Bombay High Court
Ashwini Kumar Govardhandas Gandhi And ... vs Gangadhar Dattatraya Gadgil on 12 December, 1989
Equivalent citations: (1989)91BOMLR749
JUDGMENT M.S. Deshpande, J.
1. This is a reference by a learned Single Judge in Second Appeal No. 48 of 1988. The point referred is as follows :
Whether the provisions of Clause 13(1)(a) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 are applicable to the present case?
2. The controversy arose in the following circumstances : The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction against the appellant No. 1 Ashwini kumar had obtained a lease of the suit tenements under the rent note, July 31, 1967 (Exhibit 27). He wanted the premises for his personal use and occupation and he, therefore, applied to the Rent Controller, Akola, for permission to give a notice determining the lease. Appellant No. 1, Ashwini kumar renounced his character as a tenant and respondent, therefore, filed a pursis (Exhibit 30) praying that the proceedings before the Rent Controller be filed as appellant No. 1 has renounced the tenancy and the Court, therefore, would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. The Rent Controller, thereupon, passed an order filing the proceedings on October 19, 1984. The respondent then served a notice on December 26, 1984 exercising his option of forfeiture of tenancy on the ground of disclaimer of his title by the appellant No. 1 and asked the appellants to vacate the premises, but as they did not comply, he brought the suit for possession, mainly, on the ground of forfeiture.
3. The claim was resisted by the appellants who contended that the tenement had been taken by the father of the appellant No. 1 for the use of the appellant No. 2 M/s. Alpana Terelene House. In the joint written statement filed by the appellants, it was also alleged that the appellant No. 2 was in adverse possession for more than twelve years and he had, therefore, become owner of the property. One of the contentions was also that the suit was not maintainable as no written permission from the Rent Controller was obtained as required under Clause 13 of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Control Order')
4. The trial Court held on the main issue that it was necessary for the respondent to obtain permission of the Rent Controller before instituting the suit. While holding that the appellant No. 1's father had taken the premises in the name of the appellant No. 1 and had started the business under the name and style of appellant No. 2, it was also found that appellant No. 2 was the tenant.
5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his claim for possession, respondent appealed to the District Court. Only two points were raised in the District Court and on those two points, the District Court held that appellant No. 1 had taken the tenement on lease on March 31, 1967 and found that the notice terminating the tenancy rights of the appellants, in consequence of the forfeiture, was valid, in view of the provisions of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The District Court allowed the appeal and decreed the respondent's claim.
6. In the second appeal, taken to this Court, only two points were raised before the learned Single Judge, they being (1) whether by denial of tenancy, the forfeiture had been incurred and (2) whether the permission of the Rent Controller was necessary before issuing a notice of forfeiture under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. On the first point the learned Single Judge found that the appellants had disclaimed the tenancy, that the tenancy had been set up in the appellant No. 2 which was contrary to the rent note (Exhibit 27) and above all, appellant No. 2 had set up adverse possession against the respondent. In the view of the learned Single Judge, therefore, all the requirements contemplated by condition No. 2 of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act had been fulfilled. He further held that the landlord had got an option and he, accordingly had exercised his option by issuing a notice under Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act.
7. The learned Single Judge was of the view that Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order would not operate upon the statutory option to the landlord to bring about the determination of lease, which has been incurred by forfeiture by issuing a notice as required under the clause and for application of item (a) of Sub-clause (1) of Clause 13, the option must flow from contract and not from the statute. The learned Single Judge, however, felt that since a different view has been taken by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Vishwanath v. P. Madhusudan 1986 Mah LJ 699 the question should be referred for decision to a larger Bench, and that is how the matter has come before us.
8. Clause 13(1), (2) and (3) of the Rent Control Order may be quoted in extenso, as considerable argument has been advanced before us on one or the other of the expressions used therein :
13.(1) No landlord shall, except with the previous written permission of the Controller -
(a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determining the lease, if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option ; or
(b) where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the house by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions.
(2) A landlord who seeks to obtain permission under Sub-clause (1) shall apply in writing to the Controller in that behalf :
Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, no application under Items (vi) and (vii) of Sub-clause (3) shall be entertained by the Controller before the expiry of such period.
(3) If after hearing the parties, the Controller is satisfied -
(i) that on the date of filing the application the tenant was in arrears of rent for any aggregate period of three months and that he failed to deposit with the Controller, the amount of arrears ordered to be deposited by the Controller within such time as may be fixed by him; or (ii) that the tenant is habitually in arrears with the rent ; or (iii) that the tenant has without the written permission of the landlord sublet the entire house or any portion thereof ; or (iv) that the tenant has used the house or premises or any part thereof for a purpose other than that for which it was leased ; or (v) that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation or has left the area for a continuous period of four months and does not reasonably need the house ;
Explanation - For the purpose of this item, the tenant shall be deemed to have secured an alternative accommodation if he owns a residential house in the city or town concerned and if such house is constructed on a site lying vacant on 1st January 1951 or on a site made vacant on or after that date by demolition of any structure standing on such site; or(vi) that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation, provided he is not occupying any other house of his own in the city or town concerned ; or (vii) that the landlord desires to make essential repairs or alterations which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house ; or (viii) that the tenant has committed or is committing such acts of wastes as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the house ; or (ix) that the tenant has committed a nuisance ;
Explanation. - For the purpose of this item, nuisance means any act or omission which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to the health of the neighbour or to property; he shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to determine the lease as required by Sub-clause (1).
9. As is well-known, the scheme of the Rent Control Order is different from the other Rent Control Legislations in the country, the distinguishing feature being that there is a duplication of proceedings in the eight districts of Vidarbha which are governed by the Rent Control Order: It is necessary to obtain permission of the Rent Controller before giving a notice, and after the permission is obtained, the party has to proceed in the ordinary Civil Court for obtaining the relief of possession and the other ancillary reliefs. The Rent Control Order has been framed under the powers conferred by Section 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting Accommodation Act, 1946, which provides that the Provincial Government may, by general or special order, which shall extend to such areas as the Provincial Government may, by notification, direct, provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished, and whether with or without board, and in particular,- (a) for controlling the rents for such accommodation either generally, or when let to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances, (b) for preventing the eviction of tenants or sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances, (c) for requiring such accommodation to be let either generally, or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances, and (d) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating any of the aforesaid matters. Evidently, the source for Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order is Clause (b) of Section 2 and it prescribes conditions for preventing eviction of tenants or subtenants in specific circumstances. Having regard to the source of the power and the language in which provisions of Clause 13 have been formulated, it is obvious that Clause 13 does not seek to provide for all circumstances and, to that extent, is not exhaustive.
Section 6 of the Act provides that any order made or deemed to be made under Section 2 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act.
10. It was pointed out in Dhannalal Nandlal Verma v. Additional District Magistrate Nagpur v. 1984 Mah LJ 959 that Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with eight modes of determination of lease. Clause 13 (1) or any other clause of the Rent Control Order does not deal with all those modes, e.g., determination of lease by merger, surrender etc. are not touched at all. Those untouched topics thus are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the procedure for eviction on those grounds will be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Even Clause 13(1) does not at all provide for eviction. It merely creates an embargo on the right of the landlord to give notice of termination of tenancy which embargo can be lifted only if any one or more of the nine grounds specified in Clause 13 (3) exist. Jurisdiction to test correctness of those grounds -and nothing more -is vested under that clause in the Controller who is an officer specially appointed for the purpose, and if he is satisfied, he may permit giving of a notice. The jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court to pass a decree for eviction is preserved.
11. We are considering the provisions of the Rent Control Order in the background of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In Tantulal Biharilal v: Purshottam Shankarram Purohit 1981 Mah. L.J. 981 a Division Bench of this Court pointed out, after the review of the earlier decisions, that the general law relating to leases of buildings is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Rent Control Legislations do not repeal the entire general law. The Scheme of the House Rent Control Order clearly is that the landlord cannot give quit notice without previous written permission from the Controller, who has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the points under the House Rent Control Order and Transfer of Property Act have to be satisfied by the landlord before filing a suit for eviction which is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.
In Kamlahai v. Mangilal Dulichand Mantri 1987 Mah LJ (SC) 1102 the Supreme Court observed that Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order puts restriction on the rights of the landlord to terminate the tenancy and seek eviction by determining the lease of the tenant and that could only be done on specific grounds specified in that clause with the previous permission of the Rent Controller. The scheme of this Order clearly indicates that it is meant to protect the rights of the tenant by restricting the rights of the landlord. It initially puts an embargo on the right of a landlord to determine the lease, if he so chooses. But it does not restrict the tenant to surrender the lease either by specific agreement or by an implication demonstrated by conduct. There, the question was, whether in respect of the surrender of the leasehold rights by the tenant, the permission of the Rent Controller was necessary and it was incumbent on the landlord to obtain the permission of the rent Controller before getting a decree for possession, and it was found that to such surrenders the restrictions created by Clause 13 would not apply.
12. Turning to the provisions of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order, it is apparent that Sub-clause (1) imposes an obligation on the landlord not to serve a notice on a tenant determining the lease, except with the previous permission of the Rent Controller, and two categories of cases have been provided, as mentioned in items (a) and (b). The mechanic of obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller has been provided by Sub-clause (2), and Sub-clause (3) starts with the words. "If after hearing the parties, the Controller is satisfied", and then after providing for nine categories of cases empowers the Controller to grant landlord permission to issue a notice determining the lease as required by Sub-clause (1). It is clear that Sub-clause (1), which is couched in negative words, creates a total prohibition in respect of the cases covered by items (a) and (b) and is not controlled by whatever has been mentioned in Sub-clause (3), the latter enumerating only the various situation in which his satisfaction has to be reached.
13. While contending that even the cases of forfeiture of tenancy covered by Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the permission of the Rent Controller under Clause 13(1)(a) would be necessary Shri B.N.Mohta, learned Counsel for the appellants, relied on the observations in Vishwanath's case (supra). In para 6, it was observed that once it is held that a notice in writing by the lessor, i.e., the landlord is necessary to determine the lease, or in other words, the lease is determinable at the option of the landlord even in the case of forfeiture of tenancy the provisions of Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order would step in and require the landlord to obtain previous permission in writing from the Rent Controller before giving such a notice. The learned Judge observed that there is nothing in the provisions of Clause 13 or any other provision of the Rent Control Order which would show that the notice required to be given in the case of forfeiture of tenancy is excluded from its application. Thus, even in the case of forfeiture of tenancy, the protection of the Rent Control Order is intended to be and is granted to the tenant. It does not appear that the attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the two limbs of item (a) of Clause 13(1) and particularly, the use of the expression "or determining the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option", nor does it appear that even in the earlier decision in Ganpatlal v. Hiralal 1953 Law Journal Note No. 238 : Misc. Petition No. 27 of 1953 by (the then Nagpur High Court), the learned Judges' attention was called to the language in which Clause 13(1) was couched. In that case, Hiralal, against whom permission was sought, disclaimed all interest in the premises, though he tried to create a smoke-screen by alleging some sort of a partnership. The Division Bench in that case, took the view that since Hiralal on his own showing, had no connection with the tenancy, it became a case of an admission by so-called tenant that he was not interested in resisting the suit for ejectment and so permission should have been granted to the landlord to issue a notice terminating the tenancy.
In Seth Harful v. Baliram, 1959 Nag. L.J. Note No. 64 it was observed that if a question is raised before the authorities, they have to decide it, and that it is not open to the Rent Controller to say that the question being complicated, he would not decide it. This case also would not be relevant for deciding the point which has referred to us.
14. Once it is clear that Sub-clause (1) of Clause 13 is not controlled by Sub-clauses (2) and (3), it is not necessary to refer to those clauses for understanding the scope of Sub-clause (1). Item (b) of Sub-clause (1) relates to the leases determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby and permits a tenant to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions, even after efflux of the time. Under item (a) of Sub-clause (1) of Clause (13), two contingencies have been provided where the landlord shall not, except with the previous written permission of the Controller, give a notice, and one is determining the lease, and this would obviously take in the cases which are covered by Clause (h) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is the latter limb of item (a) which presents some difficulty in the matter of application and refers to cases where a notice is to be given for determining a lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at the landlord's option. According to Shri B.N. Mohta, the learned Counsel for the appellants, the expression does not have much significance because the lease may come within the sweep of the later category, even if it is expressed by the statute to be determinable at the landlord's option and would not apply merely to the class of cases where the terms of the lease give such an option. If this were the position, there was no need to use the words which have been used in the second limb of item (a), because the first limb, which is in general terms, also would cover the class of cases. The very fact that item (a) has created two classes of cases requiring notice, would show that the Legislature contemplated different situations and wanted to provide for different contingencies. The term "expressed" has been considered in State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Nail . There, the expression, "Expressed to be taken in the name of", appearing in Article 166(1) of the Constitution, came up for consideration and the Court observed that one of the meanings of "expressed" is to make known the opinions or the feelings of a particular person and when a Secretary to Government apprehends a man and tells him in the order that this is being done under the orders of the Governor, he is in substance saying that he is acting in the name of the Governor and, on his behalf, is making known to the detenue the opinion and feelings and orders of the Governor. In the context, in which the expression has been used in item (a) of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order, the expression would only mean that the lease is expressed to be determinable in the contract, or in the instrument by which the leave is created, and it cannot have any reference to the statutory option given under condition No. 2 of the Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The use of the word "lease" twice in the second limb of item (a) of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order appears to us to be deliberate and intended for the purpose of emphasising that the option arose out of the terms of the lease.
