Himachal Pradesh High Court
Fateh Singh vs Hrtc & Anr on 2 September, 2025
Author: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Bench: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
( 2025:HHC:29730 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.14096/2025 Date of decision: 02.09.2025 .
Fateh Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
HRTC & Anr. ...Respondents.
Coram:
Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the petitioner : Mr. Rakesh Dogra, Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr. Raman Jamalta, Advocate.
Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge
Mr. Raman Jamalta, learned counsel, accepts notice on behalf of the respondents.
Petitioner feels aggrieved against the order dated 01.08.2025 passed by the respondents-Corporation rejecting his case for release of overtime claim for 212 days.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and considered the case file.
3. Background 3(i) Petitioner was appointed as Conductor in the year 1986. He superannuated from the service of the respondents-
1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -2- ( 2025:HHC:29730 Corporation on 30.09.2017. Fateh Singh Vs. HRTC & Ors.1 was instituted by him seeking release of his retiral benefits in terms of decision rendered in Nek Ram Vs. State of H.P. & .
Ors.2 The relief clause of the said petition (extracted from the judgment) reads as under: -
"7(i) Respondent may kindly be directed to release all the retiral dues/pensionary benefits and other dues as mentioned in Para 6(d) (i) to (v) above along-with interest @ 9% per annum to the applicant being covered by the judgment dated 17.07.2014 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 3050/2014 titled as Nek Ram Vs. State of H.P. & Ors. contained in Annexure A-3.
(ii) Respondents may further be directed to pay pension to the applicant, regularly, on 1st day of every month."
The aforesaid original application was decided on 02.05.2019 directing the respondents-Corporation to consider the case of the petitioner in light of Nek Ram2. With the grievance that the decision rendered in Fateh Singh1, had not been implemented, the petitioner preferred Fateh Singh Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Anr.3 The said execution petition was disposed of on 05.04.2023 with the observation that all retiral benefits along with interest had 1 OA No. 1773/2017 decided on 02.05.2019 2 CWP No.3050/2014 decided on 17.07.2014 3 Ex. PT No. 308/2021 decided on 05.04.2023 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -3- ( 2025:HHC:29730 been paid to the petitioner. The petitioner at that stage raised the grievance that arrears on account of overtime had not been paid to him, therefore, judgment had not been executed in .
letter and spirit. On the said contention, the Court held that the issue of overtime was not covered with Nek Ram 2 and no illegality could be said to have been committed by the respondents while restricting the claim of the petitioner to DCRG, leave encashment and grant of statutory interest on delayed payment of retiral benefits. The proceedings in the execution petition were closed reserving liberty to the petitioner to seek redressal in-law for his surviving grievances.
The order passed on 05.04.2023 disposing of the execution petition reads as under: -
"While placing on record communication dated nil issued under the signature of Regional Manager, HRTC Mandi, Ms. Shubh Mahajan, learned counsel, states that judgment sought to be executed in the instant proceedings stands duly complied with.
2. Having perused aforesaid communication, this court finds that in terms of the judgment sought to be executed, DCRG and leave encashment alongwith up-to-date interest stand paid to the petitioner. Though at this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since arrears on account of overtime have not been paid, judgment cannot be said to be executed in its letter and spirit, but having perused judgment rendered by this Court in Nek Ram's case, this ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -4- ( 2025:HHC:29730 Court finds that issue of overtime is not covered with the Nek Ram's case and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondents while restricting the claim of the petitioner to DCRG and leave encashment.
.
3. Consequently, in view of the above, nothing remains to be adjudicated in the instant proceedings and accordingly, same are closed. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to file appropriate proceedings before appropriate court of law qua the surviving grievance if any."
