Chattisgarh High Court
Chhat Bai Sahu vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board ... on 3 December, 2024
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1 / 19
2024:CGHC:47638
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA No. 186 of 2024
1 - Chhat Bai Sahu W/o Late Chhat Ram Aged About 41 Years
2 - Likhesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Chhat Ram Sahu Aged About 21 Years
3 - Somesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Chhat Ram Sahu Aged About 18 Years
All are R/o Village Mehanda Post Kutra Police Station Pamgarh, District
Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh
---- Appellants
versus
1 - Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (Now Chhattisgarh State Electricity
Distribution Company Ltd.) Through Executive Engineer (Transmission And
Maintenance), CSPDCL Office Janjgir Champa Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir-
Champa, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
____________________________________________________________ For Appellants : Mr. K.P.S. Gandhi, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Order On Board 03/12/2024
1. Appellants/plaintiffs by this appeal have questioned the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Janjgir, District - Janjgir-Champa in Civil Suit No.1-B/2019, whereby learned trial Court has dismissed the suit seeking compensation of Rs.4,30,000/-.
2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that on 30.03.2018, late Chhatram Sahu while working in his Badi came in contact with fencing wire and he suffered electric shock due to which he died. The Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD electricity supply to the fencing wire was caused by the electricity DEWANGAN Date: 2024.12.12 16:14:23 +0530 2 / 19 connection provided by the respondent to the deceased, which came into contact with the fencing wire in the Badi. After death of late Chhatram Sahu, appellants/plaintiffs who are wife and children of late Chhatram Sahu filed a civil suit seeking relief of compensation of Rs.4,30,000/- inter alia pleading that late Chhatram has obtained temporary electricity connection from the respondent, he submitted an application for disconnection of the electricity supply, however, even after lapse of considerable period, respondent/department has not disconnected the electricity supply given to deceased. On 30.03.2018, while deceased was working in his Badi came in contact with the fencing wire surrounding to his Badi, he suffered electric shock and died. Morgue was reported to the concerned police station and after morgue enquiry it was found that the supply line from the electricity pole to the house/badi was damaged and insulation was torn at several places and as a result of which, the damaged line came into contact with the fencing wire, due to which, fencing wire also got the electricity supply. The accident took place due to the negligence on the part of the respondent.
3. Respondent submitted written statement to the suit filed by plaintiff denying all the adverse pleadings made against them and further pleaded that on the fateful day, deceased was using electricity supply illegally and unauthorizedly. It is also pleaded that respondents have given connection from pole up to the starter and thereafter it is the deceased who took the wire of connection from starter to pump through the GI wire fencing. The connecting wire was not properly insulated due to which there was electricity supply in the fencing wire. 3 / 19 The accident occurred due to negligence and illegal act of the deceased.
4. Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made by respective parties formulated three issues for consideration.
5. Parties lead their evidence and upon appreciation of the evidence learned trial Court recorded a finding that plaintiffs failed to prove their case and dismissed the suit by impugned judgment and decree, which is under challenge in this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for appellants would submit that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the oral evidence brought on record. He contended that learned trial Court found the issues framed to be not proved only considering the documents forming part of the charge- sheet placed as Ex.P-1. Said documents are not conclusive proof, to prove the facts as mentioned therein, those documents are still required to be proved before the Court by producing further oral evidence. It is further contention of learned counsel for appellants that respondent has not lead any evidence to prove that accident occurred due to illegal and unauthorized use of electricity connection by deceased, in fact, the witness examined on behalf of the respondent has even not proved the pleadings made in the written statement by bringing on record admissible and clinching evidence that on the request of the deceased, respondent has earlier disconnected the electricity supply and thereafter, it is the deceased, who had illegally and unauthorizedly took the connection from the electricity pole, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in para -14 4 / 19 and 15 of the impugned judgment is perverse to the evidence available on record.
