Delhi District Court
Bhagwati vs Sunil Badolia on 22 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-009653-2023
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 162/2023
SMT. 'B1',
W/o. Shri. 'RL',
R/o. 'XYZ'. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. SUNIL BADOLIA,
S/o. Shri. Tirath Ram,
R/o. UD-2, PNT Outers,
Dev Nagar, PS DBG Road,
Karol Bagh, Delhi.
2. HEM BADOLIA,
D/o. Shri. Tirath Ram,
R/o. 3A/11, WEA,
Karol Bagh, Delhi.
3. STATE (NCT OF DELHI). ... RESPONDENTS
Date of e-filing : 19.07.2023
Date of institution : 20.07.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 30.07.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 22.09.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code') against the judgment dated 17.03.2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court)-04/Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM') in case bearing, 'State v. Sunil Badolia & Anr., Cr. Case No. 297081/2016', 1 Identities of the prosecutrix as well as that of her other family members have deliberately been withheld in view of the decisions in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2190.
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 1 of 52
ABHISHEK Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:07:47
+0530
arising out of FIR No. 464/2014, PS. Prashad Nagar, under Sections 323/325/341/354/354B/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), acquitting respondent nos. 1 and 2 of the offence(s) punishable under Sections 323/325/506(2)/34 IPC as well as acquitting respondent no. 1 of the offences punishable under Sections 354/354B IPC (additionally).
2. Succinctly, the prosecution's case before the Ld. Trial Court is premised on the complaint of the complainant/appellant, 'B' (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/appellant'), who inter alia asserted that on 24.08.2014, she/appellant along with her daughter/victim/'K' (since deceased, and hereinafter referred to as the 'victim/'K'/'K***'') had gone to vegetable market/subzi bazaar, Sat Nagar. As per the complainant, at around 05:00 p.m., respondent no. 1, who had earlier married appellant's daughter, however, had since divorced, as well as respondent no. 2, reached at the spot (24/8/14 को मैं अपनी लडकी 'क***' के साथ सब्जी बाजार सत नगर गयी थी कि समय करीब 5 बजे शाम सुनिल बडोलिया व उसकी बहन हेमा बडोलिया भी वहां आ गये और सुनील बडोलिया जिसका मेरी लडकी किरन से विवाह हु आ था और बाद में तलाक हो गया था।). It was further proclaimed by the complainant/appellant that victim/'K' had initiated legal proceedings against respondent no. 1, however, the matter was since agreed to be compromised for a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs only) before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Nonetheless, as per the complainant, respondent no. 1 neither honored the terms of said settlement, nor paid the agreed amount, rather, issued certain threatening correspondence to victim/'K'. Ergo, under such circumstances, victim/'K' is proclaimed to have lodged a complaint against respondent no. 1 CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 2 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:07:52 +0530 on 16.08.2014, at the concerned police station, which, respondent no. 1 was coercing the victim to withdraw (मेरी 'क***' का सुनील बडोलिया के खिलाफ कोर्ट में के स चल रहा है जो कि तीस लाख रूपये हाई कोर्ट मे 'क***' को देनेका समझोता हु आ था और सुनिल बडोलिया ने पैसे तो नहीं दिये किन्तु कु छ धमकी भरे कागज भेज दिये जिसके बारे मे 16 अगस्त 2014 को पुलिस में शिकायत की तथा जिस शिकायत को वापिस लेनेकि धमकी सुनिल, 'क***' और हमे दे रहा था।). Correspondingly, the appellant proclaimed that on 24.08.2016 at around 05:00 p.m., respondent no. 1 attacked the victim with an intention to kill her and as the victim proceeded ahead, respondent no. 1, pulled her/victim's hair ( choti kheenchi). At that point in time, as per the appellant, respondent no. 2 was uttering/exhorting, "...aaj isko jaan se maar denge agar isne apni shikayat wapis nahi li..." (24/8/14 को 'क***' को जान से मारने की नियत से करीब 5 बजे शाम बाजार में सब्जी लेते हु ए 'क***' पर हमला किया जब 'क***' थोडी आगे चली गई तो सुनिल ने 'क***' की चोटी खीची और उसकी बहन कहने लगी कि आज इसको जान से मार देगे अगर इसने अपनी शिकायत वापिस नहीं ली). Upon this, as per the appellant, respondent nos. 1 and 2 started following/running after the victim and beat her up, with an intention to kill her/the victim. The complainant/appellant further proclaimed that respondent nos. 1 and 2 were also yelling at that time, "...ise sare bazaar mein nangi karo..." (वो दोनो 'क***' के पीछे पीछे भागे व जान से मारने की नियत से उसके साथ बुरी तरह मार पिटाई करने लगे और बोलने लगे इसको सरे बाजार मे नंगी करो।). Consequently, all the clothes of the victim/'K' were torn off, whilst respondent no. 1 grabbed the victim's chest/breast from behind (और इसके सारे कपडे फाड दिये। सुनिल ने 'क***' को पीछे से जा कर छाती की ओर बुरी तरह से पकड लिया।). Further, it was asserted by the appellant that both the respondents/respondent nos. 1 and 2 started beating the victim with kicks and punches and thereafter, respondent no. 1 grabbed the victim from her private part and shoved her on the ground. Thereupon, respondent no. 1 is CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 3 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:07:56 +0530 asserted to have pulled and iron object from the vicinity and thrusted the same on the victim's head, while exhorting, "...aaj main tujhe jaan se maar dunga...". However, as per the complainant/appellant, she tried to deflect the said attack from her hand, in which process, the said iron like object hit on the appellant's hand, leading to her fingers being broken ( सुनील ने 'क***' के नीचे पिसाब वाली जगह पर हाथ डालकर जमीन पर गिरा दिया और सुनिल वही पास मे पडी लोहे नुमा चीज उठाकर 'क***' के सर पर जान लेने की नियत से भारने लगा और कहने लगा कि आज तो मैं तुझे जान से मार दूगाँ। लेकिन मैं तुरन्त 'क***' को बचानेके लिए पहुँची और जैसे ही सुनिल ने लोहे नुमा चीज 'क***' के सिर पर मारने लगा तो मैने तुरन्त अपने दोनो हाथ आगे किये और 'क***' की जान बचा ली जिससे लोहे नुमा चीज से मेरे हाथ की दो उगलियाँ टूट गई). Consequently, as per the appellant, they made a call at 100 number and someone from the public gave some cloth to cover- up the victim. Thereafter, on the concerned police officials' reaching at the spot, medical examination of the complainant and victim was got conducted and it was only subsequently, on the appellant's and victim's tendering their respective statements, the instant case/FIR came to be registered, and the investigation ensued. Notably, during the course of investigation, statement of the complainant/appellant and that of the victim, under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was got recorded before the concerned Ld. MM, site plan was prepared and the subsequent opinion of the MLC of the appellant, victim as well as the accused persons was obtained. 2.1. Relevantly, under her statement dated 30.10.2014, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the appellant, namely, 'B' inter alia proclaimed as under;
"...हम इतवार के दिन दोनों माँ बेटी बाज़ार जा रहे थे। वहाँ Sunil और उसकी बहन वहाँ सब्ज़ी ले रहे थे । 'K***' मुझसे कु छ आगे निकल गई थी । वो 'क***' की चोटी पकड़ कर उसे धमकाने लगे। बोले कि complaint वापस ले । बोले तू हमारा क्या बिगाड़ लेगी। उन्होंने 'क***' की पेशाब वाली जगह पर हाथ लगा कर उसे गिरा दिया ।
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 4 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:07:59 +0530
उसके (Sunil) के हाथ में लोहे जैसी चीज़ थी। वो 'क***' पर उससे मारने लगा, तोह मैंने अपना हाथ बीच में लगा दिया। मेरी दो उंगलियाँ टे ड़ी हो गई। अगर मैं बीच में न आती तो 'क***' उस दिन मर जाती। हमें लोगों ने बचाया उन दोनों से। उसकी बहन ने बोला कि हमारी पुलिस में जान पहचान है। उन दोनों के 'क***' को लात घूसों से बहु त मारा। उन्होंने 'क***' के सारे कपड़े फाड़ दिए। एक Lady ने उसे ('K***' को) कपडा दिया, खुद को ढकने के लिए। यह कपडा पुलिस ने हम से नहीं लिया। हमारे पूरे परिवार को Sunil से जान का खतरा है...."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Pertinent to also reproduce the relevant extracts from the statement of the victim/'K' on 30.10.2014, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as under;
