Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ashok Kumar Sahu vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 10 January, 2019
Author: B.K. Shrivastava
Bench: B.K. Shrivastava
...1...
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH: JABALPUR
D.B.: Hon'ble Shri Justice P.K. Jaiswal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice B.K. Shrivastava
Writ Petition No.3933/2014
ASHOK KUMAR SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
********
Shri Umesh Trivedi, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.5358/2014
VINAY KUMAR SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
********
Shri R.P. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate with Shri
Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.10225/2014
MURARI LAL KHARE
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS.
********
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.10224/2014
RAJU SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS.
...2...
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.12400/2014
MOHAN CHANDRA SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.12401/2014
RAMGOPAL GUPTA
VersuS
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS.
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3/State.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.12403/2014
BADRI PRASAD SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS.
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3/State.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
Writ Petition No.12404/2014
AYODHYA PRASAD SAHU
Versus
...3...
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS.
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Devesh Jain, Govt. Adv. for respondents No.1 to 3/State.
Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent
No.4.
ORDER
(10/01/2019) PER P.K. JAISWAL, J:-
Since a common question of law is involved in all these writ petitions, therefore, they all are heard together and are being disposed of by passing a common order. For the sake of convenience the facts are borrowed from W.P.No.3933/2014.
2. In these batch of writ petitions, the petitioners are challenging the order of eviction passed by the respondent No.3 - Sub Divisional Officer Naugaon, District Chhatarpur, under the M.P. Lok Parisar (Bedhakhli Adhiniyam), 1974 (hereinafter referred as 'the Adhiniyam') and the order passed by the appellate authority by which the appeals filed by the petitioner(s) have been dismissed.
3. In W.P.No.3933/2014, the petitioner and his ancestors are tenants of shop No.41 and 42 of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Naugaon, District Chatarpur since before the year 1974. On application of respondent No.4 for eviction under the Adhiniyam, the Sub Divisional Officer has passed the eviction order dated 16.1.2013, which has been confirmed in appeal by the respondent No.2 appellate authority on 22.10.2013. The petitioner is challenging the order of eviction passed by the competent authority and the order of dismissal of appeal on the ground that the earlier there was a dispute about the rent, therefore, the petitioner filed a civil suit, in which it is held that the petitioner is tenant and the respondent No.4 is trying to enhance the rent, but the suit was dismissed on the ground of ...4...
limitation. After dismissal of suit on 31.03.2006, an application was filed by the Officer In-charge of the Krishi Upaj Mandi for his eviction before the SDO. The SDO issued notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be evicted. The petitioner submitted a reply denying the allegation of the notice and averred that he is not unauthorised occupant and the Adhiniyam does not apply because the Krishi Upaj Mandi does not cover under the Adhiniyam and the shops are not in public premises under the Adhiniyam, the SDO was the Officer In-charge of the Mandi and he has no jurisdiction to hear the matter because he is both the Judge and the prosecutor. The competent authority without recording any evidence passed the order under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, which is illegal and non-est. The appellate authority has failed to see that the Adhiniyam does not apply to Krishi Upaj Mandi and hence, no proceedings for eviction can be conducted against the petitioners and the petitioners can be evicted only under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The competent authority as well as the appellate authority have committed legal error in passing the order of eviction and dismissing the appeal.
4. In all other connected appeals the similar grounds have been taken by the petitioners therein and they adopted the arguments of the learned Senior counsel Shri R.P. Agrawal and prayed for quashment of the impugned orders.
5. Shri R.P. Agrawal, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to Section 2(e) of the Adhiniyam and submitted that the petitioners are not in unauthorised occupation of public premises and eviction proceedings are not permissible and the orders are wholly without jurisdiction. The competent authority as well as the appellate authority have failed to see that the petitioner is not an unauthorized occupant nor the premises are public premises and the Krishi Upaj Mandi is not a local authority under the ...5...
provision of the Bedakhali Adhiniyam. The authorities have committed illegality in passing the order of eviction and dismissing the appeal also.
6. Per contra, Shri Shri Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate for respondent No.4 submits that the issues involved in the present batch of petitions are identical and main reply has been filed in W.P.No.3955/2014.
7. The petitioner is trying to take benefit that his ancestors were tenant of the Krishi Upaj Mandi, Harpalpur. The petitioner wants to enjoy the shops/godowns on the basis of the license issued to his ancestors years ago and even their ancestors are no more. The petitioner cannot claim shops / godown or piece of land within the notified premise on the basis of expired license of his ancestors. They are not the license holders under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam, 1972. he has no right to possess the shop / godown in question and his status is only of encroacher and not as a tenant. To remove the encroachment of the petitioner, the Krishi Upaj Mandi is empowered to initiate the proceedings under Section 22 of the Adhiniyam, 1972. The petitioner(s) is not a license holder under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam, 1972. They have no right to possess and occupy the shops or the godown in question. The suit filed by the petitioner(s) was based on another issue regarding increasing rent by the Krishi Upaj Mandi, which too has been dismissed by the trial court. No document or material was filed along with the writ petition to prove that the SDO was Officer In-charge of the Mandi Samiti. The order of eviction, which was passed by the SDO was on the basis of application, reply and arguments, which clearly goes to indicate that full opportunity of being heard was afforded by the competent authority to the petitioner before passing the order of eviction. The petitioner(s) are encroachers and no material was produced to prove that they are the license holders of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti for ...6...
occupying the shop / godown in the question. The law on the subject is well settled and prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions.
8. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case.
Section 2(b) of Adhiniyam, 1972, reads as under :-
[b] "agriculturist" means a person whose source of livelihood is wholly dependent on agricultural produce and who cultivates land on one's own account, -
(i) by one's own labour; or
(ii) by the labour of the either spouse; or
(iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or nay member of one's family referred to in sub-
clause (ii) above by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not as crop share, but does not include a traders, commission agent processor, [manufacturer], broker, weighmen, or hammal of agricultural produce although such trader, commission agent, processor, [manufacturer], broker weighmen or hammal may also be engaged in the production of agricultural produce;] Section 2(e)(ii) of Public Premises Act is reproduced below :-
2(e) "Public premises" means any premises belong to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of :-
(i)......
(ii) any corporation [not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government."
...7...
9. The issue that the land belonging to the Krishi Upaj Mandi can be construed to be a public premises has been settled in the case of Smt. Meena Agrawal V/s. Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Shivpuri & Others reported as (2008) 3 MPLJ 153. It is not in dispute that the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed as barred by time. The Gwalior Bench of this Court on 16/07/2018 in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Vijaypur, District Sheopur V/s. State of M.P. & Others in W.P.No.2317/2010 has passed the following order which reads as under :-
"These Writ Petitions at the instance of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Vijaypur is directed against the order dated 08/03/2010 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and Competent Authority, Madhya Pradesh Lok Parishar (Bedakhli) Adhiniyam, 1974, Vijaypur; whereby, application preferred by the petitioner under Section 5 of Adhiniyam, 1974 for eviction of the respondent from Plot No.13/2 ad-measuring 15X70=1050 Sq.ft. and Plot No.13/1 ad-measuring 2100 Sq.ft. situated in the Mandi Area, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, has been dismissed.
The plots in question were leased out to the respondent vide lease deed dated 31/10/1963 and 11/09/1974 respectively for a period of three years. Besides other, the respective lease deeds contained the following conditions as regard to sub-letting:-
^^5- f}rh; i{k Hkwfe lnj dks mlds Åij izFke i{k }kjk cuk;s x;s ekufp= ds vuqlkj iw.kZ #i ls bekjr cukus ds iwoZ vUr&u dj ldsxkA bekjr cuus ds ckn vUrjxk djus ds iwoZ izFke i{k ls fyf[kr vkKk iznku djus ij gh vius LoRo vUrjxk dk vf/kdkjh gksxk ijUrq 'kRkZ ;g gS fd cMs Cykd dh gkykr es a;g vUrjxk izFke i{k }kjk vuqefr i= izkIr O;kikjh ;k vk<+fr;k dks gh fd;k tkosxkA** Contravening the terms of the lease, respondent sub-let the premises/part of premises to non-licencee ...8...
