Patna High Court
Haridwar Pandey vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 27 October, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(2)BLJR1037
JUDGMENT Nagendra Rai, J.
1. The present application has been filed for quashing the prosecution of the petitioner in Special Case No. 158/1985 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 37(1) of 1978 under Section 5(ii) read with Section 5(i) 5(E) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
2. On 30th April, 1978 a First Information Report was lodged against the petitioner alleging that he was in possession of wealth disproportionate to his known source of his income during his service tenure. It is to be stated that at the relevant time the petitioner was acting as Executive Engineer in Road Construction Department, Darbhanga. On 2.1.81 the Investigating Agency submitted a final report stating mistake of facts. The matter was further investigated by the Vigilance Police and on 8.7.82 another report was submitted mentioning the mistake of facts. The matter was put up before the Special Judge. He however, did not agree with the final report submitted by the police and found that there was sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner. As the petitioner was a Government Servant and for prosecution sanction was necessary he directed the authority concerned to take necessary steps in the matter. Thereafter, sanction was obtained and charge sheet was submitted in the years, 1987 and cognizance was taken against the petitioner on 20th June, 1987.
3. The petitioner challenged the order of sanction in Cr. W.J.C. No. 242/1988 which was dismissed on 18.11.1988 and the same was upheld by the Apex Court in SLP No. 176/1984 on 22.2.1989. The petitioner again came to this Court in Cr. Rev. No. 330/1990 challenging his prosecution and the same was dismissed on 13.11.90 with an observation to dispose of the case within three months on day-to-day basis. Thereafter, the petitioner again came to this Court in Cr. W.J.C. No. 267/1992 for quashing the prosecution on the ground of denial of right to speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the said writ application was dismissed on 30th July, 1992 after coming to the conclusion that the delay was occasioned because of the system itself and the petitioner has come to this Court again and again and the Court has remained without Presiding Officer for quite some time. However, this Court directed for expeditious disposal of the case and thereafter again the present application has been filed for quashing the prosecution.
4. It is asserted on behalf of the petitioner that charges in this case were framed on 11.1.91 and during six years the trial has not been concluded on account of delaying tactics adopted by the prosecution. It is stated that out of 98 witnesses to be examined by the prosecution only 22 witnesses have been examined and out of whom two witnesses are yet to be cross-examined. Out of 105 documents to be exhibited on behalf of the prosecution only 17 documents have been exhibited. The prosecution has been delaying the trial on one ground or the other. It is also asserted that the prosecution with a view to delay the matter is examining the witnesses who have not been mentioned as witnesses in the chargesheet. The order sheets of the Court below have been filed by the accused to support his submission that the. delay is being caused by the prosecution.
5. Counter Affidavits and Supplementary Counter Affidavits have been filed on behalf of the Vigilance Department wherein it is stated that this Court in Cr, Rev. No. 330/90 did not quash the prosecution of the petitioner and by order dated 13.11.90 directed the trial Court to dispose of the case expeditiously preferably within three months on day-to-day basis. The lower Court records were sent to the lower Court and the same were received there on 5.1.91. and 10.1.91 was the date fixed for framing of the charges in the case. On that day the case was adjourned to 11.1.91 and the charges were framed on that day and 23.1.91 was the date fixed for examination of the witnesses. The accused on that day filed a petition seeking adjournment but the Court below refused to grant adjournment. Thereafter, several petitions were filed on behalf of the accused praying for stay of the further proceedings on the ground that he will move the High Court against the order of framing of the charges and in another petition he prayed for staying the proceedings till the disposal of the SLP against the order of the High Court dated 13.11.90. The aforesaid petitions were rejected on 23.1.91. However, as the accused was not present an application under Section 317 was filed by a Counsel who had no power on behalf of the accused. The two witnesses who were in attendance on that day could not be examined and a non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner fixing 30.1.91 as the next day in the case. On 25.1.1991 the petitioner appeared and prayed for recall of the order and the same was recalled by the trial Court. Again a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner on 30.1.91 that copy of the documents as required to be furnished under Section 207 Cr.P.C. has not been furnished. On that day the said petition was rejected. Similarly another petition was filed on 11.1.91 which was rejected by the Court and P.W.1 was examined on that day and the case was adjourned to 20.2.91. On 20.2.91 witness Yogendra Jha was present in the Court but on that day certain documents were not available with him so the case was taken up on 21.2.91 and on which day he was examined and discharged. Again a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner for adjournment of the case on the ground that he has moved the Supreme Court for quashing the orders dated 11.1.91 and 30.1.91. On that day a petition was filed on behalf of the prosecution that one prosecution witness, a clerk of M/s. Vaishali Nav Nirman had come to the Court with register showing purchase of shares by the family of the accused but the accused told him to go back with the said register and also threatened him not to produce the same in the Court. After hearing he parties the Court adjourned the case to 25.3.91 directing the accused to bring the stay order. The Court was not available on account of transfer from 25.3.91 to 11.4.91. On 25.5.91 the Court was closed and the case was taken up on 23.5.91 on which day one witness was examined and cross-examined. On the next date two witnesses were in attendance but due to paucity of time the case was fixed for 25.5.91. On which day one witness was examined and partly cross-examined and on 27.5.91 he was finally discharged. On 12.6.91 another witness Brajnandan (P.W.5) was examined. The the accused on that day filed three petitions and the case was adjourned to 13.6.91 on the request of the Counsel of the accused. On that day witness Brijnandan Kumar was cross-examined and discharged. Another witness was examined and cross-examined on 15.6.91 and the case was adjourned to 4.7.91 with the consent of the parties. On 4.7.91 one witness Rameshwar Lal was examined, cross-examined and discharged and another witness was examined and his cross-examination was deferred on the request made by the accused. The accused filed three petitions on that day. On 05.5.91 one witness was examined, cross-examined and discharged and on 30th July, 1991 one witness was examined, cross-examined and discharged and the case was adjourned to 9.7.91. On that day one witness was in attendance but could not be examined and the case was fixed for 29.7.91. On 14.8.91 two witnesses were examined. Cross-examined and discharged and thereafter the case was adjourned to 9.10.1991 on which day the Presiding Officer of the Court was on leave. On 2.12.91 several petitions were filed on behalf of the accused and the case was adjourned to 20.12.91. As the regular Court was not available till August, 1992 the matter was not taken up. On 9th September, 1992 several petitions were filed by the accused which were heard and disposed of and the case was adjourned to 14th September. 1992, on which day the accused filed a petition which was heard and disposed of and one witness was finally examined, cross-examined and discharged. On the next date one witness (P.W. 16) was examined, cross-examined and discharged. On 15.9.92 again petitioner filed a petition which was heard and disposed of. On 16th September, 1992 two witnesses were examined, cross-examined and discharged. Again on 18th September, 1992 one another witness was examined, cross-examined and discharged and the case was fixed for 19.9.92. Thereafter on 19th September, 1992 one witness was in attendance, who was examined in chief in part and the case was adjourned to 21.9.92. After the case was adjourned several petitions were filed by the accused-petitioner. One witness was again examined, cross-examined and discharged on 21.9.92. On 28.9.92 one witness Ram Dahin Sharma was examined in part and the case was adjourned to 29.9.92. Again several petitions were filed on 29.9.92 and aforesaid Ram Dahin Sharma was examined further and the case was adjourned to 30.9.92. Again several petitions were filed on bahalf of the petitioner and thereafter witness Ram Dahin Sharma was cross-examined on several dates. His cross-examination continued upto 5th May, 1993 on which date he was discharged. During this period the Court noticed that the accused person is in habit of filing vexatious petitions as a result of which the good deal of time is being wasted in disposing of those petitions. The Court also noticed that the cross-examination of Ram Dahin Sharma continued for many dates. It is further stated that after the witness Ram Dahin Sharma was discharged on 5.5.93 the Court went on leave as a result of which no progress was made in the case. On 7th July, 1993 the case was taken up and on which date no witness was examined in chief and the same was adjourned for the next date. On the next date i.e. 8.7.93 the witness was absent but he made him available on.9th July, 1993 and was examined in part and the case was adjourned to 23.7.93. Again on which date he was examined in part. He was further cross-examined in part. He was further cross-examined in part on several dates i.e. 24.7.93, 1.8.93, 12.8.93, 13.8.93 and 5.9.93. Thereafter, the Court was on leave for certain dates. Several petitions were filed by the accused which were disposed of by order dated 12.1.94. The Court noticed that the accused person was in habit of filing frivolous petitions to prevent the trial. On 13.1.94 one witness. P.N. Misra was examined and finally discharged. On 27.1.94 Ramjas Singh was examined in chief. On 7.2.94 no witness was in attendance. The accused filed three petitions which were heard and disposed of. Witness Ramjas Singh was further examined on 1.2.94 and a long petition was filed on behalf of the accused which was heard and disposed of on that date and the case was fixed for 14.2.94. On which date Ramjas Singh was cross-examined in part and his cross-examination continued to several dates i.e. 24.4.1994 4.3.94, 5.3.94, 9.3.94, 18.3.94 and 2.4.94. During this period other witnesses were present on some dates but as the Court was busy they could not be examined. Witness Ramjas Singh was further cross-examined on 16.3.94. On 17.5.94 one other witness was present but because of cross-examination continued on 21.5.94, 23.5.1994, he was not examined and the case was adjourned to 31.5.1994, on which date Ramjas Singh was further cross-examined and his examination continued on 14.6.94, 23.6.94, 8.7.94 and thereafter the Court remained non-functional due to strike of the Advocates. Again Ramjas Singh was further cross-examined on 24.8.94, 25.8.94, 26.8.94, 3.10.94, 14.11.94, 1.6.94 and finally he was discharged on 3.6.95. The trial Court in its order noticed that cross-examination of Ramjas Singh for a long period is mere a delaying tactics adopted by the accused for prolonging the case. No progress was made in the trial Court from 23rd December, 1994 to 13.3.95 due to strike by the non-gazetted employee. No witness was produced by the prosecution immediately after the strike was called off as the witnesses could not be informed in time. On 14.4.95 Rameshwar Nath Mishra was in attendance who was examined, cross-examined and discharged. On 22.695 five petitions were filed by the accused. The Court fixed 5.7.95 for disposal of those petitions. On 5.7.95 one witness was present but nobody appeared on behalf of the accused and the case was adjourned to 17.7.95. Later on the same day accused-petitioner appeared and filed petition for expediting the trial and fixing a date of hearing on day-to-day basis. The Court disposed of the said petition on the next date i.e. 17.7.95, on which date one witness was examined and on the request of the accused 11.8.95 was fixed for further cross-examination of the aforesaid witness. Again on 11.8.95 several petitions were filed and the case was adjourned to 23.8.95 for cross-examination of B.C. Verma, on which date witness was not present. Two petitions were filed on behalf of the petitioner and the case was fixed for the next date. On the next date the case was adjourned with the consent of the parties to 13,9.95 for further cross-examination of B.C.Verma. On 14.9.95 B.C. Verma was cross-examined and on the request of the witness the case was adjourned to 2.'11.95 for the further cross-examination. In the meantime, several petitions were filed which were heard and disposed of. In the month of November '95 the Presiding Officer went on leave and the case was fixed for 6.12.95 on which day the Presiding Officer was on current leave. In the month of December 1995 the records were called for in Cr. Misc. No. 1154/95 by this Court; The Presiding Officer was transferred in January, 1996. In the month of March '96 the case was taken up but no witness was in attendance and the case was adjourned to 6.4.96. Thereafter, the Presiding Officer was on leave on certain dates and the witnesses were also absent on one date. On 8.8.96 one witness was present, who was examined in part and on the request of the accused his further cross-examination was deferred. Several petitions were filed by the accused which were heard and disposed of. Thereafter, again several petitions were filed by the accused with a view to delay the proceedings and P.W.22 was further cross-examined on 24.9,96 and the case was adjourned to 8.10.96 for further cross-examination. The Presiding Officer was on leave in November 1996 and thereafter he was promoted as the District Judge. In the meantime, the petitioner has filed the present application.
6. Thus, the stand of the State is that accused has been prolonging the cross-examination of the witnesses. He has cross-examined one witness for a number of days with sole object to delay the proceeding. Even on the dates when the witnesses were present most of the time of the Court was consumed in disposing of the several petitions filed by the petitioner with sole object to delay the disposal of the trial. The accused also put irrelevant questions which have been noticed by the Court with a view to delay the disposal of the case. Most of the witnesses are retired Government personnel. When they appeared in the Court they could not be examined, either the Court was on leave or because of the transfer of the Presiding Officer the Court was absent or the accused himself prayed time for procuring some documents for cross-examination. It is also stated that from last part of year, 95 to the beginning of 1997 the Court of Special Judge was not functioning regularly. It was also stated that even when the Court was available it was pre-occupied with other important cases as it is incharge for vigilance cases as well as Special Court for C.B.I, cases.
7. The petitioner also filed reply to the counter affidavit and has also filed ordersheets of the trial Court and other documents to justify his assertion that he is not responsible for the delay and the delay has been occasioned by the prosecution. He has also-urged that the case is of the year, 1978 and in view of the materials brought on the record it is a fit case where the prosecution of the petitioner should be quashed on the ground of denial of right to speedy trial.
8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State on the other hand submitted that the materials on the record show that the delay, if any, is because of the system itself as well as because of the delaying tactics adopted by the accused and the prosecution has been taking steps and is vigilant in this case. As such no case for quashing the prosecution is made out in this case.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of In re The Special Court Bill 1978 (1979) 1 S.C.C.380 has observed that it is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal Courts excel in slow motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and still more exasperating there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and Supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of the prosecutions. The aforesaid case is fully applicable in the present case.
10. The record of this case shows that the petitioner have been coming to this Court at every stage such as challenging the order of sanction, order of cognizance, framing of charges and continuance of the proceedings. This apart the matter has come at he instance of the petitioner or his relations to this Court times without number. Even in the trial Court the petitioner who is appearing in person in making all efforts to see that any how the trial delays so that ultimately he can get the benefit of delay in disposal of the trial. The trial Court has noticed in several orders the way petitioner was disturbing the proceeding in the trial Court every day. It appears from the different orders that on every day in the proceeding he is in habit of filing petitions. Most of them are frivolous and unjustified and the Court's valuable times have been consumed in disposing of those petitions. In this connection I would like to mention one order dated 20.4.93 wherein the trial Court has observed as follows:
It is to be observed that the accused petitioner appears to have got fascination for filing vexatious petitions with the contents already heard and disposed of. A good deal of time of the Court is wasted every day in listening to him and passing orders on his petitions. He has been cross-examining a single witness. P.W.19 since long. He very often puts unnecessary and irrelevant questions to the witnesses and when he is asked not to put such questions he sharply reacts, and start shouting words derogatory to the Court at the top of his voice and he also picks up quarrel with the witness. He is in the habit of levelling wild and baseless allegation against the Court branding it having passed order in annoyance or on account of it not being conversant with the provisions of law and showing undue favour to the prosecution. Some of his utterance are definitely contemptuous but he Court with all restraints has been ignoring them since long even without making an observation to that effect.
11. As stated above earlier the petitioner has also come before this Court for quashing of the prosecution on the ground of delay and this Court in Cr. W.J.C.No.267/92 did not quash the prosecution on the ground of delay by order dt. 30.7.92. The relevant paragraph of the order passed by this Court is as follows:
Having heard the learned Counsel and considered Antulay's case (supra) we are of the opinion that delay has occurred on account of the system itself. The petitioner has come to this Court again and again and the Court has remained without a presiding judge for quite some time also. As has been observed in Antulay's case (supra), case of disproportionate assets of public servants a take longer time for investigation and trial. In paragraph 85 of the judgment the apex Court has been pleased to observe that ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice.
The said order attained finality as the petitioner has not challenged the order before the Apex Court. Upto July, 1992, this Court did not find that the delay in disposal of the case has been occasioned by the prosecution. On the other hand, the Court has found that the delay has occurred because of the system itself and also because of the delaying tactics adopted by the accused as he has been moving to this Curt again and again.
12. From the ordersheet and the averments made in the Courter affidavits it appears that after 1992 the prosecution has taken steps for production of witnesses and the case has proceeded on several dates because accused cross-examined one witness on many dates. One witness P.W. 19 was cross-examined for 19 dates. He was filing petition after petitions. The materials on the record do not show that the prosecution is not responsible for delaying the prosecution. It is to be mentioned that the Vigilance Special Judge is a Special Court under the other Act also including the C.B.I. cases. He has very little time to devote each date in a case because of his pre-occupation with the other cases. The materials on he record further show that the Presiding Officer was on leave or was not available for many months. In that view of the matter, as stated above the delay partly has occasioned due to the system itself and partly due to the delaying tactics adopted by the petitioner in disposal of the case by filing frivolous petitions as noticed above by the trial Court in its order mentioned above.
13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, has relied upon the cases of this Court and the Supreme Court in support of his submission that where the matter has remained pending for a considerable long period and the delay has occasioned by the prosecution the case has to be quashed. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of State of Bihar v. The Director, Mines, Bihar AIR 1994 SC 1929, Ramanand Choudhary v. State of Bihar 1994 (2) BLJ SC 324, R.K Mandal, v. State of Bihar 1997 (1) PLJR 103, State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Ketriwal 1981 (2) SC 402; Bishwanath Pd. Singh v. State of Bihar 1994 (3) (Suppl) SCC 97 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.V. Pavitra (DPS), Commissioner, Weights and Measures 1990 SC 1266.
14. It is well settled that a right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution. A constituent bench of the apex Court has considered the question as to whether a time limit can be fixed for disposal of the criminal case or not. In the case of Abdul Rahman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, and Ors. 1992 SC 1701, held that no time can be fixed beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to continue. It was further held that whenever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances such as nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work load of the concerned Court and the Prevailing legal condition and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed the take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delay too cannot be treated as unjustifiable. Of course, if it is a minor offence not being an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. In the said case apex Court has issued guidelines which are as follows:
In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all the situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 to the Constitution creates right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from and unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out. "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, dis-apperance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior Court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays obtained on ex-parte representation.
(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation is of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on--what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.
(7) The 'demand' rule cannot be recognised or given effect to. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors--balancing test or 'balancing process'--and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or ,the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order--including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducings the sentence where the trial has concluded--as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of Right to Speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit inspite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor it can be said that non-fixing any such outerlimit ineffectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
15. The prosecution case cannot be quashed only on the ground that it has remained pending for certain periods of time as has been asserted on behalf of the petitioner in this case. The nature of the crime, the number of the witnesses, the period taken in examination and cross-examination of the witnesses in the case, non-availability of the Court, engagement of the Court in other cases, the delaying tactics adopted by the accused and similarly other relevant factors have to be taken into consideration to decide as to whether the prosecution in a particular case should be quashed or not.
16. The apex Court in the aforesaid case has-noticed that the cases of corruption against public servant and high public officials take long time for investigation and trial.
17. The cases relied upon by the petitioner are the cases wherein in facts of a particular case the prosecution has been quashed by taking into consideration the principle laid down by the constitution Bench of the Apex Court. In none of the cases it has been held that only because the case has remained pending for a particular period of time the prosecution has to be quashed. In the facts of those cases it has been found that the delay was occasioned by the prosecution as no progress was made in the case for several years and has quashed the prosecution. Those cases are not helpful in the case of the petitioner as each case has its own facts and peculiarity.
18. After going into the entire facts of the case. I am of the view that the prosecution cannot be blamed for delay in disposal of the case. The prosecution has been taking effective steps but in view of the nature of the crime and the tactics adopted by the accused which has been noticed above, the trial has not come to an end. The system is also responsible for disposal of the case as the Special Court is over burdened with the case. It has not enough time to do this case only. This apart the Special Court was not available for a number of days. Thus, the present case is not a case wherein it can be said that the prosecution has to be blamed for delay.
19. Accordingly, no case for quashing the prosecution is made out. The nature of the evidence, which is to be adduced in this case, and the way, in which the petitioner has been conducting himself in the proceeding, refrains this Court from issuing any specific direction fixing a date for disposal of the case. However, as the case is old one the trial Court will make all efforts to dispose of the case at an early date. It is made clear that if the accused petitioner is found unnecessarily creating hinderance in progress of the case as noticed by the Court in its order dated 23.4.97 the trial Court will take an appropriate action against the petitioner for creating disturbance in the Court.
20. In the result, there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed.