Delhi District Court
M/S Indraprastha Ice & Cold Storage Pvt. ... vs National Insurance Company Limited on 27 November, 2012
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUNIL RANA
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGEII: ROHINI COURTS: DELHI
CS no. 214/11
Unique Code No. 02404C0120422011
M/s Indraprastha Ice & Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.
Having its registered office at:
Indraprastha Bhawan, 17 & 18,
New Subzi Mandi, Azadpur, Delhi110033. .......Petitioner
Vs.
National Insurance Company Limited
Through its Manager
At: 2nd Floor, Indraprastha Bhawan,
17 & 18, Indraprastha Bhawan,
New Azadpur Subzi Mandi, Azadpur, Delhi110033.
Also at: National Insurance Company Limited
Through its Divisional Manager,
D.O.No. 19, Laxmi Tower,
Azadpur Commercial Complex, Delhi110033. .......Respondent
ORDER
1. By this order I shall decide an application u/O 12 R 6 CPC moved by the plaintiff stating that main suit for possession and recovery of Rs.5,40,757/ towards arrear of occupational CS No. 214/11 Page no. 1 of 16 charges/mesne profit is pending.
2. It has been stated that suit premises measuring 1325 sq.ft., approximately on 2nd floor, of the building at 1718, Indraprashta Bhawan, at New Azadpur, Delhi was let out to the defendant for 9 years commencing from 15.12.01 to 14.12.10 vide registered lease deed, which got expired on 14.12.10 by efflux of time and execution of said lease registered lease deed is admitted by the defendant. It has been further stated that defendant was called upon to handover the peaceful possession of the premises as no further document was executed for renewal of the lease deed and since defendant has failed to handover the possession of the premises, therefore, present suit for possession and recovery was filed.
3. It is further stated that defendant has admitted the existence of relationship of lessor and lessee and fact of possession of the suit premises vide registered lease deed which got expired on 14.12.10 and defendant is contesting the relief for possession only on CS No. 214/11 Page no. 2 of 16 the ground that said lease was renewed as the plaintiff had accepted the monthly rent from the defendant after 14.12.10 and oral consent for extension of the lease was given by the plaintiff. It is stated that acceptance of rent does not amount to renewal of the lease and as such, defendant has no legal right to retain the said premises and therefore, plaintiff is entitled for decree of possession U/o 12 Rule 6 CPC.
4. On the other hand, defendant has filed reply to the present application raising objections that present application is nothing but a misuse of process of law and liable to be dismissed with cost. On merits, it has been submitted that lease was executed between the parties, however, said lease was subject to further renewal by mutual consent of the parties and by accepting the rent after 14.12.10 means that said tenancy was renewed automatically with the consent of CS No. 214/11 Page no. 3 of 16 plaintiff for further period of three years on the same terms and conditions as the plaintiff has accepted the rent continuously upto April'2011 and the present application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed with cost.
5. Defendant has relied upon the judgment titled, Jai Mata Builders Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CM(M) 638/2012 & CM NO. 9514-15/2012.
6. I have heard the counsels for the parties and their rival contention and perused the record.
7. Before deciding this application, I have gone through the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the said provision is reproduced here for ready reference: Order 12. Admission Rule 6(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleadings or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at CS No. 214/11 Page no. 4 of 16 any stage of the suit, either on the application of any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, may such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whether a judgment is pronounced under SubRule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date of which the said judgment was pronounced."
8. The scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. VS. Union Bank of India, reported as AIR 2000 SC 2740 and relevant para of judgment is as under: "Para 12: As to the object of order 12 R 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that 'where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to CS No. 214/11 Page no. 5 of 16 which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the fact of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed."
9. It is a well established proposition of law that the very objective and purpose of enacting the provision like Order 12 R 6 CPC is to enable the court to pronounce the judgments on admission when the admissions are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to get a decree. Such a provision is enacted to render speedy judgments and save the parties from going through the rigmarole of a protracted trial. The admissions can be in the pleadings or otherwise, namely in documents, correspondence etc. These can be oral or in writing. The admissions can even be constructive admissions and need not be specific or expressive which can be inferred from the vague and CS No. 214/11 Page no. 6 of 16 evasive denial in the written statement while answering specific pleas raised by the plaintiff and can even be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.
10. It is also well settled law that in order to pass a decree of possession in respect of tenanted premises the court has only to ensure that there was relationship of landlord and tenant and the tenancy of the tenant stands terminated either by a valid notice or by efflux of time and rate of rent is above Rs. 3500/ and tenant is not protected under Delhi Rent Control Act.
11. In judgment titled as Pooja Aggarwal Vs. Sakata Inx (India) Ltd., 154(2008) DLT 237, it was observed in para 7 which is as under: "7. In the instant case, the admission regarding relationship of the landlord and tenant is not in dispute. The rate of rent is above Rs.3500/. The service of notice has been amply shown by the plaintiff by placing the documents on record and the denial by the defendant is a sham and false and the court can always disregard such sham CS No. 214/11 Page no. 7 of 16 and false denials. All conditions of passing an order Order 12 R 6 CPC being satisfied"
12. In another judgment titled as M/s Raptakos Brett & Co.
Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, AIR 1998 SC 3085, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when a lease comes to an end by efflux of time, or by notice of termination, or if there be a breach and the lessee's rights are forfeited, the lessee becomes a tenant at sufferance, and it becomes the duty of the lessee under Section 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act to restore possession to the lessor forthwith. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held as under: "22. ....Under law the erstwhile landlord is entitled to restoration of possession by enforcement of statutory obligation of the erstwhile tenant as statutory imposed on him under Section 108(q) read with Section 111 (a) of the Property Act..."
13. In another judgment titled as C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran, (2006) 1 SCC 228, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: CS No. 214/11 Page no. 8 of 16 "26. ...Much argument was advanced on the receipt of the rent by the landlord after the cancellation of the lease. The consensus of judicial opinion in this country is that a mere continuance in occupation of the demised premises after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an amount by the quondam landlord, would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession..."
"32. ...We are, therefore, of the opinion that mere acceptance of rent by the landlord, the first respondent herein, from the tenant in possession after the lease has been determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of a tenant or a right to be in possession..."
14. In another judgment titled as Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik, 104 (2003) DLT 151 (DB), the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held as under: "12. It is no longer a grey area that where a tenancy had otherwise expired by efflux of time but the tenant continued in possession of the premises, mere acceptance of rent by the landlord could neither renew the tenancy nor create a new one. That is so because such CS No. 214/11 Page no. 9 of 16 subsequent occupation of premises was not in pursuance of any contract, express or implied between the parties..."
"13. ...In any case, this aspect does not assume any importance as no notice under Section 106 was required to be served on appellant due to the expiry of the Lease between the parties by efflux of time..."
15. In another judgment titled as Usha Rani Jain v. Nirulas Corner House Private Limited, ILR (2005) II Delhi 349, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held as under: "17. Though a plea was taken in the written statement about non determination of the lease because no notice to quit as envisaged under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been served on the defendants before filing of the present suit, but this aspect was not pressed at the hearing. Even otherwise, it is a well settled proposition of law that when the term of the lease has expired by efflux of time, there is no need for a landlord to determine the lease by serving quit notice..."
16. In another judgment titled as Inmacs Limited v. Prema Sinha, 153 (2008) DLT 311 (DB), the Division Bench of Hon'ble High CS No. 214/11 Page no. 10 of 16 Court has held as under: "13. ...If a lease is evidence by a contract, as in the instant case, the duration of the lease would be as per the contract and at the expiry of the lease period as per contract the lease expires by efflux of time. Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee and since the lease expires under the contract by efflux of time, no notice of determination of the lease is required."
17. In another judgment titled as Ashok Chopra v. Syndicate Bank, 169 (2010) DLT 361, Hon'ble High Court has held as under: "17. It is clear that the tenancy had come to an end by a efflux of time. Admittedly, there was no document executed between the parties renewing the lease. Tenancy having expired by efflux of time; no notice was required to terminate the lease;..."
18. In another judgment titled as Pakistan International Airlines v. Abaskar Constructions Private Limited, MANU/DE/4394/2011, Hon'ble High Court has held as under: "21. Law is clear. If a lease is evidence by a CS No. 214/11 Page no. 11 of 16 contract in writing, as in the instant case, the duration of the lease would be as per the contract and at the expiry of the lease period, as per contract the lease expires by efflux of time. Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee and since the lease expires under the contract by efflux of time, no notice of determination of the lease is required."
19. It is an admitted case of the parties that there was a lease commencing from 15.12.01 to 14.12.2010 for a period of 9 years between the parties and rate of rent at the time of execution of the lease deed was Rs. 43,725/ subject to increase by 15% on the second term of 3 years and admittedly rate of rent was more than Rs.3500/ per month as per the terms and conditions of the lease deed entered into between the parties. It is worthwhile to mention herein that earlier rent agreement executed between the parties has got expired on 14.12.10 and the notice for termination of the lease was also given by the plaintiff to terminate the tenancy and to handover the peaceful vacant possession of the suit property.
CS No. 214/11 Page no. 12 of 16
20. The only defence as setup by the defendant is that no fresh lease deed was executed between the parties but the plaintiff has been accepting the rent after termination of the tenancy due to efflux of time and same was alleged to be renewed by mutual consent for a further period of 3 years and as such possession of the defendant is not illegal as acceptance of rent after the expiry of lease period is waiver of notice to quit. Ld. Counsel for the defendant has urged that tenancy was not terminated and as such there are triable issue between the parties and plaintiff is not entitled for a decree of possession U/o 12 Rule 6 CPC.
21. In the instant case, I am of the view that since no fresh lease deed/agreement was executed between the parties after termination of the tenancy qua the suit premises on 14.12.2010, hence, the tenancy is on month to month basis and the contention raised by the defendant does not sustain as defence of the defendant is sham, false and the court always disregard such sham and false CS No. 214/11 Page no. 13 of 16 defences.
22. Considering the arguments made on behalf of the parties and lease deed placed on record, provision of law, precedent on this point and discussion made above, I am of the view that a relationship of tenant and landlord has been admitted by the parties and rent was Rs.43,725/ p.m. and the tenancy was terminated as the lease deed got expired by efflux of time on 14.12.10. The judgment relied upon by the defendant is not applicable in the present case as the facts of this case are different. Relying upon the judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court titled as "C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran, (2006) 1 SCC 228" it can be easily concluded that since no fresh lease deed was executed between the parties after the expiry of previous lease by efflux of time on 14.12.2010 and mere acceptance of rent after the termination of lease would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant, the status of a tenant or a right to be in possession.
CS No. 214/11 Page no. 14 of 16
23. Therefore, I am of the opinion that plaintiff has made out a case under the four corners of the Provisions of O 12 R 6 CPC and is entitled for a decree of possession. Hence, present application U/o 12 Rule 6 CPC is allowed and the decree of possession is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant with a direction to the defendant to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. However, keeping in view the facts that defendant being the National Insurance Company Ltd. is a public undertaking and the premises in question is being used by the tenant for a commercial purpose, the period of three months has been granted to the defendant to vacate the suit premises and handover the possession to the plaintiff on or before the Ist of March, 2013. Application U/o 12 Rule 6 CPC stands disposed of accordingly. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Needless to say that the defendant shall be liable to pay the mesne profit for the period hereby granted at the rate determined during the trial in accordance with law.
CS No. 214/11 Page no. 15 of 16 Announced in the Open Court (SUNIL RANA) today i.e. 27.11.2012 ADJII (NW): Rohini: Delhi CS No. 214/11 Page no. 16 of 16