Himachal Pradesh High Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Usha Rani And Ors. on 1 August, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990ACJ785
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.
1. These appeals with Cross-objections [FAO.(MVA) No. 80 of 1981, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Usha Rani with Cross-objections No. 3 of 1982 and FAO. (MVA) No. 90 of 1981, Pishori Lal v. Usha Rani with Cross-objections No. 4 of 1982] arise out of the same accident and common award, therefore, they are being taken up for decision together.
2. The facts, in brief, are that Ram Karan, aged 24%, of village Naina Tikkar died in a truck accident on 2.8.1977 at about 11.30 p.m. on Rajgarh-Solan Road. The deceased was in truck No. HRE 2697 while the same was loaded with goods and vegetables belonging to the deceased and a few others. The same were to be carried from the Rajgarh area of Sirmaur District to Delhi. The truck met with an accident resulting in the death of the deceased and one other person although a few others sustained injuries. A claim petition for Rs. 1,50,000/- was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Solan, by the claimants and it was alleged that the accident took place due to the rash driving of the truck driver and it was also alleged that the truck driver had consumed liquor along with his food on the way whereafter he became all the more rash and despite warning by the occupants of the vehicle he did not pay any attention to it with the result that near village Neri, it fell down the road resulting in the death of the deceased.
3. The defence of respondent No. 1 has been that the deceased was an unauthorised traveller. He was neither a third party nor entitled to any relief in view of the fact that his case did not fall within the scope of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It has also been averred that the deceased had no permission to travel by the truck nor his goods were being carried in the same. The appellant insurance company has also disputed its liability towards any compensation in this case seeking in aid the provisions of Section 95 of the Act.
4. The parties led evidence in the case and ultimately the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that the deceased was the hirer of the truck. His goods were being carried in the vehicle and he was going by the same vehicle to Delhi at that particular time after loading the fruits in the vehicle through a few of his labourers. The Tribunal, therefore, found the claim legally sustainable and passed the impugned award. The appellants have a grievance against this award, therefore, they filed separate appeals against the same in this court.
5. Mr. Sood, learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, contends that the insurance company is not liable for the payment of compensation as the case of the claimants does not fall within the provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is contended that the vehicle was intended to carry merchandise goods and not to carry any person, much less the owner of the goods. Therefore, the learned counsel urges that the heirs of the deceased are not entitled to claim any compensation from the insurance company. On the other hand, Mr. Chhabil Dass and Mr. Devinder Gupta, who appear for the claimants and the owner of the vehicle, contended that the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in this case.
6. Mr. Chhabil Dass, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, submits that the liability of the insurance company is statutorily covered under Clause (b) (i) of Section 95 (1) and Sub-clause (ii) to proviso of Clause (b) of Section 95 (1). It is further submitted by him that when the owner of the goods hires a vehicle for the transportation of his goods, sometimes it becomes necessary for him to either accompany the goods himself or through someone else on his behalf for proper supervision for the carriage of goods and for loading or unloading the goods or for similar other purposes incidental thereto. Naturally, he will be one of the passengers of the vehicle during this time. In these circumstances, he cannot be said to be a person going on a joy ride. He, according to the learned counsel, is a passenger carried by the owner of the vehicle or his driver for hire or reward.
7. Sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'goods vehicle' as a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers. Sub-section (20) of this section gives the definition of 'permit' to mean the document issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage, or authorising the owner of a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. Sub-section (23) of Section 2 defines the 'public carrier' as owner of a transport vehicle who transports or undertakes to transport goods, or any class of goods, for another person at any time and in any public place for hire or reward, whether in pursuance of the terms of a contract or agreement or otherwise, and includes any person, body, association or company engaged in the business of carrying the goods of person associated with that person, body, association or company for the purpose of having their goods transported. Sub-section (25) further defines 'public service vehicle' as any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage.
8. In the present case, the vehicle in question is stated to be insured only as 'public carrier'. Therefore, Section 95 of the Act deals with the requirements of policies as given in Chapter VIII of the Act. The submissions of the parties relate primarily to the provisions of Sections 94 and 95 of the Act. Section 94 deals with compulsory insurance against third party risk in respect of motor vehicles used in a public place. Section 95 envisages the requirements of policies and the limits of liability. The relevant portion of the same may be quoted thus:
95. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which--
(a) XXX XXX XXX
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-section (2)--
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) XXX XXX XXX Provided that a policy shall not be required-- (i) XXX XXX XXX
(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises.