3(ii) The petitioner instituted Fateh Singh Vs. HRTC & Anr.4 once again seeking retiral benefits in light of law laid down in Nek Ram1. The said petition was disposed of on 17.05.2023 with direction to the respondents to release retiral benefits to him within six months. As noticed earlier, Fateh Singh3 instituted by the petitioner for the same relief stood already disposed of on 05.04.2023 as satisfied. The petitioner instituted Fateh Singh Vs. HRTC & Anr.5 seeking implementation of decision in Fateh Singh4. The said execution petition was also disposed of as satisfied on 23.09.2024.
3(iii) The petitioner next instituted Fateh Singh Vs. HRTC & Anr. 6 seeking due and admissible amount towards 4 CWP No. 2871/2023 decided on 17.05.2023 5 Ex. Pet. No. 496/2024 decided on 23.09.2024 6 CWP No. 6824/2025 decided on 28.04.2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -5- ( 2025:HHC:29730 overtime claim for 212 days in light of law laid down in Dhani Ram Vs. HRTC7. The said petition was disposed of on 28.04.2025 with direction to the respondents to decide .
petitioner's representation within time bound schedule. In terms of liberty given to the petitioner in the judgment dated 28.04.2025, the petitioner preferred a representtion on 27.06.2025. The respondents rejected the said representation of the petitioner on 01.08.2025. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition.
4. The respondents have rejected petitioner's case for overtime allowance primarily on the ground of delay and laches.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on considering the case file, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. This is for the following reasons: -
4(i) In the impugned order, the respondents-
Corporation has referred to a decision rendered in Ranbir Singh Vs. HRTC8. In the said case, the petitioner had claimed 172 days of compensatory leave for work done on days of rest in terms of the provisions of Section 26 of the Motor Transport 7 CWP No. 5179/2022 decided a/w connected matters on 16.03.2023 8 CWP NO. 1473/2024 decided on 10.12.2024 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -6- ( 2025:HHC:29730 Workers Act, 1961, with interest. The petitioner therein had superannuated on 31.03.2019, whereas the claim was made in the writ petition instituted in the year 2024. It was held that .
the petitioner therein had not approached the Court either when he was denied the un- allowed compensatory leave or within three years even from the date of his superannuation.
The claim being belated was not entertained. Relevant portion from the judgment reads as under: -
"2. Though, reply to the petition has not been filed by the respondents, however, a perusal of the Writ Petition as well as documents appended therewith demonstrate that prayer of the petitioner is hit by delays and latches. The petitioner is praying for issuance of direction to the respondents to pay extra wages in lieu of the un-allowed 172 days compensatory leave (Sunday rests) for work done on rest days in terms of the provisions of Section 26 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, with interest. The petitioner superannuated on 31.03.2019. This means that the compensatory leave is being claimed with regard to the un-allowed 172 days on which the petitioner worked before 31.03.2019, which otherwise were rest days being Sunday before his superannuation. Unfortunately, the petitioner has not approached the Court either when he was denied the un- allowed compensatory leave or within three years even as from the date of his superannuation.
3. In terms of the law of declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, Constitutional Court are not to entertain belated Writ Petitions even in service matters. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in the matters wherein monetary ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -7- ( 2025:HHC:29730 consideration are involved, if belated petitions are entertained by the Court, then it has to be ensured that monetary relief is restricted upto three years as from the date of filing of the Writ Petition.
.
4. In the present case, the Writ Petition has been filed on 03.01.2024. In the preceding three years as from 03.01.2024, nothing is due to the petitioner from the respondents. The claims which the petitioner is seeking from the Court are pertaining to the period even before his superannuation, i.e. 31.03.2019. Therefore, as the petition is hit by delays and latches, the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any."
The above decision was assailed in Ranbir Singh Vs. HRTC 9. The Hon'ble Division Bench dismissed the said appeal on 13.03.2025 holding as under: -
"Challenge in the present Letters Patent Appeal is to the judgment passed by learned Single Judge on 10.12.2024, in Civil Writ Petition No.1473 of 2024, titled as Ranbir Singh versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, filed by the present appellant.
