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Punjab-Haryana High Court

State Of Haryana Through ... vs Chander Lal on 9 January, 2013

Author: Paramjeet Singh

Bench: Paramjeet Singh

CRM M-40078 of 2012                                                                        1

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANAAT
                     CHANDIGARH

                                                 CRM M-40078 of 2012(O&M)
                                              Date of Decision: January 09, 2013



State of Haryana through Superintendent of Police, State Vigilance Bureau
(H), Rohtak Range, Rohtak.

                                                                             .... Petitioner

                                         Versus

Chander Lal

                                                                             ... Respondent

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH

1) Whether Reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes

3) Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes Present: Mr. Sandeep S. Mann, Sr. D.A.G., Haryana Paramjeet Singh J.

The challenge in present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, "the Cr.P.C.") is to order dated 10.04.2012 (Annexure P/2) passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Karnal, directing the petitioner to register the FIR and investigate the matter.

Necessary facts for disposal of this petition are that respondent filed a Criminal Complaint titled as "Chander Lal versus Manoj Kumar Verma, Inspector CIA ((II) Karnal and another", under Sections 323, 342, 363, 506, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13 of the CRM M-40078 of 2012 2 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short 'the P.C. Act') against police officials in the Court of Sessions Judge, Karnal, alleging that they illegally abducted, tortured and threatened to kill him and released him only after taking illegal gratification. The learned Sessions Judge entrusted the complaint to the Additional Sessions Judge -Cum-Special Judge, wherein the request was made by the respondent (herein-after to be referred as 'the Complainant') under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., that the complaint be sent to Vigilance Bureau for investigation. The learned Additional Sessions Judge vide impugned order directed the SHO, PS SVB, Rohtak to register a case, investigate and file report within three months. The said order dated 10.04.2012 has been impugned by the State through Superintendent of Police Vigilance Bureau(H), Rohtak Range, Rohtak, alleging it to be abuse and misuse of process of law.

Mr. Sandeep S. Mann, the learned State counsel vehemently contended that the grounds on which the prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been allowed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are untenable. The powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised by the Special Judges under the P.C. Act. It is contended by the learned State counsel that Special Judge under the P.C. Act, excercises the powers of Magistrate only for certain purposes. The Special Judge has no power to entertain private complaint and the application/prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. containing allegations about the commission of the offences under the P.C. Act. It is also contended that if the cognizable offence of serious nature requiring investigation by the police is made out from the CRM M-40078 of 2012 3 allegations made in the application/prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., then the Magistrate only, not the Special Judge, can order registration of F.I.R. and its investigation by the police. The application/prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as complaint by Special Judge. It is further submitted that even otherwise, cognizable offences of very serious nature requiring police investigation are not disclosed in present case, hence the learned Special Judge should not have passed an order for registration of FIR and its investigation.The impugned order is illegal being without jurisdiction deserves to be set aside.

The learned State Counsel further contended that the Magistrate or Special Judge is not bound to direct registration of FIR and its investigation by the police on each and every application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., even if the cognizable offences are disclosed from the allegations made in the complaint/ application and in appropriate cases the said prayer/application can be treated as complaint only by the Magistrate.

Mr. Mann further contended that for entertaining a private complaint and for registration of FIR under PC Act sanction of the competent authority is necessary.

From the arguments of the learned counsel for the State following legal points emerge for consideration :-

(i) Whether the Special Judge can entertain private complaint under the P.C. Act along with other offences under IPC and order for registration of FIR and its investigation on the application/prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. ?
CRM M-40078 of 2012 4
(ii) Whether the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

disclosing the commission of cognizable offence can be rejected on the ground that "sanction" of appropriate government or authority would be required at the time of registration of FIR and its investigation ?

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the contentions/ arguments raised by the learned State counsel. I find no substance in contention of the learned counsel for the State that the prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. should have been rejected by the learned Special Judge. This contention is wholly untenable. In the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another AIR 1984 Supreme Court 718, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of offences under the P.C. Act can be entertained by the Special Judge. It is not disputed that the Addl. Sessions Judge is empowered to act as Special Judge under the P.C. Act. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions Cr.P.C. and P.C. Act:

Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus:-
"156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case: (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground CRM M-40078 of 2012 5 that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned."

Section 190 Cr.P.C. reads thus:-

"190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed."

Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the PC Act deal with the power to appoint Special Judges, cases triable by the Special Judge and the procedure and power of the Special Judge respectively. Section 5 reads as under:-

"5. Procedure and powers of special Judge (1) A special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and, in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrates.
(2) A special Judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his CRM M-40078 of 2012 6 knowledge. relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of sub-sections (1) to (5) of section 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be deemed to have been tendered under section 307 of that Code.
(3) Save as provided in sub-sections (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor.
(4) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the provisions of sections 326 and 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so for as may be, apply to the proceedings before a special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions, a special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. (5) A special Judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted. (6) A special Judge, while trying an offence punishable under this Act, shall exercise all the powers and functions exercisable by a District Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. ""

The reading of sub-section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr.P.C. may order such investigation as above-mentioned. On a combined reading of sub- CRM M-40078 of 2012 7 section (3) of Section 156 and Section 190 Cr.P.C., this fact is borne out that any Magistrate, who is empowered to take cognizance of any offence is authorized to pass order for investigation of the case. It is settled principle of law laid down in catena of decisions that the Magistrate exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can pass order for registration of the F.I.R. Section 5 of the P.C. Act 1988 empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offences under PC Act without the accused being committed for trial and in trying the accused persons, the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate. Sub- Section (3) of Section 5 P.C. Act lays down that save as provided in sub- Section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with P.C. Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. Although according to sub Section (3) of Section 5 of the P.C. Act, 1988, the Court of Special Judge is deemed to be a Court of Sessions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. R. Antulay's case (supra) has observed in para 27 of the judgement that Special Judge is empowered to exercise powers of the Magistrate also for certain purposes. Para 27 is reproduced below :

"27. It is, however, necessary to decide with precision and accuracy the position of a special Judge and the Court over which he presides styled as the Court of a special Judge because unending confusions have arisen by either assimilating him with a Magistrate or with a Sessions Court. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted CRM M-40078 of 2012 8 for more effective prevention of bribery and corruption. Years rolled by and experience gathered showed that unless a special forum for the trial of such offences as enumerated in the 1947 Act is created, the object underlying the 1947 Act would remain a distant dream. This led to the enactment of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill refers to the recommendations of the Committee chaired by Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand appointed to review the working of the Special Police Establishment and to make recommendations for improvement of laws relating to bribery and corruption. To take the cases of corruption out of the maze of cases handled by Magistrates, it was decided to set up special courts. Section 6 conferred power on the State Government to appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary with power to try (the offences set out in Clauses (a) and
(b). Now if at this stage a reference is made to Section 6 of the CrPC which provides for constitution of criminal courts, it would become clear that a new court with a new designation was being set up and that it has to be under the administrative and judicial superintendence of the High Court. As already pointed out, there were four types of criminal courts functioning under the High Court. To this list was added the court of a special Judge. Now when a new court which is indisputably a criminal court, because it was not even whispered that the Court of special Judge is not a criminal court, is set up, to make it effective and functionally oriented , it becomes necessary to prescribe its powers, procedure, status and all ancillary provisions.

While setting up a court of a special Judge keeping in view the fact that the high dignitaries in public life are likely to CRM M-40078 of 2012 9 be tried by such a court, the qualification prescribed was that the person to be appointed as special Judge has to be either a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge. These three dignitaries are above the level of a Magistrate. After prescribing the qualification, the Legislature proceeded to confer power upon a special Judge to take cognizance of offences for the trial of which a special court with exclusive jurisdiction was being set up. If a special Judge has to take cognizance of offences, ipso facto the procedure for trial of such offences has to be prescribed. Now the Code prescribes different procedures for trial of cases by different courts. Procedure for trial of a case before a Court of Sessions is set out in Chapter XVIII; trial of warrant cases by Magistrates is set out in Chapter XIX and the provisions therein included catered to both the types of cases coming before the Magistrate, namely, upon police report or otherwise than on a police report. Chapter XX prescribes the procedure for trial of summons cases by Magistrates and Chapter XXI prescribes the procedure for summary trial. Now that a new criminal court was being set up, the Legislature took the first step of providing its comparative position in the hierarchy of courts under Section 6 Cr.P.C. by bringing it on level more or less comparable to the Court of Sessions, but in order to avoid any confusion arising out of comparison by level, it was made explicit in Section 8(1) itself that it is not a Court of Sessions because it can take cognizance of offences without commitment as contemplated by Section 193 Cr.P.C.