7. Learned counsel for respondent opposes the submission of learned counsel for appellants and would submit that the suit seeking compensation is filed by appellants/plaintiff, and hence it is for the plaintiffs to prove their pleadings and the claim made in the plaint in accordance with the law in which they utterly failed. There is no error in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that appellants/plaintiffs failed to prove that death of late Chhatram was on account of electric shock due to negligence on the part of respondent. He further submits that to prove the plea that, electricity connection given by respondent was disconnected, has submitted the details of the bills generated against the use of electricity connection by late Chhatram which is only up to 26.12.2017, whereas accident occurred on 30.03.2018. copy of the particulars of the bills is marked as Ex.D-6.
8. I have heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the documents placed on record.
9. Appellants/plaintiffs in support of plea of accidental death due to electrocution of late Chhatram Sahu, produced the copy of final report prepared by the Police Station Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa as Ex.P-1, property seizure memo Ex.P-2, information of untimely death as Ex.P-3, inquest as Ex.P-4, application for postmortem as (Ex.P-5) and Postmortem report as (Ex.P-6), Panchnama Ex.P-7 and examined Likhesh Kumar Sahu as (P.W.-1), Pankaj Suryawanshi as (P.W.-2). Defendant/respondent has produced and exhibited the copy of the letter (Savingram dated 27.02.2019) as Ex.D-1, description and 5 / 19 particulars of the form electrical/non-electrical accident as Ex.D-2. Inquiry report Ex.D-3, spot map Ex.-D-5, particulars of the Bill Ex.D-6, statement of Vinod Kumar Soni as Ex.D-7, statement of Balram Shrivas as Ex.D-8, statement of Pankaj Suryawanshi as Ex.D-9 and examined H.S. Shukla, Executive Engineer as (D.W.-1).
10. Likesh Kumar Sahu (P.W.-1) in his examination-in-chief has made categorical statement that on 09.01.2018 his father late Chhatram Sahu has submitted an application for disconnection of electricity connection in the office of respondents, however, even thereafter, the electricity supply was not disconnected. On 30.03.2018, wire through which the electricity connection was given to late Chhatram Sahu came in contact with fencing wire of the house and badi. His father late Chhatram came in contact with fencing of Badi and suffered electric shock. In cross-examination though there is statement that he has not submitted copy of the application for disconnection of the electricity supply submitted before the respondents, however, he stated that they have taken temporary meter connection from the electricity department. He further shown unawareness to the question put to him that after completion of the period, the temporary connection was disconnected. In later paragraph in para 18 he stated that on the date of accident, valid meter connection was taken and he has not submitted the electricity bills to show that connection was valid and legal. He denied the suggestion given that his late father has taken illegal and unauthorized electricity connection from pole for running the motor pump and it was tied through GI fencing wire. 6 / 19
11. Pankaj Suryawanshi (P.W.-2) in his examination-in-chief has made statement as per the pleadings in the plaint. This witness has denied the suggestion given by defendant that the accident took place due to the negligence of late Chhatram and further he has shown his unawareness about the responsibility of the supervision of the electricity connection of the electricity department. The documents Ex.P-1, which is the final report is a document prepared by the police during the course of the investigation, which has been produced to prove the fact that accident occurred and due to the accident late Chhatram Sahu died. This documents is to be read as the information of the fact only and it cannot be read as an evidence as conclusive proof of the contents of those documents because the contents of the documents are required to be proved by examining witness who prepared the documents at the time of investigation. In this case, the persons who have prepared the documents i.e. the final report, is not examined as witness by the defendants to prove the same. Copy of the postmortem report (Ex.P-6) mentions that opinion with respect to cause of death of late Chhatram as "due to cardio respiratory arrest in sequence of shock and its complications". From the aforementioned documents (Ex.P-6) it is apparent that cause of death of late Chhatram was on account of electric shock.