2. Accordingly, learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches by noticing that the claim as such of 172 days' compensatory leave [Sunday rests] for work done in terms of Section 26 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, with interest was the claim.
3. Learned Single Judge has further noticed that retirement of the employee was on 31.03.2019 and the writ 9 LPA No.72/2025 decided on 13.03.2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -8- ( 2025:HHC:29730 petition was only filed in the year 2024. It is further accordingly held that even a period of 3 years had expired and therefore, the writ petition as such was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
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4. We are of the considered opinion that the view of the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity as any contrary view would amount to opening a Pandora's Box of all retired employees, who would start seeking the benefit which they have not claimed during their service period.
5. The reliance on Annexure A/1 now placed on records also does not strengthen further case of the appellant in terms of instructions dated 15.03.2023 as certain writ petitions are pending before this Court and the directions are that employees who are on the verge of retirement and have compensatory leave in their credit, be got exhausted/liquidated first before the retirement of such employee's and that the Corporation intends to pay the due's as per the act.
6. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that once an employee as such was a fence sitter and chose not to agitate for his grievances during his period of service and has approached this Court after a period of almost five years after the date of retirement, no indulgence can be granted to such a litigant.
7. Even otherwise, it would have far reaching consequences, if such, an indulgence is granted it shall lead to all retired employees staking their claims even though their claims had been barred by limitation and even a civil suit could not have been filed for recovery of the amount.
8. Settled principles of law of limitation bar the remedy if a person is not vigilant enough. In such circumstances, we do not find any plausible reason to interfere in the well-reasoned ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -9- ( 2025:HHC:29730 order passed by learned Single Judge, as it does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity.
9. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed alongwith miscellaneous application(s), if any."
.
4(ii) The ratio of above decision in Ranbir Singh9 squarely applies to the facts of the instant case. The petitioner superannuated on 30.09.2017. He raised claim for overtime allowance for the first time in Fateh Singh6. Petitioner's claim lodged eight years after his superannuation suffers from un- explained delay and laches. Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others10 holds that delay and laches are vital in service matters and can be seen as acquiescence.
Belated service related claim is to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. Laches can be based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. Acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches.
Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay.
Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed 10 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1307 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -10- ( 2025:HHC:29730 pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to .
amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act.
Hon'ble Apex Court explained that while laches refers to an unreasonable delay without active consent, both delay and laches serve the important purpose of preventing stale claims that disrupt settled rights and administrative decisions. In service matters, these doctrines were held to play crucial roles as they protect the stability and finality of administrative decisions. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:-
"21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court:
"(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
"To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal).
One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -11- ( 2025:HHC:29730 doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ .
petition."
(Emphasis supplied) (B).................
21-23. .................
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis."
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301:
36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent.
Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -12- ( 2025:HHC:29730 the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh .
inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case.
xxx
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action.
The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 :
(2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213).
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows:::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -13-
( 2025:HHC:29730 'In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter.
Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?"
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between "acquiescence" and "delay and laches".
Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -14- ( 2025:HHC:29730 (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct .
that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See "Introduction", U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures -- Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation." In Marinmoy Maity versus Chanda Koley & Ors.11, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from 11 AIR 2024 SC 2717 ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -15- ( 2025:HHC:29730 deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ Courts. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising .
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Relevant portion from the decision is as under: -
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -16- ( 2025:HHC:29730 jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited.
If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong.
It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others. (2009) 1 SCC 768, has held to the following effect:-
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS -17- ( 2025:HHC:29730 third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case of .
an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit also when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose." "
The ratio of above decisions apply to the facts of the instant case. In view of above, the impugned order cannot be said to be suffering from any error. The claim of the petitioner at this belated stage suffers from unexplained delay, laches and acquiescence. Hence, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of Jyotsna Rewal Dua Judge 02nd September, 2025 rohit ::: Downloaded on - 02/09/2025 21:26:37 :::CIS