Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
M. Nagender Rao vs B.M. Lakshmiah on 29 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(2)ALT489, 1996 A I H C 3452, (1996) 2 RENCR 562, (1996) 1 RENTLR 386, (1996) 3 ICC 656, (1996) 1 LS 223, (1996) 1 ANDHLD 964, (1996) 2 ANDH LT 489
Author: B.S. Raikote
Bench: B.S. Raikote
JUDGMENT B.S. Raikote, J.
1. These two C.R.Ps. arise out of the same common proceedings and thus they involve common questions of facts and law and as such I am disposing of both the C.R.Ps. by this common Judgment. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the Rent Controller.
2. The petitioner in both the CRPs. is the tenant of the schedule mentioned premises and the respondent is the Landlord.
3. Both the CRPs have arisen out of the petition filed by the tenant under Order 6, Rule 17 read with 151 C.P.C., in I.A.No. 510/94 in R.C.No. 163/92 filed by the tenant on the file of the Addl. Rent Controller, Secunderabad. I have to note at this stage itself that the respondent-landlord has filed an eviction petition against the tenant in R.C.No. 131/92. One of the grounds of eviction is that the tenant had commited wilful default in payment of rent. On the other hand the tenant filed R.C.No. 163/92 seeking permission of the court to deposit the rents into court as per Section 8(5) of the A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the 'Rent Control Act') Both the cases were clubbed together and common evidence was recorded and when the matter was posted for arguments, the present I.A.No. 510/94 was filed by the tenant in R.C.No. 163 /92 for an amendment of the pleading. In R.C.No. 163 /92 the tenant has stated that when he sent the rent for the month of March 1992 through Monery Order, the respondent refused to receive the same without any bona fide reasons. But now by amendment, he wants to delete this plea and in substitution he wants to plead that the petitioner had personally met his Landlord in the month of January, 1992 expressing his in ability to pay his rent in view of the fact that he had to perform his daughter's marriage on 15-4-92 for which the Landlord has orally permitted him to pay by giving his consent. This proposed amendment has been refused by the Addl. Rent Controller, Secunderabad by dismissing I.A.No. 510/94 filed in R.C.No. 163/92 vide Judgment and order dated 3-12-94. Being aggrieved by the same the tenant preferred an appeal before the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in RASR. No. 34605/94 Under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act. The Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, by order dated 20-12-1994 dismissed the appeal holding that such an appeal was not maintainable Under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act and even otherwise there were no merits in the appeal. Being aggrieved by the said order, the tenant preferred CRP.No. 991 /95 before this Court. Against the original order of the Rent Controller dt.3-12-1994 passed in I.A.No. 510/94 in RC.No. 163/92, the tenant preferred another CRP in CRP.No. 5320/94 before this Court.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord in both the cases.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner tenant submitted that the impugned order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller in rejecting his petition for amendment was erroneous. He also further contended that the order of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in dismissing his appeal filed Under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act was also erroneous, and he further submitted that the learned first appellate authority was in error in holding that such an appeal was not maintainable. He alternatively contended that, assuming for the sake of argument, the said appeal before the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad was not maintainable, he has filed another CRP., against the original order of the Addl. Rent Controller, Secunderabad dt. 3-12-1994 rejecting his petition for amendment of the pleading and the same may be considered on merits by exercising the power Under Section 22 of the Rent Controller Act or Under Section 115 of CPC.
6. As against this argument, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord contended that the appeal filed by the tenant Under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act before the lower appellate authority was not maintainable and therefore it was rightly dismissed. He further contended that the revision petition would not be maintainable either Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act or Under Section 115 of C.P.C. He submitted that the Rent Control Act has provided revision petition before this Court Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act only with reference to certain specific orders, but not against all interlocutory orders. He also further submitted that this court cannot exercise jurisdiction Under Section 115 of C.P.C. as the case on hand does not warrant such exercise of revisional power. Thus, he submitted that both the CRPs are liable to be dismissed.
7. From the nature of the dispute raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and the learned counsel for the respondent landlord, the following two points require to be considered by me in these C.R.Ps:
(1) Whether the lower appellate court was in error in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant Under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act, being aggrieved by the Judgment and order of the Addl. Rent Controller, Secunderabad dated 3-12-1994 refusing amendment of the pleading under Or.6, Rule 17 C.P.C. ?
(2) Whether this court can entertain the revision petition either Under Section 22 of Rent Control Act or Under Section 115 of the C.P.C., against the order passed by the Rent Controller on 3-12-1994 rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner-tenant for amendment of the pleading ?
8. Arguing, regarding point No. 1, both the counsel brought to my notice S.20 of A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter, for short, referred to as the Rent Control Act.). The said Section reads as under:-
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within thirty days, from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the Cities of Hyderabad and Secundrabad and elsewhere to the Subordinate Judge or if there are more than one Subordinate Judge, to the Principal Subordinate Judge having original jurisdiction over the area aforesaid. In computing the said period of thirty days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.
(2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal.
(3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.
Explanation:-The appellate authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Controller grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building.
(4) The decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 22."
From the reading of the above section, it is clear that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may prefer an appeal to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the city of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and elsewhere to the Subordinate Judge and if there are more than one Subordinate Judge, to the Principal Subordinate Judge having original jurisdiction over the area aforesaid. The scope of this section has already been interpreted by this Court in more than one decision. This Court has consistently held that Section 20 does not confine the remedy of an appeal only to final orders of eviction or refusal to evict but an appeal can be filed by a person aggrieved even against other orders passed by the Controller. In fact, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hakeem Laxmaiah v. Smt.Kantha Devi, 1979 (2) ALT 228 had held that no appeal was maintainable against interlocutory orders but only against final order. But the said decision cannot be taken as laying down a correct Law in view of the Division Bench ruling of this court reported in re Saleem Bin Ahmed, In re, 1964 (1) An.W.R. 169 which reads as follows:-
"This section, in a plain reading of it, does not confine the remedy of an appeal only to final orders of eviction or refusal to evict. An appeal can be filed by any person, who is aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller. An order passed by the Controller can be an interlocutory order, which may effect one or the other of the parries, and the party so aggrieved can certainly in appeal. The revisional powers given Under Section 22 of the Act confer power on the High Court on an application of an aggrieved party to call for an examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act by the Cotroller in execution Under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal Under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. At any rate, since we are of the view that the impugned order can be appealed against, the revisional powers cannot be availed of, before such an appeal is filed. While agreeing with respect, with the judgment of Basi Reddy, J., in S.R.No. 33312 of 1962 dated 30th November, 1962, we hold that this revision is not maintainable. Let the papers be returned to the petitioner."
In this decision, this Court has held that a person can file an appeal even against the interlocutory order passed by the Controller if he is so aggrieved by that order. It was further held that such person cannot invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 22 which is restricted only against an order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by the Controller in execution Under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal Under Section 20. But in this decision it has not been specifically stated as to when a person is said to be aggrieved by an order in order to maintain an appeal Under Section 20 of the Act. But this point has been clarified in subsequent Division Bench ruling of this Court reported in Chaganlal(died) Sardarilal v. N.Pershad, 1972 (1) APLJ 352 in which this court ruled as under:-
"It may be seen that while the wording in Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is that an appeal shall lie against every order of the Rent Controller, the wording of Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is not so very specific. It only says "that any person aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller". From the decision of the Supreme Court, which is binding on us, it follows that it is not every order of the Rent Controller that would become appelable, nor would it mean that only final orders passed by the Rent Controller are appealable and not interlocutory orders. The test is whether it is an order affecting any rights or liabilities of the parties. Only such orders that affect the rights and liabilties of the parties would become appealable and not all interlocutory orders, which amount only to steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their cases in the pending proceedings, thus, regulating the procedure and not affection any right or liability."
From this decision, it is clear that only those orders which affect the rights and liabilities of the parties would become appealable and not all interlocutory orders which amount only to steps taken, towards the final adjudication. In view of this decision of this Court we have to examine, in every case, whether such interlocutory order affects the rights and liabilities of the parties or it was only a step in aid towards and final adjudication. In fact, the said Divisions Bench of this Court followed the ruling of the Supreme Court, in Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, in which it was held that an order refusing to issue commission for inspection and preparation of plan of a particular premises of landlord, in proceedings for eviction, was not appealable Under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as the order of this nature was mere procedural order not affecting any right or lability of the party.
9. In the instant case, I have to find out whether the order passed by the Rent Controller in I.A.No. 510 of 1994 refusing an amendment of the petition can be said to be an order appealable Under Section 20 of the Act. It would be appealable only if it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties and if it is only a step in aid for final adjudication, then, it would not be appealable. The learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions contended that an order either allowing or refusing an amendment of the plaint or written statement would definitely determine the rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedins and, therefore, it is an appealable one. In fact, under the Rent Control Act, there is no specific provision regarding amendment of the pleadings. But number of decisions of this Court have already laid down that whenever there is no specific provision regarding particular procedure, the Courts have ancillary power to deal with the situation appropriately and in such circumstances, the Court may adopt the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code which is not otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the rules made there under. The authorities of this Court in this behalf are the decisions reported in G.Satyanarayana v. S. Satyanarayana Murthy, 1967 (2) An.W.R. 479. Md.Ikramuddin v. Smt.Sheela Bai Ekbote, 1969 (1) An.W.R. 545 and G.Manikyamma(died) by L.Rs. v. T.Seetharamaiah, 1988 (2) ALT 33. In view of these decisions of this Court, this court also consistently took the view that the Rent Control Court could resort to the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. for the purpose of amendment of the pleadings.
10. But the question still remains to be considered is whether an order either allowing or rejecting the amendment would determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. According to me, an order either allowing or refusing an amendment is only procedural in nature as a step in aid to the final orders to be passed. In fact, this view of mine is supported by the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Indian Cable Company Limited v. Divakar Maternity & Nursing Home, 1988 (2) ALT 89 in which it is held as under:-
"Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions referred to above, I have no hesitation to hold that the amendment of the eviction petition sought for by the respondents herein and permitted by the Rent Controller does not in any way affect the rights or liabilties of the petitioner herein."
The same also was the view of another learned Single Judge in N.Venkata Srinivasulu, In Re, 1984 (2) ALT 63 (NRC). In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the appeal against the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C, before the Chief judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad was not maintainable since the order in question did not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in order to attract the appellate jurisdiction Under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the said appellate judge rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner as not maintainable. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the revision petition filed by the tenant in C.R.P.No. 991 of 1995 and the same is liable to be dismissed.
11. The other complaint of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the appellate Court, having held that the appeal was not maintainable should not have expressed the opinion on merits. I think, there is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. When the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the appeal itself was not maintainable, it should not have expresed opinion on the merits of the case because if a person has not challenged any interlocutory order in any proceedings, he could still challenge the same along with the main appeal, in case if a person feels aggrieved by the same. In this view of the matter, I set aside the observations made by the appellate Court on the merits of the case. In the result, C.R.P.No. 991 of 1995 is hereby dismissed subject to the above observations.
12. With regard to Point No. 2 as formulated by me above, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that alternatively this other Revision Petition filed in C.R.P.No. 5320/94 challenging the order of the Rent Controller directly could be entertained and the impugned order passed by the Rent Controller dated 31-12-1994 passed in I.A.No. 510/94 in R.C.No. 163 of 1994, rejecting the prayer for amendment of the pleading, could be set aside. He submitted that this C.P. could be entertained Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act or u / s.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. From the cause title of the CRP it is clear that this Revision Petition is filed Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act. In order to appreciate the first limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, whether this Revision Petition can be entertained Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, I am extracting Section 22 of the Act herein for immediate reference:
"22. Revision:- (1) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by the Controller in execution Under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal Under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the leaglity, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit."
From a reading of this section, it is clear that the Act provides for revision to the High Court against the order of the Rent Controller passed in execution Under Section 15 of the Act or against an order of the appellate authority passed on appeal Under Section 20 of the Act. Against no other orders, revision is provided under this section. To the same effect is also the interpretation of the learned Single Judge of this court in a Judgment reported in Pasupuleti Krishnamurthy v. Bondilli Bhavani Bai, 1985 (2) ALT 421. From a reading of Section 22 of the Act and also the decision rendered by this court already, it is clear that against the order of the Rent Controller dated 3-12-1994 rejecting the petition filed by the tenant for amendment of an pleading, revision cannot be entertained Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act.
13. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in case if the revision is held to be not maintainable Under Section 22 of the Act, the same may be treated as one filed Under Section 115 of CPC. In support of this argument, he contended that the Rent Controller is a court subordinate and therefore this court may exercise the powers Under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and consider the legality of the order. He has further submitted that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction in as much as the Rent Controller should not have refused the amendment as prayed for by the petitioner in view of the fact that the petitioner has already raised a pleading, for which the present application for amendment is sought, in other connected proceedings initiated by the Landlord i.e., in R.C.No. 137/92 and the landlord would not be taken by any surprise. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Landlord contended that the tenant has already admitted in his evidence that he did not tender the rent amount by money order and there was no refusal on the part of the landlord, which admission the tenant cannot be allowed to take away by pleading contra in the proposed amendment. He submitted that by such admission in his evidence before the court, a right has accured to the respondent and the same cannot be taken away by allowing to plead contrary to such admission. He also stated that the present amendment has been filed only with a mala fied intention to drag on the proceedings after the close of evidence on both sides and when the matter was posted for arguments. In support of his contention he relied on number of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. For instance he refied upon a decision of this Court in Jaldu Anantha Raghurama Arya v. Jaldu Bapanna Rao, in which it is laid down that amendment of plaint or written statement should not be allowed after the case is closed. He aslo relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Shaikh Masthan Sahib v. Palayani Balaram Reddi, in which it is held that "it was not proper on the part of the learned District Munisf to have allowed the respondent to raise an amendment which was a direct negation of his own admission in the Written statement."
He also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shigonda Patil and Ors., in which the Suprme Court held that an amendment should not be allowed when such amendment takes away the right accrued to the party by lapse of time. He also brought to my notice another decision of the Suprme Court in Modi Spinning And Weaving Mills Co. Ltd v. Ladha Ram & Company, in which the Supreme Court held that repudiation of dear admission is motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the valuable right accrued to him and it is against law. On the other hand the learned counsel for the petitioner - tenant submitted that no prejudice will be caused to the landlord if such an amendment is allowed. This kind of controversy, I can go into only after considering the question whether this court can entertain the revision petition against the order of the Rent Controller, Under Section 15 of C.P.C. in view of Sections 20 and 22 of Rent Control Act.
14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that this Court can entertain a revision petition Under Section 115 of C.P.C. He submitted that the Rent Controller is a court subordinate for the purpose of this Court exercising revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 of C.P.C. In suppoprt of his contention, he relied on a Division Bench ruling of this court in K.Chalapati Rao v. B.N. Reddy and Ors., 1969 (1) ALT 227 = 1968 (2) An.W.R. 587 and M.Jagannadham v. N.Rangaiah and Ors., 1983 (1) ALT 106 (NRC) have gone through these rulings and found that this court has consistently held that the Rent Contoller is a court subordinate to the High Court. From the notification issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.O.Ms.No. 4, dated 3-1-1966, it is also further clear that the powers of the Rent Controller are entrusted to the Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and District Munsifs in other areas. In this background, it is clear that the Rent Controller is a subordinate Court appears to be not in doubt at all. But the very short and important question still remains is whether the power of this Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is available at all under in view of Section 20 and Section 22 of the Rent Control Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, held that-
"it cannot be disputed that if the legislature intends to oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, it must say so, expressly or by necessary implication."
In the light of the ratio of this decision, now I have to scrutinise the scheme of the Act in order to find out whether by enacting the Rent Control Act, the legislature excluded the revisional jurisdiction of this Court Under Section 115 of C.P.C., by necessary implication, in view of the fact that there is no express exclusion as such spelled out in any provisions of the Act.
15. I have already extracted above both Section 20 providing for an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller and Section 22 of the Act providing for a direct revision to the High Court against the orders of the Rent Controller. Section 20(4) states that "the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in Section 22."
Section 22 of the Act further provides that "the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records real ting to an order or proceedings taken in this Act by the Controller in execution Under Section 15 or by the appellate authority in appeal Under Section 20 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such orders in reference thereto."
From a reading of both these sections, it is clear that Under Section 20(4) all the orders, under the Rent Control Act of both the appellate and revisional authority are made final and they shall not be called in question "in any Court of law" except as provided Under Section 22. Under Section 22 Revision is provided directly to the High Court against the order of the appellate authority in appeal Under Section 20 or against original orders of the Rent Controller regarding certain execution matters Under Section 15. Thus, from a reading of both the sections, it is clear that the orders under the Act are made final. While providing Revision to High Court Under Section 22 of the Act, the legislature was quite aware of Section 115 of C.P.C. Even without Section 22 there could have been a revision against such order before this Court Under Section 115 of C.P.C. Therefore, the intention of the legislature appears to be to modify the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to the extent indicated Under Section 20(4) read with Section 22 of Rent Control Act, so as to restrict the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court only regarding matters that are specifically provided Under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act and against no other orders. The A.P. Buidlings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is a self-contained Act. To the extent provided under the Act, the general provisions stand excluded. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court provided Under Section 115 of C.P.C. has been excluded by implication. In fact, for this kind of my opinion I am supported by the Judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court reported in Gunta Ramamurthy v. N. Venkoba Setty, 1987 (2) ALT 71 in which the Lordships held that -
"The Rent Control Act is a self-contained enactment providing for remedies under the Act and the applicability of the provisions of any other Act including C.P.C. are excluded. The heirarchy of the authorities are constituted under the Act and diverse remedies are provided under the Act and therefore the relies or remedies are regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Act. In this view, it cannot be said that Section 15 CPC is applicable."
In this decision, the learned single Judge further held that the Rent Controller is not a court subordinate for the purpose of Section 15 of C.P.C. That view appears to be not correct in view of the other rulings of this court already referred o above. Therefore, I am of the opinion that though the Rent Controller is a court subordinate to High Court yet the revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 C.P.C. cannot be exercised more than what is indicated in Section 20(4) read with Section 22 of Rent Control Act. The Code of Civil Procedure is under the Concurrent List and therefore the State Legislature is competent to amend C.P.C. whether ever it thinks appropriate and in fact by this time there are number of State amendments to C.P.C. also. In this view of the matter, the State legislature was competent in restricting the powers of this Court Under Section 115 of C.P.C, by enacting Section 20(4) read with Section 22 of Rent Control Act. Hence, I have to hold that the Revision petition now filed by the tenant Under Section 115 of C.P.C, against the order of the Rent Controller refusing the proposed amendment also is not maintainable Under Section 115 of C.P.C.
16. While dealing with the similar provisions under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965, the Supreme Court held in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, that having regard to the scheme of that Act, the jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 115 of C.P.C. was excluded. In the said Kerala Act also, Under Section 18(5) it is provided as under:-
"subject of the decision of the appellate authority, the order of the Rent Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any other Court of law except as provided Under Section 20."
But a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in a decision reported in Vareed v. Mary, had held that notwithstanding Section 18(5) of the Act, revision to the High Court was maintainable Under Section 115 of C.P.C, but over-ruling the said decision, the Supreme Court held as under :-
"The learned Judge referred to the decision of the judicial Committee in the case of Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, (AIR 1934 PC 81). The learned Judge also referred to a decision of this Court in South Asia Industries (P) Limited v. S.B. Sarup Singh . The learned Judge concluded that so long as there was no specific provision in the statute making the determination by the District Court final and excluding the supervisory power of the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it had to be held that the decision rendered by the District Court Under Section 20(1) of the Act being a decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court was able to be revised by the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that view of the matter, the Full Bench rejected the view of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kurien v. Chacko (1960 Ker LT 1248). With respect, we are unable to sustain the view of the Full Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter. In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section(5) of Section 18 of the Act clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable o be questioned except in the manner Under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition of exclusion of a second revision Under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided Under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided Under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a Court of law and which is a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision Under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The Courts must so construe."
"Judicial Committee in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (AIR 1934 PC 81)(supra) was dealing with the Provincial Insolvency Act an the Judicial Committee observed that when a right of appeal was given to any of the ordinary Courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court would be governed by the ordinary rules of he Civil Procedure Code, and therefore an appeal to Privy Council was maintainable from the decision of the High Court. Here in the instant case the right of appeal has been given under the Act not to any ordinary Court of the country under the Code of Civil Procedure but to the Courts enumerated under the Rent Act. In that view of the matter, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied in aid of the submission for respondent in this case."
"Indeed this view, in our opinion, is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad where this Court was concerned with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the amendments made therein which superseded the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court. The High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction from an order of District Judge disposing of revision petition. This Court observed that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred on the High Court of a State power to remove any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate Court in case, where the error could not be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction. Thereafter, tracing the history of the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act, 1976, this Court observed that the amendment superseded the scheme of bifurcation or revisional jurisdiction with effect from 1st February, 1977. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was amended from time to time in its application to the State of U.P. The two questions that fell for consideration before this Court where (i) whether the High Court possessed the revisional jurisdiction Under Section l15 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court Under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and (ii) whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 of C.P.C. against an order of District Court Under Section 25 of Privincila Small Causes Courts Act. It was held that the High Court was not vested with that revisional jurisdiction. This Court was of the view that an order Under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was not of a Court of District and was not amenable to revisional jurisdiction. This Court further observed that an examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act indicated that it was self-sufficient Code so concerned. All the indications in that Act were to that effect. After analysing the scheme and referring to the decisions of this Court, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded."
"In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
"It was urged that in case we are of the opinion that a revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not lie, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of he Constitution. We are unable to accede. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is different from revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two procedures are not interchangeable though there are some common features. It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act."
17. This ration of the ruling of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Section 20(4) and Section 22 of the Rent Control Act are in pari material similar to Section 18(4) and Section 20 of the Kerala Act. Therefore, I have to hold that the powers of revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure stands excluded and modified to the extent indicated Under Section 20(4) read with Section 22 of the Rent Control Act. Therefore, Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is by implication, excluded by the A.P. Rent Control Act.
18. As I have already stated above, since this Court has been consistently holding that a revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be entertained, against any order, excepting as provided Under Section 20(4) read with Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, I have to hold that, that has been the consistent practice of this Court in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shyamraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat and Ors., . Absolutely, there are no compelling reasons to upset such a practice. Even otherwise, the Legislature also has not thought fit of introducing any amendment to either Section 20(4) or Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, so as to make such other orders amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, the other revision petition filed y the Petitioner-tenant Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure also is liable to be rejected as not maintainable. Since I am rejecting the said C.R.P.No. 5320 of 1994, on the ground of maintainbility only, I do not propose to consider the merits of the case, whether such an amendment should have been allowed or rejected. As I have already observed above, it is always open to the party aggrieved, to challenge such interlocutory order also at the time when the main order is required to be challenged, in case such person is aggrieved by that main order. With these observations, this revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
19. For the reasons stated above, C.R.P.Nos. 991 of 1995 and 5320 of 1994 are hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs.