Supreme Court of India
Pankaj Bhargava And Anr vs Mohinder Nath And Anr on 11 December, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 1233, 1990 SCR SUPL. (3) 508
PETITIONER:
PANKAJ BHARGAVA AND ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOHINDER NATH AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1990
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
OJHA, N.D. (J)
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 1233 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 508
1991 SCC (1) 556 JT 1990 (4) 628
1990 SCALE (2)1251
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1992 SC1555 (2,16,20)
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Sections 21 and 39--Tenan-
cy for limited period---Rent Controller on basis of admis-
sions of parties granting permission--Whether can be chal-
lenged in collateral proceedings.
Appeal--'Substantial question of law'--What is.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 9---Civil
Court--Jurisdiction of--Competence to take decision--The
test.
Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 8--Stipulation for
payment of rent--Whether brings about a contract of tenancy.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section
105--Lease--Yearly rent paid by cheque--Cheque
returned--Effect on lease--What is.
Words & Phrases: 'Substantial question of law'--Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants and the respondents by their joint appli-
cation to the Rent Controller sought for and obtained per-
mission for a limited tenancy, under Section 21 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958. The Respondents not having surren-
dered possession upon the expiry of the said period of five
years, the appellants commenced proceedings for re-delivery.
Respondents resisted the proceedings raising several conten-
tions. They urged that the appellants were not the owners of
the premises at all; that the permission under Section 21
was vitiated by fraud resulting from a suppression by the
appellants of the material fact that at the relevant time
the premises was not available for letting at all; that
respondents having been inducted into possession as tenant
from March 5, 1978 itself, one of the basic jurisdictional
requirements for the grant of permission under Section 21
was absent, and that at all events a fresh contractual
tenancy had been created with effect from April 6, 1983
immediately upon the expiry of the five year term of the
limited tenancy.
509
The Rent Controller rejected all the aforesaid conten-
tions and made an order granting possession.
The respondents' appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal
was unsuccessful, but the second appeal under Section 39 of
the Act was allowed by the High Court which held that even
prior to the limited tenancy the respondents had been in-
ducted into possession as tenants; that the subsequent
permission for the limited tenancy was a mere pretence and
the result of a fraud on the statute and therefore a nulli-
ty, and relying on this Court's decision in Subhash Kumar
Lata v. R.C. Chhiba, [1988] 4 SCC 709 held that such a
nullity could be pleaded in and against execution as well.
It accordingly reversed the orders of the authorities below,
and dismissed the appellants' claim for possession.
In the landlords' appeal to this Court it was contended
that: (1) both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribu-
nal having concurrently held that with the respondents'
occupation of the premises from March 5, 1978 to April 5,
1978 even if true, did not constitute a tenancy in that the
other requisite indicia of such tenancy, namely, the stipu-
lation of a consideration was absent and that being a pure
question of fact, the High Court in exercise of its juris-
diction under Section 39 which permitted only an appeal on a
substantial question of law could not reappreciate the
evidence and upset the finality of that finding of fact, (2)
that even if the limited tenancy under Section 21 was ob-
tained despite the subsistence of a tenancy created earlier,
the respondents were bound to assail the validity of the
limited tenancy during its subsistence and not as a collat-
eral plea in the course of execution, (3) Even if the re-
ceipt Ex. D.W.1/3 was susceptible of an inference that the
transaction envisaged by it was one of lease could be said
to be a question of law, by no standards it could be said to
be a substantial question of law within the meaning and for
the purposes of Section 39 of the Act.
On behalf of the tenants it was urged that Section 21 to
the extent it runs counter and forms an exception to the
general scheme of the statute its operation was required to
be restricted severely to the expressed conditions and
limitations contained in that section and that wherever
permission for a limited tenancy was sought and obtained
suppressing any jurisdictional fact such as that the pro-
spective limited tenant was already in occupation as a
regular tenant, the transaction amounted to a fraud on the
statute rendering the permission void ab initio, that the
jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to grant permission is
conditional and that if the conditions upon which alone
permission can be granted are not fulfilled permission
cannot be granted in invitum
510
and that consequently the landlord cannot recover posses-
sion.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1(a) The receipt dated March 5, 1978 on which
Respondents relied contained a recital that a cheque for
Rs.18,000 mentioned in it was given as rent for the premises
for the period of. 12 months w.e.f. March 5, 1978. The Rent
Controller and the Tribunal, quite erroneously, proceeded to
hold that the mere fact that the cheque had been shown to
have been returned had the effect of taking away the consid-
eration for the lease. These authorities mistook the non-
payment of rent in point of fact as equivalent to absence of
consideration in point of law. This was clearly erroneous.