"... मैं ने 16.08.2014 को Sunil के खिलाफ PS. Prasad Nagar में complaint दी। मैं अपनी mummy के साथ Sunday को (24.08.2014) सब्ज़ी लेने जा रही थी। वहाँ Sunil और उसकी बहन Hem आ गए। Sunil ने मेरी चोटी खींची। वह बोला कि तू आजकल बड़ी complaint करने लग गई है। अपनी complant वापस ले। Hem बोली भैया आज इसे जान से मार देते हैं । मैं सब्ज़ी लेते - लेते अपनी mummy से थोड़ी आगे आ गई थी। फिर वह दोनों जान से मारने के इरादे से मेरे पीछे भागे। फिर Sunil ने पीछे से मेरी छाती को दोनों हाथों से जबरदस्त तरीके से पकड़ लिया। फिर दोनो भाई-बहन ने मुझे लातों-घूसों से बहु त बुरा मारा । फिर बोला कि इसे सरे बाजार आज नंगा कर दो । उसने (Sunil ने ) मेरे सारे कपड़े फाड़ दिय बाज़ार में , सबके सामने । फिर मेरी पेशाब वाली जगह में हाथ डालकर Sunil ने मुझे नीचे लेटा दिया। पास लोहे जैसी चीज़ थी। उसे उठाकर बोला में आज मैं इसे जान से मार दूंगा 1 मेरे सर पर मारने लगा। इतने में मेरी mummy आ गई उन्होंने अपना हाथ मेरे सर पर रख दिया, मुझे बचाने के लिए तो उनकी दो उंगलियाँ fracture हो गई। अगर वो न आती तो मैं मर जाती। एक औरत ने मुझे मेरे शरीर को ढकने के लिए ओढ़नी दी। वहां की Public ने हमें बचाया हमने 100 number पर फ़ोन करा। वह मुझे अभी तक धमकी दे रहा है..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Subsequently, upon conclusion of investigation in the present case, chargesheet was filed by the concerned IO before the Ld. Trial Court. Notably, consequent upon Ld. Trial Court's taking cognizance of the offence on 24.07.2015, summons were issued to respondent nos. 1 and 2. Subsequently, CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 5 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:08:03 +0530 upon the said respondents entering appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and upon, compliance of provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C., disposal of application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., moved on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2 before the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 12.05.20161, and on the arguments on charge having been addressed by/on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2, State and the complainant/appellant, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 04.07.2018, directed framing of charges against respondent nos. 1 and 2, inter alia, under the following observations;
"...Arguments heard on the point of charge. Prima facie case punishable under Section 323/325/354 and 506 IPC all r/w Section 34 IPC is made out against both the accused persons and case punishable under Section 354B IPC is also made out against Sunil Badoliya.
Ingredients of under Section 341 is not made out in the present case and therefore notice is not given for the said offence.
Charge framed accordingly to which the accused persons plead not guilty and claim trial..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Consequently, the following charges were framed against respondent nos. 1 and 2 by the Ld. Trial Court on 04.07.2018;
"...I, ***, M.M. Delhi do hereby charge you accused persons Sunil Badolia S/o. Late Sh. Tirath 1 Notably, in the order dated 12.05.2016, while dismissing respondent nos. 1 and 2's application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., seeking further investigation, Ld. Trial Court inter alia proclaimed, "...The above judgment cited by the applicant/ accused are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case as it has been clearly indicated in both the judgments that though the Magistrate is empowered to order for further investigation but that depends totally on the facts in hand and the connecting situation thereby.*** The law expects the discharge of duties by the investigating officer properly resulting in a report under section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. It may only be in some exceptional cases where investigating officer may have to collect some further evidence materials and submit it to the magistrate that further investigation be ordered under Section 173(8) Cr.PC. Further, S. 173 (8) Cr.P.C is permission in character. Neither the presentation (informant) nor the accused can claim from the court, as a matter of right a direction consequenting further investigation to the investigating officer. *** In Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that:*** The power of the Magistrate to direct "further investigation" is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. *** The counsel for the applicant accused is not able to narrate any peculiar facts of case which entails the need for further investigation in the present case. With regard to the alleged anomaly of the recording of time, when information of crime was given and when the alleged incident took place, it is a matter of trial. Even otherwise, also he is at liberty to put forth the alleged anomaly, while, leading his defense evidence. *** Thus, in view of above mentioned discussion, there is no merit in the application of the applicant and the same is hereby dismissed. *** Now to come up for arguments on charge..." (Emphasis supplied) CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 6 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:07 +0530 Ram, aged about 51 years, R/o UD2, PNT Quarter, Dev Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, (2) Hem Badolia, W/o Sh. Jitender Singh, aged about 43 years, R/o. 3A/11, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, as under:-
That on 24.08.2014 at about 5.00 p.m., in front of gali no. 6, Sat Nagar, Ganga Mandir Marg, Karol Bagh, Delhi within the jurisdiction of PS Prasad Nagar, you both accused in furtherance of your common intention used criminal force against the daughter of complainant/victim (name not written to protect the identity of the victim, however verbally told to the accused persons) with the intention to outrage her modesty and thereby you have committed the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC r/w Section 34 IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly, on the above said date, time and place you both accused persons in furtherance of your common intention voluntarily caused hurt to daughter of complainant and grievous hurt to complainant and thereby had committed the offence punishable offence under Section 323 IPC and Section 325 IPC both r/w section 34 IPC. Thirdly, on the abovesaid date, time and place, you both accused persons extended threats to kill the daughter of the complainant and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 506 (2) IPC r/w Section 34 IPC and within my cognizance. Fourthly, on the abovesaid date, time and place, you accused Sunil Badoliya with the intention to disrobe the daughter of complainant/ prosecutrix or compelling her to be naked use criminal force against the daughter of complainant and torn her wearing clothes and thereby you had committed the offence punishable under Section 354B IPC and withing my cognizance.
And I hereby direct you to be tried for the aforesaid offences by this court..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.5. Markedly, respondent nos. 1 and 2 pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges and claimed trial. Relevantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 11 (eleven) witnesses, i.e., PW-1/Dr. Pawan Dhawan;
PW-2/complainant/appellant ('B'); PW-3/ASI Bhuvan Chand; PW-4/W/HC Sunita; PW-5/ASI Bhoop Singh; PW-6/Ms. CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 7 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:11 +0530 'KA'/cousin of victim; PW-7/Sh. 'RL'/father of victim; PW-8/Sh. Roop Singh; PW-9/SI Prabha; PW-10/Dr. Shilpi Nain; and PW-11/SI Brij Mohan. Correspondingly, during the course of trial, on 08.12.2021, respondent no. 1 admitted the genuineness of registration of FIR No. 464/2014, PS. Prasad Nagar as well as the factum of recording of statement of the appellant and victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, recording of statement of respondent nos. 1 and 2 under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C. on 07.12.2022 and 14.12.2022, respectively, as well as on conclusion of arguments by/on behalf of the parties, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment, acquitted respondent nos. 1 and 2 of the offence(s)/charges levelled against them, as noted hereinabove.