Undoubtedly in Section 8(3) it was clearly laid down that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1) and (2) of CRM M-40078 of 2012 10 Section 8, the Court of special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. In contra-distinction to the Sessions Court this new court was to be a court of original jurisdiction The Legislature then proceeded to specify which out of the various procedures set out in the Code, this new court shall follow for trial of offences before it. Section 8(1) specifically says that a special Judge in trial of offences before him shall follow the procedure prescribed in the CrPC for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. The provisions for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate are to be found in Chapter XXI of 1898 Code. A glance through the provisions will show that the provisions therein included catered to both the situations namely, trial of a case initiated upon police report (Section 251A) and trial of cases instituted otherwise than on police report (Section 252 to 257). If a special Judge is en-joined with a duty to try cases according to the procedure prescribed in foregoing provisions he will have to first decide whether the case was instituted upon a police report or otherwise than on police report and follow the procedure in the relevant group of sections. Each of the Sections 251A to 257 of 1898 Code which are in pari materia with Sections 238 to 250 of 1973 Code refers to what the Magistrate should do. Does the special Judge, therefore, become a Magistrate? This is the fallacy of the whole approach. In fact, in order to give full effect to Section 8(1), the only thing to do is to read special Judge in Sections 238 to 250 wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs. This is what is called legislation by incorporation. Similarly, where the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile to go in search of the CRM M-40078 of 2012 11 fact whether for purposes of Sections 190 which conferred power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, special Judge is a Magistrate? What is to be done is that one has to read the expression 'special Judge' in place of Magistrate, and the whole thing becomes crystal clear. The Legislature wherever, it found the grey area clarified it by making specific provision such as the one in Sub-section (2) of Section 8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in Sub-section (3) that all the provisions of the CrPC shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a special Judge. At the time when the 1952 Act was enacted what was in operation was the CrPC, 1898. It did not envisage any Court of a special Judge and the Legislature never wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new criminal court which was being set up. Therefore, it conferred power (taking cognizance of offences), prescribed procedure (trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate) indicated authority to tender pardon (Section 338) and then after declaring is status as comparable to a Court of Sessions proceeded to prescribe that all provisions of the CrPC will apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1952 Act. The net outcome of this position is that a new court of original jurisdiction was set up and whenever a question arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the CrPC undaunted by any designation claptrap. When taking cognizance, a Court of special Judge enjoyed the powers under Section

190. When trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though CRM M-40078 of 2012 12 as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Sessions. The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a court of a special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Sessions revolves round a mistaken belief that a special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Sessions. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the court or a special Judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide-bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Sessions. Under the Code it will enjoy all powers which a court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied."

Thus, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Special Judge has all powers under the Code, which are vested in the Court of original jurisdiction except the ones specifically prohibited. Since the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not specifically denied, the Special Judge has the jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a Court of original jurisdiction which the Magistrate has. Hence, in my considered opinion, the private complaint and an application /oral prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., disclosing the commission of the offences under the P.C. Act can be entertained by the Special Judge CRM M-40078 of 2012 13 appointed under Section 3 of PC Act. Although there is no specific provision in the P.C. Act conferring the power on the Special Judge to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., but since the Special Judge by virtue of Section 5(1) of the P.C. Act is empowered to take cognizance of the offences without committal under P.C. Act and also exercise power of Magisrate under Section 5(4) of P.C. Act, hence the order for registration of the FIR and its investigation on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of the offences under the P C Act can only be made by the Special Judge.

Therefore, on the analogy of the law laid down in A. R. Antulay's case (supra), the Special Judge under the P.C. Act is fully empowered to pass order on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

In the present case, prima facie offence punishable under Section 13 of the P.C. Act, 1988 read with offences under IPC are disclosed from the allegations made in the complaint moved by the respondent. It is alleged in the complaint that the accused illegally abducted, tortured and threatened to kill the complainant and released him after taking illegal gratifications. These allegations prima facie fullfil the ingredients of offences under PC Act and IPC On the basis of these allegations prima facie cognizable offences of serious nature requiring investigation by the Vigilance Bureau are disclosed. Hence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge acting as Special Judge under the P.C. Act has correctly passed order CRM M-40078 of 2012 14 for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on the request of complainant.

The argument on which the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.is sought to be rejected is that the Special Judge is not empowered to take cognizance of the offences under the P.C. Act on the complaint of private person and only the Magistrate can pass order under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. This contention is also not legally sound, as there is no legal bar for the Special Judge under the P.C. Act to take cognizance of the offences under this Act on the basis of complaint of private person. Similar argument has been considered in detail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay (supra), in which it is held that the Special Judge under the P. C. Act is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under this Act on the complaint of private persons also. A.R. Antulay's case (supra) pertains to the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947. After having considered the various provisions of the P. C. Act and other statutes, it is specifically held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a private complaint can be entertained by the Special Judge in respect of the offences committed by the public servant under P.C. Act and cognizance of the same by Special Judge is legal.

Therefore, in view of the law laid down in A.R. Antulay's case (supra), in present case also, the prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has rightly been allowed as there is no legal bar for the Special Judge under the P.C. Act to take cognizance of the offences under P.C. Act on the complaint of private person.

CRM M-40078 of 2012 15

The second point is that the learned Special Judge cannot take cognizance on private complaint for offences under the P.C. Act without the "sanction" by the appropriate government/ authority. There is no dispute about this proposition of law, but no 'sanction' is required at the time of registration of FIR and investigation of case. The Court of Special judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction and can entertain complaint as Magistrate can. The argument on the face is misconceived and without any substance.

From reading of sub-Section (i) of Section 19 of the P.C. Act, 1988, it is crystal clear that "sanction" of appropriate government or authority is required at the time of taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of P.C. Act alleged to have been committed by the public servant and not at the time of passing the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of the FIR, or lodging the FIR about such offences directly at the police station. Therefore, the prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can not be rejected on the ground that "sanction" of appropriate government or authority would be required at the time of registration of FIR and its investigation. No sanction is required for registration of FIR, its purpose is to set the law in motion, thereafter investigation commences.

Before parting with the judgment, I deem it appropriate to refer to the law laid down in the case of Ram Babu Gupta & others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 698 (All.), wherein while passing order for treating the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as CRM M-40078 of 2012 16 complaint, the following observations were made by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, which must be kept in mind by the learned Magistrates/Judges:-

"42. ... However, it is always to be kept in mind that it is the primary duty of the police to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences and aggrieved person cannot be forced to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XV and to produce his witnesses at his cost to bring home the charge to the accused. It is the duty of the state to provide safeguards to the life and property of a citizen. If any intrusion is made by an offender, it is for the State to set the law into motion and come to the aid of the person aggrieved."

The Magistrates/Judges should not shirk their legal responsibility to pass an order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on the applications under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in the cases where on the basis of the allegations made therein and the material, if any, brought on record in support thereof, prima facie cognizable offence of serious nature requiring police investigation is made out. In such cases the complainant should not be compelled to collect and produce the evidence at his cost to bring home the charges against the accused, thereby forcing the complainant to proceed in the manner provided by chapter XV Cr.P.C.

The following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 4 and 5 of the judgement titled as Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & others (2008) 7 SCC 164 are also worth mentioning:- CRM M-40078 of 2012 17

"4.It is a matter of experience of one of us (B.N. Agrawal,J.) while acting as Judge of the Patna High Court, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court and Judge of this Court that inspite of law laid down by this Court, the police authorities concerned do not register FIRs unless some direction is given by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the High Court or this Court. Further, experience shows that even after orders are passed by the courts concerned for registration of the case, the police does not take the necessary steps and when matters are brought to the notice of the inspecting Judges of the High Court during the course of inspection of the courts and Superintendents of Police are taken to task, then only FIRs are registered. In a large number of cases investigations do not commence even after registration of FIRs and in a case like the present one, steps are not taken for recovery of the kidnapped person or apprehending the accused person with reasonable dispatch. At times it has been found that when harsh orders are passed by the members of the judiciary in a State, the police becomes hostile to them, for instance, in Bihar when a bail petition filed by a police personnel, who was the accused was rejected by a member of the Bihar Superior Judicial Service, he was assaulted in the courtroom for which contempt proceeding was initiated by the Patna High Court and the erring police officials were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment."
"5.On the other hand, there are innumerable cases that where the complainant is a practical person, FIRs are registered immediately, copies thereof are made over to CRM M-40078 of 2012 18 the complainant on the same day, investigation proceeds with supersonic jet speed, immediate steps are taken for apprehending the accused and recovery of the kidnapped persons and the properties which were the subject-matter of theft or dacoity. In the case before us allegations have been made that the Station House Officer of the police station concerned is pressurising the complainant to withdraw the complaint, which, if true, is a very disturbing state of affairs. We do not know, there may be innumerable such instances."

After making above mentioned observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued certain directions (in para 6 at page 165, (2008) 7 SCC 164):-

"6. In view of the above, we feel that it is high time to give directions to the Governments of all the States and Union Territories besides their Director Generals of Police/ Commissioners of Police as the case may be to the effect that if steps are not taken for registration of FIRs immediately and copies thereof are not made over to the complainants, they may move the Magistrates concerned by filing complaint petitions to give direction to the police to register case immediately upon receipt/production of copy of the orders and make over copy of the FIRs to the complainants, within twenty-four hours of receipt/production of copy of such orders. It may further give direction to take immediate steps for apprehending the accused persons and recovery of kidnapped/abducted persons and properties which were the subject-matter of theft or dacoity. In case FIRs are not registered within the aforementioned time, and/or CRM M-40078 of 2012 19 aforementioned steps are not taken by the police, the Magistrate concerned would be justified in initiating contempt proceeding against such delinquent officers and punish them for violation of its orders if no sufficient cause is shown and awarding stringent punishment like sentence of imprisonment against them inasmuch as the disciplinary authority would be quite justified in initiating departmental proceeding and suspending them in contemplation of the same."

When Lalita Kumari's case (supra) came up for hearing on 08.08.2008, the Hon'ble Apex Court passed the following order, [reported in (2011) 11 SCC 331] which too is worth noticing:-

"6.....Registry is directed to communicate this order by fax as well to the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories and all the Director Generals of Police/Commissioners of police, as the case may be.
7. Let order dated 14.07.2008, and this order be put on the website of the Supreme Court of India so that the people of India may know what directions have been given by this Court and they may take appropriate steps in case of any inaction on the part of the concerned officer of the police station in instituting a case and the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall take action in a case of inaction upon filing of complaint petition and give direction to institute the case within the time CRM M-40078 of 2012 20 directed in the said order failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall not only initiate action against the delinquent police officer but punish them suitably by sending them to jail, in case the cause shown is found to be unsatisfactory.
8. Apart from this, the Chief Judicial Magistrate/ Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall report the matter to the disciplinary authority at once by fax as well upon receipt of which the disciplinary authority shall suspend the concerned police officer immediately in contemplation of departmental proceeding."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. & others (2008)2 SCC 409 that the magistrate has implied/incidental power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to monitor the police investigation.

In view of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the Special Judge under the P.C. Act is empowered to pass order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on the basis of the application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of the offences under PC Act and the offences under the I.P.C. The Special Judge can entertain the complaint of a private person also. It is further held that the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can not be rejected on the ground that CRM M-40078 of 2012 21 'sanction' of appropriate government/authority had not been obtained before lodging complaint.

For the reasons mentioned herein-above, the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal excercising powers of Special Judge under the P.C. Act is upheld.

Petition being devoid of merit and is dismissed.

January 09, 2013                                  [Paramjeet Singh]
kadyan/vkd                                            Judge