The Authorized Officer vs Haseena Nazar @ Haseena on 17 February, 2026

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Kerala High Court

The Authorized Officer vs Haseena Nazar @ Haseena on 17 February, 2026

The 1st respondent in W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025 has filed this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 12.01.2026 of the learned Single Judge in that writ petition, which was one filed by the respondent herein-petitioner, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Bank to grant her 15 installments to pay the defaulted dues and to pay balance equated monthly installments as and when it falls due, thereby regularising the loan account; and a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 possession notice dated 18.12.2025 issued by the 1st respondent Authorised Officer of the South Indian Bank Ltd.

2. By the judgment dated 12.01.2026, the learned Single Judge disposed of W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that judgment read thus;

"2. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank on instructions submits that the overdue amount in the home loan comes to Rs.1,50,000/-. The Bank has no objection in regularizing the home loan account.

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2026:KER:14948

3. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, and taking note of the fact that the Bank is proposing to take physical possession of the property and since the Bank has no objection in regularizing the loan account, I deem it appropriate to dispose of this writ petition with the following directions:

a) The petitioner shall remit the overdue amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) in the home loan, together with any accrued interest, cost and allied charges, in four equated monthly installments, starting from 15.02.2026 and the subsequent installments shall be paid on or before 15th of every succeeding months.

b) The petitioner shall continue to pay the regular EMIs/installments along with the installments as directed above.

c) In the event of default of any one installment, the respondent Bank shall be entitled to proceed in accordance with law.

d) All coercive proceedings shall be kept in abeyance to enable the petitioner to repay the entire amount as directed above.

e) As far as the car loan is concerned, the respondents are free to proceed with OS No.15/2026 pending before the Munsiff Court, Wadakkanchery.

3. Challenging the judgment dated 12.01.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025, the appellant- 1st respondent is before this Court in this writ appeal.

4. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-1st respondent and also the learned counsel for the 4 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 respondent-petitioner.

5. The issue that requires consideration in this writ appeal is as to whether the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025 can be sustained in law.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant-1st respondent would submit that, as pointed out in paragraph 6 of the statement of facts of the memorandum of writ appeal, South Indian Bank Ltd., through its Authorised Officer, instituted O.S.No.15 of 2026 before the Munsiff Court, Wadakkancherry for realisation of the dues in the car loan availed by the respondent- petitioner. C.S.No.4 of 2026 is instituted before the Commercial Court, Thrissur, for recovery of the dues in the term loan availed by the respondent-petitioner. Initiation of those proceedings necessitated due to the persistent and wilful default committed by the respondent-petitioner in remitting the monthly installments, despite repeated demands and opportunities granted by the Bank. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Authorised Officer of the Bank, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation 5 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), issued Ext.P1 possession notice dated 18.12.2025 and took symbolic possession of the secured assets. The total liability as on 17.12.2025 was Rs.17,84,397.41 along with further interest, penal interest and cost. As stated in paragraph 9 of the statement of facts of the memorandum of writ appeal, the above facts were specifically mentioned before the learned Single Judge, based on the instructions received from the Bank. Contrary to the above stand taken by the Bank, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2026, stating that the Bank has no objection in regularising the loan account. Such an indulgence shown to a chronic defaulter when parallel civil proceedings were pending before the competent civil court, in addition to the proceedings initiated by the Authorised Officer under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, by the issuance of Ext.P1 possession notice, is highly unwarranted. The learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in 6 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 view of the alternative remedy available under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Further, South Indian Bank Ltd., being a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank, no writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Sobha S. v. Muthoot Finance Limited [2025 (2) KHC 229].

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner would contend that no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025, since by that judgment the learned Single Judge has only granted a reasonable time of 4 months to pay the overdue amount, along with the regular monthly installments. Before the learned Single Judge, there was no strong opposition from the side of the appellant-1st respondent in granting installment facility to pay the overdue amount in monthly installments. The learned counsel would submit that on the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a 7 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank the law is as laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions relied on by the appellant-1st respondent.

8. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

9. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on the 8 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

10. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge 9 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also 10 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression 'any person', who could approach the Tribunal.

11. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of 11 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters 12 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.

12. Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act deals with the powers of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate to assist a secured creditor in taking possession of a secured asset.

13. In Indian Bank v. D. Visalakshi [(2019) 20 SCC 47], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the question as to whether 'the Chief Judicial Magistrate' is competent to deal with the request of the secured creditor to take possession of the secured asset under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act as can be done by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in metropolitan areas and the District Magistrate in non-metropolitan areas. The Apex Court noted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equated with the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the purposes referred to in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and those expressions are used interchangeably, being synonymous with each other. Approving the view taken by this Court in Muhammed Ashraf v. Union of India [2008 (3) 13 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 KHC 935] and Radhakrishnan V.N. v. State of Kerala [2008 (4) KHC 989], by the Karnataka High Court in Kaveri Marketing v. Saraswathi Cooperative Bank Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 18], by the Allahabad High Court in Abhishek Mishra v. State of U.P. [AIR 2016 All 210] and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.R. Jewellery v. State Bank of India [AIR 2016 Hyd 125], the Apex Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equally competent to deal with the application moved by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and reiterated in Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the respondent-petitioner has any grievance against the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, she could have availed the statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

15. When the remedy available to an aggrieved person under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is both expeditious and 14 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 effective, as held by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], the borrower, the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) or Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act have to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal availing the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the said Act, instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

16. In Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KLT 784], the Apex Court held that no writ petition would lie against the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, in view of the statutory remedy available under the said Act.

17. In Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. (for brevity 'ARC'), which is a private financial institution, proposed to take action under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The Apex Court held that ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to 15 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 be performed by State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lends money to the borrowers and the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function, which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken, and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, he has to avail the remedy under the SARFESI Act, and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable.

18. In Sobha S. v. Muthoot Finance Limited [2025 (2) KHC 229], the Apex Court considered the question of maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a private non-banking financial company and also a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank. In the said case, the Apex Court held that a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank cannot be termed as a company carrying on any public function or public duty. Merely because a Statute or a rule having the force of a statute requires a company or some other 16 W.A.No.321 of 2026 2026:KER:14948 body to do a particular thing, it does not possess the attribute of a statutory body.

19. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that if the respondent-petitioner is feeling aggrieved by the measures taken by South Indian Bank Ltd., which is a private company carrying on banking business as Scheduled Bank, under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, her remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal in an application filed under Section 17 of the Act and not in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In the result, this writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment dated 12.01.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.48653 of 2025; however, without prejudice to the right of the respondent-petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal with a proper application.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-

MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE AV

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