3. Ld. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset. As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment is incorrect both on facts as well as in law, making the same liable to be set aside at the outset. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating the facts and circumstances of the present case, nor the submissions of the appellant. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, in case the impugned judgment is permitted to stand, grave justice and irreparable loss would accrue to the complainant/victim/appellant. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against respondent nos. 1 and 2, despite which, the Ld. Trial Court erroneously granted benefit of doubt to the said respondents, while disregarding the infinite lacune in the CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 8 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:08:15 +0530 defence put forth by the said accused persons/respondents. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further fervently argued that while passing the impugned judgment, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the sterling testimony of the appellant. In particular, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant made clear and specific allegations against respondent nos. 1 and 2 in her FIR as well as her statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and apart from the same, the appellant also corroborated/supported her version in her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court. It was further argued that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to appreciate that not only was the appellant persistent in her statements/depositions at various stages of investigation/trial, rather, the Ld. Trial Court did not even consider that the Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2, did not put any leading question and/or suggestion to falsify the statement(s)/deposition of the complainant. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court even erred in not considering that the version put forth by the appellant was duly corroborated under her MLC (Ex. PW1/A), recording the nature of appellant's injury as grievous. Concomitantly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not duly consider that the appellant's daughter/victim, namely, 'K', in her statement under Section(s) 161/164 Cr.P.C., made clear allegations regarding the commission of offences under Sections 307/376 IPC by respondent no. 1, despite which the case was erroneously, not committed by the Ld. Trial Court to Ld. Session Court as per mandate of law/Section 323 Cr.P.C. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the victim/'K', specifically proclaimed in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., "fir meri pesab waali jaga me hath daal kar sunil ne niche leta diya " as CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 9 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:19 +0530 well as "pass me ek lohe jessi chiz thi use utha kar bola aaj me isse jaan se mar dunga, mere sir par marne laga itne me meri mummy aagy, unhone apna haath mere sir par rakh diya mujhe bachane ke liye to unki do ungliyan facture hogai", attracting the provisions under Sections 307/376 IPC against the said respondent, despite which, it was reiterated that the case was wrongly not committed by the Ld. Trial Court to the Ld. Sessions Court for trial.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further vehemently contended that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating the contents of statement of the victim/'K', recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that, though, victim/'K', left for heavenly abode during the course of trial before the Ld. Trial Court, however, despite the same, Ld. Trial Court did not consider the said statement as dying declaration of the victim/'K' in terms of the provisions under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act'). Even otherwise, Ld. Counsel strenuously argued that the Ld. Trial Court erred in observing that there were material omissions/improvements in the testimony of the appellant, despite the fact that alleged omissions/improvements were neither material nor significant in the instant case. Concomitantly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the appellant had been consistent in her earlier statements before the police officials and the Ld. Magistrate, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and Section 164 Cr.P.C., respectively. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Trial Court even erred to appreciate that the appellant, being an old age person, had forgotten her statement and when the Ld. Addl.CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 10 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:08:23 +0530 PP for the State put the relevant question of her statement, she remembered and admitted her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that while reaching at the conclusion of respondent nos. 1 and 2's acquittal, Ld. Trial Court erroneously appreciated the deposition of PW-6 vis-à-vis email (Ex. PW6/D1). In this regard, Ld. Counsel further argued that the Ld. Trial Court did not apply its judicial mind and wrongly relied on the wrong time mentioned in photocopy of said email. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court erred in considering that the possibility of respondent nos. 1 and 2's intentionally tampering/replacing the time of email from the actual time cannot be ruled out. It was further submitted that the conclusion of the Ld. Trial Court regarding the non-presence/doubt regarding the presence of accused/respondent no. 1 at the scene of crime at the time of incident is also unsubstantiated and contradictory to the material placed on record.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court did not apply its judicial mind and wrongly accorded benefit of alleged delay in lodging complaint in the instant case to respondent nos. 1 and 2. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching such conclusion, failed to appreciate that the complainant/appellant had made a complaint (Ex. PW5/D1) against PW-5 and PW-9 for not registering timely FIR. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court did not apply its judicial mind as PW-1 did not confirm in his deposition that the appellant's broken fingers were resultant due to a sudden fall or fall during quarrel. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, the said facts had emerged only during the course of CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 11 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:27 +0530 cross-examination of PW-1, as suggestions, and without proving respondent nos. 1 and 2's defence, which could not have been considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching a finding of acquittal of the said respondents. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not even consider that the appellant correctly identified the torn clothes of her daughter, victim/'K' during her cross examination and also deposed that respondent no. 1 had hit on her fingers by iron rod, which has been corroborated in appellant's earlier statements under Sections 161/164 Cr.P.C., establishing the case against the said respondent. In this regard, Ld. Counsel strenuously contended that the statement/deposition of the complainant/appellant has been natural and consistent as well as withstood the rigours of cross examination. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel solitary deposition/evidence of the appellant is sufficient in the instant case to reach a conclusion of guilt of respondent nos. 1 and 2, which fact has not been duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while acquitting the said respondent. Correspondingly, it was reiterated by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court did not properly appreciate the law on the point of delay in registration of FIR and even failed to consider that, even otherwise, the delay if any, was properly explained by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, sexual offences against women are violative of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India/Constitution and that the courts are obligated to treat such offences sternly, severely and rigorously. It was further asserted by the Ld. Counsel that the impugned judgment ignores material facts and circumstances and the Ld. Trial Court, did not apply judicial mind while reaching a finding of acquittal of respondent nos. 1 and 2 from such serious CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 12 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:31 +0530 allegations. Accordingly, it was entreated that the impugned judgment be set aside and respondent nos. 1 and 2 be convicted and sentenced as per law.
4. Per contra Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 3 submitted that the impugned judgment was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after duly appreciating of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as, is in consonance with the settled judicial precedents. Concomitantly, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State no grounds for any indulgence or relaxation are made out by the appellant. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2/accused persons, vehemently contended that no irregularity can be attributed to the impugned judgment, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due consideration of facts and circumstances brought on record. It was further submitted that the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant with malafide intentions and ulterior motives to harass and humiliate the said respondents. In this regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment specifically observed the factum of the FIR being registered with a delay, without tendering any plausible reason for such delay. Correspondingly, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the appellant and her daughter and other relatives, conspired to falsely implicate respondent nos. 1 and 2 and their family members in the instant case, owing to their long pending enmity. In this regard, Ld. Counsel outrightly submitted that the appellant's daughter/'K', being the erstwhile wife of respondent no. 1, filed numerous cases against him and in furtherance to her nefarious designs, even the instant proceedings CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 13 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:08:35 +0530 were initiated by the appellant and her other relatives, with the sole intention to harass the respondents. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court correctly appreciated that the deposition/statement of the appellant was replete with material contradictions and uninspiring of confidence to bring home, charges against respondent nos. 1 and 2, in the instant case. As per the Ld. Counsel, the statement of the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court does not find corroboration with her own statements under Section 161/164 Cr.P.C., besides, there is no corroboration even in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses even with respect to material allegations, mentioned under the appellant's complaint. In this regard, it was asserted by the Ld. Counsel that the appellant, while under her statement recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 161 Cr.P.C. asserted that respondent no.
1, tore the clothes of 'K' and pressed her breast as well as assaulted her, however, during the course of her cross examination, PW-2/appellant asserted that both the accused/respondent nos. 1 and 2, assaulted her daughter with legs and blows, and both the accused persons pressed her breast, belying her earlier version. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the appellant, nowhere under her deposition gave any description of alleged 'iron like thing', allegedly deployed in hitting the victim. Even otherwise, the serious allegations levelled against the accused persons, do not find corroboration from the medical reports of the appellant/victim or from the deposition of the concerned Doctor. Ld. Counsel further vehemently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court duly reached the conclusion that even the testimonies of other witnesses/police witnesses, create a doubt on the version put forth by the prosecution. In this regard, Ld. Counsel strenuously contended CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 14 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:39 +0530 that PW-9, in his testimony, deposed that torn clothes were seized by her on 30.10.2014, about two months after the date of incident, thus, creating further doubt, as to whether respondent no. 1 even tore the clothes of the appellant. Correspondingly, even PW-11, who was on patrolling duty, on the date of alleged incident, also testified that when he read the spot, he did not see that the clothes of any woman were torn, besides proclaimed that there was no blood oozing out from anybody, creating further doubt in the story put forth by the appellant. 4.2. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2/accused persons further submitted that the statement of victim/'K' under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as her dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act as no two statements disclose the cause of her death, besides the alleged victim, left of heavenly abode several years after the date of alleged incident and there is no proximity between her death and the alleged incident. Further, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that though the alleged incident took place in a crowded public place, despite which, the prosecution failed to bring any eyewitness before the Ld. Trial Court to lend credence to the version put forth by the appellant. Ld. Counsel further vigorously reiterated that no such incident, as alleged or otherwise, took place and that the appellant, her daughter and their other relatives conspired to falsely rope in respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the instant case. In this regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that the same is demonstrable from the contents of email dated 24.08.2014, which was sent at 08:23 a.m. regarding the alleged incident, in the morning by PW-6 to the Commissioner of Police, despite the fact that the alleged incident took place in the evening at about 04:30 p.m. to 05:00 p.m. on 24.08.2014. As per the Ld. Counsel, the CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 15 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:08:43 +0530 said email was duly admitted by the PW-6 during the course of her cross examination, as Ex. PW6/D1, wherein the witness has admitted the fact of sending the email to commissioner of police on 24.08.2014 at about 08:23 a.m., belying the version of the prosecution. Ld. Counsel further argued that there are several material lacunae, omissions, contradictions and improvement in the case put forth by the prosecution. Correspondingly, it was reiterated that the version/story put forth against the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2 is uninspiring and does not bring home charges beyond reasonable doubt against respondent nos. 1 and 2. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel iterated that the instant appeal is grossly malicious and devoid of merits, deserving its dismissal. In support of the said contentions reliance was placed upon the decision(s) in; Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab @ Kuti Biswas & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 3334; and Kishnegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2017 SC 1657.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Addl. PP for the State as well as that of Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2 have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record and the written submission/synopsis filed, as well as the case laws relied upon by the parties, thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against acquittal. In this regard, it is pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the ' scope and ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal, inter alia noted as under;
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"20. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, in the case of Sambasivan and Ors. v. State of Kerala, MANU/SC/0356/1998: (1998) 5 SCC 412, has held:
7. The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are well settled. The powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate Court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial Court. It is only when the approach of the trial Court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal.
21. This Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate Court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If the appellate Court, on scrutiny, finds that the decision of the Court below is based on erroneous views and against settled position of law, then the interference of the appellate Court with such an order is imperative.
22. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/7108/2007: (2007) 4 SCC 415, after referring to a catena of decisions, has laid down the following general principles with regard to powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal:
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 17 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:08:53 +0530 powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court..."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC Online SC 51 , iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"8. ...It is also well settled that the Court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 18 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:08:58 +0530 the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207 :
AIR 1952 SC 52] ; Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122] . In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the aforenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal, either against conviction or against acquittal, extends to reappreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising appellate power is not required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law1 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Needless to reemphasize that the appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal. Nonetheless, it is seen from above that in the instances of appeal against acquittal, appellate courts have to be cognizant of the fact that in appeal against acquittal there is 'double presumption' in favour of the accused, i.e., one of 1 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 19 of 52 Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:09:02 +0530 fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person has to be presumed, innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Correspondingly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid principles, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention-When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
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319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
320. Grievous hurt-The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous":
First-Emasculation.
Secondly-Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly-Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly-Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly-Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
Sixthly-Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly-Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 20 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
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322. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt--Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is said "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt"...
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt-
Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
325. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt-Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** *** 354B. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe-Any man who assaults or uses criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the intention of disrobing or compelling her to be naked, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation- Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 21 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:09:10 +0530 either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with line, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is outrightly observed that the provisions under Section 34 IPC recognize the principle of vicarious liability1 in criminal jurisprudence, attracting culpability against a person for an act/offence, not committed by him but by another person with whom he shared the common intention. It is trite law 2 that Section 34 IPC does not provide for a substantive offence, rather, envisages culpability on the part of an accused only upon the proof of two conditions, i.e., "the mental element or the intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual participation in one form or the other in the commission of the crime." Quite evidently3, mere common intention on the part of any such accused, per se may not attract the provisions under Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance thereof. Strikingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Naresh v. State of U.P., (2024) 1 SCC 443, while explicating the contours of the provisions under Section 34 IPC inter alia remarked as under;
"7. A reading of Section 34 IPC reveals that when a criminal act is done by several persons with a 1 Suresh v. State of U.P., (2001) 3 SCC 673.2
Virendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 407.3
Jasdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 545.
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common intention each of the person is liable for that act as it has been done by him alone. Therefore, where participation of the accused in a crime is proved and the common intention is also established, Section 34IPC would come into play. To attract Section 34IPC, it is not necessary that there must be a prior conspiracy or premeditated mind. The common intention can be formed even in the course of the incident i.e. during the occurrence of the crime.
*** *** ***
11. Assistance has been taken of para 26 of the decision of this Court in Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka [Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 7 SCC 521: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 192], which is reproduced herein below: (SCC p. 537) "26. Section 34 IPC makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the offence, equally liable on the principle of joint liability. For Section 34 to apply there should be common intention between the co-perpetrators, which means that there should be community of purpose and common design or prearranged plan. However, this does not mean that co-perpetrators should have engaged in any discussion, agreement or valuation. For Section 34 to apply, it is not necessary that the plan should be prearranged or hatched for a considerable time before the criminal act is performed. Common intention can be formed just a minute before the actual act happens. Common intention is necessarily a psychological fact as it requires prior meeting of minds. In such cases, direct evidence normally will not be available and in most cases, whether or not there exists a common intention has to be determined by drawing inference from the facts proved. This requires an inquiry into the antecedents, conduct of the co-participants or perpetrators at the time and after the occurrence.
The manner in which the accused arrived, mounted the attack, nature and type of injuries inflicted, the weapon used, conduct or acts of the co-assailants/perpetrators, object and purpose behind the occurrence or the attack, etc. are all relevant facts from which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the ingredients of Section 34IPC are satisfied. We must remember that Section 34IPC comes into operation against the co-perpetrators because they have not committed the principal or main act, which is undertaken/performed or is attributed to the main culprit or perpetrator. Where an accused CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 23 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:09:18 +0530 is the main or final perpetrator, resort to Section 34IPC is not necessary as the said perpetrator is himself individually liable for having caused the injury/offence. A person is liable for his own acts. Section 34 or the principle of common intention is invoked to implicate and fasten joint liability on other co-participants."
12. A plain reading of the above paragraph of Krishnamurthy case [Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 7 SCC 521: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 192] reveals that for applying Section 34IPC there should be a common intention of all the co-accused persons which means community of purpose and common design. Common intention does not mean that the co-accused persons should have engaged in any discussion or agreement so as to prepare a plan or hatch a conspiracy for committing the offence. Common intention is a psychological fact and it can be formed a minute before the actual happening of the incidence or as stated earlier even during the occurrence of the incidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Markedly, from the above, it is noted that in the instances where the provisions under Section 34 IPC are proposed to be invoked by the prosecution against accused persons, it is not mandatory to demonstrate that there such persons engaged in any prior discussion or agreement so as to prepare a plan or hatch a conspiracy for committing the offence. On the contrary, common intention may be formed at a spur of moment, even during the commission/occurrence of incident, which is to be discernible from the facts of circumstances of each case. Correspondingly, it is also a settled law that for proving formation of common intention by accused persons, direct evidence may seldomly be available, yet, in order to attract the provisions under Section 34 IPC, prosecution is under a bounden duty to prove that the participants had shared a common intention1. Reference, in regard the foregoing is further made to 1 Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Khalid B.A. v. State of Kerala, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 11875, in this regard, remarked; "72. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of the individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 24 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:09:22 +0530 the decision in Virendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 407, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, elucidated as under;
"38. The vicarious or constructive liability under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions stand fulfilled i.e. the mental element or the intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual participation in one form or the other in the commission of the crime.
39. The common intention postulates the existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds. It is the intention to commit the crime and the accused can be convicted only if such an intention has been shared by all the accused. Such a common intention should be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such a crime is committed . In most of the cases it is difficult to procure direct evidence of such intention. In most of the cases, it can be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances. Therefore, in inferring the common intention under Section 34 IPC, the evidence and documents on record acquire a great significance and they have to be very carefully scrutinised by the court. This is particularly important in cases where evidence regarding development of the common intention to commit the offence graver than the one originally designed, during execution of the original plan, should be clear and cogent.
40. The dominant feature of Section 34 is the element of intention and participation in action. This participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert.
