Appeal No. 312-ST/APPL/KNP/2012 dated 13.12.2012 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur).
M/s Girnar Transformers Pvt. Ltd. Appellant
Vs.
CCE, Kanpur Respondent
Appearance:
Sh. Jitin Singhal, Advocate for the appellant
Shri Somesh Arora, Dr. G.K. Sarkar & Sh. B.L. Narasimhan, Advocates as amicus curie.
Shri Govind Dixit, DR for the Respondent
Coram: Honble Mr. Justice G. Raghuram, President
Honble Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Technical Member
Final Order No. 50590 /2014
Per: Justice G. Raghuram:
The assessee company has preferred this appeal. The Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Kanpur passed an order dated 28.03.2012 confirming service tax demand of Rs. 10,24,952/-, interest and penalties, including penalty of an equal amount as the assessed tax, under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act).
2. Under an agreement with M/s Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (DVVNL) the appellant was providing maintenance and repairs of old and damaged transformers. On allegation that during 01.04.2010 to 31.03.2011, the appellant failed to disclose the gross consideration received for having provided the taxable management, maintenance or repair (MMR) service to M/s DVVNL; had disclosed only labour charges received but not the gross value received, proceedings were initiated by the show cause notice dated 07.10.2011. The proceedings culminated in the adjudication order, dated 28.03.2012.
3. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs (Appeals), Kanpur, alongwith an application seeking waiver of pre-deposit. By the order dated 29.08.2012, the appellate authority granted waiver of pre-deposit, on condition of deposit of 25% of the duty and penalty confirmed by the adjudicating authority. The pre-deposit was directed to be made by 30.09.2012. The appellant by letter dated 29.08.2012 requested the appellate Commissioner to reconsider the order of pre-deposit, since it was under severe financial distress.
4. By the (impugned) order dated 13.12.2012, the Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the appeal for failure in pre-deposit, ordered on 29.08.2012. The appellate authority observed that if the assessee were aggrieved against the pre-deposit order it should have approached this Tribunal; that the appellate authority has become functous officio after passing the pre-deposit order; and had no authority to review that order. Since there was no authority conferred to review the pre-deposit ordered, the appellate authority held, the appellants request for review (of the pre-deposit ordered on 29.08.2012) cannot be entertained. The appeal was rejected. Assessee is therefore before this Tribunal against this order dated 13.12.2012.
5. At the stage of considering the stay application, on 21.01.2004 we entertained a doubt as to the appropriate disposition warranted by this Tribunal, in the circumstances; whether an appeal against such order of the appellate Commissioner was maintainable; if maintainable whether it is permissible to reconsider the correctness of the appellate Commissioners order dated 29.08.2012 (directing pre-deposit before that authority); and if not whether the impugned order rejecting the appeal for failure of pre-deposit is liable to be interfered with by this Tribunal. Since the above issues have a general application and are recurrent issues before this Tribunal, the stay application along with the substantive appeal were listed for hearing after an invitation to the bar to make submissions on these issues. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant Sh. Jitin Singhal, and Sh. Somesh Arora, Sh. G.K. Sarkar and Sh. B. L. Narasimhan, as well.
6. We dispose of the stay application granting waiver of pre-deposit and the substantive appeal as well, by this order.
7. Section 83 of the Act enjoins application of certain provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the 1944 Act) to service tax. Section 35 F of the 1944 Act is one such provision which is made applicable to service tax matters. Section 35 F of the 1944 Act enjoins pre-deposit of tax, interest and penalties as assessed, when an appeal is preferred against an order, whether the appeal be preferred before the Commissioner ( Appeals ) or to this Tribunal. The first proviso to Section 35 F authorizes the appellate authority to dispense with the pre-deposit requirement, where the appellate authority is of the opinion that deposit of the duty/ tax demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to an appellant but subject to such conditions as the appellate authority may deem fit to impose, so as to safeguard the interest of Revenue. Principles governing the exercise of discretion while granting waiver of pre-deposit or a stay are spelt out in several decisions, including decisions of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise vs. Dunlop India Ltd.1; Benera Valves Ltd. Vs. CCE2; S. Vasudeva vs. State of Karnataka3; Bhabya Apparels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India 4; Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd5 ; Monotosh Saha vs. Enforcement Directorate 6; Vijay Prakash D. Mehta vs. Collector of Custom7.
8. The issue whether the learned appellate Commissioner erred in the exercise of discretion (in directing pre-deposit of 25% of the assessed liability, vide the order dated 29.08.2012) must however depend on whether that order had attained temporal finality since the appellant had not challenged that order and allowed that order to attain finality; whether an appeal against that order could be preferred to this tribunal and whether in an appeal preferred against the impugned order (dismissing the appeal), treating this as an order passed under Section 35 A, the correctness of the pre-deposit order dated 29.08.2012 passed appellate Commissioner could be considered.
9. Section 35 A of the 1944 Act sets out the procedure to be followed by the appellate Commissioner while disposing of appeals. Section 85 (5) of the Act provides that in hearing of appeals and passing orders under this provision, the Commissioner (Appeals) shall exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as he exercises and follows in hearing appeals and making orders under the 1944 Act. Thus, the procedure for hearing appeals enjoined by Section 35 A of the 1944 Act is mandated to be followed by the Commissioner (Appeals) while hearing and disposing of appeals under the Act. A similar provision with regard to hearing and passing orders by this Tribunal is set out in section 86 (7) of the Act. Section 86 of the Act provides an appellate remedy to this Tribunal against a primary adjudication order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise under Section 73 or 83 A, or an order passed by a Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 85. Section 85 (4) of the Act authorizes the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear and determine an appeal preferred to that authority and to pass such orders as he thinks fit including an order enhancing the service tax, interest or penalty.
10. On a primary analysis of the provisions of Sections 85 and 86 of the Act it appears that an appeal to this Tribunal lies only against a final order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in an appeal preferred to him; and not against an (interlocutory) order of pre-deposit passed by that authority, in exercise of discretion under the first proviso to Section 35 F of the 1944 Act. Since it is the settled legal principle that an appellate remedy is a creature of the statute; and availability of an inherent appellate remedy shall not be assumed; and requires to be legislatively provided, it is legitimate to infer that no appellate recourse to this Tribunal is open to an assessee against an (interlocutory) order of pre-deposit passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), since such an order would not be a order, which by itself disposes of appeal on merits. The appropriate remedy available to an assessee aggrieved by an order of pre-deposit passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) would therefore be judicial review under Article 226 or a supervisory curative recourse under Article 227, of the Constitution. Precedents however appear to belie this empirical assumption.
11. We consider some of the precedents which consider whether an appeal lies to this Tribunal against an order of pre-deposit passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
12. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. CCE, Chennai8, the Madras High Court ruled that an order passed under Section 35 F, not being a final order passed under Section 35 A of the 1944 Act, no appeal to this Tribunal is maintainable and a writ petition is maintainable. The Madras High Court quoted with approval decisions of this Tribunal in Bhushan Industrial Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CCE, Chandigarh 9 ; and International Computers vs. CCE 10, for this conclusion.
13. In Rajkumar Shiv Hare vs. Assistant Director11, the relevant facts were that appellate Tribunal under FEMA, 1999 directed pre-deposit of the adjudicated penalty, observing that in default the appeal would be dismissed. Against this order a writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court which was rejected on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court the fundamental issue which was considered was (also) whether a writ petition was maintainable against an order of the appellate Tribunal directing pre-deposit. The apex Court concluded that under the statutory scheme of FEMA in particular Section 35 thereof provided for an appeal to the High Court, against any decision or order of the appellate Tribunal. An appeal to the High Court is therefore available against an interlocutory order of the appellate Tribunal (directing pre-deposit) as well, rule the Supreme Court.
14. Following this decision, the Madras High Court in Metal Weld Electrodes vs. CESTAT 12 ruled that a remedy against a pre-deposit order passed by the CESTAT is by way of an appeal to the High Court and not a writ petition. This decision proceeded on an analysis of the provisions of Section 35G of the 1944 Act which facilitated an appellate remedy to the High Court from every order passed in appeal, by the appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). Consequently, writ petitions filed challenging pre-deposit orders passed by CESTAT were rejected, granting liberty to prefer appeals (to the High Court) under Section 35G of the 1944 Act.
15. The Punjab and Haryana High Court vide the decision dated 15.01.2013 in CWP No. 13288 of 2012, in a writ petition preferred by M/s Surya Air Products Pvt. Ltd., ruled that an order passed by the Tribunal in an application for waiver of pre-deposit (under Section 35F) must be considered as an order passed in the substantive appeal and such an order is an appealable order in terms of Section 35G of the Act. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, since an effective alternative remedy of appeal is available.
16. In its decision dated 31.07.2013, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 1672 of 2013, an appeal preferred by M/s Surya Pharmaceuticals and others, distinguished the judgment of the Madras High Court in Hindustan Levers Ltd vs. CCE, Chennai (supra) and concluded that an assessee, aggrieved by an order of pre-deposit passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) (under Section 35F of the 1944 Act) could prefer an appeal to the CESTAT. This conclusion was recorded on the basis that the requirement of pre-deposit and the discretion to waive pre-deposit under provisions of Section 35F is integral to the scheme of appellate powers conferred by Section 35 and Section 35A of the 1944 Act; and an order of pre-deposit passed under Section 35F is essentially an order passed in an appeal filed under Section 35 read with Section 35A.
17. In Mela Ram & Sons vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab 13 the issue was whether an order of the appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to condone the delay in preferring an appeal is an order under Section 30(2) or one, under Section 31 of the Income Tax Act. Supreme Court held that Section 31 being the only provision relating to hearing and disposal of appeals, if an order dismissing an appeal on the ground of bar of limitation is passed in appeal, it must fall within Section 31. Section 33 conferred a right of appeal against all orders passed under Section 31. It must therefore follow that an appeal would lie not only against an order that could be passed under Section 31(3)(a), i.e. confirming, reducing, enhancing or annulling the assessment after a consideration of merits of the appeal but also against an order dismissing an appeal as a consequence of rejection of an application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. The Court concluded that an order of the appellate Assistant Commissioner (holding that there were no sufficient reasons for condoning the delay and rejecting the appeals as time barred), would be an order passed under Section 31 and be open to appeal and, it would make no difference in the position whether the order of dismissal is made before or after the appeal is admitted.
18. In P. S. Pictures, Bombay vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay14 a full Bench of this Tribunal held that an order of a lower appellate authority disposing of an appeal, confirming the order under appeal is appealable under Section 128A and not under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.
19. In Shree Ambika Steel India vs. CCE, Chandigarh15 a full Bench of this Tribunal held that an order of the appellate Commissioner dismissing an appeal for non-compliance with a pre-deposit order, is an order passed under Section 35A of the 1944 Act and not one under Section 35F and an appeal to the Tribunal thereagainst, is maintainable.
20. In an appeal arising under the Customs Act, 1962 (the 1962 Act), this Tribunal in Syed Aizaz Ahmed vs. CC, Bangalore16 ruled that an appeal before the Tribunal would lie against an order of the appellant Commissioner dismissing an assessees appeal on the sole ground of failure of pre-deposit. The reasons recorded are: (a) the scheme of law requires a remand to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a decision on merits; (b) the Tribunal has power (of remand) while the Central Government (exercising revisional jurisdiction) has no such power; (c) the scheme of the Act does not foreclose or permit bypassing the appellate Commissioners jurisdiction to deal with the substantive issues on merits; and (d) that on a harmonious construction of provisions of Sections 129(a) and 129(b) (d) of the 1962 Act, the issue whether a dismissal of an assessees appeal by the appellate Commissioner for failure of pre-deposit, without having to examine the substantive issue on merit is sustainable in law, must be determined by the Tribunal.
21. In Baron International Limited vs. Union of India 17, the High Court clearly ruled that the CESTAT has no inherent power to review its orders. This is also the well settled position see Harbhajan Singh vs. Karam Singh18; D.N. Roy vs. State of Bihar19; Patel Narshi Jhakesshi vs. Pradyumnasinghji 20; Mehar Singh Nanakchand vs. Naunihal Jhakkar Das21; State of Assam vs. J.N. Roy22; Major Chandra Bhan vs. Latafat Ullah Khan23; R.R. Varma vs. Union of India24; Gram Panchayat Kauouda vs. Div. of Consolidation of Holdings25; and Lily Thomas vs. Union of India 26;
22. The scope of Section 35C(2) came to be considered in CCE, Vadodara vs. Steelco Gujarat Limited27, which ruled that the power of review is not inherent to the Tribunal unless expressly granted by the statute; and no such power is granted under provisions of the 1944 Act. The provision grants but a limited power to rectify errors. The Court pointed out that although the ground for rectification namely, an error on the face of the record may be common to a power for review as well, the nature of the power to be exercised in the two cases must be distinguished; the power of review is not limited to rectification and is wider than the power conferred under Section 35C(2). Drawing on this decision, the Bombay High Court in Sarla Performance Fibers Ltd. vs. Union of India28; Union of India vs. Sir Hurkisondas Nurottam Hospital & Medical Research Centre29; and in Tejus Proprietary Concern of Tejus Rohitkumar Kapadia vs. Union of India30 after referring to its the earlier decision in Maina Khemka vs. Union of India 31 held that though the Tribunal cannot exercise a review jurisdiction, a party can always seek a modification of the order, within the permissible limits and parameters laid down in law. Such power, of modification, according to the above decisions is limited to rectification of an order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record, one of the shades of power to review, granted under Section 35C(2) of the Act. Such power of rectification authorizes modification of an interim order of stay/ pre-deposit as well, though on the limited ground of error apparent on the face of the record, ruled the High Court.
23. The scope of review jurisdiction is explained in several decisions including Shiv Deo Singh vs. State of Punjab 32; Sow Chandra Kanta and Another vs. Sheikh Habib 33; Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others 34; and in Northern India Caterers (India) Limited vs. Lt. Gen. of Delhi. The decisions inter alia explain that a review is not permissible on the ground that the earlier decision was inconsistent with a binding precedent, pronounced subsequent to such decision.
24. However, the Karnataka High Court in M. I. Metal Sections Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Bangalore35; ruled that if as the result of a subsequent decision of the Tribunal any change in the correct legal position has been brought about, an appellant can move the Tribunal for modification of the order passed by the Tribunal. The High Court ruled that it is improper for the Tribunal to dismiss an appeal merely since an assessee failed to comply with the condition of pre-deposit ordered. When the appeal is listed for hearing, it will be open to an assessee / appellant to move the Tribunal, even at that stage, to address a plea that it could not comply with the (pre-deposit) order passed by the Tribunal, on account of financial difficulties or circumstances beyond its control; and where such a plea is raised the Tribunal shall have to consider its merits, ruled the High Court.
25. The Gujarat High Court in Amar Food Products vs. Union of India36 considered the scope of Section 35F of the 1944 Act, and pointed out that where, subsequent to an order of pre-deposit, the decision of a Tribunal which was a basis for the pre-deposit was referred for consideration to a Larger Bench, that would constitute a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of an application for modification of the earlier interim order; and no application for modification of the stay order (in such circumstances) should be rejected, including on the ground that the appeal itself stood dismissed for failure of pre-deposit.
26. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi-III37; Ador Polycontainers Ltd. vs. CCE, Aurangabad38; and in Dr. V.V. Patil S.S.K. Ltd. vs. CCE, Aurangabad39 this Tribunal ruled that the appellate Commissioner has power to consider modification of an order of pre-deposit passed by that authority.
27. In the light of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Sarla Performance Fibers Ltd.; Sir Hurkisondas Nurottam Hospital & Medical Research Centre and in Tejus Prop. Concern (supra), it would follow that the appellate Commissioner has jurisdiction and powers to entertain an application for rectification and modification of an order of pre-deposit or stay; to be exercised in terms of Section 35C(2), namely for rectification of an error apparent on the face of the record.
28. CCE, Chandigarh vs. Smithkline Beecham Co. Health C. Ltd.40 had occasion to consider Revenues appeal against an order of the Tribunal which considered an appeal against an order of the appellate Commissioner. The appellate Commissioner had dismissed an appeal without going into merits, on the limited ground of failure of pre-deposit ordered. The Supreme Court ruled that in such factual matrix, the Tribunal ought not to have entertained and determined substantive merits of the appeal but could have considered only the validity of the appellate Commissioners order, dismissing the appeal for failure of pre-deposit.
29. Decisions of this Tribunal in The Latur District Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. vs. CCE, Aurangabad41; Shardha Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai42; Pure Helium (India) Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai-III43; Vikram Green Tech (I) Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-I44; and Ispat Industries Ltd. vs. CCE, Raigad45 illustrate a regular practice of entertainment of appeals preferred against decisions of appellate Commissioners dismissing appeals by assessees for failure of pre-deposit and considering merits of orders of pre-deposit earlier passed by appellate Commissioners.
30. While no uniform, or a wholly coherent norm could be culled out from the several decisions adverted to (supra), we are able to identify the following principles from the precedents, to the extent relevant and material for the purposes of the issues arising in the present case. The following principles, in our considered view emerge:
(a) While considering an application for waiver of pre-deposit, the appellate Commissioner is required to avoid a mechanical and ritualistic approach. A waiver of pre-deposit application must be disposed of applying the principles set out in the judgments of the Allahabad High Court in ITC vs. Commissioner (Appeals) Meerut46 and the A. P. High Court in CCE, Guntur vs. Sri Chaitanya Educational Committee47. A summary of the principles governing the exercise of discretion in this area is set out in paragraph 14 of the judgment of the A.P. High Court;
(b) The Commissioner (Appeals) has the power, authority and jurisdiction to entertain an application for rectification or modification of an order of pre-deposit/ stay passed by that authority. While no power is specifically conferred on the Commissioner (Appeals) either under Sections 35 or 35A of the 1944, Act to review his own decision; and though the provisions of Section 35C(2) of this Act confer the power (to rectify any mistake apparent on the record) only on this Tribunal, the Commissioner (Appeals) may entertain an application for rectification/ modification of a pre-deposit order, but only for rectification of an error on the face of the record;
(c) The appellate Commissioner could avoid an invitation/ plea for rectification by a careful, good faith and critical analysis of the prima-facie merits of the case and other relevant parameters, while disposing of an application for pre-deposit. Adjudicatory discipline mandates that the appellate Commissioner must follow established judicial norms by unreservedly following decisions of the Supreme Court, the High Courts and of this Tribunal, wherever such decisions operate and are brought to his notice, instead of proceeding on an independent analysis of the applicable legal provisions and persisting in applying such interpretation though it be at variance with interpretations by the Supreme Court, the High Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be; and
(d) An appeal to this Tribunal is maintainable against an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dismissing an appeal for failure of pre-deposit.
(e) In view of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surya Pharmaceutical Ltd. (supra), since an order of pre-deposit passed by the appellate Commissioner, in exercise of discretion under Section 35F of the 1944 Act amounts to an order passed under the generality of the appellate jurisdiction under Section 35, an appeal lies to this Tribunal against such order as well, apart from an appeal against the final order dismissing an appeal for failure of pre-deposit;
(f) While considering an appeal preferred against a final order passed, rejecting an appeal for failure of pre-deposit, the Tribunal is authorized to consider the correctness/ appropriateness of an earlier order (of pre-deposit) passed by the appellate Commissioner, the non compliance whereof resulted in dismissal of the appeal by that authority;
(g) While disposing of an appeal against a final order of the appellate Commissioner, (dismissing an appeal for failure of pre-deposit), the Tribunal shall not adjudicate upon the merits of the appeal. If the order of pre-deposit passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), in the given facts and circumstances is erroneous, the Tribunal is required to set aside the order of the appellate authority and remit the matter to the appellate Commissioner for denovo consideration, after passing an appropriate order as to pre-deposit.
31. Coming to the merits of the present appeal, the primary authority confirmed the demand of service tax, penalty and interest on the ground of non remittance of service tax on the gross consideration received for repair and maintenance of old/ damaged transformers, from DVVNL. The appellant had remitted service tax on the value of the labour charges received; but not on the value of replaced parts such as HV/LT leg coils, transformer oil and other goods used in the process of repair/ maintenance. The agreement between the parties catalogues a break-up of the total cost of repair and maintenance, under several heads such as labour charges and value of items to be replaced. The adjudicating authority concluded that though the total cost of the repair package is separately mentioned under the different heads in invoices and the assessee had remitted central excise duty and sales tax, as the case may, be on the coils, transformer oil, and other purchased items which were used in the repairs/ maintenance, since the taxable service was provide under a composite contract, the gross consideration received is the taxable value.
Assessee had preferred an appeal to the appellate Commissioner against this order and by the order dated 29.08.2012 the stay application was disposed of by the appellate authority directing pre-deposit of 25% of the assessed liability. Since there was a failure of the pre-deposit ordered, the appeal was dismissed on that singular ground. We notice that this Tribunal in the final order passed in s vide the final order No. ST/A/402/12-Cus dated 23.05.2012 and in the final order dated 21.11.2012 in ST Appeal No.161/2012 has consistently ruled that goods which are deemed to have been sold in execution of works contracts, including in the process of rendering the taxable repair / maintenance service cannot be included within the ambit of the taxable value for the service provided. The decision of this Tribunal in Balaji Tirupati Enterprises vs. CCE, Meerut-II is confirmed by the decision of the Allahabad High Court. Revenues appeal thereagainst was rejected in CC&CE vs. Balaji Tirupati 48.
32. In the light of the above rulings, the appellant/ assessee has made out a strong prima facie case on merits and it would occasion undue hardship in the circumstances, to direct pre-deposit. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) directing pre-deposit is therefore unsustainable. Since the appeal was rejected by the appellate Commissioner on the singular ground of failure of pre-deposit, the impugned order rejecting the appeal cannot be sustained. Since the appellate Commissioner has not disposed of the assessees appeal on merits, we are precluded from considering the substantive merits of the present appeal.
31. On the aforesaid analysis we set aside the order of the Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs, Kanpur dated 13.12.2012 in OIA No. 312-ST/APPL/KNP/2012 as well as the order dated 29.08.2012 in OIA No. 260-ST/Stay/APPL/KNP/2012 (directing pre-deposit); grant waiver of pre-deposit; and remit the matter to the learned Commissioner (Appeals). The appellate Commissioner shall now dispose of the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. We clarify that nothing in this judgment should be considered as an expression by this Tribunal on the substantive merits of the assessees appeal. The appellate Commissioner shall dispose of the appeal by due consideration of the material on record and the applicable principles of law. No order as to costs.
(Justice G. Raghuram)
President
(Rakesh Kumar)
Technical Member
Pant
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2 (2006) 13 SCC 349
3 (1993) 3 SCC 467
4 (2007) 10 SCC 129
5 (2007) 13 SCC 207
6 (2008) 12 SCC 359
7 1989 (39) ELT 178 (SC)
8 2006 (202) ELT 591 (Mad)
9 1984 (18) ELT 538 (T)
10 1985 (19) ELT 83 (T)
11 2010 (25) ELT 3 (SC)
12 2013-TIOL-865-HC-MAD-CESTAT
13 AIR 1956 SC 367
14 1986 (23) ELT 235 (Tri.)
15 2002 (150) ELT 931 (Tri.Del.)
16 2013 (297) ELT 535 (Tri. Bang.)
17 2004 (163) ELT 150 (Bom.)
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23 (1979) 1 SCC 321
24 (1980) 3 SCC. 402
25 (1989) Supp (2) SCC 465
26 (2000) 6 SCC 512
27 2004 (163) ELT 403 (SC)
28 2009 (16) STR 392 (Bom.)
29 2010 (18) STR 254 (Bom.)
30 2012 (275) ELT 175 (Bom.)
31 2004 (170) ELT 3 (Bom.)
32 AIR 1963 SCC 1909
33 1975 1 SCC 674
34 1979 4 SCC 389
35 1995 (75) ELT 470 (Kar.)
36 2010 (259) ELT 490 (Guj.)
37 2004 (176) ELT 159 (Tri.Del.)
38 2001 (130) ELT 821 (tri. Mumbai)
39 2005 (182) ELT 53 (Tri. Mumbai)
40 2003 (157) ELT 497 (SC)
41 2013-TIOL-1272-CESTAT-MUM
42 2011 (274) ELT 584 (Tri. Mum)
43 2004 (163) ELT 122 (Tri. Mum.)
44 2003 (159) ELT 319 (Tri. Mum.)
45 2008 (2012) STR 263 (Tri. Mum.)
46 2005 (184) ELT 347 (All.)
47 2011 (22) STR 135 (A.P.)
48 2013 (32) STR 530 (All.)
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