which led the petitioners issue show cause notice on 05/12/2000 as to why the lease be not cancelled. Since reply filed by the respondent has not found satisfactory, Mandi Samiti vide resolution dated 22/08/2001, called upon the respondent to get the premises vacated. This led to issuance of second show cause notice on 01/09/2001 and 23/11/2001 to get the premises vacated. Aggrieved, respondent filed Civil Suit No.21-A/2001 and Civil Suit No.20-A/2001 for declaration of title and for consequential relief. The Civil Suits were decreed on 20/10/2005 whereby, permanent injunction in favour of the respondent was issued to the extent that the plaintiff shall not be evicted except in accordance with law. That Civil First Appeal Nos.49- A/2005 and 50-A/2005 and Second Appeal No.251/2006 and Second Appeal No.252/2006 which though were dismissed; however following observations were made:
"5. I am afraid that such finding will not come on the way of the appellants because the decree of the trial Court is very specific and as per the terms and conditions of the decree and finding recorded in Para 12 of the Judgment and decree of the trial Court which has been upheld by the lower appellate Court, the appellants are free to take necessary legal action against the respondent for determining the lease. If the lease deed is in existence, he can also take necessary action for vacating the premises in accordance with the provisions as provided underthe M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Ahdiniyam or any other law. Since no action has been taken by the appellants, therefore, the question whether Krishi Upaj Mandi is a local authority u/s 7 (3) of the M.P. Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974, and premises in of the said 1974 Act, cannot be decided in this Second Appeal.
The notices dated 1.9.01 and 23.11.01 issued by appellant which is in fact notice cum order directing the respondent to vacate the premises within 30 days, else lease will be determined, was the subject matter in the suit and, therefore, trial Court granted limited relief and held that ...9...
appellants are at liberty to take legal action in accordance with law. The finding recorded by the courts below is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence. I do not find any merit in this appeal nor any substantial question of law is involved in this appeal."
Consequently, the petitioner Samiti vide resolution dated 26/04/2017 decided to initiate legal proceedings for evicting the respondent being in unauthorized occupation of the premises in question. After issuing notice on 10/05/2007 as the respondent did not vacate the premises, an application under Section 5 of Adhiniyam, 1974 was filed by the petitioners before the Competent Authority. The Authority concern while holding that the premises in question is a public premises and that proceedings under the Adhiniyam are maintainable; yet non- suited the petitioners on the findings that the Trial Court having allowed the suit, the interference can be only after the expiry of lease period. The order is in the following terms:
"bl izdkj Li"V gS fd vkt Hkh flfoy U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr LFkxu vkns'k izHkko'khy gkus s ds dkj.k vukons d ls e.Mh lfefr Hkw[k.M ,oa Hkou [kkyh ugha djok ldrh gSA vkosnd }kjk izLrqr vkosnu i= varxZr eiz- yksd ifjlj ¼cns [kyh½ vf/kfu;e 1974 ds vra xZr izLrqr vkons u i= dk voyksdu fd;k x;k mDr vf/kfu;e dk mn~n's ; 'kkldh; vf/kdkjh ,oa deZpkjh }kjk 'kkldh; Hkou vFkok mldk Hkkx vFkok Hkwfe ij voS/k ykHk yus s ij izfrc/a k yxkuk gS ifjlj ls vk'k; Hkou ;k Hkou ls vuqyXu vU; Hkkx Hkh ekU; gS bl vf/kfu;e vuqlkj yksd ifjlj dh ifjf/k esa e.Mh lfefr dk ifjlj vkrk gS fdUrq flfoy U;k;ky; dks LFkxu izHkko'khy gkus s ds dkj.k ifjlj [kkyh ugha djok;k tk ldrk ;fn vukons d dk Hkou [kkyh djok;k tkrk gS rks O;ogkj U;k;ky; ds vkns'[email protected];ksa dk mYy?a ku fd;k tkuk ekuk tk ...10...
ldrk gS ftlds rgr U;k;ky; dh voekuuk laca/kh dk;Zokgh Hkh laHkkfor gSA flfoy U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k Hk[w k.M ij fufeZr Hkou dk vukons d Lokeh gS iV~Vksa dh 'krksZ ds mYy?aku ds lca/ak esa O;ogkj U;k;ky; }kjk fu.kZ; oknh@vukosnd ds i{k esa fd;k tk pqdk gS ,slh fLFkfr esa dsoy iV~Vs dh vof/k lekIr gksus ds vk/kkj ij iV~Vs dh uohuhdj.k dh O;oLFkk nh xbZ gSA ;gka ;g Li"V fd;k tkrk gS fd Lo;a vukosnd }kjk iV~Vk uohuhdj.k grs q vkons u i= izLrqr fd;k gS rFkk 2010 rd e.Mh 'kqYd] Hkou 'kqYd ,oa fujkfJr 'kqYd Hkh tek fd;k gS ,slh fLFkfr esa vukons d ds fo:) csn[kyh dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk mfpr u gksus ds dkj.k [email protected] lfpo }kjk izLrqr vkosnu i= fujLr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk vkons d dks ;g funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og e.Mh vf/kfu;e ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr uohuhdj.k dh dk;Zokgh djuk lqfuf'pr djsaA vkns'k esjs }kjk ikfjr ,o ?kksf"krA""
It is this order which is being challenged being perverse and illegal. It is urged that the Court vide judgment and decree dated 20.10.2005 subjected the eviction of respondent in accordance with law, which was further clarified in the Second Appeal. It is urged that the Mandi having determined the lease because of the breach of terms and conditions was well within its right in initiating the proceedings and the provision of Adhiniyam 1974. It is urged that the Competent Authority grossly erred in misconstruing the judgment and decree by the Trial Court that it had perfected the respondent's title and the suit property until the expiry of the lease. On these contentions, the petitioners seek quashing of the orders.
The respondent, on his turn, has to submit that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not tenable, because the petitioner has the remedy of Appeal.
The issue as to whether an appeal would lie ...11...
against the order rejecting application under Section 5 of Adhiniyam, 1974 came up for consideration before a Single Bench of this Court in Khushal Chand vs. State of M.P., 2001 (1) MPLJ 680 wherein taking note of the stipulations in Section 4, 5 and 9 of the Adhiniyam, 1974, it was held by His Lordship :
"8. Be it may, on perusal of the language of Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, it is apparent that no order on the application has been passed. On bare reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Adhiniyam it is clear that the show cause notice is issued why the order of eviction should not be made. Section 5 provides that if the competent authority is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the competent authority may make an order of eviction. Thus, Section 5 contemplates only one order, i.e., order of eviction. Dropping of the proceedings will not be an order under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam. On bare perusal of the language of Section 5 of the Adhiniyam it is clear that the order would mean the order of eviction.
13. In the present case also, question of title is disputed and competent authority is of the opinion that there is a dispute of the title and, has rightly not proceeded with thecase. It is for the parties to establish their title before the Competent Court. The order, Annexure P-2 cannot be said to be an order appellable under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. Section 5 of the Adhiniyam contemplates only one type of order, i.e., order of eviction. Thus, interpreting the word "every order" in Section 9 of the Adhiniyam it is not clear that the order would mean the order of eviction. When no orders pertaining to eviction are passed under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, appeal under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam will not be maintainable."
We are in the respectful agreement with the view taken ...12...
by learned Single Judge. In view whereof, the contention that an appeal lies against the order impugned are overruled. It is next contended that the application under Section 5 of Adhiniyam, 1974 was not tenable before the Competent Authority because the land belonging to the Mandi cannot be construed to be a public premises. In this context, reference can be had of the decision in Meena Agrawal (Smt.) Vs. Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Shivpuri and others, 2008(3) MPLJ 153, wherein it is held:
"(22) This judgment of Ashoka marketing limited (supra) relates to interpretation of section 2(e) (ii) of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, whether any corporation not being a company as defined under section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority is excluded from the definition of public premises, whereas under M.P. Lok Parisar Bedakhali Adhiniyam, 1974, any corporation established by Central or State Act, and owned and controlled by the State Government or a local authority except company established under section 3 of Companies Act, 1956 will fall within the ambit of public premises. Corporation has been explained and they will include local authority. In the case of S.S. Dhanoa (supra), the Apex Court has considered the meaning of corporation and it is held that the term corporation is wide enough to include private corporation. The word 'corporation' is wide enough to include private corporation.