[515D]
A stipulation for payment of rent was by itself suffi-
cient to bring about a contract of tenancy where, of course,
the other element of exclusivity of possession was shown.
The High Court held that a consideration promised is as
valid as one paid, and that, therefore, the circumstance
that the cheque was returned would not detract from the
legal consequence of the stipulation to pay rent implicit in
Exhibit DW 1/3. The High Court construed the receipt and
found that a lease was intended. [515E]
2. The construction of a document which is the founda-
tion of the rights of the parties raises a question of law.
An inference from facts admitted or found is a question of
law if such an inference is to be drawn on the application
of proper principles of law to the facts. Such determination
is a mixed question of the fact and law. The submission that
the High Court treaded on the forbidden ground of facts
cannot therefore be accepted. [515F]
3. What is a 'substantial question of law' would cer-
tainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case. If
a question of law had been settled by the highest court of
the country that question however important and difficult it
may have been regarded in the past and however large may be
its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as
substantial question of law. [515H]
Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh,
[1927] 54 I.A. 126; Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.
The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1962]
Supp. 3 SCR 549 at 557 and 558 and Union of India v. M/s.
Chaman Lal & Co., AIR 1957 SC 652 at 655 & 656, relied on.
511
Kaikhushroo Pirojsha Ghaira v. C.P. Syndicate Ltd.,
[1948] I. Bom. L.R. 744; Dinkarrao v. Rattansey, I.L.R.
(1949) Nag. 224 and Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju,
I.L.R. 1952 Mad. 264, referred to.
4(a) In view of the pronouncements of this Court as to
the limitations on the permissible challenge to the exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 21, any appeal to the remedy
based on concept of nullity and collateral attack is inap-
propriate. [521H]
(b) In a collateral challenge the exercise is not the
invalidation of a decision, but only to ascertain whether
the decision "exists" in law at all and to rely upon inci-
dents and effect of its "non-existence". The permission
granted must be presumed to be valid till set aside. Doc-
trine of collateral challenge will not apply to a decision
which is valid ex-hypothesis and which has some presumptive
existence, validity and effect in law. Such a decision can
be invalidated by the right person in 'right proceedings
brought at the right time. It is only a nullity stemming
from lack of inherent jurisdiction or a proceeding that
wears the brand of invalidity on its forehead that might
afford a defence even against enforcement. Such a collateral
challenge may not be available where there is no lack of
inherent jurisdiction but what is disputed is only the
existence or non-existence of facts which though collateral
to the merits do require investigation into and adjudication
upon their existence or non-existence on the basis of evi-
dence. If the parties before the Rent Controller have admit-
ted that the fact or the event which gives the Controller
jurisdiction is in existence and there was no reason for the
Controller to doubt the bona fides of that admission as to a
fact or event, the Controller is under no obligation to make
further enquiries on his own as to that factual state. The
test of jurisdiction over the subject matter is whether the
Court or Tribunal can decide the case at all and not whether
the court has authority to issue a particular kind of order
in the course of deciding the case. [522A-E]
Subhash Kumar Lata v. R.C. Chhiba, [1988] 4 SCC 709, com-
mented upon.
S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCR 281;
J.R. Vohra v. Indian Export House Pvt. Ltd., [1985] 2 SCR
899; Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, [1990] 1 SCC 234 and
Yamuna Maloo v. Anand Swarup, [1990] 3 SCC 30, explained.
Joginder Kumar Butan v. R.P. Oberoi, [1987] 4 SCC 20, re-
ferred to.
512
5. The expression 'fraud on the statute' is merely a
figurative description of a colourable transaction to evade
the provisions of a statute and does not, for purposes of
choice of the remedy, distinguish itself from the conse-
quences of fraud as vitiating the permission under Section
21. [523H-524A]
6. Permission under Section 21 for letting out the
premises to the same tenant for limited periods more than
once successively would not by itself and without more
vitiate the subsequent grants. In one sense, the successive
grants of permission would share, the characteristics of
post-facto grant. [524B]
Dhanvanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 SCC 1, relied on.
7. The jurisdiction of a court depends upon its right to
decide the case and not upon the merits of its decision.
[522G]
Hugh B. Cox. "The Void Order and the Duty to Obey", 16
U.Chi. L.Rev. 86 (1948), relied on.
JUDGMENT:
