Delhi District Court
State vs Pradeep Kumar Maurya on 21 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SEEMA NIRMAL
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS -09,
SOUTH-EAST DISTRICT / SAKET COURTS, DELHI
Cr CASE NO. 2485/18
STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA
FIR NO. 174/17
PS GREATER KAILASH
JUDGMENT
a. CNR NO. DLSE020136882018
b. Name of the Complainant Sh. Shyam Singh
s/o Sh. Khacheru
c. Name of the accused & his Pradeep Kumar Maurya
parentage and address S/o Rameshwar Prashad Maurya
R/o H.No. E-292, Street no.
29A, Molarband Extension, New
Delhi.
d. Offence charged U/s 279/304A/283 IPC &
Section RRR-15(2)/177 MV Act
e. Date of commission of 08.10.2017
offence
f. Date of Institution 01.05.2018
g. Plea of accused Pleaded not guilty
h. Order Reserved on 03.11.2025
i. Date of Pronouncement 21.11.2025
j. Final Order ACQUITTED
Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 1 OF 20
STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA
FIR NO. 174/17
SEEMA Digitally signed by
SEEMA NIRMAL
PS GREATER KAILASH
NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.21
16:50:19 +0530
Present: Ld. APP for the State.
Sh. S.C. Chaturvedi along with Sh. H.C Sharma, Ld. counsels for accused with accused.
BRIEF FACTS AND REASONS FOR DECISION
1. It is alleged that on 08.10.2017, at about 04:45 PM, on BRT Road near Petrol Pump, Krishi Vihar, PS GK-1, New Delhi, within the jurisdiction of PS GK-1, accused Pradeep Kumar Maurya was driving the car bearing registration no. DL2CAC 7402 in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others and caused the death of deceased Manoj by doing a rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide and thus committed an offence punishable u/s 279/304A IPC. It is further alleged against accused that on the aforesaid date, time and place, accused Pradeep Kumar Maurya also omitted to take order with the aforesaid car in his possession or under his charge and caused danger, obstruction or injury to Manoj in a public way and thus committed an offence punishable u/s 283 IPC. It is also alleged that on the aforesaid date, time and place, accused had parked his vehicle in question i.e. car bearing registration no DL2CAC 7402 in the lane meant exclusively for the buses and thus committed an offence punishable under RRR-15 (2)/177 MV Act.
2. Briefly stated, it is the case of prosecution that on Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 2 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA Digitally signed by SEEMA SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.21 16:50:24 +0530 PS GREATER KAILASH 08.10.2017, on receipt of DD no.18A regarding an accident, IO/ASI Sube Singh along with Ct. Harpal reached the spot i.e. BRT near Petrol Pump, Krishi Vihar, where one motorcycle bearing no. DL6SCU5260 was found lying in an accidental condition and one car bearing no. DL2CAC7042 was found stationed in between BRT road and the driver of the said car was also found present there, whose name was revealed as Pradeep Kumar Maurya s/o Rameshwar Prasad Maurya. Thereafter, IO/ASI Sube Singh left Ct. Harpal Singh to safeguard the spot and directed the driver of the offending car to park his car aside the road. IO also came to know that the injured had already been shifted to the Trauma Center. Thereafter, IO/ASI Sube Singh went to AIIMS Trauma Center where IO obtained MLC no. 500053634/17 on which the doctor concerned opined that the injured /patient has been shifted to OT and patient is unfit for statement. IO made search of eye witness at the spot of incident or at the hospital, but no eye witness of the accident could be found in the hospital. Thereafter, IO came back to the spot and on the basis of DD no.18A and MLC itself, he got registered the present case FIR for offence under Section 279/337 IPC. During the course of investigation, IO prepared the site plan of the spot, took photographs of both the accidental vehicles and seized the same. In the meantime, the eye witness of the accident namely Shyam Singh s/o Sh. Khachedu came who revealed himself to be the eye witness of the accident. Thereafter, IO recorded statement u/s 161 Cr.p.C of eye witness and obtained his signatures on the site plan. During the course of further investigation, both the accidental vehicles got Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 3 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:50:28 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH deposited in the Malkhana, they got mechanically inspected, notice under Section 133 MV Act was served. Thereafter, IO came to know about the name of injured as Manoj s/o Bishamber and after obtaining the name of original owner of offending vehicle, accused Pradeep Kumar Maurya was arrested and he was released on bail. During the course of investigation, efforts were made to obtain statement of injured Manoj, however, he was declared unfit for statement. Thereafter, on 30.01.2018, on discharge of accused, result of injury being opined as Dangerous on MLC, Section 338 IPC was added in place of Section 337 IPC. Thereafter on 19.02.2018, during the course of treatment, injured Manoj died at his home and on 20.02.2018, postmortem of dead body was conducted and postmortem report was obtained and thereafter Section 304A IPC was conducted. After completion of investigation, final report in the form of charge sheet under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A/283 IPC & Section RRR (Rules of Road Regulation)-15(2)/177 MV Act was forwarded to the Court against the accused for trial.