12. Learned trial Court in para-16 of the impugned judgment has taken note of the document Ex.D-6, which are particulars of the bills and observed that temporary connection bill was up to Nov. 2017 whereas, the accident is of 30.03.2018 and based on the said fact recorded a finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that electricity connection was valid and legal connection. Perusal of Ex.D-6 would show that it is only 7 / 19 particulars of the electricity bills issued and generated by the defendant/respondent. It is prepared by them on their computers. The contents of the said documents can be printed as per the command given by the persons obtaining print of said documents. It is not the auto generated bill showing the use of electricity connection and therefore, from this document only it cannot be inferred that the electricity connection and supply was till month of November, 2017 only. In the said document there is mention that it has been produced to show that the electricity bill was issued only up till November, 2017, therefore, the contents of the documents has to be read for limited purpose showing the issuance of the bill up to November, 2017 and it cannot be read to infer that the electricity connection and supply was given by respondents only up till November, 2017 and therefore, in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court fell into error in concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the valid electricity supply connection given by the respondents only based on the documents (Ex.D-6) and therefore, said finding is not sustainable.
13. Statement of Vinod Kumar Soni, Balram Shrivas and Pankaj Suryawanshi was produced as Ex.D-7, D-8 & D-9 however, statements of Vinod Kumar Soni and Balram Shrivas have not been proved as the said persons have not been examined and only Pankaj Suryawanshi was examined as P.W.-2 but perusal of his evidence does not reflect that the said statement has been put before him to prove his statement recorded by the respondent department.
14. H.S. Shukla (D.W.-1), Executive Engineer of the respondent department in cross-examination has stated that he is not aware 8 / 19 whether late Chhatram Sahu has submitted an application on 09.01.2018 for disconnection of the electricity supply. In cross- examination he further stated that after receipt of information, Junior Engineer - Vinod Kumar Soni and Lineman- Balram Shrivas went on spot, however, the persons have not been examined as witness by respondent/department to prove the actual position on spot. This witness has further admitted that late Chhatram Sahu was provided temporary electricity connection for domestic use and further that on account of death due to electrocution, there is provision to grant of Rs.4.00 Lakhs as compensation to the family members of the deceased, however, it will not apply when the electricity connection is illegal and unauthorized.
15. From the evidence of the defendant it is not proved that the electricity connection which was being used on the date of accident by late Chhatram was illegal and unauthorized but from the evidence of D.W.- 1 and the admission made by him it is apparent that on 25.01.2017 late Chhatram Sahu was provided temporary electricity connection for domestic use.
16. This Court in case of Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited and Another Vs. Smt. Bhagwati Bai, in F.A. No.198/2003, decided on 16.06.2014 held thus :-
"9. Now the question arises for consideration as to whether defence raised by the electricity department that they were not liable for the act as no negligence was committed by them whether was available to them or not. Predominantly department has tried to raise defence to the 'torts' strict liability rule and exception for Act of god or safety measures. This issue was considered in the case of M.P. 9 / 19 Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar and others, 2002 AIR SCW 129 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality is statutorily conferred on the Electricity Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. Therefore applying such principle, the defence so taken on the part of the management of the board that by reason of thunder storm the live wire fell down without there being any negligence was unavailable to the board. Even when safety measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertaking. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity and as such liability cast on such person is known, in law, as strict liability which is exactly in this case.
10. Similarly Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527 has laid down principle that exception to the doctrine of strict liability or no fault liability for hazardous activities cannot be applied to a Welfare State and there has been a corresponding shift from positivism to sociological jurisprudence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 24 of this judgment has held as under:-10 / 19
"24.The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is twofold; (i) The people who engage in particularly hazardous activities should bear the burden of the risk of damage that their activities generate, and (ii) it operates as a loss distribution mechanism, the person who does such hazardous activity (usually a corporation) being in the best position to spread the loss via insurance and higher prices for its products (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn. p. 267).
11. Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that doctrine of strict liability shall be applicable to the public corporation or local bodies which may be of the social utility, undertaking not working for private profit."