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42. Section 34 IPC does not create any distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of constructive liability. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In order to incur joint liability for an offence there must be a prearranged and premeditated concert between the accused persons for doing the act actually done, though there might not be long interval between the act and the premeditation and though the plan may be formed suddenly. In order that Section 34 IPC may apply, it is not necessary that the prosecution must prove that attending circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances." (Emphasis supplied) CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 25 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:09:26 +0530 the act was done by a particular or a specified person. In fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and on the facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under that section read with Section 34."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In so far as culpability under Section 323 IPC is concerned, prosecution is required to prove1, "(a) the victim suffered from bodily pain, disease or infirmity; (b) that the accused caused the aforesaid bodily pain etc.; (c) that the accused did so intentionally or with knowledge that in the process hurt would be caused.". Correspondingly, this Court deems it pertinent here to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Ramamurthy v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl. RC No. 1326/2017, dated 21.12.2017, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while explicating the ingredients of offence under Section 325 IPC inter alia remarked, as under;
"...To bring home an offence under Section 325 IPC, the prosecution is to prove that (a) that the accused has caused bodily pain, disease or infirmity to the victim; (b) this hurt has been cause voluntarily;
(c) and this hurt has been caused without being provoked by any one, (d) that the hurt has been caused answers any of the hurts described in Section 320 IPC..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relevantly, in order to attract the provisions under Section 354 IPC in a given case, it is required for the prosecution to prove; (i) commission of criminal assault or use of criminal force on a person, who is a woman; (ii) use of criminal force on such victim by the aggressor/accused; and (iii) use of criminal force upon such a woman with a mens rea (intention or 1 Hanif Usmanbhai Kalva & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, MANU/GJ/1012/2015.
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knowledge) to 'outrage her modesty'. In this regard, this Court deems is apposite to make a reference to the decision in Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court1, while explicating the basic ingredients of Section 354 IPC, noted as under;
"9. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. (See State of Punjab v. Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] .) A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Analogously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., MANU/SC/0116/2004, while inter alia cogitating on the meaning of the term, 'modesty', remarked as under;
"11. Coming to the question as to whether Section 354 of the Act has any application, it is to be noted that the provision makes penal the assault or use of criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty.1
Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81.
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The essential ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are:
(a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the word 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast."
*** *** ***
14. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Reference in respect of the foregoing is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC Online SC 51 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, whist confronted with the issue, ' whether a female child of seven-and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of 'modesty' which could be outraged', remarked as under;
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 28 of 52 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:09:38 +0530 "15. I think that the essence of a woman's
modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on her body. Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged. Whoever uses criminal force to her with intent to outrage her modesty commits an offence punishable under Section 354. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive, as for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of anaesthesia, she may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the act; nevertheless, the offender is punishable under the section."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Remarkably, in the aforesaid dictate, the Hon'ble Apex Court unambiguously explicated that the sense of modesty in all women is not the same for all and that the same may vary from woman to woman. Nonetheless, considering that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex, touching of the victim's body, i.e., breasts, mouth any other body parts, etc., by an accused, without the consent of the complainant/victim, would indubitably and plainly fall within the four corners of the provisions under Section 354 IPC. Apposite at this stage to further note at this stage that in order to bring home the charges/conviction under Section 354B IPC, prosecution is required to prove the commission of; (i) assault or use of criminal force by any man on any woman or abetment of such act; and (ii) such accused's mens rea, i.e., intention of disrobing such woman or compelling her/the woman to be naked. However, law is trite that in order to attract culpability under the said provision, it is irrelevant whether or not the accused was successful in disrobing a woman. In fact, it is a settled law that mere use of criminal force by a perpetrator, with an intention/requisite mens rea to CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 29 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:09:43 +0530 disrobe, is sufficient to bring home culpability under the said provision. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in Gobinda Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, CRA No. 152 of 2018, dated 09.02.2022 , wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as under;
"...Careful reading of Section 354B suggests that even if an accused does not have any intention to commit rape, he may be held guilty for committing the offence of disrobing a woman. Even in Section 354B it is not required for the prosecution to prove that the victim was actually disrobed used of criminal force with the intent to disrobe by the accused is sufficient to bring home the charge under Section 354B of the Indian Penal Code..."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. In as much as the applicability/culpability under Section 506 IPC is concerned, law is trite that in order to attract the said provision, the prosecution is required to prove that the;
(i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Pertinently, the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori. 317 , while explicating the meaning of the word, ' alarm' used under Section 503/506 IPC, noted as under;
"...The threat must be intended to cause alarm from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm may vary in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 30 of 52 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:09:46 +0530 produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for all that has then to be proved is that threat was given and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the threat has not that effect, it involves a question whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of Section 506. "Intimidate" according to Webstar's Dictionary means" (1) to make timid, make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence, cow". Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat communicated or uttered with intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a man of common firmness. "Threat" is derived from Anglo-sexam word "threotou to life", (harass). It is the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. "Injury" is defined in Section 44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the person threatened has to be established by evidence to be brought on record..."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon'ble Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any consequence. Apropos the present discourse, reference is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
"11. ... A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 31 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:09:50 +0530 must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Consequently, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed to deal with the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Counsel for respondents. In particular, to determine whether the Ld. Trial Court erred in acquitting respondent nos. 1 and 2 of the charges levelled against them. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly deal with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant inter alia to the effect that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not reading/considering the statement of the victim/'K', recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., while reaching the conclusion of respondent nos. 1 and 2's acquittal. As aforenoted, Ld. Counsel strenuously asserted that since the victim/'K' left for heavenly abode, prior to recording her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, her said statement ought to have been considered as her/victim's dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. However, the said contention, fails to impress this Court for the reason that Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act provides for relevancy and admissibility of a dying declaration1, "...made by a person who is dead as to cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which 1 Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517, noted in this context, "...6. The law relating to dying declaration -- the relevancy, admissibility and its probative value -- is fairly settled. More often the expressions "relevancy and admissibility" are used as synonyms but their legal implications are distinct and different for more often than not facts which are relevant may not be admissible, for example, communication made by spouses during marriage or between an advocate and his client though relevant are not admissible; so also facts which are admissible may not be relevant, for example, questions permitted to be put in cross-examination to test the veracity or impeach the credit of witnesses, though not relevant are admissible. The probative value of the evidence is the weight to be given to it which has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the thrust of the submission relates not to relevancy or admissibility but to the value to be given to Exh. 2. A dying declaration made by a person who is dead as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which cause of his death comes in question, is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and is also admissible in evidence. Though dying declaration is indirect evidence being a specie of hearsay, yet it is an exception to the rule against admissibility of hearsay evidence. Indeed, it is substantive evidence and like any other substantive evidence requires no corroboration for forming basis of conviction of an accused. But then the question as to how much weight can be attached to a dying declaration is a question of fact and has to be determined on the facts of each case..." (Emphasis supplied) CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 32 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:09:54 +0530 resulted in his death, in cases in which cause of his death comes in question...". However, in the instant case, it is noted from a conscientious perusal of the records of the Ld. Trial Court that while the statement of the victim/'K' was recorded by the Ld. Magistrate, in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., on 30.10.2014, however, the said victim left for heavenly abode on 15.06.2018 (as recorded under order dated 08.08.2018 of the Ld. Trial Court), admittedly for reasons unrelated to the present case/alleged incident. Needless to further note that neither it is the case of the prosecution or that of the appellant that the said statement of the victim, in any manner related to the cause of her/victim's eventual demise, nor, it is observable from a reading of the said statement that it, in any manner, encapsulates the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her/victim's demise, clearly, bringing such statement outside the purview of the provisions under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Correspondingly, this Court is further not impressed with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that even otherwise, such statement could have been read in evidence by the Ld. Trial Court, in the absence of the victim/'K' stepping in the witness box before the Ld. Trial Court. In fact, in this regard, this Court is well cognizant of the settled law 1, repeatedly avowed by the superior courts that the statement of a witness, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., is not a substantive piece of evidence, and that the same can only be used for corroborative or contradictory purpose(s). Reference in 1 Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Singh v. Harmit Kaur, (1972) 3 SCC 280 , noted, "...8. A statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not substantive evidence. It can be used to corroborate the statement of a witness. It can be used to contradict a witness. The first information report was considered by the Sessions Judge. Any special consideration of the statement of Hazura Singh under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not have produced a different result by reason of the conclusions of the Sessions Judge as to rejecting the oral evidence of Nihal Kaur, Harmit Kaur and Hazura Singh as unreliable, untruthful and unworthy of credence...." (Emphasis supplied) CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 33 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:09:58 +0530 this regard is made to the decision of Hon'ble Patna High Court in Md. Manir v. State of Bihar, 1994 SCC Online Pat. 234 , wherein the Hon'ble Court in an akin context, remarked as under;
"9. Ordinarily, the statement of a witness is recorded by Magistrate when the witness is sent by the Investigating Agency for the purpose of pinning him down when it is feared that he may resile afterwards or may be tampered with. Statement u/s 164 Cr. P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence but can be used for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration as provided u/s 145 of the Evidence Act. The difference of statement before police u/s 161 Cr. P.C. and that on u/s 164 Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate is that the latter one is on oath and the witness, if found afterwards be resiling from it may be proceeded for giving false evidence easily. It has got no evidentiary value of its own. The effect of recording statement u/s 164 Cr. P.C. is primarily relating to the appraisement of evidence during the course of trial and it cannot be said that witness should necessarily be unreliable on the ground that his statement was previously recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Similarly, this Court is also cognizant of the legal provisions and settled law that the statement of witnesses, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are not substantive pieces of evidence as neither being made on oath, nor signed by a witness. In fact, the usage of such statement(s) is quite limited 1, i.e., only for the purposes of contradiction of witness in terms of the provisions under Section 161/162 Cr.P.C. read with Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Apposite in this regard to make a reference to the decision in Omkar Namdeo Jadhao v. Second Additional Sessions Judge, (1996) 7 SCC 498, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of the foregoing, remarked, as under;
"3. It is seen that the observation made by the Sessions Judge, as confirmed by the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in the impugned judgment dated 10-3-1992 made in Criminal Application No. 1 V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588.
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20 of 1991 is based on Section 161 statements recorded during the investigation. Admittedly, no evidence has been recorded. The court should not come to the conclusion on the basis of Section 161 statements which are not evidence. It can be used at the trial only for contradictions or omissions when the witness was examined. Nor could it be contradicted by looking at the physical features of the accused even before they are examined. The Additional Sessions Judge had discharged them concluding that the police officers had fabricated the record. It would appear that the learned Sessions Judge had overstepped his jurisdiction in recording a finding, while looking at the physical features of the accused, that the police had fabricated the record. The High Court has also not properly considered the matter while going into the question regarding discharge of the accused for other offences. Under these circumstances, we hold that in view of the finding recorded by the Sessions Judge of fabrication of the record and that the case is a false one, issuance of notice under Section 340, CrPC is wholly unjustified. The said order of the Sessions Judge is accordingly quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, this Court reiterates that the statement of the victim/'K', recorded under Section 164/161 Cr.P.C. could not have been/cannot be considered to reach a conclusion of respondent nos. 1 and 2's guilt as the same is neither a substantial piece(s) of evidence, nor relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, with such understanding, this Court would now proceed with the evaluation of the material placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court. However, before proceeding to appreciate the evidence of prosecution witnesses and other material brought on record of the Ld. Trial Court, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that the crux of the entire prosecution's case as well as that of the appellant's is premised on her/appellant's own sole testimony before the Ld. Trial Court. Therefore, it becomes pertinent at this stage to note that this Court is mindful that it has been recurrently CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 35 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:10:07 +0530 avowed1 by the superior courts, in a catena of judicial dictates/decisions that there is no bar/legal impediment in convicting a person on the testimony of a sole/single witness, if the version so put forth by such a witness is clear and reliable. Unquestionably, reason behind the same is that the evidence, 'has to be weighed and not counted'. Notably so, in the instances of offences pertaining to modesty of a woman, superior courts have even gone on to the extent to declare 2 that to seek corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim before relying upon the same would amount to adding insult to the injury3 sustained by such victim and, consequently, deprecated the said practice. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with evidentiary value of the sole victim/prosecutrix, noted as under;
"21. ...The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1 Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680.
2State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Munna v. State of M.P., (2014) 10 SCC 254.
3State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550.
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3207, in the similar context observed as under;
"17. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of rape/sexual assault can be based on the sole testimony of prosecutrix, if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars..."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Quite evidently, it is seen from the above that a conviction of an accused can be premised on the testimony of a sole witness only when such testimony is 'sterling1' in nature, which can be relied upon, without any corroboration. Notably, the term(s), 'sterling witness'/'sterling testimony' in criminal jurisprudence has been repeatedly declared by superior courts to mean a witness who is2, "worthy of credence, one who is reliable and truthful." Reference in this regard is further made to the decision in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, catalogued the quality of a 'sterling witness', under the following observations;
"22. ...In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance 1 Bhimapa Chandapa Hosamani & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 323.2
Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433.
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should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged..."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Consequently, being wary of the aforenoted principles, when the material/evidence placed on record is conscientiously evaluated, this Court unwaveringly reaches a conclusion that the testimony of the appellant/complainant/PW-2 in the instant case is far from being terms as being 'sterling' in any manner, so as to form the sole basis of conviction of respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the instant case. On the contrary, this Court is in consensus/concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that there are material improvements/variations in the deposition of the appellant, casting serious dents in the case of the prosecution. In this regard, it is outrightly noted that nowhere under her deposition, the appellant/PW-2 proclaimed of the date of alleged incident, rather, merely proclaimed, "...One day, I CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 38 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:10:20 +0530 along with my daughter 'K' was going to the market. Accused Sunil Badolia along with his sister Hema Badolia came and started beating my daughter 'K'...". However, upon being cross examined by/on behalf of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, PW-2 affirmed that on 24.08.2014, "...accused persons attacked my daughter with the intention to kill my daughter 'K'..." . Pertinently, notwithstanding such confirmation/affirmation, PW-2 again changed her version during the course of her cross- examination and asserted that she could not recollect as to when the alleged incident had taken place. Correspondingly, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment that while PW-2 deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that the accused persons, threw the victim/'K' on ground and beat her up with bricks, however, nowhere in her earlier statement/statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. PW2/C), is any reference made to the accused persons' beating the said victim with bricks. Apposite to further note that there are also material improvements in the testimony of PW-2 as to the role of the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the alleged incident. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note that while in her examination in chief, the appellant/PW-2 avowed that accused person threw her daughter 'K' on the ground and beat her with bricks; respondent no. 1 tore said victim's clothes as well as beat her/'K' with iron rod, whereupon she/PW-2 sustained injury, while saving her daughter, however, upon being cross examined by/on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2, PW-2 gave an altogether new version of incident. Here, this Court finds it pertinent to reproduce the relevant extracts from cross examination of PW-2, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for both the CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 39 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:10:23 +0530 accused.
*** *** *** ...I can specify regarding the sequence of the event in the manner it had taken place. Firstly, both the accused assaulted my daughter with legs and blows and simultaneously they caught hold her hair (Choti). Then, they both told her either the my daughter would take back the case as pending between the parties before Hon'ble High court of Delhi or they both will kill her. Then they both hit my daughter with an iron like thing, again said rod and when I tried to save my daughter, then I suffered fracture in two of my left hand fingers. They had assaulted my daughter and abused her. They both tom her clothes and then pressed her breast. It is wrong to suggest that no such incident had taken place and I am deposing falsely against the accused because of the pending multiple litigation between my daughter and her husband..."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Quite palpably, it is noted from above that the appellant/PW-2 completely changed her version, from her initial deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, during the course of her cross-examination by attributing role of both respondent nos. 1 and 2 in allegedly tearing off the clothes of the victim, beating her up with iron rod and pressing her breast. Concomitantly, it is noted from a conscientious perusal of the record that PW-2, in her examination in chief proclaimed that respondent nos. 1 and 2, came when she/the appellant and her daughter were in market, and started beating the victim. However, during the course of her cross-examination held on 23.11.2019, it was proclaimed by PW-2/appellant that she had seen both the accused on the day of incident for the first time at a distance of approximately 2-3 feet. Nonetheless, PW-2 immediately proclaimed that she had not seen the accused persons, as they approached from behind. In fact, considering such inconsistency in her deposition, as well as her earlier statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., PW-2 was specifically confronted by the accused persons, wherein, the CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 40 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:10:27 +0530 appellant proclaimed, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for both the accused.
*** *** *** ...Q. In your statement u/s. 164 Cr.P.C. you had mentioned that you had seen both the accused for the first time, when they were buying vegetables and today you have stated that they came from behind and started beating your daughter. Which of your statement is correct?
A. I had seen the accused persons first time when they were purchasing the vegetables. I saw the accused persons for the first time at some distance, but I cannot tell as to the exact distance between me and the accused persons. It is correct that next day after the incident the police officials had recorded my statement..."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Here, it is further pertinent to note that even this Court records from the testimony of PW-2/complainant that nowhere under her examination in chief, PW-2 proclaimed anywhere of respondent no. 1's having grabbed the private parts of the victim and throwing her on the ground. In fact, it was only during the course of her cross examination by/at the behest of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, PW-2 inter alia affirmed as correct that accused Sunil Badolia/respondent no. 1, "... grab(bed) the private parts (peshab vali jagah) of my daughter 'K' and threw her on the ground...". However, this Court concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that even in her initial statement dated 25.08.2014 (Ex. PW2/D3), PW-2 made no such allegations regarding respondent no. 1's grabbing the private parts of the victim and shoving her on ground after having grabbed her said private part. Needless to mention that the same is despite the fact that PW-2, during the course of her cross examination held on 23.11.2019, by/at the behest of respondent nos. 1 and 2, not only admitted her signatures at point A on the said statement dated CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 41 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:10:33 +0530 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:10:38 +0530 25.08.2014 (Ex. PW2/D3), rather, even acknowledged the same to be her correct statement. Pertinent to further note that nowhere during the course of her examination in chief, PW-2 asserted of her tendering her complaint to the concerned police officials on the alleged date of incident, i.e., on 24.08.2014, rather, merely proclaimed that her complaint was filed on 19.09.2014. In fact, even during the course of her cross examination, PW-2 asserted that she visited the police station immediately after the incident, however, the reasons for first making a formal complaint (Ex.
PW2/A) only on 19.09.2014 is not forthcoming under the cross examination of the appellant. Undoubtedly, as aforenoted, PW-2, though affirmed that she had made a statement to the police officials on 25.08.2014 (Ex. PW2/D3), however, there is no mention of such statement under the examination in chief of the appellant. In fact, no reasons are forthcoming under the deposition of the appellant regarding the delay in lodging a formal complaint against the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2 only on 19.09.2014. Here it is further pertinent to note that nowhere in her deposition, the appellant/complainant has deposed regarding any malfeasance on the part of the concerned police officials in delaying the recording of her statement or the instant FIR. Significantly, when the said fact is seen in conjunction with the deposition/cross examination of PW-5/ASI Bhoop Singh, the factum of non-explanation of delay in lodging a formal complaint against the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2, in the instant case becomes quite critical.
27. Pertinent in respect of the foregoing to note, PW-5/ASI Bhoop Singh specifically proclaimed under his examination in chief that despite request, both, the appellant and her daughter refused to give their statements on 24.08.2014.
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 42 of 52
ABHISHEK Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:10:45
+0530
Congruently, upon being cross-examined, PW-5 affirmed that the statement of, "...complainant and her daughter was not recorded on 24.08.2014. It is correct that complainant and her daughter were fit for statement on 24.08.2014. On asking from complainant and her daughter for not giving their statement, they replied that will give their statement after consulting with their Advocate. The statement of complainant was recorded on 19.09.2014...". Correspondingly, PW-9/SI Prabha affirmed during her cross examination that the complainants did not give their statements on 24.08.2014 and despite request too, "...both the complainants to give statement but they refused, but they did not give any reason for their refusal to give statement. The complainants gave their statement, after about one month from the date of incident. Between the date of incident and date of their statement, I approached the complainants about two to three times...". Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court further concedes with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the delay in recording of statement/formal complaint of the appellant in the instant case, becomes quite momentous1, not ruling out a possibility of fabrication/embellishment in the case put forth against the accused persons. Needless in this regard to note that though this Court is conscious of the settled law that in the instances/incidents of sexual offences/offences of sexual tenor, delay in the lodging of the FIR can be due to variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family, consequently, such delay(s) cannot be read against 1 Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1; and Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379.
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the prosecutrix1 of a case, however, the present is not a case where the appellant and victim delayed in approaching the police authorities. Rather, as aforementioned, PW-2 asserted that she and her daughter had visited the police station on the alleged date of incident, i.e., on 24.08.2014. However, despite the same, the factum of registration of a formal complaint (Ex. PW2/A) against the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2 only on 19.09.2014 is not forthcoming, anywhere under the deposition of the appellant/PW-2.
28. Congruently, this Court further yields to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that even the reason for delayed handing over of the alleged torn clothes to the police officials is not demonstrable from the material brought forth. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that PW-9/SI Prabha deposed during the course of her cross examination that the complainant handed over the case property to her only on 30.10.2014. Pertinent in this regard to note that despite extensive/thorough cross examination, PW-2 failed to assert the date of handing over of said clothes or the reason for such delay in her deposition. Quite desolately to exacerbate the inconsistencies in the case of prosecution, PW-11/SI Brij Mohan during the course of his deposition, denied the suggestion put forth by Ld. Addl. PP for the State in his cross examination that one woman told him, while sitting in the TSR, that someone had torn her clothes. On the contrary, upon being cross examined by/at the behest of the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2, PW-11 affirmed as correct that, "...when I reached at the spot, no clothes of any woman whom I sent in TSR to PS, were torn. It is correct that no woman was crying from pain, when I sent them to PS in TSR...". In this 1 Dildar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 10 SCC 531; and Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170.
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 44 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:10:54 +0530
regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that nowhere under the MLC of the victim/'K' is there any mention of the victim's wearing torn clothes at the time of her visit in the Hospital, especially when it is not the case of the complainant/appellant that they had handed over the alleged clothes to the police officials on the alleged date of incident , i.e., on 24.08.2014 or that the complainant/appellant anywhere asserted that the victim had an occasion to change her clothes prior to such visit in the Hospital.
29. Markedly, another disconsolate feature in the instant case is that the MLC bearing no. 47324 of the complainant/appellant (Ex. PW1/A) and that of the victim/'K' bearing MLC No. 47323 (Ex. PW8/B) only record the alleged history of/brief history of assault on the complainant as well as victim, respectively, without explication/recording the particulars of the incident alleged to have transpired with the said victims (appellant and her daughter, 'K'). Pertinent in this regard to note that the said factum gains significant momentum, considering that during the course of present proceedings, Ld. Counsel for the appellant has contended that the delay in the instant case was occasioned due to refusal of the concerned police officials to take prompt steps in registration of FIR, which fact as aforenoted, is not forthcoming in the deposition of PW-1. However, it is pertinent to note that despite such assertion of Ld. Counsel for the appellant at this stage, reasons for not explicating/having recorded the alleged history of incident in the said respective MLCs either by the complainant/appellant or by the victim, as asserted by the complainant/appellant under her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, does not, in the considered opinion of this Court, come to the aid and rescue of the appellant's case at CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 45 of 52 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:10:58 +0530 this stage.
30. Portentously, another confounding aspect in the instant case is that though, PW-6/Ms. 'KA', asserted that on 24.08.2014, she went to the local weekly market at around 04:30 p.m.-05:00 p.m. at Sat Nagar, Karol Bagh and saw that respondent no. 1 and 2 were fighting with victim/'K' and the appellant. PW-4 further deposed that she saw respondent nos. 1 and 2 pull the victim from behind, whereupon her kurta was torn from back-side and she made a call to 100 number. However, despite such assertion PW-6 affirmed that neither she accompanied the complainant at the time of alleged incident, nor gave her statement to the police officials. In fact, admittedly, PW-6 did not even meet the complainant and the victim at the alleged time of incident, creating a certain degree of doubt in the version put forth by the said witness. Concomitantly, this Court concedes with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the situation become quite grim when PW-6 failed to explain as to how an ante-time email was issued by her to the police officials by the said witness, despite rigorous cross examination. In fact, in this regard, even this Court records with quite amazement that though, PW-6 affirmed in her cross examination that an email dated 24.08.2014 (Ex. PW6/D1) was issued by her from her email id. to the Commissioner of police on the said date at 08:23 a.m., however, as per the prosecution the alleged time of occurrence was around 05:00 p.m. Needless to reiterate that the explanation in this regard of such ante timed email is not forthcoming under the deposition of PW-6. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that the prosecution has further adduced PW-7/Sh. 'RL'/father of the victim as one of the witnesses, however, admittedly, PW-7 was neither an eyewitness CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 46 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:11:02 +0530 to the incident nor had he accompanied the complainant/appellant as well as the victim to the Hospital on the alleged date of incident. Needless to mention that nowhere under the deposition of any of the other police/formal witnesses, presence or that of reaching of PW-7 at the police station on the alleged date of incident, forthcoming. At this stage, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant extracts from the cross examination of PW-7, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for both the accused.
*** *** *** ...It is correct that I was not present at the time of incident. It is correct that the entire statement given u/s 161 Cr.P.C. was hearsay as I was not personally present at the alleged spot. I came to know about the incident/whole story from my daughter. I do not remember the exact time but it was probably 4:30- 5:00pm. After hearing the above said incident of my daughter, I reached at PS Prasad Nagar. There, I found my daughter along with my wife and did not see any other person as I did not pay any attention towards the accused and other persons. I saw, my daughter was wearing a dupatta as the clothes of my daughter were torn. All her clothes were torn. It is wrong to suggest that my daughter's clothes were torn when I met her in the PS. I did not take my daughter to hospital. I also did not take my wife to the hospital. (Vol. the police officials took my wife and daughter to the hospital). I am not aware about the fact that my daughter as to whether she refused to take herself medical examination. I have not personally made any complaint against the accused as they threatened my daughter to kill her. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely. It is further wrong to suggest that no such incident has taken place on the alleged day, time and place..."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Ominously, even in the considered opinion of this Court, the medical evidence brought on record does not lend credence to the version of the appellant/case of the prosecution in the instant case. In this regard, it is noted that PW-1/Dr. Pawan Dhawan specifically deposed during the course of his cross CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 47 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:11:07 +0530 examination that the possibility of injury on the appellant, though, opined to be grievous under her MLC, due to fall in a quarrel cannot be ruled out. In fact, PW-1 specifically affirmed during the course of his cross examination, "... It is possible that the said injury can be cause due to sudden fall..." . Concomitantly, this Court concedes with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that as per the MLC of the victim (Ex. PW8/B), it is clear that there was no injury on the victim and that she refused to undergo internal examination. Ergo, under such circumstances, the factum of accused persons'/respondent nos. 1 and 2's causing injury to the victim and of respondent no. 1's inserting his hand/grabbing private part of the victim is rendered suspicious. Needles to mention that there has been no recovery of any weapon/iron weapon in the instant case by the concerned police officials at the behest of the appellant or the victim. Correspondingly, even the public person who is asserted to have handed over cloth to victim at the alleged crime scene has not been joined in the investigation. In fact, in this regard, this Court also concedes that considering the various omissions, inconsistencies and lacunae, in the case of the prosecution, it was incumbent that public persons were joined in the investigation. However, despairingly, no endeavor to join any independent persons/public persons was made in the instant case, despite PW-2's assertion that the incident had occurred at a crowded place and public persons were present as well as assisted/came to the aid and rescue of the appellant and the victim.
32. Conclusively, in light of the foregoing, it is reiterated that from the material placed on record and arguments addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and the respondents, the prosecution/complainant, in the considered opinion of this Court, CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 48 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:11:12 +0530 has failed to discharge the burden to prove its case against the respondent nos. 1 and 2, 'beyond reasonable doubt'. On the contrary, in light of the various contradictions, omissions, and/or lacunae, hereinunder observed, benefit of doubt must accrue in favour of respondent nos. 1 and 2. Needless to reiterate, the appellant has made several material improvements in her deposition, besides the reasons for delayed initiation of said proceedings only on 19.09.2014; persistent improvements and contradictions in the testimony of the appellant; non-reporting of incident even to the concerned Doctors at the time of preparation of MLC of the victim and the complainant; besides, considering various lacunae in investigation as hereinunder noted, in the considered opinion of this Court, are sufficient to cast a considerable indentation in the prosecution story against respondent nos. 1 and 2. On the contrary, even in the considered opinion of this Court considering the foregoing lacunae/omissions, the defence put forth by the accused persons/respondent nos. 1 and 2 that considering the ongoing marital discord between the appellant and respondent no. 1, the instant case was falsely initiated against the said respondent, appears to be a reasonable/probable cause. Needless at this stage to further mention, it is trite law1 that the prosecution has to prove the charges/its case against an accused, beyond reasonable doubt and that an accused is presumed to be/considered to be innocent, till it is established, otherwise. It is equally a settled law2 that in case where two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused and the other adversely against it, the view favoring the accused must be accepted.
1Meena v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21.
2Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398, Dhan Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1980) 1 SCC 605 and State of U.P. v. Nandu Vishwakarma, (2009) 14 SCC 501.
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 49 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:11:17 +0530
33. As a concluding remark, this Court deems it apposite to note that against the order dated 17.03.2023/impugned order, the present appeal was preferred by the appellant only on 19.07.2023, with a delay of 94 days. Markedly, in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation Act'), accompanying to the present appeal, Ld. Counsel for the appellant has entreated for condonation of delay of "four months" in the title and around "46 days" in the prayer clause inter alia for the following reasons;
"... 2. The appellant could not file the present appeal in time because the appellant did not get complete certified copy of the trial court record and counsel of the applicant had received the certified copy on 03.07.2023 and thereafter, he prepared the present appeal and the said appeal could not be filed due to the flood as the counsel of the appellant had to come from Trans-Yamuna, Delhi..."
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Clearly, it is seen from above that the appellant had inter alia contended under the aforesaid application that the delay was occasioned due to delay in receipt of the complete trial court records as well as floods, leading to Ld. Counsel for the appellant's not filing the same on time. However, nowhere under the said application the date of applying for certified copy of the TCR or that of eventual date of preparation of certified copy(ies) thereof have been specified. Correspondingly, no particulars of date and time of such alleged floods or eventual removal of incapacity on the part of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, except of mere general assertions have been specified under the said application. On the contrary, it is noted that the said application has been drafted in an extremely casual/cursory manner, so as to even disentitle the appellant any benefit/relaxation under Section CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 50 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:11:21 +0530 5 of the Limitation Act. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note that this Court is conscious of the repeated avowals of the superior courts that there is no presumption under law1 that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate on the part of the litigant and that the courts are advised to adopt a pragmatic, justice-oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation while considering an entreaty for condonation of delay. However, the superior courts have also persistently avowed2 that an application for condonation of delay, "should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system." As a corollary, application for condonation of delay, which is drafted in an extremely casual manner so as to even be bereft of material particulars, besides failing to disclose sufficient cause such as a bald statement, as aforenoted, in the considered opinion of this Court be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
35. Conclusively, in view of the above discussion, the present appeal deserves to be rejected/dismissed and is hereby dismissed not only on merits, rather, even on the aspect of delay. Accordingly, the judgment dated 17.03.2023 passed by Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, 'State v. Sunil Badolia & Anr., Cr. Case No. 297081/2016', arising out of FIR No. 464/2014, PS. Prashad Nagar, under Sections 323/325/341/354/354B/506/34 IPC, acquitting respondent nos. 1 and 2 of the charges(s) levelled 1 J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1082.
2Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649.
CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 51 of 52 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:11:27 +0530 against them, is hereby upheld.
36. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order/judgment.
37. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
GOYAL 2025.09.22
17:11:32
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 22.09.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CA No. 162/2023 B v. Sunil Badolia & Ors. Page 52 of 52