3. After taking cognizance of the offences by the court, accused was summoned. Pursuant to his appearance, in compliance of Section 207 Cr.P.C, copy of charge sheet was supplied to him. Subsequently, after perusal of the judicial file and hearing the parties, a prima facie case against the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 279/304A/283 IPC & Section RRR-15(2)/177 MV Act was found to be made out. Accordingly, on Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 4 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:50:32 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH 11.07.2018, formal notice of accusation for commission of offence punishable under Section 279/304A/283 IPC & Section RRR-15(2)/177 MV Act was served upon the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, the matter was posted for Prosecution Evidence.
4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, examined the following witnesses:
i) PW-1 Sh. Shyam Singh (complainant),
ii) PW-2 Sh. Raj Kumar (public witness/witness to dead body identification),
iii) PW-3 Vikram (public witness),
iv) PW-4 Ct. Rakesh Kumar (police witness),
v) PW-5 Ct. Harpal (police witness),
vi) PW-6 Retd. ASI Sube Singh (IO).
5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, also relied upon the following documents:
1. site plan as Ex. PW1/A,
2. arrest and personal search memo as Ex. PW1/B & Ex. PW1/C,
3. seizure memo of DL of accused and other documents of offending car as Ex. PW1/D & Ex.
PW1/E respectively, Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 5 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:50:37 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH
4. photographs of alleged motorcycle and photographs of alleged car as Ex. P-1(colly) and Ex. P-2 (colly), respectively,
5. dead body identification statement as Ex. PW2/A,
6.seizure memo of motorcycle bearing registration no. DL6SU5260 and car bearing registration no.
DL2CAC7042 as Ex. PW5/A & Ex. PW5/B
respectively,
7. notice u/s 133 MV Act upon owner of offending vehicle as Ex. PW6/A,
6. In addition to the above-mentioned witnesses, accused also admitted copy of factum of registration of DD no.18A, endorsement by DO, FIR No.174/17, certificate u/s 65-B Indian Evidence Act, MLC no. 500053634/17, mechanical inspection report of vehicle no. DL2CAC7042 and DL6SU5260, postmortem report no. 239-18 as Ex. A-1 to Ex. A-8 respectively, in terms of Section 294 Cr.P.C vide order dated 05.10.2018, hence, the said witnesses were dropped on the submissions of Ld. APP for State.
7. After prosecution evidence, statement of accused was recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. wherein all incriminating circumstance led against him during the trial by the prosecution witnesses were put to him, affording him an opportunity to give his explanation, if any. The accused pleaded innocence and claimed that he has been falsely Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 6 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:50:42 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH implicated in the present case. He preferred to lead defence evidence and therefore examined himself as DW1. Thereafter, DE was closed vide order dated 12.09.2025 and the matter was posted for final arguments.
8. I have heard the Ld. APP for the State and the Ld. counsel for the accused and gone through the case file carefully. After hearing rival contentions and after appreciation of evidence on file, I am of the considered view that prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubts and the arguments advanced by the Ld. APP for the State cannot be accepted for the reasons given below.
9. First of all, the accused has been charge-sheeted for commission of offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC. Before proceeding further, for reference Section 279 IPC is reproduced as under:
279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.--
Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. The essential ingredients of Section 279 IPC are:
(i) driving of a vehicle or riding on a public way,
(ii) such driving or riding must be so rash or negligent Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 7 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:50:47 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person.
10. To bring home the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC, first of all, the identity of the author of rash or negligent act must be fixed. Coming back to the facts of the present case, PW-1 Shyam Singh is the eye witness in the present and he has deposed in his examination in chief that at that time, accused was seated there and he saw him and told the police officials that he is the same person who had caused the accident. He also identified the accused present in the court. Further, the accused has also examined himself as DW-1 and duly admitted the incident but did not admit that the accident was caused by his rash and negligent driving. Thus, identity of the accused has been duly proved on record.
11. Now, the prosecution had to prove on record the rashness and negligence on the part of the accused while driving the offending vehicle.
12. In Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan (SC) 2012(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 245, it has been held as follows:-
"11. 'Negligence' means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 8 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:50:52 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the Court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.
12. The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., 'reasonable care' in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrian happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.
13. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 9 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL PS GREATER KAILASH NIRMAL 16:50:55 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes - one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in the Indian Penal Code that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of 'culpable rashness' and 'culpable negligence' into consideration in cases of road accidents. 'Culpable rashness' is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). 'Culpable negligence' is acting without the consciousness that Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 10 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA Digitally signed SEEMA by SEEMA FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:51:00 Date: 2025.11.21 +0530 PS GREATER KAILASH the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's 'An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988' (First Edition, 2010]."
13. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the eye witness namely Shyam Singh while appearing as PW-1 deposed in his examination in chief that on dated 08.10.2017 he was driving his auto and at the place of occurrence one car bearing registration no.DL2CA7042 was going ahead of him and driver of the said car applied sudden brakes immediately in a rash and negligent manner, so he turned his auto to his left side and at that time one motorcycle bearing registration no.DL6SU5260 was also coming and that motorcycle had collided with that car. However, he has not deposed regarding the speed of the alleged car, what was the traffic condition Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 11 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:51:03 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH on the road, what was the width of the road.
14. Further, in State of Karnataka v. Satish , (SC) 1998(8) SCC 493, it has been held as follows:-
"4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence"
or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 12 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:51:15 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged."
15. Further, in Kandhara Singh v. State of Punjab, (P&H) 2007(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 679, it has been observed as follows:-
"6. The argument advanced by Mr. R.S. Rai, learned Senior Advocate is two fold. Firstly, he urged that though, the case is based on the testimony of the sole eye-witness i.e. Nishan Singh and no doubt, he could not be disbelieved merely for the reason of his relationship with the deceased, but his testimony, if Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 13 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.21 16:51:41 +0530 PS GREATER KAILASH scrutinised, does not land us anywhere and he is bound to be disbelieved as his testimony does not meet with the following required standards; (i) He does not describe the manner as to how the petitioner was rash and negligent; (ii) he has failed to establish the identity of the petitioner. Having examined the testimony of Nishan Singh (PW4), I see some substance in his arguments. Nishan Singh (PW4) has stated during his examination that the petitioner was driving the vehicle at a high speed, but he has not specifically stated anywhere if he was rash or negligent, much less he has not testified as to at what speed, he was driving the vehicle. Regarding high speed, it may be observed that the driver may be driving the vehicle at a high speed, but he cannot be said to be rash or negligent, unless it is explained as to in what manner he was rash or negligent. It is a matter of common parlance that if a person is driving the vehicle upto 100 km per hour, then the same could not be said to be a high speed and it could be assessed as high, if he exceeded 100 km per hour. In absence of such categorical statement, the words 'high speed' without further explanation about its rate, could not be termed as a rash or negligent act in the terms of Section 304A Indian Penal Code. It is also worthwhile to mention that Nishan Singh during his examination Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 14 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA Digitally signed SEEMA by SEEMA FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.21 16:51:46 +0530 PS GREATER KAILASH as PW4 has been changing his stand. As per the First Information Report, the offending vehicle was a 'Maruti Van', which allegedly struck against the deceased, but in his testimony recorded in court Nishan Singh (PW4) has stated that the petitioner was driving the 'matador', therefore, this discrepancy leads me to infer that he was not witness to the occurrence. His house is allegedly situated at about 100 yards from the place of occurrence, therefore, he may have come after hearing the noise of collusion after the occurrence was over."
16. In the present case also, the eye has not deposed regarding the width of the road, the density of the traffic on the road, manner of driving the alleged offending vehicle and the physical condition of the road etc. in the absence of which rashness and negligence on the part of the accused cannot be ascertained. Reliance in this regard can be placed on Shakila Khader v. Nausher Gama, (SC) 1975 AIR (SC) 1324, wherein it has been held as follows:-
"6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving which led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but the width of the road, the density of the traffic and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles resulting in going to the wrong side of the Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 15 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:51:50 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye it is not difficult for an eye witness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 and rejecting it is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 16 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:51:54 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road and hit an electric post and parapet wall and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for the purpose of this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic."
17. Further, in this regard can be placed on Braham Dass v. State of H.P., (SC) 2010(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 418, wherein it has been held as follows:-
"4. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 17 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:51:58 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH Section 279 Indian Penal Code is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304 A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304 A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved."
18. Further, the accused while appearing as DW-1 deposed in his examination in chief that while driving his car the tyre of his car got detached from the car and he got his car stationed on the side of the road and the rider of the motorcycle got struck into his car form behind. Ld. counsel for the accused gave him a suggestion to which he replied that it is wrong to suggest that his car was very old and when he was taking the same to the service centre the tyre of the car got detached from it. Meaning thereby, the prosecution has admitted the fact deposed by the accused while appearing as DW-1. He has further stated in his cross-examination that when the accidental motorcycle hit his car from behind his car was already stationed and jack was placed under the car. Thus, it seems that the injured/rider of the motorcycle was at fault. Further perusal of photographs of car (Ex. P-2) show that one tyre of the car is missing, which fortifies the case of the accused in his favour.
19. Further, another eye witness namely Vikram while appearing Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 18 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 174/17 NIRMAL 16:52:02 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH as PW-3 clearly deposed in his examination in chief that he does not know anything about the present case. Thus, he has turned hostile and as such he was permitted to be cross-examined by the Ld. APP for the state in which he has stated that he had not given any statement to the police and when confronted with his statement Ex.PW-3/A he has stated that the said statement was not given by him to the police. Thus, it also casts a serious doubt on the investigation and version of the prosecution and benefit of the same shall go to the accused.
20. Thus, in my considered view, rashness and negligence on the part of the accused is not proved on record by the prosecution. Accordingly, in view of the above discussion, the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC is not proved on record against the accused.
21. There is no other eye witness of the alleged occurrence and all the remaining witnesses of the prosecution are just formal witnesses whose testimony is not sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution.
22. In the light of above discussion and reasons, this Court is of the considered view that evidence led by the prosecution is highly insufficient and is discrepant on the material aspects of this case. It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove its case against the accused present in the Court beyond the shadow of reasonable doubts. In the instant case prosecution has failed to prove its case and as such while extending the benefit of doubt to the accused, he is hereby Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 19 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:52:06 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 PS GREATER KAILASH acquitted of the charges leveled against him by the prosecution. Case property, if any, be disposed of as per rules after expiry of period of appeal/revision. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance. SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:52:11 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 Announced in the Open (SEEMA NIRMAL) On 21.11.2025 JMFC-09/ SED/ Saket Courts, New Delhi/21.11.2025 It is certified by me that this judgment contains 20 pages and each page is signed by me personally. SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 16:52:15 +0530 Date: 2025.11.21 (SEEMA NIRMAL) JMFC-09/ SED/ Saket Courts, NewDelhi/21.11.2025 Cr CASE NO. 2485/18 PAGE 20 OF 20 STATE Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR MAURYA FIR NO. 174/17 PS GREATER KAILASH