17. In the aforementioned decision, the Court took note of the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that doctrine of strict liability shall be applicable to the public corporation or local bodies which may be of the social utility, undertaking not working for private profit.
18. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, evidence brought on record by the respective parties as also the decision in case of Smt. Bhagwati Bai (supra) in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court erred in dismissing the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs only relying upon the contents of final report and other documents forming part of the final report, which in the opinion of this Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court is set-aside.
19. As the appellants/plaintiffs in relief clause has prayed for compensation of Rs.4,30,000/- which in the opinion of this Court cannot be said to be exaggerated amount of compensation sought in 11 / 19 the facts of the case where the age of the deceased was 42 years. The appellants/plaintiffs will be entitled for amount of compensation as prayed for in the relief clause of Rs.4,30,000/-. The amount of compensation shall carry further interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing of suit till its realization.
20. At this stage, learned counsel for appellants submits that appellants have also paid court fees of Rs.51615/- by mistake as claim of compensation made for the death, due to electrocution of person from the supply line of the electricity department is exempted from court fees and therefore, it be ordered to refund of the court fee to the poor appellants. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Hemlata Netam & Ors, in F.A. No. 63 of 2021 (decided on 27.01.2022).
21. Considered the submission and decision relied upon by learned counsel for appellants.
22. The issue with regard to exemption of court fee has come up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in case of Smt. Hemlata Netam (supra) wherein the Division Bench of this Court while referring to its earlier decision in case of Rishikesh Sahu Vs. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board & Anr, in MCC No.90 of 2003 (decided on 20.09.2012) as also the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. NUSLI Neville Wadia & Anr., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 279 and taking into consideration the Notification F.No.9-2-86-B-XXI, dated 2nd August, 1986 held that claim made in death case, which occurred owing to 12 / 19 electrocution would be exempted from court fees. Relevant para is quoted as under :-
"13. With respect to payment of Court fees, this Court in the matter of Rishikesh Sahu v. Chattisgarh State Electricity Board & another3, has held that the notification F.No.9-2-86-B-XXI dated the 2nd August 1986, which exempts the parties to pay the Court fee in the plaint when the death of any member of the family is caused on account of environmental, vegetationial, ecological water and such other pollutions caused by the operation in an industry through leakage or escape of any dangerous gases, vapours, fumes or dust from any part of the plant would also apply to the cases of victim who dies because of electrocution. In the matter of Rishikesh Sahu (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has exempted the Court fees when the death is caused as a result of injuries sustained by him due to electrocution. In the said decision it was held that ad valorem Court fees would not be paid and the petitioner would be entitled to take benefit of exemption as per the Notification dated 2-8-1986.
14. The said Notification dated 2-8-1986 whereby the Court fees was exempted would be relevant to the issue in hand and is reproduced as under :
Notification F.No.9-2-86-B-XXI, dated the 2nd August, 1986.--In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (No.7 of 1870) and in supersession of the Department Notification No.F. 9-1-
84-B-XXI, dated the 29th December, 1984, the State Government hereby remits in whole the Court Fees mentioned in Article 1-A of the First Schedule and Articles 1, 11 and 11-A of the Second Schedule payable on a plaint, appeal, revision or any other claim, as the case may be, presented by a person for compensation for,-
13 / 19
(i) any damage or injury caused to him or any member of his family; or
(ii) the death of any member of his family; or
(iii) any damage caused to him or member of his family's property; or
(iv) any damage, injury to, or death of a citizen of India; or
(v) any damage and/or loss caused to a Corporation, undertaking, establishment, association, department and any other juristic person;
on account of environmental, vegetational, ecological water and such other pollutions caused by the operation in an industry through leakage or escape of any dangerous gases, vapours, fumes or dust from any part of the plant.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this notification,-
(i) "person" shall include the Government of India; and
(ii) "family" shall include, husband, wife, minor son, unmarried daughter or any relation by blood wholly dependent on the claimant.
[Published in M.P. Rajpatra (Asadharan) dated 2-8-86 page 1178].