15. In this context, Shri. B.N. Mohta urged that this may well provide for the contingencies (1) and (3) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. We may reproduce the relevant portion as follows :
111. A lease of immovable property determines -
(g) by forfeiture: that is to say, - (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease.
Conditions (1) and (3) take in situations where the lessor may re-enter for breach of an expressed condition or the lease provides for re-entry upon the lessee being adjudicated an insolvent, and these conditions have to be expressed in the contract, because those conditions would be creation of the volition of the parties and not a direct consequence of the statutory provision incorporated in condition (2). In condition (2), the choice of renouncing his character as a lessee by setting up a title in a third person, or in himself, is entirely with the lessee, and if he commits an act, the consequence of forfeiture would ensue subject, however, to the landlord sending a notice of his intention to determining the lease. Condition (2) would not be covered by the latter limb of item (a) of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order, though conditions (1) and (3) would directly come within that provision.
The contention of Shri B.N. Mohta, that if it cannot fall under the latter limb of item (a), the condition (2) may fall within the first category, cannot be accepted, because when there is a special provision intended for covering a special situation, it would be only that clause that would have to be interpreted and whatever is excluded from second category would not, by itself, be said to come within the first category which would be the general category; otherwise there was no reason for the Legislature to use advisedly the expression, "determining the lease, if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option", and it would have been enough to say that it would cover all the leases determinable at the option of the lessor.
16. Shri. B.N. Mohta urged that it would not be permissible to exclude certain categories of cases, when this social legislation was meant for the protection of needy, not necessarily the so-called weaker section of the society as is commonly and popularly called, as observed in V. Dhanapal Chettiar u. Yesodai Ammal . The Supreme Court observed there that there is appreciable inroad on the freedom of contract and a person becomes a tenant of landlord even against his wishes on the allotment of a particular premises to him by the authority concerned. However, it would not be open to us to bring within the sweep of the social legislation those classes of cases which, upon a proper interpretation of the language of the provision, would not come within it.
17. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta v. National Taj Traders it was pointed out that two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well-settled. In other words, under the first principle, a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anamalous result which could not have been intended by the Legislature.
18. As we have pointed out, the category of cases covered by condition (2) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, upon a proper and reasonable construction of Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order, a most certainly excluded by the expression advisedly used. As observed in Legislation and interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, at page 195, a statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to plain natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statutes. Redundancy in a legislative enactment is to be avoided and it is only when there is a manifest absurdity, or inconsistency that the paste and scissor method is to be applied. It is well-settled that whenever the Legislature makes a particular provision it must be presumed that there is a certain object behind doing so and the Legislature never intends to make provisions which are useless and redundant. In order to avoid redundancy the Courts cannot adopt a rule of construction which cuts down the amplitude of words used except, of course, to avoid the redundancy.
19. Considering the scheme of the Rent Control Order and the class of the persons for whose benefit the provisions have been enacted, it is apparent that the benefit would become available only to a tenant on whom the notice is to be served, if he accepts his character as a tenant, and not otherwise. If he repudiates the character of a tenant, he makes it obvious that he does not want to partake of a benefit conferred by the beneficial piece of legislation. We are fortified in this view by the observations of Division Bench of this Court in Ratanlal Manikchand Shah v. Chanbasappa Senqanbasappa Chincholi to the effect that a tenant, who disclaims his tenancy, does not fulfill the qualifications of Section 5(11) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and a tenant disclaiming the title of the claimant landlord and his relationship of tenancy literally knocks out the very bottom of statutory protection, and this amounts to disclaiming the benefits available under the Bombay Rent Act. It was pointed out that a tenant disclaims the title of his landlord who accepts such disclaimer and seeks eviction upon the basis thereof, and the voluntary action of the tenant and its acceptance by the landlord results in a bilateral determination of the tenancy and takes the case out of the pale of Section 5(11) of the Bombay Rent Act. Evidently, forfeiture of lease arising out of condition (2) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act would stand on a footing different from the conditions laid down in conditions (1) and (3) of Clause (g). The distinction made by item (a) of Clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order cannot, therefore, be said to be without substance, and we find that the Legislature, in its wisdom, while treating the two classes differently, had a rational basis for classification and it would, therefore, be erroneous to regard the exclusion of the class of cases covered by condition (2) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act to be inadvertent or a mistake.
20. Shri. R.K. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord, urged that the exclusion from Sub-clause (3) of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order of the category covered by Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, would also furnish a clue to the intention of Legislature, and since, that class was not inumerated in Sub-clause (3) of Clause 13, the intention to make the mandatory provision, i.e., requirement of the permission of the Rent Controller inapplicable to the cases covered by forfeiture clause, was obvious. We do not think, it is possible for us to accept this contention. In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India it was pointed out that if the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words, such as the use of 'must' instead of "shall", that will itself be sufficient to hold the provision to be mandatory, and it will not be necessary to pursue the enquiry further. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory. Here, the prohibition enacted by Sub-clause (a) of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order is peremptory, while the provisions of Sub-clause (3), relating to the satisfaction of the Controller, are couched in a affirmative language and if what is prohibited by Sub-clause (1] would have finality about it, it would be permissible to read into Sub-clause (2), which prescribes the mechanics by which the procedure for the Controller to record his satisfaction and the nine categories in Sub-clause (3), though apparently numerous, still liable to be enlarged if effect is to be given to the provisions of item (a) of Sub-clause (1). Merely because the said clause does not refer to the satisfaction of the Controller about forfeiture, it cannot be said that the Controller would not have the power to ascertain whether a case comes within the prohibition. It would be open to the Controller to consider also the cases which would fall within the second limb of item(a) for determining whether permission should be given to the landlord for issuing a notice in that case also. Shri. Deshpadne, however, urged that a defect in the phraseology cannot be supplied by the Court, but we may point out that in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar it was held that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. The Court must proceed on the footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature, the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or aid and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. Even where there is a casus omissus, it is for others than the Courts to remedy the defect. Considering the peremptory language of Sub-clause (1), which enacts the prohibition, the omission to include forfeiture in the categories to be seen in Sub-clause (3), would not be decisive. Effect will have to be given to the peremptory part of the statute and it would have to be held that it would be the duty of the Controller to consider whether a notice should be allowed to be given in the class of cases falling under the second limb of item (a). However, this can be called in aid only in respect of cases covered by conditions (1) and (3) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and not to condition (2), the cases under which, in our view, must be regarded as being excluded from the operation of item (a) of Sub-clause (1) of Clause (13) of the Rent Control Order.
21. We might state that Shri B.N. Mohta also wanted to urge before us the position that there was no disclaimer in terms of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the circumstances of the present case. However, the learned referring Judge has recorded his finding on that point, and in view of the provisions of Sections 100 and,100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, that finding, which is recorded in second appeal, is not open to challenge before us and the remedy of the appellants, should they feel aggrieved by the finding, would lie elsewhere.
22. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to record our appreciation for the assistance rendered to us by Shri. J.N. Chandurkar, Advocate, who addressed us on the questions of law arising in this case.
23. In the result, our answer to the question referred would be as follows:-
The provisions of Clause 13(1)(a) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, would come in the way of giving notice without obtaining permission of the Controller only in respect of classes covered by conditions (1) and (3) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. That prohibition will not apply to cases overed by condition (2) of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, and since the present case falls under the latter category, the permission of the Controller would not be necessary for giving a notice of determining the lease as contemplated by Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was therefore, maintainable, even without obtaining the permission of the Controller. The reference is answered accordingly.
This case shall, now, go back to the learned Single Judge and we direct that the papers be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal according to law.