The word corporation occurring in section 2(e)(ii) of the Adhiniyam, will include the properties of local authorities including municipalities and other local authorities. In the case of Ashoka Marketing Limited (supra), it is held that the word corporation includes municipalities and other local authorities. Thus, we are of the opinion that the language of section 2(e)(ii) of the Adhiniyam is clear and specific and it will mean that any corporation which is established by any central or state act or ...13...
under them and is owned and controlled by state government or local authority or taken on lease, therefore corporation except the companies registered under section 3 of the Companies Act, will fall in the definition of public premises. Therefore, any corporation under the control of State Government and local authority will include any premises owned or taken on lease by the bodies under the control of State Government including local authority.
`(23) We are of the view that the properties owned and controlled by local authority will fall within the ambit of public premises under section 2(e)(ii) of Adhiniyam, and we hold that Hariom Verma (supra), has not laid down the correct law, and law laid down in the case of R.P. Sharma (supra), is the correct law. We answer the reference as under: -
"That the public premises as defined under section 2(e) of the Adhiniyam includes the premises belonging to local authority created by Central or State act, or under the control of State Government or the local authority."
And whether Market Committee is a local Authority the reference can be had of the stipulations contained under section 7 (3) of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 which stipulates Nothwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force, every Market Committee shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be a local authority. In view whereof, even otherwise, the respondent has not questioned the finding arrived at by the Competent Authority holding the premises in question to be a public premises. In that event, the contention that the application was not tenable before the Competent Authority in respect of property belonging to Marketing Committee is negative. The question now remains to be answered is whether the Competent Authority was justified in holding that the respondent has perfected the lease title till its expiry.
...14...
The decision in the Civil Suit and the observations made in the Second Appeal No.251/2006 and Second Appeal No.252/2006 goes a long way to establish that Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti was set at liberty to initiate the action against the lessee even prior to expiry of the term of lease. The finding contrary to the same arrived by the competent authority is therefore, not sustainable and hereby quashed.
The matter is relegated to the Competent Authority to initiate proceedings on the application preferred by the petitioner under section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1974 and take decision on merit after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties.
At this stage learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the term of lease of the petitioner in respect of Plot No.13/1 and 13/2 has expired long back and the respondent has no authority to be in occupation of the premises in question. The competent authority shall also take into consideration these facts while dwelling upon the application preferred by the petitioner. Let a decision be taken by the competent authority within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.
The petitions are disposed of finally in above terms.
10. The Division Bench of this court at Principal Seat at Jabalpur in the case of M/s. Sevak Ram & Others V/s. State of M.P. & Ors. W.A.No.499/2015 decided on 05.08.2015 have decided similar issues. Order dated 05.08.2015 reads as under :-
"Heard counsel for the parties on admission. This writ appeal takes exception to the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 27.07.2015 in W.P.No.11871/2015. By this writ petition the appellants had challenged the order dated 2.7.2015 passed by the Secretary, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti with further direction to the respondents to follow due process of law.
In substance, the order impugned in the writ petition calls upon the appellants to vacate the premises in their possession within the Mandi area and ...15...
ownership whereof is vested in the Mandi as the Mandi has been shifted to another area, failing which action would proceed against the occupants of the concerned premises treating them as unauthorized occupants in terms of Section 22 of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1972.
The learned Single Judge has rejected the writ petition on the finding that on the establishment of new Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, shops have been allotted to the writ-petitioners but the writ-petitioners intend to continue at the old place which cannot be countenanced as the old place has already been denotified. The argument of the writ-petitioners is, however, that they were occupying the premises in old Mandi area as tenants.
Notably, no contractual agreement in support of this contention has been produced alongwith writ petition nor such express case is made out in the writ petition.
Reliance placed on receipts issued from time to time by the Mandi, cannot be the basis to assume that there was relationship of landlord and tenant or lessor and lessee between the parties. The possession of the appellants in the respective premises/shops was only as licensor and licencee and nothing more, keeping in mind the provisions of the Mandi Act.
The argument of the appellants that in the reply filed by the respondents it is admitted that the appellants were occupying the premises as tenants does not commend to us. Some loose observation made in the affidavit cannot be the basis to create any right in favour of the parties, much less in the nature of landlord-tenant relationship. The Mandi area once notified, the occupancy of premises is governed by the provisions of Mandi Act and the Rules framed thereunder. No provision in the Act of 1972 or any Rules framed thereunder, have been brought to our notice which may entitle the appellants to assert that the relationship was that of landlord and tenant and cannot be terminated in the manner resorted to by the respondents. Notably, it is conceded that the provisions of M.P.Rent Act do not apply to the case on hand.
The impugned order, in our opinion, has been passed keeping in mind the provisions of Act of 1972 and Rules framed thereunder for ensuring compliance of the notification issued by the competent Authority to ...16...
de-notify the area as Mandi was and to shift all the shops within the old area to the newly established Mandi. The very purpose for which new Mandi has been established would be completely defeated if the argument of the appellants that they are entitled to continue in the old premises which was earlier occupied by them on the old Mandi area was to be accepted. This aspect and including the rights of the appellants to get a shop in the new Mandi area is considered in W.P.No.15957/2014 decided on 27.11.2014.
The relationship of landlord and tenant can be created only by way of contract or at best statutory protection available to the occupants. In the Act of 1972, as aforesaid, there is nothing to indicate that relationship of appellants with the Mandi can be treated one as that of landlord and tenant.
Furthermore, the impugned order being in the nature of terminating the occupancy/licence of the premises in question, the continuous occupation of the premises would result in unauthorized occupation and for which reason it is open to the Authority to resort to remedy under Section 22 of the Act for removal of such encroachment. In our opinion, no fault can be found with the final conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition being devoid of merits.
Counsel for the Mandi has brought to our notice that out of 23 writ-petitioners, 15 writ-petitioners have already been allotted shops in the new Mandi after they participated in the auction process. It was open to the appellants (writ-petitioners) to participate in the auction process for allotment of shop. Since there are other vacant shops, in due course auction process will be held in which the appellants are free to participate, if eligible in all respects which is a matter to be considered by the appropriate Authority. Besides this, we do not wish to observe anything more and dismiss the appeal.
At this stage, counsel for the appellants submits that atleast on humanitarian consideration, the respondents be called upon to consider whether the appellants can be permitted to occupy the shops in the old Mandi area until end of September, 2015. It is open to the appellants to make representation to the appropriate Authority, which may consider it in accordance with law within one week from the date of receipt thereof. The representation, however, should be ...17...
made on or before 10.08.2015, failing which it will be open to the appropriate Authority of Mandi to proceed in the matter in accordance with law against the concerned occupants.
11. No provision in the Act of 1972 or any Rules framed thereunder, have been brought to our noise which may entitle the petitioner to assert that the relationship was that of landlord and tenant and cannot be terminated in the manner resorted to by the respondents. The provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 do not apply to the case on hand. Their only contention is that since before the year 1972, they and their ancestors are the tenants of the shops in question of Krishi Upaj Manidi, Harpalpur and, therefore, the provisions of Bedhakhali Adhiniyam would not be applicable and the proper course for the respondent No.4 Krishi Upaj Mandi, Harpalpur, is to file the suit for eviction under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, has no force because no material was produced that either before the competent authority or before the appellate authority or before this court to prove that they are tenants of the Krishi Upaj Mandi. In absence of any material or any document, we cannot accept the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that SDO cannot be arbitrator in his own cause. Herein the present case, the application for eviction was filed by the Krishi Upaj Samiti before the competent authority and thereafter, the competent authority issued the show cause notice to the petitioner. The petitioner(s) filed their detailed reply and thereafter, order was passed. In absence of any material to prove their relationship as landlord and tenant, the competent authority as well as appellate authority have not committed any legal error in passing the order of eviction and dismissing the appeal.
12. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench at Jabalpur in the case of M/s Sevak Ram and others (upra) ...18...
W.A.No.499/2015 decided on 05.08.2015 as well as by the Gwalior Bench in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Vijaypur, District Sheopur V/s. State of M.P. & Others (supra) who have considered the issues in question and decided the same by passing the detailed order, which we have reproduced in the preceding paragraphs, no fault can be found with the final conclusion reached by the appellate authority in dismissing the appeal being devoid of merits.
12. For the above mentioned reasons, the writ petition No.3933/2014 filed by the petitioner(s) has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
No costs.
(P.K. JAISWAL) (B.K. SHRIVASTAVA)
JUDGE JUDGE
SS/ts.
Digitally signed by TULSA SINGH
Date: 2019.01.11 17:17:29 +05'30'