19. Further in the matter of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. NUSLI Neville Wadia and Another7, it is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 51 :
"51.....With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/ author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to 14 / 19 which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled, which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 406."
20. Accordingly, when the damages caused due to electrocution by live wire lying on road the rule of strict liability would be applicable. Accordingly, when the damage to person or property is caused which is otherwise caused a tortuous liability, and is covered under strict liability where the death caused by electrocution, due to live wire or any incident which escapes and caused damage or injury to a person or property to claim damages, we are of the opinion that the purposive interpretation of notification would be required and accordingly instead of putting it out from the reach of vast, we deem it proper to hold that by virtue of notification dated 02.08.1986 payment of court fees would be exempted."
23. The issue with regard to refund of Court fees came up for consideration before Division Bench of High Court of Allahabad in case of Chaubey Munna Lal reported in 1930 SCC OnLine All 47, wherein the Division Bench has observed thus :
"............This subject has come before the courts for a number of years and the earliest case is that of In the matter of Grant [(1870) 14 W.R., 47.] in which a refund of excess duty paid by inadvertence on an appeal was ordered by the High Court. In Harihar Guru v. Ananda Mahanty [(1912) I.L.R., 40 Cal., 365.] the High Court directed the taxing officer to issue a certificate to enable an applicant to obtain a refund of excess court fee paid. Similarly in Chandradhari Singh v. Tippan Prasad [(1918) 3 Pat. L.J., 452.] , the Patna High Court, acting under 15 / 19 section 151, Civil Procedure Code, held that the courts have inherent power to pass orders directing, the refund of excess court fee paid by mistake.
We agree with the view held by the Calcutta High Court and the Patna High Court and accordingly we hold that under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate courts have power to issue certificates directing the refund of court fees paid in excess by inadvertence. Accordingly we return this reference to the learned Subordinate Judge with the direction that he should issue the necessary certificate. No order is required as to costs."
24. In the case Narayana Reddiar, In re, reported in 1941 SCC OnLine Mad 283, the High Court of Madras while considering the application of Section 151 of C.P.C. for considering the prayer for refund of the Court fee has observed thus :-
"................It is true that S. 13, 14, or 15 of the Court-fees Act has no application, but it has been held that the court- fee can be refunded under the inherent powers of the Court. It may be that the court-fee in this case was not paid by a mistake of either party or in obedience of a wrong order of the Court, but it is equally clear that it was not meant to be utilised until the petition for review presented on behalf of the petitioner was accepted by the Court. The Munsif was therefore wrong in rejecting the application for the grant of a certificate. He should have granted one under S. 151, C.P.C. 1 would therefore accept the revision and direct that a certificate in regard to the court-fee of Rs. 183-14-0 should be issued to the petitioner by the lower Court."
25. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench) in case of Mahadeo Karnik Vs. Keshav Karnik, reported in MANU/MP/0185/ 1956 has observed thus :-
16 / 19
"3. It was pointed out in this ruling that even in cases not covered by Ss. 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-fees Act of
187), the Court can, under S. 151 of Civil Procedure Code, order refund of Court-fees paid in excess either by mistake, inadvertence or by oversight. This view is in consonance with that taken by other High Courts. See Munna Lal vs. Ram Chandra and others ( MANU/UP/0173/1929MANU/UP/0173/1929 : A.I.R. 1930 All 471 (1); In re Narayana Reddiar (MANU/TN/0318/1941MANU/TN/0318/1941 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad 316); and Girish Chandra vs. Girish Chandra (MANU/WB/0145/1931MANU/WB/0145/1931 : A.I.R. 1932 Cal 450). The Allahabad and Madras rulings had been followed by an earlier Bombay decision in Ahmed Ebrahim Vorajee vs. Government of the Province of Bombay (MANU/MH/0078/1942MANU/MH/0078/1942 : A.I.R. 1943 Bom 50)."
