Karnataka High Court
Mr. T.S. Manjappa vs Deputy Commissioner on 17 February, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268
WP No. 2113 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.2113 OF 2024 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
MR. T.S. MANJAPPA
S/O. THIMMAJARA SHIVALINGAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF GOPENAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHANNAGIRI TALUK,
DAVANAGERE DISTRICT 577215.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. AJAY KADKOL T., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DAVANGERE DISTRICT-577002.
2. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
DAVANGERE SUB-DIVISION,
Digitally signed by DAVANGERE-577002.
MAHALAKSHMI B M
Location: HIGH 3. MR. VENKATESH NAYAK
COURT OF
KARNATAKA S/O. KALYANAYAK,
MAJOR IN AGE,
RESIDENT OF V. KOMARANAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHANNAGIRI TALUK,
DAVANGERE DISTRICT-577530.
4. MR. K.S. THIPPESWAMY
S/O. NANJUNDAPPA,
MAJOR IN AGE,
RESIDENT OF GOPENAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHANNAGIRI TALUK,
DAVANGERE DISTRICT-577215.
... RESPONDENTS
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268
WP No. 2113 of 2024
(BY SRI YOGESH D. NAIK, AGA FOR R-1 & R-2;
SRI N.K. SIDDESWARA, ADVOCATE FOR R-3;
V/O. DATED 13/02/2025, NOTICE TO R-4 DISPENSED WITH)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE DIRECTION
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 24.12.2018
PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 IN PTCL:34/2014-2015, WHICH
IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E; AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED 27.11.2023 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IN PTCL:CR
06:2019-20 IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-G.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR DICTATION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner - purchaser knocks the door of this Court assailing the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, who by the order directed for restoration of land bearing Sy.No.9/15 measuring 01 acre 15 guntas and Sy.No.11/18 measuring 01 acre 03 guntas both situated at V Komaranahalli village, Channagiri taluk, Davangere district confirmed by the respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner.
2. The petitioner claims to have purchased the land in Sy.No.9/15 from its erstwhile owner one Rudrabai under registered sale deed dated 19.01.1994 and under a -3- NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 sale deed dated 12.10.1995 Sy.No.11/18 is conveyed in favour of the petitioner by the respondent No.4, who in turn had purchased the land Sy.No.11/18 under sale deed dated 07.07.1993 from Rudrabai and pursuant to the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner they claim to be in possession and enjoyment of the lands in question. The respondent No.3 filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner - respondent No.2 under Section 4 (2) and (5) of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'PTCL Act' for short) contending that the sale of the lands which is executed in favour of the petitioner herein is in violation of the provisions of the PTCL Act, and sought for restoration in his favour on the score that he is the legal heir of the grantee Rudrabai, whom he claims to be his grandmother and the date of grant being 19.04.1978. The well settled legal proposition laid down by this Court and also by the Apex Court is that the law does not come to the rescue of those who have slept over their rights. The application filed by the -4- NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 respondent No.3 claiming to be the legal heir of the original grantee namely, Rudrabai has to provide an acceptable explanation as to what compelled him to maintain a silence for more than 20 years i.e., from the period between 1993, the first sale to 2015, the date on which he filed an application for resumption. This Court deems it appropriate to refer the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Ram Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and another1 (Nekkanti).
3. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti while interpreting Section 5 of the Act observed that the point of limitation wherein interested person can file appropriate application seeking annulment of sale as void under Section 4 of the Act. Reiterating the principles laid down in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and others vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead) through LRs and others2 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner 1 (2020) 14 SCC 232 2 2018 (12) SCC 527 -5- NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 and others3 held that where a statute did not prescribe a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. The Apex Court was of the view that the authorities have to give due regard to the period of time within which an action has to be taken by the interested person. The Apex Court was of the view that an inordinate delay in initiating an action by an interested person under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act no annulment of transfer could be allowed.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the question of dealing in making a resumption application would pale in significance in view of the Karnataka Act No.30/2023, whereby the PTCL Act has been amended, to the effect that there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the PTCL Act and this aspect has been rightly considered by the Deputy Commissioner. It is submitted that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in W.P.No.27496/2023 3 2020 (14) SCC 236 -6- NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 and is pending consideration before the coordinate bench of this Court and submits that the present petition needs to await the order of the coordinate bench in W.P. No.27496/2024.
5. In this context learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placing reliance upon various judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti, Chhedilal and Ningappa stated supra, submits that the judgments clearly indicate that on the ground of gross delay and latches, the application made by the grantee or by the legal heirs under Section 5 of the PTCL Act requires to be rejected.
6. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the pendency of challenge of the validity should not come in the way when the delay and latches are concerned and places reliance on the following judgments:
1. Sri Vijayendra vs. State of Karnataka and others (W.A. No.110/2023) -7- NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024
2. Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma vs. The Deputy Commissioner and others (W.A. No.100101/2024)
3. Smt. M. Manjula and others vs. The Deputy Commissioner and others (W.A. No.210/2023)
4. Sri Muniraju and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (W.P. No.3840/2022)
5. Erappa vs. Assistant Commissioner and others (W.A. No.100265/2023).
7. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi has held at para No.8 as under:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo moto action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav and also in Ningappa v. Commr.
-8-NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to 31-12- 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Commr., Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka and G.Maregouda v. Commr. holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly."
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8. The division bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma vs. The Deputy Commissioner and others4 at para No.3 has held as under :
"3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the definition of 'granted land' in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004.
Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, 4 WA 100101/2024
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003.
(b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a "hereditary land" falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty-two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 Karnataka5, that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of "limitation and delay" has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under:
"(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section."
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened 5 (2020) 14 SCC 232
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses
(c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation period" at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken.
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
(C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal,
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ....."
(Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are replete in Law Reports relating to delay and laches
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan6 make out this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of 6 (2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify."
9. The division bench marked difference between "delay and Laches", held that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured and considering the submission of
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 the learned counsel for the appellant that the Act 30 of 2023 was amended, the provisions of Section 5 of the PTCL Act by adding clauses (c) and (d) to sub Section (1) of the said Section and thereby held that the concept of "limitation and delay", has to remain miles away. Regard to amendment it was stated that at no point of time that the Act itself did not prescribe any period of limitation for moving an application for resumption of land after it was alienated, the amendment which has been made with retrospective effect is only duplication of the existing legal position as most common they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through so far as the limitation period is concerned.
10. It is not in dispute that there is no limitation prescribed in the enactment and neither the amendment which has been sought to be stated by the respondent as per the Karnataka Act 30 of 2023 prescribe no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the Act. What is there is the latches which involves a ground factor and pertains to
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 the domain of equity; neither in Nekkanti Ramalakshmi speak about the limitation period. What is spoken or discussed is rather the long lapse of time between the alienation of the granted land and filing of a claim for its resumption. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi's case still stands the field and the amendment so sought also prescribed that no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the Act. The recent decision of division bench of this Court headed by our Chief Justice in the case of Vijayendra took a similar view and held at para No.4 to 4.8 as under:
"4. The legal provisions and development of law in the subject deserve to be noticed. While 'granted land' is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act, Section 4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of transfer of granted lands, to provide that notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or commencement of the Act, in terms of the contravention of the grant or in contravention of the law in that regard or in breach of sub-Section (2) of Section 4, such transfer shall be treated as null and void, not to give any right, title or interest
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 in favour of the person to whom the land is transferred.
4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Under sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1) and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution of granted lands.
4.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as under, "5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands-
(1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub- section (1) of Section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land.
(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub- section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this Section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4."
4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision that there is no prescription of time limit for resumption or restitution of the land which is null and void under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), which was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein that the application made for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay. It was held that there was no annulment of transfer could be allowed.
4.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra),
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 "However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.'' (para 8) 4.3.2 It was further stated, "An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ......"
4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27.07.2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely,
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 "(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act.
(d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section."
4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not touch anything on merits of the said validity proceedings and it is clarified that the said proceedings before learned Single Judge shall be decided on their own merits.
4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29.07.2024.
4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the Division Bench observed thus, in para 3(d),
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity."
4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the Division Bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate."
4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the Division Bench highlighted the nice distinction between 'delay and laches', as against 'limitation'. It was observed that the 'limitation' is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of 'delay and laches' has a different connotation to operate.
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 4.8 The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of laches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by laches."
11. The Division Bench in the case of Vijayendra observed that the remedy for which the party knocks the door of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches. The principles governing overlap delay and latches as the facet in equity. The division bench held that the delay is genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The Court in Vijayendra's case held at para No.5.2 as under:
"5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and laches has the facet in
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 equity. Delay is the genus to which the laches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, laches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law."
12. The decision stated supra in the case of Nekkanti, Gouramma and Manjula are aptly applicable to the present case the delay is not of few days but an inordinate delay of 20 years. It is borne from the records that the lands in question has not only changed the hands but also the character of the land. The Apex Court in Chhedilal Yadav's case at para No.13 has held as under:
"13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights."
13. The Apex Court in the case of Ningappa has held at para Nos.3, 4 and 5 as under:
"3. Admittedly, Respondents 3 to 7 had sold the land in question to the appellant in the year 1972. This was done by Respondents 3 to 7 voluntarily and of their own free volition. It is only in the year 1988 that they filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 inter alia praying for cancellation of the sale transaction and also restoration of the land in question.
4. In our opinion, the application of the respondents should have been rejected on the short ground that there was considerable delay in filing the same and thus it was not maintainable. Even if
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 no limitation is prescribed by the statute, all acts have to be done within a reasonable period of time.
5. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. No costs."
14. The law being settled by the Apex Court in the case of Chhedilal Yadav's case wherein the Apex Court has observed that the action which was grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time would be incorrect and it is stated that what is reasonable time would be determined on circumstances of each case. In the judgment of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi the Apex Court held that the delay in invoking the provisions of PTCL Act would have to be taken within a reasonable time and if not, the application for resumption would have to be rejected. The two division bench of this Court in Smt. Manjula, Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma have held that if the proceedings for resumption have initiated belatedly such proceedings are required to be quashed.
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024
15. This Court on 25.01.2024 declined to grant interim relief as prayed by the petitioner. Pursuant to the rejection of the interim prayer the possession of the land in question was delivered from the petitioner to the respondent No.3 which is not in dispute.
16. In the present facts the delay is not a few years but a delay of 20 years, the doctrine of latches would definitely come into play in light of the decisions stated supra rendered by the Apex Court and by the division bench of this Court, the orders of the Assistant Commissioner confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner in allowing the restoration application warrants interference, and this Court pass the following order.
ORDER
(1) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(2) The impugned orders passed by the Assistant
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner are hereby set aside.
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NC: 2025:KHC:7268 WP No. 2113 of 2024 (3) Since the orders of Assistant commissioner and deputy commissioner are set aside, the appropriate authority is directed to take appropriate action for redelivery of possession in accordance with law.
Sd/-
_______________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA ykl List No.: 1 Sl No.: 29