(iii) XXX XXX XXX (2) XXX XXX XXX
(4) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any conditions subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matter; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases.
(4-A) XXX XXX XXX
9. In support of his submissions, Mr. K.D. Sood refers to South India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Heerabai, 1967 ACJ 65 (MP); Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Gurdev Kaur 1967 ACJ 158 (P&H); Des Raj Arora v. Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. 1985 ACJ 401 (P&H); Bansi Lal v. Sohan Singh 1988 ACJ 333 (P&H); Commonwealth Assurance Co. Ltd. v. v.P. Rahim Khan Sahib 1971 ACJ 295 (Madras); M. Kandaswamy Pillai v. Chinnaswamy 1985 ACJ 232 (Madras) and Hindustan Ideal Insurance Corporation Ltd. v. Manne Chimperamma 1974 ACJ 13 (AP) and contends that the provisions of Section 95 of the Act do not include the owners of the goods within the contract of employment and, therefore, in case of an injury to or death of the owner of goods in the course of transportation, the legal representatives of the deceased cannot claim any compensation and the liability in that event falls squarely on the owner of the vehicle. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel was based upon the aforementioned Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Gurdev Kaur 1967 ACJ 158 (P&H). In that case, the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had taken the view that the hirer of a goods vehicle travelling as a passenger in the vehicle while carrying goods is not a person who is a passenger in the vehicle carried for hire or reward nor he is a passenger who is being carried in the said vehicle by reasons of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In this case, the court upheld the contention of the insurance company and held that the policy of insurance did not cover the liability of the owner of the goods vehicle towards hirer of the same while the latter was travelling in that vehicle.
10. This decision was followed by the single Judge of the same High Court in Oriental Fire & Genl Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Kasturi Lal 1968 ACJ 227 (P&H), where the facts were that the deceased, one Sham Lal, was carrying wheat belonging to M/s. Roshan Lal Kasturi Lal in the goods vehicle which the said firm had hired for transport of the said wheat. The deceased happened to be one of the partners in the firm. The truck met with an accident on account of the negligence of the driver and as a result of which Sham Lal died. Kasturi Lal, his father, filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act on account of the negligence of the driver of the truck. It was not only against the owner of the vehicle but also against the insurer. The question arose as to whether this liability was covered by the insurance policy and the company contended that no such liability accrued under the policy since deceased Sham Lal was not being carried in the truck for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. This protest of the company prevailed and the company was held not responsible for the claim.
11. The decision in Kasturi Lal's case, 1968 ACJ 227 (P&H), was followed by the Madras High Court in Commonwealth Assurance Co. Ltd. v. v.P. Rahim Khan Sahib 1971 ACJ 295 (Madras) and the court held that an owner of the goods accompanying the goods in a truck cannot be said to be travelling by virtue of any contract of employment.
12. The view of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has been the same and the court refused to change the same as is apparent from Des Raj Angra v. Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. 1985 ACJ 401 (P&H).
13. In Parkash Vati v. Delhi Dayal Bagh Dairy Ltd. 1967 ACJ 82 (Punjab) and South India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. P. Subramanium 1972 ACJ 439 (Madras), the same principle has been followed and it has been held that under proviso to Section 95 (1) (b) of the Act, the insurance company is liable to meet the liability of a passenger only if he has been carried for hire or reward or by reasons of or in pursuance of a contract of employment and as both these things are absent in a case where the owner of the goods travels in the same vehicle, the insurance company is not liable. The argument that the owner of the goods should be deemed to be under the contract of employment with the owner of the vehicle or a passenger carried for hire or reward was repelled.
14. The other line of the argument is based upon the decisions like Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 1977 ACJ 343 (SC); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat); Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. YusufMusa Chandki 1986 ACJ 500 (Gujarat); BadriNarain v. Chotu Ram 1986 ACJ 1062 (Rajasthan); HarishankarTiwariv.Jagru, 1987 ACJ 1 (MP); Abdul Razaq v. Sharifunnisa 1984 ACJ 44 (Allahabad) and Channappa Chanavirappa Katti v. Laxman Bhimappa Bajantri AIR 1979 Karnataka 93.
15. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), the facts were that the Manager of the respondent company was driving the car belonging to the company. The driver-Manager gave lift to the deceased Udeshi. It met with an accident due to the negligence of the said driver-Manager. The insurance company repudiated its liability under the policy asserting that the deceased Udeshi was not being carried in the car for hire or reward. While construing Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) of the Act, the Supreme Court said as follows:
Therefore, it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under Section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured, the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act.
16. The High Court of Gujarat in Ambaben v. Usmanbhai Amirmiya Sheikh 1979 ACJ 292 (Gujarat), after exhaustive examination of the matter and analysis of the judgments on the point, said in an answer to a reference to it as follows:
The decision in Sakinabibi's case, (1974) 15 GLR 428, is toned down, to the extent we have indicated in our judgment above, by the decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai's case, 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), and in the light of that decision, it is obvious that so far as the policy contemplated by Section 95 (1) (b) is concerned, it does not cover the risks to (A) persons other than those who were carried for hire or reward at the time of occurrence of event which gives rise to the claim against the insurer and (B) passengers other than those who were bona fide employees of the owner or hirer of the vehicle not exceeding six in number, carried in pursuance of or by reason of a contract of employment.
17. By this judgment, the High Court of Gujarat not only narrowed down its earlier view in Sakinabibi v. Gordhanbhai Prabhudas (1974) 15 GIR 428, by virtue of which every passenger of the goods vehicle was covered by the insurance risk and thus rendering the exception clause contained in Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) meaningless, but also laying down clearly that if the passenger in a goods vehicle was being carried for hire or reward, then such passenger would be required to be covered by the insurance policy under the Act.
18. The Allahabad High Court in Abdul Razaq v. Sharifunnisa 1984 ACJ 44 (All), held that the owner of the goods or his employee travelling in a goods vehicle along with his goods is also covered by the third party risk and in case of the death, the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner. The risk is covered by the second proviso to Section 95 (1) (b) of the Act and the Act requires compulsory insurance.
19. The Orissa High Court in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Narayani Bai 1984 ACJ 106 (Orissa), held that the owner of the goods accompanying the goods in a goods vehicle hired by him is a passenger who is being carried for hire or reward.
20. The same view was expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in a Full Bench decision in Santra Bai v. Prahlad 1985 ACJ 762 (Rajasthan).
21. In Channappa Chanavirappa Katti v. Laxman Bhimappa Bajantri AIR 1979 Kant 93, the facts were rather identical with the facts of this case. Somappa Mallappa, the deceased, hired a truck for the carriage of his goods and while the goods were being carried and he was also travelling in the same vehicle along with his goods as one of the passengers, due to the negligence of the driver, the truck met with an accident with the result that the deceased Somappa Mallappa died. Negligence was established and the question of liability for the compensation arose. The insurance company disputed the liability and the court held that the owner of the vehicle was not liable. It held that Section 95 of the Act made it compulsory for the owner to cover the risk of such liability to such passenger-hirer. In para 17 of its judgment, the court said:
(17) The legislature by enacting the exception contained in the second part of the proviso excludes a specific category of persons from the requirement of compulsory insurance against liability which may be incurred by the insured in respect of the use of the vehicle insured. Such category of persons are those carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event (accident) out of which the claim arises. From this it would follow that passengers carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises are excluded from the coverage of compulsory insurance contemplated in Chapter VIII of the Act. If we remember that on the construction of the provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Act, the Supreme Court has held, as already pointed out, that the policy should be taken in respect of the vehicle so as to provide insurance against any liability to third party incurred by the person using the vehicle; by reason of the exception referred to by us, the policy need not be taken in respect of the vehicle so as to provide insurance against any liability to passengers incurred by the person using the vehicle. But enacting a further exception in the first part of the proviso to the exception contained in the second part thereof, the legislature imposes a duty on the insured to take out a policy of compulsory insurance in respect of the vehicle so as to provide insurance against any liability to passengers carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, incurred by the person using the vehicle. In our opinion, therefore, passengers carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment falling under the class of passengers within the meaning of the exception contained in the first part of the proviso, are thrown back or restored to the status of 'any person' found in Section 95 (1) (b) (i) of the Act. Thus, if a passenger, carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment in a vehicle which is compulsorily insured, dies or suffers bodily injury by the use of the insured vehicle making the insured liable in damages, it must necessarily be construed as a liability which requires to be reimbursed by the insurer by reason of the policy of compulsory insurance taken in respect of the insured vehicle by the insured.
22. These are the two lines of judicial decisions and the question is as to the view which appears to be correct or at least nearest to the legislative emphasis. Adverting to the Punjab Full Bench decision, it can be said that the only point considered and decided was that the owner of the goods accompanying the goods on the truck cannot be said to be travelling in the truck in pursuance of any contract of employment and the other part of the provision that the hirer of the vehicle can be covered under the description "passenger carried for hire or reward" was neither urged nor considered. The court did not also consider the principle of "practical or business reasons" whereupon "for hire or reward" in proviso to Section 95 (1) are based nor was such a plea raised in Kasturi Lal's case, 1968 ACJ 227 (P&H).
23. In my humble opinion, the view pointing out the liability of the insurance company for the claim of the hirer-passenger is more broad, exact and in consonance with the object of the scheme of insurance in accident cases. As already said, the hirer of the vehicle normally travels in the same vehicle for number of reasons and to say that such passenger is not covered under Section 95 of the Act, is not only to do damage to the plain language of the provisions but also harm to the hirer of the vehicle for no fault of his. More particularly, in the absence of any specific and clear-cut prohibition against his travelling along with his goods in the same vehicle. When once it is held that Section 95 of the Act covers such passengers, the argument as to the conditions in the permit and the insurance policy are not of much significance and have only to be considered and dealt with in the alternative without prejudice to the conclusions already arrived at.
24. Production of the permit with regard to the vehicle is essential to see the condition imposed upon the plying of the vehicle. In the absence of the same, it can be presumed that there was no bar to carry the owner of the goods in the vehicle.
25. Further, Rule 4.60 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, do not, in my opinion, lay any prohibition; rather the same permits it.
This provision is reproduced as under:
4.60. Carriage of persons in goods vehicle.--
(1) Save in the case of a vehicle which is being used for the carriage of troops or police or in the case of a stage carriage in which goods are being carried in addition to passengers no person shall be carried in a goods vehicle other than a bona fide employee of the owner or the hirer of the vehicle and except in accordance with this rule. The owner of a goods vehicle may also travel in it for a purpose connected with the bona fide business of the vehicle.
(2) No person shall be carried in the cab of a goods vehicle beyond the number for which there is seating accommodation at the rate of 380 millimetres measured along the seat excluding the space reserved for the driver for each person, and not more than six persons in all in addition to the driver shall be carried in any goods vehicle.
Provided that in the case of goods vehicle owned by Government, carriage of more than six persons may be allowed by the State Transport Authority provided that such number shall not exceed the area in square metre of the floor of the vehicle divided by .63 subject to a maximum of 12.
(3) No person shall be carried upon the goods or otherwise in such a manner that such person is in danger of falling from the vehicle, and in no case shall any person be carried in a goods vehicle in such a manner that any part of his person, when he is in a sitting position, is at a height exceeding 3.048 metres from the surface upon which the vehicle rests.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-rule (2) a Regional Transport Authority may, as a condition of a permit granted for any goods vehicle, specify the conditions subject to which a large number of persons may be carried in the vehicle, provided that such number shall not exceed the area in square metre of the floor of the vehicle divided by .63 subject to a maximum of 12.
(5) Nothing contained in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the carriage of any person for hire or reward in any vehicle unless there is in force in respect of the vehicle a permit authorising the use of the vehicle for such purpose, and save in accordance with the provisions of such permit.
(6) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to motor vehicle registered under Section 39 of the Act.
26. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat), it has been laid down that in case the insurance company wants to get discharged from its liability, it must have produced the necessary permit on the record. It having failed to do so, this contention against liability must fail. It is further held that in order to repudiate the claim that the vehicle was not covered by the permit to ply for hire or reward, the insurance company has to prove:
(1) That on the date of the contract of insurance, the insured vehicle was expressly or implicitly not covered by a permit to carry any passenger for hire or reward;
(2) That there was a specified condition in the policy which excluded the use of the insured vehicle for the carriage of any passenger for hire or reward; and (3) That the vehicle was, in fact, used in breach of such specified condition on the occasion giving rise to the claim by reason of the carriage of the passenger therein for hire or reward.
27. Now, coming to the question of insurance policy, the presumption has to be drawn that it also does not prohibit the carriage of the owner of the goods in the vehicle because the policy has neither been produced nor proved in this case by the insurer before the Tribunal. Enough time was allowed to do so but the failure persisted and it can, therefore, be easily concluded that the policy of insurance did not prohibit the carriage of the owner of the goods in the vehicle insured.
28. Mr. K.D. Sood submits that original policy was with the insured, therefore, the same could not be filed. I am not satisfied with this submission. No such plea has been taken by the company before the Tribunal. Reasons for failure to produce and prove the same have nowhere been given. The question is, should such a prayer be allowed at this late stage and in this court? The simple answer is in the negative.
29. At this stage, it is relevant to quote para 33 of Satyawati Pathak v. Hari Ram 1983 ACJ 424 (Delhi):
(33) Learned counsel for the insurance company has filed an application (CM. No. 3688 of 1982) under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for proving the contract of insurance at this stage. Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:
'27 (1). The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if:
(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or
(b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission.' In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912, it has been held that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacunae in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps. It has been further observed that the position is different where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties. Similar observations have been made in Natha Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab AIR 1976 SC 1053. This court does not require any additional evidence. The application of the insurance company for additional evidence is, therefore, dismissed.
30. In these circumstances, the prayer of the insurance company for the production of the insurance policy by way of additional evidence cannot be allowed at this stage and the same is accordingly rejected. Without prejudice to this conclusion, perusal of the copy of the insurance policy, now sought to be produced by way of additional evidence, neither inspires any confidence nor the same can be proved in accordance with the statutory provisions under the Indian Evidence Act. It is just a document signed by someone; it cannot be considered to be a true copy. It is not even a carbon copy of the original. Such like copies can be prepared by anyone, at any time and at any stage and especially in cases where the liability of the insurance company stands already fixed by the Tribunal.
31. None of the above conditions have been proved in the present case. Therefore, on this ground as well, the insurance company is liable for meeting the claim of the claimants in the present case.
32. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, excluding only those who are not travelling for hire or reward, (Sic. passengers, who) are, as a matter of fact, routinely carried by the owners or the drivers of the vehicles for personal reward or by way of free transport, will have the risk of having nothing to fall back in case any accident takes place except a claim against the owner of the vehicle. This appears to be the only case left untouched by the existing statutory provisions or the judicial decisions. There remains no doubt regarding the hirer of a vehicle who happens to travel along with his goods in the same.
33. The result of the aforesaid examination of this matter, therefore, is that, in my opinion, the better view between the two sets of authorities interpreting Section 95 of the Act is the one which holds that when a hirer of a goods vehicle is travelling by the same vehicle along with his goods, he must be deemed to be a passenger in the vehicle for hire or reward within the meaning of Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) of the Act and hence the tortious liability of the owner towards him is covered by the insurance policy. In view of this conclusion, I dismiss F.A.O. No. 80 of 1981.
34. On the quantum of compensation, no arguments have been addressed, therefore, this aspect of the matter does not call for any decision.
F.A.O. No. 90 of 198135. This appeal has been preferred by the owner of the vehicle challenging the total amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal as well as the findings arrived at by the Tribunal on various aspects of the case. I have perused the statements of the witnesses and it is clear that the deceased was travelling by this vehicle along with his goods when the fatal accident took place. On the aspect of the assessment of compensation, there is enough evidence on the record to sustain the findings arrived at by the Tribunal in paras 37 and 38 of the judgment. Just compensation has been awarded and the same is not, at all, arbitrary, as contended. The result, therefore, is that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 500/-.
Cross-objections Nos. 3 and 4 of 1982
36. No arguments were addressed by either of the counsel in support or in opposition of these Cross-objections, therefore, the same are also rejected.