Bombay High Court
Krishna Hasha Mokal vs Secretary/President- Peoples ... on 12 March, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:11544
11-WP-1754-2006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1754 OF 2006
Shri Krishna Hasha Mokal,
Residing at H.No.43/F,
Walmiki Worli Village,
Mumbai 400 025. ... Petitioner
V/s.
1. Secretary/President
People's Education Society
Raosaheb N.M.Kala Marg,
Gokhale Road (S), Mumbai 400028
2. Head Master Jr. College
& Maharashtra High School No.2,
Gokhale Road (S), Raosaheb,
N.M.Kale Marg, Mumbai 400 028
3. The Education Officer,
Education (Department)
Mumbai.
4. The State of Maharashtra
Through Secretary Education Dept. ... Respondents
______________
Mr. Prashant Bhavke, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Mandar Limaye i/b Mr. Mayuresh S. Lagu, for the Respondent Nos.
1 and 2.
Ms. Kavita Salunkhe, AGP for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4-State.
_______________
CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Digitally
signed by
PRIYA
RESERVED ON : 28 FEBRUARY 2025
PRIYA RAJESH
RAJESH SOPARKAR
SOPARKAR Date:
2025.03.12
14:58:24
+0530 PRONOUNCED ON : 12 MARCH 2025
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JUDGMENT :
1. Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the judgment and order dated 31 October 2005 passed by Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Mumbai dismissing Appeal No. MUM/116/2000 which was filed by the Petitioner challenging his termination order dated 8 September 2000.
2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that, Respondent No.1-People's Education Society is a registered Trust which runs Maharashtra High School in Mumbai, which is an aided and recognized school. Petitioner was initially working with Mahatma Gandhi Vidyamandir School at Bandra and later worked at Navajeevan Vidyamandir at Bhandup. He thereafter served Aryan English School as well as Sir Elly Kadoorie. school. Thereafter, the Petitioner started working with Respondent No.2-Vidya Mandir High School from 6 September 1991. It is Petitioner's case that his services were terminated on 20 March 1992 on the ground of unsatisfactory work. He filed appeal before School Tribunal, which was allowed by setting aside termination order dated 20 March 1992. Petitioner was reinstated in service on 13 July 1994. It is the case of the Petitioner that the Head Master deliberately took signatures of students on blank papers and prepared statements thereon against him. Petitioner was issued with show cause notice on 13 April 2000 alleging that he abused and beat up the students, used objectionable language to a student during yoga period and drew nude picture of a woman on the blackboard in Class of Standard 8. Several other allegations were also levelled against the Petitioners in the said Priya Soparkar Page No. 2 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 show cause notice dated 13 April 2000. Petitioner replied the show cause notice on 20 April 2000 denying the allegations. The Management thereafter issued chargesheet dated 30 June 2000 against the Petitioner alleging several charges against him. Petitioner denied the charges by reply dated 8 July 2000. Inquiry was conducted into the charges. The Inquiry Committee submitted two reports and accordingly held Petitioner guilty of charges whereas Petitioner's representative on the Committee submitted his independent report exonerating the Petitioner. The Management issued termination order dated 5 September 2000.
3. Petitioner preferred Appeal No.116 of 2000 before School Tribunal Mumbai challenging the termination letter. The Tribunal has proceeded to dismiss the appeal by judgment and order dated 31 October 2005, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition.
4. Mr. Bhavke, the learned counsel appearing for Petitioner would submit that the Tribunal has erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal without noticing that the conduct of inquiry was in violation of provisions of Rule 37 of Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (MEPS Rules). He would submit that Petitioner was denied due opportunity of defence as well the witnesses were examined on one single day. That the witnesses did not state anything against the Petitioner in their examination-in-chief and merely confirmed the pre-recorded statements/complaints. That Petitioner was not provided with copies of the said statement/ complaints and was thus denied proper opportunity of cross-examining Priya Soparkar Page No. 3 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 the witnesses. He would submit that the procedure followed was in clear violation of provisions of Rule 37(2)(d) of the Rules of 1981.
5. Mr. Bhavke would further submit that combined report of the Inquiry Committee was not submitted and that there are two separate and conflicting reports, one holding Petitioner guilty and other exonerating the Petitioner. He would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal and another vs. Education Officer and another1 in support of his contention that submission of joint report by all three members of the Inquiry Committee is mandatory.
6. Mr. Bhavke would further submit that under Rule 37 (4) of the Rule of 1981, summary of the inquiry proceedings was required to be served on the Petitioner. That though the summary is shown to have been forwarded to the Petitioner vide letter dated 11 August 2000, the same was actually served on him on 4 September 2000 and an order terminating his services was issued immediately on 5 September 2000. He would rely upon judgment of this Court in National Integration and Education Welfare Society, Akola Vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati and other2 in support of his contention that grant of full opportunity under provisions of Rule 37(2)(b) of MEPS Rules is mandatory. He would also rely upon judgment of this Court in Ramdas Tejram Bhoyar Vs. Education Officer & ors.3 in support of his contention of mandatory requirement for submission of combined report. Mr. Bhavke would submit that since the inquiry is conducted in gross 1 (2007) 11 SCC 352 2 2022 (3) Mh.L.J. 140 3 2015 (6) Bom CR 76 Priya Soparkar Page No. 4 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 violation of provisions of Rule 37, the School Tribunal ought to have allowed the appeal by setting aside the termination letter.
7. The Petition is opposed by Mr. Limaye, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent-Management. He would submit that Petitioner faced very serious charges of exhibiting objectionable conduct before girl students and that therefore punishment of termination was clearly warranted for commission of such serious misconduct. That Petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself in the inquiry. That there is sufficient evidence on record to connect Petitioner to the misconduct alleged in the chargesheet. He would rely upon judgment of this Court in Syed Nasiruddin s/o Karimuddin vs. N. B. Shaikh and others4 in support of his contention that no opportunity infact is warranted to a teacher who faces charge of outraging modesty of girl students/ lady teachers. That despite of absence of requirement for conduct of full-fledged inquiry considering the nature of charges levelled against Petitioner, the Management still conducted detailed inquiry by examining as many as 16 witnesses and by offering all the witnesses for cross-examination to the Petitioner. That the Petitioner has cross-examined all the management witnesses and has availed proper opportunity of defence. He would therefore submit that the order passed by the School Tribunal does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He would pray for dismissal of the petition.
42002(5) Mh.L.J. 96 Priya Soparkar Page No. 5 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006
8. I have also heard Ms. Salunkhe, the learned AGP appearing for the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, who would also oppose the Petition and support the order passed by the School Tribunal.
9. Rival contentions of parties now fall for my consideration.
10. While working as Assistant Teacher in Respondent No.2-School, Petitioner faced following charges in the chargesheet dated 30 June 2000 :
जावक क्र. 129/6-2000 दि नांक:- 30/06/2000
प्रति . घरचा पत्ता:-
श्री. कृ. ह. मोकल खोली क्र. ४३/एफ
सहाय्यक शि#क्षक वाल्मि&मकी चौक, वरळी
महाराष्ट्र हायस्कूल क्र. २ व्हि0हलेज, मुंबई ४०० ०२५.
ा र, मुंबई- ४०००२८.
आरोपपत्र
महो य,
ुम्ही या ै संस्थेच्या महाराष्ट्र हायस्कूल क्र.२, ा र, मुंबई ४०००२८, येथे सहाय्यक शि#क्षक या प ावर काय> र आहा . ुमची गैरव > णूक, कामा ील बुध् ीपुरस्सर व स हयगय व अकाय> क्षम ा याबाब ुम्ही पुढीलप्रमाणे गंभीर गुन्हे केले आहे .
१] ुम्ही महाराष्ट्र खाजगी #ाळां ील कम> चारी सेवेच्या # G दिनयमावली १९८१ च्या दिनयम क्र . २८ [५] [अ] मध्ये नमू केलेला गैरव > णुकीचा गंभीर गुनहा खालील प्रसंगी केला आहे.
अ] ुम्ही दिवद्याथG व दिव याथGनींना ुध् ा मारहाण कर ा, शि#वीगाळ कर ा, असभ्य, अपमानास्प बोचरी भाषा वापर ा. अ#ा घटना दि . २३.२.२०००, १७.२०.२०००, २.२. २००० रोजी व त्यापूवGही घड&या आहे . या सव> प्रसंगी ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] अ [i] नुसार ेवेच्या अटी व # G याचा भंग करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे. व ो ुम्ही दि ले&या स्पष्टीकरणा मान्य केला आहे.
ब] दि . ४.८.१९९९ रोजी नववी/ड च्या योगाच्या ासिसकेला दिवद्याथGनींनी #ारीरिरक शि#क्षणाचा गणवे# घा लेला नस&यामुळे झोपुन करा0याची योगासने करण्यास नकार दि ला. े0हा असभ्य भा ुम्ही त्यांना मुलांसमीर म्हणाला की " ुमच्या चड्डया दि स&या र काय झाले?
अ#ाच प्रकारे १९.११.१९९८ रोजी ८वी/ड च्या वगा> ुम्ही फळ्यावर नग्न स्त्रीचे तिचत्र काढले . त्याना एका दिवद्यार्थिथनीने हरक घी ली अस ा ुम्ही ति ला "गप्प बै ु, नाही र ुझे तिचत्र काढीन" अ#ी धमकी दि ली.
Priya Soparkar Page No. 6 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 :::11-WP-1754-2006 या प्रसंगी ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] अ [ii] नुसार आचारसंदिह ेचा भंग करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे. क) ुम्ही मुख्याध्यादिपका श्रीम ी भाटीया व पय> ेशि#का श्रीम ी पाटणकर यांच्या अतिधकारांचा उपम > कर ा व आप&या हका-यां#ी उद्दामपणे वाग ा.
यामध्ये ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] अ [ii] व [iii] नुसार आचारसंदिह ेचा भंग व #ाच स्वरुपाची इ र कृत्ये करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे.
ड] ुम्ही ऑगस्ट १९९७ ची फी जमा करण्याच्या ारखीनं र उशि#रा दि . ३०.८.१९९७ रोजी जमा केली.
यामध्ये ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] अ [ii] आचारसंदिह ेचा भंग करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे . व ो ुम्ही मान्य केला आहे.
२] ुम्ही महाराष्ट्र खाजगी #ाळा कम> चारी सेवेच्या # G दिनयमावली १९८१ च्या दिनयम क्र . २८ [५] क मध्ये नमू केलेला क > 0या बुध् ीपुरत्सर व स हयगय करण्याचा गुन्हा खालील घटनांमध्ये केला आहे.
अ] दि . १२.४.१९९९ रोजी ब्लॉक नं. २ वर पय> वेक्षक म्हणून काम करी अस ाना गशिण [२] या दिवषयाच्या अ#ोक सणस या दिवद्यार्थ्यांयाgच्या उत्तर पदित्रकेच्या पुरवण्या बांधणून न घे &या मुळे त्याला २२ गुणांना मुकावे लाग े अस े. सेच उत्तरांच्या योग्य ेपेक्षा कमी गुण ेणे, परीक्षौंला गैरहजर असणा-या दिवद्यार्थ्यांयाgना गुण ेणे, परीक्षेच्या पय> वेक्षणा हयगय करणे, पालकसभेला गैरहजर राहणे अ#ाही घटना ुमच्याकडू न घड&या आहे .
येथे ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] क च्या [i] व [iii] नु ार या दिनयमा0 ारे किंकवा न्वये दिवदिह करण्या आले&या क > 0यापासून च्यु होणे दिकवा क > 0य पार पाडण्या कसूर करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे. व ो ुम्ही मान्य केला आहे.
ब) दि . ५.१०.१९९८ रोजी झाले&या इति हासाच्या परीक्षे क&पना रघुनाथ दिप लकर या दिवद्यार्थिथनीच्या उत्तरपदित्रकेचे पूण> ः चूकीचे परीक्षक्षण करून योग्य ेपेक्षा खूप जास् म्हणजे ६० पैकी २५ गुण दि ले. येथे ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८ [५] क च्या [१] व [iii] नु ार या दिनयमा0 ारे किंकवा न्वये दिवही करण्या आले&या क > 0या-पासूनच्यु होणे किंकवा क > 0य पार पाडण्या कसूर करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे . व ो ुम्ही मान्य केला आहे क) वेगवेगळ्या परीक्षांच्या उत्तरपदित्रका ुम्ही वेळेवर पासून न दि &यामुळे परीक्षेचा दिनकाल वैळेवर न लागण्याची #क्य ा दिनमा>ण झाली. अ#ा घटना एदिप्रल १९९८, नो0हेंबर १९९५ मध्येही घड&या. येथे ुम्ही दिनयम २८ [५] क च्या [i] व [iii] नु ार या दिनयमा0 ारे दिकवा न्वये दिवहत्ती करण्या आले&या क > 0या-पासूनच्यु होणे किंकवा क > 0य पार पाड पाडण्या कसूर करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे. व ो ुम्ही मान्य केला आहे.
३] ुम्ही महाराष्ट्र खाजगी #ाळा कम> चारी सेवा # G दिनयमावली १९८१ 0या दिनयम क्र. २८ (५) ड मध्ये नमू केलेला अकाय> क्षम ेपा गुन्हा खालील घाटनांमध्ये केला आहे.
अ] ुमचे ुमच्या वगा>वर दिनयंत्रण नस&याने १५.२.२००० ,७.२.२०००, २७.१.२००० व त्यापूवGही अनेक ा आढळू न आले आहे येथे ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८[५] ड च्या [iii] नुसार गुन्हा केला आहे ब] १८.२.२००० रोजी ुम्ही ९वी/इच्या वगा> बीजगशिण ाची चुकीची शि#काप ाना आढळला . सेच १४.७.१९९८ रोजी चंद्रग्रहणाबद्दल चुकीची मादिह ी े ाना आढळला . येथी ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८[५] ड च्या [i] नुसार #ैक्षशिणक प्रग ी न करणे व ज्ञान उ यव न ठे वण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे.
Priya Soparkar Page No. 7 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 :::11-WP-1754-2006 क) आक्टोबर - तिडसेबर १९९८ मध्ये दिवद्यार्थ्यांयांची प्रग ीपुस् के योग्यरा ाने न भरणे, २७.१०.१९९२ रोजी पय> वेक्षणा न कर ा डु लक्या घे &यामुळे दिवद्यार्थ्यांया>ला कॉपी करण्यास संधी दिमळणे , गैरहजर दिवद्यार्थ्यांयांना हजर ाखवणे असा ुमचा दिनष्काळजीपणा दिन #> नास आला आहे. अनेकवेळा पय> वेक्षानं र पुरवणी पदित्रकाचा गठ् ठा ुम्ही वगा> च सोडू न ये ा. याचा रु ु पयोग केला जाऊ #क ो. येथे ुम्ही दिनयम क्र. २८[५] ड च्या [iii] नुसार क > 0या-बाब पूण> ः हलगजGपणा करण्याचा गुन्हा केला आहे. व ो ुम्ही मान्य केला आहे.
वरील गुन्हयाबाब चा आवश्यक पुरावा सेच सं र्थिभ अतिधक पुरावा चौक#ीसदिम ीच्या कामकाजाच्या वेळी सा र करण्या येईल.
आपली ऊर्मिमल आपटे मुख्य काय> कारी अतिधकारा Secretary People's Education Society, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PEOPLES EDUCATION SOCIETY
11. The chargesheet dated 30 June 2000 was preceded by show cause notice dated 13 April 2000. The allegations in the show cause notice were denied by the Petitioner by reply dated 20 April 2000. The charges levelled against him in the chargesheet dated 30 June 2000 were denied by the Petitioner by his reply dated 8 July 2000. In his reply, Petitioner attributed the chargesheet to the order passed by the School Tribunal setting aside previous termination of 1992 and alleged that after his reinstatement in 1994, the Head Master had hatched a conspiracy to once again terminate him by implicating him in false charges. The Management constituted Inquiry Committee comprising of Awardee Teacher-Mr. Ramakant Pandey, Mr. Vasant Karve-Management Representative and Mr. Janardan Mitharam Jangle-Petitioner's nominee. The Inquiry Committee conducted seven meetings. In the fifth meeting held on 3 August 2000, out of the 16 witnesses proposed to be examined by the Management, 14 witnesses were present before the Committee. The depositions of said 14 witnesses were recorded by the Priya Soparkar Page No. 8 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 Inquiry Committee. Petitioner's nominee was present in the fifth meeting of the Inquiry Committee when witnesses were examined, but apparently the Petitioner was absent. In the sixth meeting held on 8 August 2000, a query was raised as to whether Petitioner was desirous of cross-examining the witnesses which were examined in the fifth inquiry committee meeting. The Petitioner answered in the affirmative. Though the management representative opposed recall of the witnesses, the Inquiry Committee decided to recall all the witnesses for being cross-examined by the Petitioner. The Petitioner accordingly cross-examined 11 witnesses during the sixth inquiry meeting held on 8 August 2000.
12. It is Petitioner's contention that the inquiry was conducted in gross violation of the MEPS Rules. Reliance is particularly placed on provisions of Rule 37(2)(c) and (d) of MEPS Rules. Rule 37 deals with procedure of inquiry and provides thus:
37. Procedure of inquiry:
(1) The Management shall prepare a charge-sheet containing specific charges and shall hand over the same together with the statement of allegations and the explanation of the employee or the Head as the case may be, to the Convener of the Inquiry Committee and also forward copies thereof to the employee or the Head concerned by registered post acknowledgement due, within 7 days from the date on which the Inquiry Committee is deemed to have been constituted.
(2)(a) Within 10 days of the receipt of the copies of charge-sheet and the statement of allegations by the employee or the Head, as the case may be,
(i) If the employee or the Head, as the case may be, desires to tender any written explanation to the charge-sheet, he shall submit the same to the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee in person or send it to him by the registered post acknowledgement due.
(ii) If the Management and the employee or the Head, as the case may be, desire to examine any witnesses they shall communicate in writing to the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee the names of witnesses whom they propose to so examine, and Priya Soparkar Page No. 9 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006
(iii) If the Management desires to tender any documents by way of evidence before the Inquiry Committee, it shall supply true copies of all such documents to the employee or the Head, as the case may be.
If the document relied upon by the Management is a register or record of the school it shall permit the employee or the Head as the case may be, to take out relevant extracts from such register of record. The employee or the Head as the case may be, shall supply to the Management true copies of all the documents to be produced by him in evidence.
(b) Within 3 days after the expiry of the period of 10 days specified in clause
(a), the Inquiry Committee shall meet to proceed with the inquiry and give 10 days notice by registered post acknowledgement due to the Management and the employee or the Head, as the case may be, to appear for producing evidence, examining witnesses etc., if any.
(c) The Inquiry Committee shall see that every reasonable opportunity is extended to the employee for defence of his case.
(d) (i) The Management shall have the right to lead evidence and the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the employee.
(ii) The employee shall have the right to be heard in person and lead evidence. He shall also have the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the Management.
(iii) Sufficient opportunities shall be given to examine all witnesses notified by both the parties
(e) All the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee shall be recorded and the same together with the statement of witnesses shall be endorsed by both the parties in token or authenticity thereof. The refusal to endorse the same by either of the parties shall be recorded by the Convenor.
(f) The inquiry shall ordinarily be completed within a period of 120 days from the date of first meeting of the Inquiry Committee or from the date of suspension of the employee, whichever is earlier, unless the Inquiry Committee has, in the special circumstances of the case under inquiry, extended the period of completion of the inquiry with the prior approval of the Deputy Director. In case the inquiry is to be completed within the period of 120 days or within the extended period, if any, the employee shall cease to be under suspension and shall be deemed to have rejoined duties, without prejudice to continuance of the inquiry.
(3) The Management and the employee or the Head, as the case may be shall be responsible to see that their nominees and the witnesses, if any, are present during the inquiry. However, if the Inquiry Committee is convinced about the absence of either of the parties to the dispute or any of the members of the Inquiry Committee on any valid ground, the Inquiry Committee shall adjourn that particular meeting of the Committee. The meeting so adjourned shall be conducted even in the absence of person concerned if he fails to remain present for the said adjourned meeting.
(4) The Convener of the Inquiry Committee shall forward to the employee or the Head, as the case may be a summary of the proceedings and copies of statements of witnesses, if any, by registered post acknowledgement due Priya Soparkar Page No. 10 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 within four days of completion of the above steps and allow him a time of seven days to offer his further explanation, if any.
(5) The employee or the Head as the case may be shall submit his further explanation to the Convener of the Inquiry Committee within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the summary of proceedings etc., either personally or by registered post acknowledgement due.
(6) On receipt of such further explanation or if no explanation is offered within the aforesaid time the Inquiry Committee shall complete the inquiry and communicate its findings on the charges against the employee and its decision on the basis of these findings to the Management for specific action to be taken against the employee or the Head, as the case may be, within ten days after the date fixed for receipt of further explanation. It shall also forward a copy of the same by registered post acknowledgement due to the employee or the Head, as the case may be. A copy of the findings and decision shall also be endorsed to the Education Officer or the Deputy Director, as the case may be, by registered post acknowledgement due. Thereafter, the decision of the Inquiry Committee shall be implemented by the Management which shall issue necessary orders within seven days from the date of receipt of decision of the Inquiry Committee, by registered post acknowledgement due. The Management shall also endorse a copy of its order to the Education Officer or the Deputy Director as the case may be.
13. Under Rule 37(2)(c), the Inquiry Committee needs to ensure that every reasonable opportunity is extended to the employee for defence of his case. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 provides that the management has right to lead evidence and also to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the employee. It further provides that the employee has right to be heard in-person and lead evidence. He also has right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the management. Rule 37(2)(d)(iii) provides that sufficient opportunity shall be given to examine all witnesses notified by both the parties.
14. When the inquiry conducted against the Petitioner is seen in the light of provisions of Rule 37(2)(c) and (d), I am unable to notice any serious infraction on the part of the Management in the conduct of the Priya Soparkar Page No. 11 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 inquiry. I do not see as to how there is any infraction of Rule 37(2)(c) or (d).
15. The Management presented before the Petitioner the witnesses examined by it for the purpose of conduct of their cross-examination by him. As a matter of fact, Petitioner was absent in the fifth Inquiry Committee meeting when 14 witnesses were examined. Petitioner failed to cross-examine the said witnesses during the course of fifth meeting of Inquiry Committee. Though Inquiry Committee could have denied another opportunity to the Petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses as Petitioner had failed to avail such opportunity during fifth meeting, the Committee thought it prudent to grant one more opportunity to him by inquiring with him during the sixth inquiry committee meeting as to whether he was desirous of cross-examining the witness. When the Petitioner answered the query in the affirmative, the Management recalled 11 witnesses for cross-examination by the Petitioner. Petitioner cross-examined them without expressing any reservation or inability to conduct the cross-examination. He never complained that he was neither ready or incapable of cross-examining the witnesses. He personally conducted cross-examination of all the witnesses without any demur.
16. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Inquiry Committee did not record examination-in-chief of management witnesses. In domestic inquiry, strict rules of evidence do not apply. It is permissible in a domestic inquiry to invite attention of a witness to prerecorded statements/complaints by asking him to confirm its contents. Therefore, instead of repeating the entire story in Priya Soparkar Page No. 12 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 examination-in-chief, it is permissible to take pre-recorded statements of witnesses on record, once the witnesses confirm making those statements. Therefore, the contents of pre-recorded statements/ complaints become part of evidence and it is not necessary that a witness in domestic inquiry must repeat contents of pre-recorded statements. It therefore cannot be contended that proper examination- in-chief of the witnesses was not conducted by the Inquiry Committee.
17. It is also sought to be contended that the Petitioner was not supplied with copies of statements of the said witnesses and in absence of furnishing copies of such statements, due opportunity of cross- examination was denied to the Petitioner. However, the minutes of sixth Inquiry Committee meeting dated 8 August 2000 would indicate that the Petitioner never complained to the Inquiry Committee that he did not receive copies of statements/complaints of witnesses, which were taken on record. The factum of conduct of detailed cross-examination of each of the witnesses would completely falsify the contention that he did not receive copies of statements of the said witnesses. If Petitioner was not provided the pre-recorded statements, how he was able to cross-examine the witness becomes a mystery. It is therefore difficult to believe that there is any element of truth in the allegation of non-supply of statements of the witnesses.
18. It is sought to be suggested that the Petitioner was not provided with copy of summary of inquiry proceedings as mandated under provisions of Rule 37(4) of MEPS Rules. In the compilation of documents, Petitioner has placed on record copy of communication dated 11 August 2000, by which summary of the inquiry proceedings Priya Soparkar Page No. 13 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 together with copies of the proceedings of the inquiry were forwarded to the Petitioner. Petitioner however contends that he received the communication dated 11 August 2000 on 4 September 2000 and did not get an opportunity of submitting his representation against such summary. However, it is seen that this point is not raised by the Petitioner before School Tribunal. The date of receipt of communication dated 11 August 2000 becomes a question of fact which ought to have been raised before the School Tribunal and cannot be raised directly before this Court in the present petition. School Tribunal in the present case would be the fact finding Court and in absence of any dispute before the fact finding Court about date of service of communication dated 11 August 2000 on 4 September 2000, the question cannot be raised in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It otherwise becomes impossible to believe that it would take almost a month for service of letter dated 11 August 2000 within city of Mumbai. I am therefore not inclined to accept the contention about the violation of provisions of Rule 37(4) of the MEPS Rules.
19. Coming to the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry, in my view, this is not a case where there is total absence of evidence for tracing an element of perversity in the findings of the Inquiry Committee. The charges levelled against the Petitioner have already been culled out above. One of the gross charges levelled against the Petitioner was that on 11 November 1998, he drew nude picture of lady on the blackboard in class of standard 8. Upon one girl student raising an objection, Petitioner told her to shut up and threatened to draw her picture. In the inquiry, the management examined Smt. Parvati C. Mangaonkar, mother of the concerned girl student. She has been cross-
Priya Soparkar Page No. 14 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 :::11-WP-1754-2006 examined by the Petitioner. Petitioner asked the witness during cross- examination about the exact incident narrated by her daughter and the parent deposed before the Inquiry Committee that the Petitioner had drawn picture of nude woman on the blackboard. Petitioner sought to make a suggestion that he had drawn a picture of a lady watering the plants, to which the parent gave a reply during her cross-examination that it was not necessary to draw picture of nude woman while explaining the concept of watering of plants. In my view therefore the serious charge of Petitioner drawing picture of a nude woman on the blackboard of 8th standard "D" division is clearly proved. So far as the charge of beating one of the student is concerned, there is enough evidence on record by various witnesses about one student being beaten up with the stick by the Petitioner and his fingers being swollen. In my view therefore, there is sufficient evidence on record to prove various charges levelled against the Petitioner and the case does not involve total absence of evidence. It is repeatedly held by the Apex Court that so long as there is some evidence on record finding of guilt cannot be interfered with by Courts and Tribunals.
20. The test of proof of charges in a domestic inquiry is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It would be apposite to refer the judgment of a Kuldeep Singh vs. The Commissioner of Police and ors.5 in which it is held in paragraph No.10 as under:
"10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. It a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no 5 1999(2) SCC 10 Priya Soparkar Page No. 15 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
(emphasis added)
21. In State of Haryana vs. Rattan Singh6, it is held that even hear-say evidence is admissible in domestic inquiry, provided it has reasonable nexus and creditability. The Apex Court has reiterated that so long as there is some evidence on record, charges in the domestic inquiry can be held to be proved. The Apex Court held in paragraphs No.4 of the judgment in Rattan Singh as under:
4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility.
It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence -- not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence 6 AIR 1977 SC 1512 Priya Soparkar Page No. 16 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.
(emphasis supplied)
22. In Balkrushna Mishra (supra), the Apex Court has reiterated the principle that even hearsay evidence is admissible in a domestic inquiry. It is held in paragraphs Nos. 8, 9 and 10 as under:
"8. If the decision of the learned Tribunal is judged keeping in view the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, it would appear that the decision is not perverse and it is not that the finding is not supported by any evidence, or is entirely opposed to the whole body of evidence adduced. In fact there is evidence on record and the learned Tribunal has accepted the same. Even though there can be any possibility to arrive at a different conclusion on the same evidence, this Court cannot substitute its conclusion on facts. In an application under Articles 226 and 227, the High Court cannot sit in appeal ever the findings recorded by the competent Tribunal. It cannot reappreciate the evidence. It would however, be justified in setting aside the finding if it is based on no evidence.
9. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence of M.W. 1 to the extent that the petitioner had told his wife about the amount, is not admissible in evidence as the same is hearsay. In our opinion, such a statement cannot be said to be hearsay. M.W. 1 states about the enquiry made by the wife of the petitioner while he handed over the money to her. The petitioner himself cross-examined, but did not challenge the aforesaid statement. Even assuming that it is hearsay evidence, there is no bar on the part of the competent authority to rely on the same in a disciplinary proceeding. Law is well settled that the Evidence Act has no application to such a proceeding. If the Evidence Act has no application then the principles of that Act have equally no strict application. It is the principle of natural justice which should be followed (See Harihar Das v. I.G. of Police, Orissa(2). In that case, a question arose whether hearsay evidence was admissible in a disciplinary proceeding. Following two English decisions, this Court came to the conclusion that hearsay evidence was admissible before a domestic tribunal provided the essential condition that an opportunity was afforded to the parties to comment and contradict such evidence was fulfilled. This view has also been reaffirmed in another decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Behera v. State of Orissa. This Court has consistently held that hearsay evidence is Priya Soparkar Page No. 17 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 admissible in a departmental proceeding. As such, the contention of the petitioner has no force.
10. On the aforesaid analysis, we hold that there is no justifiable ground to interfere with the decision of the learned Tribunal and this writ petition is without any merit. In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs."
(emphasis and underlining added)
23. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the findings of the inquiry committee can be sustained by applying the test of preponderance of probability. Even hearsay evidence of mother of girl student would become admissible in the present case. There is some evidence on record to sustain the charges and therefore the findings of the inquiry committee do not suffer from the vice of perversity.
24. Another point strenuously urged by Mr. Bhavke is submission of two distinct reports by the Inquiry Committee members which, according to him is in violation of the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal (supra). The Apex Court has held in paragraph No.9 of the judgment as under:
9. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, Rule 37(6), which is mandatory in nature, has not been strictly complied with. The inquiry committee comprising of three members, as already noticed, only one member nominated by the Management has submitted his inquiry report within the time stipulated as per Rule 37(6) and admittedly, the other two members nominated by the employee and an independent member have not submitted their report within the time prescribed under Rule 37(6). However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, though noticed that the two members out of three found the employee not guilty, failed to appreciate that the said findings by the two members of the Committee were submitted after the expiry of the period prescribed under Rule 37(6). In our opinion, the report submitted by individual Priya Soparkar Page No. 18 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 members is also not in accordance with the Rules. When the Committee of three members is appointed to inquire into a particular matter, all the three members should submit their combined report whether consenting or otherwise. Since the report is not in accordance with the mandatory provisions, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court have committed a serious error in accepting the said report and acting on it and thereby ordering the reinstatement with back wages. Since the reinstatement and back wages now ordered are quite contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 37(6), we have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, and learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench of the High Court. In addition, we also set aside the order passed by the Management based on the report submitted by the single member of the Committee, which is also quite contrary to the Rules.
25. However, in case before the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal, only one member out of three members of the Inquiry Committee nominated by the management had submitted his inquiry report within the stipulated time and the other two members had not submitted the report. The main flaw noticed by the Apex Court was that the report of the two members was submitted after the time limit prescribed by the Rule 37(6) of the MEPS Rules. It is in the light of this factual position where the three committee members wrote individual reports on different dates that the Apex Court has held that all the three members ought to have submitted their combined report, whether consenting or otherwise.
26. In the present case, it appears that at the end of the inquiry, the summary was jointly prepared by all the three members of the Inquiry Committee. The seventh meeting of the Inquiry Committee was conducted on 11 August 2000, when the Committee was to meet for preparing inquiry report. It appears that despite being invited to attend the seventh meeting on 11 August 2000, Petitioner's nominee Priya Soparkar Page No. 19 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 Mr. Jangle refused to acknowledge the notice of inquiry on 11 August 2000 and refused to attend the same. Mr. Jangle did not make any request for adjournment of the meeting nor showed any interest in participating in the process of deliberations and discussions for preparation of inquiry report. It appears that Mr. Jangle simply refused to sit with other two members for preparation of the report. In such circumstances, question arises as to whether the report of the other two committee members would get automatically vitiated if the third member deliberately refuses to prepare a joint report. The findings rendered by the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal must be understood in the context in which they are made. As observed above, observations of the Apex Court are made in the context of three members of the Committee submitting individual reports on three different dates.
27. The judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal is rendered in the peculiar facts where three Inquiry Committee members had written three distinct reports at different times and there was no deliberation amongst them. In the present case, the nominee of the Petitioner was invited for deliberations, but he refused to participate in such deliberations. Therefore, the deliberations took place between the remaining two members of the Inquiry Committee. The nominee of the Petitioner, who was expected to write a joint report, deliberately submitted his individual report on 29 August 2000 after the report of the two committee members was prepared on 25 August 2000.
28. It is well settled position of law that observations in a judgment are not to be construed as statute and the observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. In Haryana Financial Priya Soparkar Page No. 20 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 Corporation and another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another 7 the Apex Court held as under :-
19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co.
Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (at p. 761) Lord MacDermot observed : (All ER p. 14C-D) "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge."
21. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
29. The above principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Ashwani Kumar Singh Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission and others 8. Therefore the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal cannot be read in support of an absolute proposition of law that in every case, failure to submit joint inquiry report would vitiate the inquiry.
30. It must also be noted that in the given case, there is a possibility that the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Vikas Mandal being deliberately misused by delinquent employee with a view to vitiate the inquiry. The delinquent teacher can request his nominee on 7 (2002) 3 SCC 496 8 (2003) 11 SCC 584 Priya Soparkar Page No. 21 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 the Inquiry Committee not to participate in the discussions and deliberately submit a separate report with a view to attract ratio of judgment in Vidya Vikas Mandal. Thus, vitiation of inquiry by way of writing of independent report would become a matter of choice. The ratio of the judgment in case of Vidya Vikas Mandal is not for encouraging these kinds of tendencies. Therefore, in every case where all the three members of the Inquiry Committee are invited to deliberate for preparation of inquiry report and if one of the members of the Committee fails or refuses to participate in such deliberations (for whatever reason), mere non-submission of joint report cannot become a ground for vitiation of the inquiry. In the present case, Petitioner's nominee was invited to attend the deliberations for preparation of joint report, but he deliberately refused to attend the same and submitted his individual dissenting report 4 days later. Therefore, there is no violation of ratio of the judgment in Vidya Vikas Mandal. I am therefore not inclined to hold that there is any defect in report of the Inquiry Committee for this Court to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
31. It must also be borne in mind that mere infraction of procedural provision does not ipso facto vitiate the inquiry unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to the delinquent employee. There is no dearth of decisions on this principle of law. It would be apposite to make a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh and others 9 in which the Apex Court has held as under:
42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:9
(2021) 19 SCC 706 Priya Soparkar Page No. 22 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 ::: 11-WP-1754-2006 42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The "prejudice" exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.
32. In the present case, Petitioner is provided due opportunity of defence. No prejudice is shown to have been caused to him even if it was to be held that there was any breach of principles of natural justice which ultimately find embedded in provisions of Rule 37 of the MEPS Rules.
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33. Coming to the aspect of proportionality of penalty, Petitioner faced grave charges, which are proved in the inquiry. The penalty is thus commensurate with the misconduct proved against him.
34. After considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the view that no case is made out by the Petitioner for interference in the order passed by the School Tribunal. The Petition must fail. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) Priya Soparkar Page No. 24 of 24 ::: Uploaded on - 12/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2025 22:33:31 :::