26. In case of Arjuna Govinda v. Amrita Keshiba, reported in 1955 SCC OnLine MP 42, Division Bench of Nagpur High Court while considering the prayer for refund of the excess court fee paid therein observed thus :-
"13. In Mt. Mohri Kunwar v. Keshri Chand, ILR (1941) All 558 : (AIR 1941 All 298) (R), it was observed:-
"No suitor has a vested right to insist that during the pendency of a litigation which a suitor has started the enactment relating to court-fee shall not be changed and the fee leviable shall not be increased or reduced either with regard to future applications or with regard to future appeals and he would be entitled to carry on proceedings on the basis of law as it stood when the plaint was filed even though the law is different when he comes to file an appeal or to make an application."17 / 19
14. There is support for the view that court-fee on a plaint or memorandum of appeal is payable according to the Court-fees Act in force on the date the plaint or memorandum of appeal is presented and a change of law during the pendency of the suit or appeal will not affect the court-fee payable. Chunnilal v. Kishandas Ramdas, AIR 1926 Nag 71 (S), Tara Prasanna v.
Nrisingha Moorari, AIR 1924 Cal 731 (T), Abubaker Tarmahomed v. Fatmabai, AIR 1933 Sind 354 (U), and Gulam Husain v. Nanhubeg, Taxing Decisions p. 100(V).
26. According to the decision of the Full Bench, in Radhakishan v. Shridhar, (Z4) (supra.), in general when an Act is altered during the pendency of an action the substantive rights of the parties remain unaffected and are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new amendment is made retrospective either expressly or by necessary implication.
27. Further, according to that decision, where a statute as altered merely deals with procedure and does not affect the substantive rights of the parties, it is held to apply prima facie to all actions, pending as well as future. For the purpose of this rule of interpretation an appeal is a continuation of the original action initiated by the filing of a plaint. The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal, are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by intrinsic unity.
29. But the question here is not about the right to any such insistence or a limitation on the power of legislature to increase the court-fees so as to affect even pending proceedings. The question is whether the legislature has evinced the necessary intention merely by enacting a measure enhancing the fees. What is involved in the present case is a rule of construction for the Court, not a limitation on legislative competence. 18 / 19
There is nothing in the amending Act to indicate that the enhanced fees govern pending cases. So the normal rule of construction laid down by the Full Bench must prevail.
35. In AIR 1950 Bom 4 (C) excessive court-fee was paid because earlier decisions of the Court had wrongly treated the appeals in suits for partition as falling under Section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. It was held that the Court could under its inherent power, apart from Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-fees Act, grant a certificate entitling the appellant to a refund of the excess amount paid. To the came elect are the decisions in AIR 1932 Mad 438 (E) and Abdul Majid ??? v. Amina Khatun, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 253 : (AIR (1942) 2 Cal 539 (Z5).
37. But if that decision is invoked as laying down the proposition that the Court cannot order refund of court- fees apart from Sections 10 to 15 of the Court-fees Act, it cannot be regarded as correct. The Court can in a case like the present act under its inherent powers to order refund. We agree with Deo, J. that the appellant is entitled to a certificate of refund. The decision in Raoji v. Collector, Amraoti, (A1) (supra.) cannot come in the way of the grant of such a certificate. The case will now be, placed before the appropriate bench for disposal."
27. In the case at hand, as discussed above in the preceding para, it is held that deceased - Chhatram Sahu died while he came in contact with live wire and was died due to electrocution. As submitted by learned counsel for appellants that, they have mistakenly paid the court fee of Rs.51,615/- while seeking compensation before the Court below. Therefore, in view of the notification dated 02.08.1986 as also the decisions referred above, this Court is inclined to allow the prayer made by learned counsel for appellants for refund of the court fee. 19 / 19 Accordingly it is directed that learned trial Court/Executing Court shall issue certificate in favour of appellants authorizing them to claim refund of the court fee paid mistakenly.
28. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
29. Decree be drawn up accordingly.
Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram