Karnataka High Court
Sri M V Manjunatha vs Sri. M. Muniswamy on 20 March, 2025
Author: Hemant Chandangoudar
Bench: Hemant Chandangoudar
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC:11977
CRP No. 739 of 2023
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 739 OF 2023 (IO)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI M.V. MANJUNATHA
SON OF SRI VEERABHADRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEASR,
RESIDING AT MINSANDRA VILLAGE,
LAKKUR HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 160.
2. SRI N.M. SATHISH
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
SON OF LATE MARAPPA,
NO.198, NEAR GOVT. SCHOOL,
GUNJUR VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI,
BANGALORE EAST-560 087.
Digitally signed by B
K
...PETITIONERS
MAHENDRAKUMAR
Location: High Court
of Karnataka
(BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. VIVEK HOLLA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. M. MUNISWAMY
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
SON OF LATE MUNIYAPPA,
RESIDING AT DODDAKALLAHALI VILLAGE,
MASTI HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 139.
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC:11977
CRP No. 739 of 2023
2. SRI H.V. SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
SON OF LATE VENKATASWAMY,
RESIDING AT DINNERA HAROOHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 139.
3. SRI L. MANJUNATHA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
SON OF SRI LAXMAN GOWDA,
RESIDING AT DODDA SHIVARA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 130.
4. SRI SUBRAMANI
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
SON OF SRI PAPAIAH,
RESIDING AT HAROHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 130.
5. SRI YELLAPPA
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
SON OF ALTE RAMANNA,
RESIDING AT DADINAYAKANA DODDI VILLAGE,
LAKKUR HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 130.
6. SRI V. NAGARAJU
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
SON OF LATE VENKATACHALAPPA,
RESIDING AT CHOWDENAHALLI VILLAGE,
LAKKUR HOBLI,
MALUR TALUK-563 160.
-3-
NC: 2025:KHC:11977
CRP No. 739 of 2023
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RASHEED KHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R6)
THIS CRP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CPC,
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 29.09.2023 PASSED ON I.A NO.3
IN OS.NO.636/2022 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
AND JMFC, MALUR, REJECTING THE I.A.NO.3 FILED UNDER
ORDER 7 RULE 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151 OF CPC, FOR
REJECTION OF PLAINT.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING,
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners-defendants, in this civil revision petition, are challenging the order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Malur in O.S. No. 636/2022, whereby the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Section 151 of the CPC was rejected.
2. The respondent-plaintiffs, as public-spirited persons and residents of Malur Taluk, have filed the present suit for declaration and permanent injunction seeking that the government is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property--bearing Sy. No. 112 and newly -4- NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 created Sy. No. 563, measuring 1.20 acres, situated in Malur Village, Kasaba Hobli, Malur Taluk, Kolar District. The prayer for permanent injunction is sought to prevent defendants, their agents, etc., from alienating the suit schedule property. Incidentally, the plaint does not feature a prayer for recovery of possession.
2.1. Essentially, they seek a negative declaration in favor of the government, on the grounds of illegal grabbing of valuable public property.
3. The defendants contend that the suit is not maintainable as it challenges the grant of the suit schedule property to the late husband of Defendant No. 1 after a lapse of 40 years from the date of the grant, which was made in 1973. The plaintiffs dispute the defendants' title, alleging that the documents were fabricated in collusion with revenue authorities, leading to the mutation of khatas in the name of Defendant No. 1, the wife of the original grantee. However, the defendants argue that a declaratory suit, along with a consequential relief of injunction, cannot be sustained in the absence of any specifically pleaded right of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property.
3.1 The petitioner-defendants sought rejection of the plaint before the Trial Court on the grounds of non- disclosure of cause of action and bar of limitation.
-5-NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 However, the Trial Court, vide impugned order dated 29.09.2023, rejected the application, holding that the revenue records appeared to have been fabricated and that a detailed trial was necessary to ascertain the genuineness of the grant. The Trial Court further observed therein that the issue of limitation herein is a mixed question of law and fact, necessitating a full trial.
Submissions
4. Shri Uday Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners' counsel, submitted that the plaint averments do not disclose whether the suit schedule property is either gomala land or earmarked for public purposes. He further contended that the grant of the suit schedule property was made in favor of the defendants in 1973, and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the present suit, seeking a declaration that the government is the owner of the suit schedule property, is not maintainable. Additionally, he argued that the plaint averments fail to disclose any cause of action for filing the present suit.
4.1 Furthermore, he contended that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the application filed by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. He argued that the Trial Court erroneously concluded that the revenue records appear to have been -6- NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 fabricated and that a cause of action is not barred by limitation.
In support, reliance is placed on the following:
1) Tamalo Das alias Sethi and another -vs- Sefali Pradhan Through Her L.Rs. - (Air OnLine 2024 ORI 86);
2) The State -vs- Khanbahadur HHDH Bhiwandiwala and Co., Bhopal (1974 The Indian Law Reports 465);
3) Mool Raj -vs- Atma Ram - (1984 SCC OnLine J&K 27);
4) Sree Surya Developers and Promoters -vs- N Sailesh Prasad and others (2022) 5 SCC 736;
5) I.T.C. Limited -vs- Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others (1998) 2 SCC 70;
6) Saleem Bhai and others others (2003) 1 SCC 557; vs State of Maharashtra and
7) RK Roja -vs- U S Rayudu and another - (2016) 14 SCC 275;
8) CS Ramaswamy -vs- V K Senthil and others (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330)
9) Arulmigu Chokkantha Swamy Koil Trust v. Chandran (2017) 3 SCC 702
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the documents annexed to the plaint clearly establish that the grant certificate was fabricated with the intention of grabbing government property. He further submitted that the suit was filed after obtaining permission under Order 7 Rule 1 of the CPC.
5.1. Additionally, the learned counsel stated that during the pendency of the suit, an application to implead the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner and the Tahsildar as defendants was made, and that the government has been subsequently arrayed as party herein.
-7-NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 In support, reliance is placed on the following:
1) HS Deekshit and another -vs- M/s.Metropoli Overseas Limited and others - (ILR 2022 Kar 4531);
2) Hari Ram -vs- Jyoti Prasad and Anr. - (AIR 2011 SC
952);
3) Madho Singh and others -vs- Moni Singh (D) by L.Rs and others (AIR 2004 SCC 4316).
4) Lingam Ramaseshayya v. Myneni Ramayya and Ors ( AIR 1957 AP 964).
Issues
6. The arguments of the learned counsel for the parties have been duly noted. The issues that arise for consideration are as follows:
6.1. Whether the plaintiffs can maintain a claim for negative declaration, asserting that the title and ownership of the suit schedule property rests with the government, in the absence of a categorical pleading in the plaint demonstrating any vested or particular interest of the plaintiffs in the said property?
In other words, whether the cause of action, as set out in the plaint, adequately satisfies the requisites of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to sustain the plaintiffs' suit for a negative declaration of ownership in favor of the government?
-8-NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 6.2. Whether the title and ownership of the suit schedule property, granted in favor of Defendant No. 1 in 1973, can be challenged in a suit for declaration instituted on 28.09.2022, after a lapse of forty years? In other words, whether the present suit is barred by the law of limitation?
6.3. Whether any interference is warranted by this Court with the impugned order dated 29.09.2023, whereby the Trial Court has dismissed the defendants' application for rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, necessitating a full-fledged trial?
Discussion/Analysis
7. Before proceeding any further, it is pertinent to recall the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC, 1908, which deals with summary dismissal of suits. A plain reading of the statute reveals that a plaint in a suit shall be rejected if it fails to disclose a cause of action or is barred by any law. A cause of action comprises all material facts (distinct from material particulars) that must be pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint to establish a prosecutable remedy under the law against the defendants. However, such a cause of action must not be barred by any statute, including the Limitation Act, 1963.
-9-NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 7.1. Therefore, when the averments in the plaint present a cause of action based on a substantive law (under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963), but fails to meet the statutory requirements necessary to avail a remedy (such as a declaration under the substantive law), the question of whether the enforcement of such a statutory right is barred by the Limitation Act, 1963, need not be considered.
7.2. As such, in view of the proposed order, the instant petition is allowed, as the plaint averments do not sufficiently disclose a cause of action to prosecute a suit for a negative declaration of title and ownership of the suit property.
8. A summary of facts based on the plaint averments is reduced as hereunder:
8.1. A perusal of the plaint reveals that the suit property was originally granted to one Sri Dodda Siddappa by way of a government grant way back in the year 1976, (more particularly, grant certificate bearing LND/SR/232/73-74, dated 15.03.1976, as gathered from the impugned order passed by the Trial Court below). In 1996, Dodda Siddappa passed away, leaving behind his wife, Smt. Muniyamma (Defendant No.1). Following his demise, the khata entries were mutated to the name of Defendant No.1 based on Pavathivarasu (succession), (more particularly, on
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 05.03.2014, as gathered from the impugned order passed by the Trial Court below).
8.2. Subsequently, Defendant No.1 sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 through a registered Sale Deed (No. 7338/2014-15) dated, 20.12.2014. However, when Defendant No.2 approached the Sub-Registrar of Malur to transfer the khata entries based on the said sale deed, the application was rejected due to objections filed by one Sri M. Manjunath S/o of Sri Dodda Munivenkatappa
- defendant No. 6 in the subject suit.
8.3. Subsequently, in a report submitted to the Deputy Commissioner of Kolar, the Tahsildar of Malur had observed therein that the grant of the suit property to the original grantee, Sri Dodda Siddappa, was issued by a Tahsildar named M.S. Khoti, instead of S.G. Khoti, who was the actual jurisdictional Tahsildar at the time of the grant. Additionally, the report highlighted that the date of the challan, grant, and all related proceedings were recorded on a public holiday, further raising doubts about their authenticity.
8.4. The Deputy Commissioner referred the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for inquiry, which revealed discrepancies in the name and signature of the Tahsildar, who had purportedly issued the grant certificate. The inquiry also found that an application for re-survey had
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 been submitted in 2007 on behalf of Sri Dodda Siddappa, despite his demise in 1996. Consequently, the application for the change of khata was rejected.
8.5. A perusal of the memorandum of the instant petition reveals that Defendant No.2 had subsequently filed an appeal before this Court in W.P. No. 24396/2018, DD 03.11.2023, challenging the Tahsildar's rejection of the khata entry. This Court had directed the revenue authorities to reconsider the application and to dispose of it within three months. However, the revenue authorities once again rejected the application for khata transfer in favor of Defendant No.2.
8.6. During the pendency of the inquiry, the Defendant No.2 executed a sale of the suit property in favor of Defendant No.3, who was the advocate on record on behalf of Defendant No.2 in the revenue proceedings before the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner. The said Deputy Commissioner has purchased the suit property for a sum of ₹80,00,000 through an Agreement of Sale (No. 3465/2021-22), dated 17.09.2021, and is currently the owner of the suit property.
8.7. The plaintiffs allege that Defendants No.2 and 3 have fabricated the RTC and other survey documents, which do not contain the signatures of the presiding or
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 jurisdictional officers. The plaintiffs also contend that no official order for phodi (subdivision) of the suit property has been obtained. Furthermore, they argue that the frequent execution and cancellation of the agreement of sale indicates that the defendants are not bona fide owners of the suit property.
8.8. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants have fabricated documents in an attempt to illegally acquire the suit property, which belongs to the government. It also appears that the Petitioner-defendant No.2 had instituted a suit for bare injunction in O.S. No. 343/2015 against defendant No.6 - Shri Manjunatha, S/o Dodda Munivenkatappa, who had filed objections before the Tahasildar, Malur, against the effecting of khatha in the name of defendant No. 2. The said suit came to be dismissed as withdrawn.
8.9. The plaintiffs further contend that the cause of action for the present suit arose on 20.09.2022, when the defendants denied the government's title over the suit schedule property.
9. Having established the relevant facts, it is appropriate at this stage to refer to the governing provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.--
"Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested in denying, his title to such character or right, and the court may, in its discretion, make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so."
9.1. A perusal of the above provision indicates that the plaintiff must establish the following essential parameters to maintain a declaratory suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
i) The plaintiff must be entitled to a legal character or any right concerning the property.
ii) The defendant must be denying or be interested in denying the plaintiff's title to such legal character or right.
iii) The declaration sought must establish that the plaintiff is entitled to such legal character or right.
iv) The plaintiff must be capable of seeking further relief beyond a mere injunction as a consequential relief.
10. The learned counsel for Petitioner-Defendants No. 2 and 3 has placed reliance on the decision of the High
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 Court of Madhya Pradesh in The State v. Khan Bahadur H.H.D.H. Bhiwandiwala & Co., Bhopal (AIR 1971 MP 65 (DB)). In this case, a dispute arose between the licensor - Public Works Department, and the lessee regarding the fixation of rent for the distillery building. The lessee sought a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act to withhold pecuniary liability arising from the contract.
10.1. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while allowing the appeal, summarized the general principles governing declaratory suits, which are found to be applicable to the present case:
"In order to obtain relief in a declaratory suit, the plaintiff must establish that:
(i) The plaintiff, at the time of the suit, is entitled to a legal character or any right to the property;
(ii) The defendant has denied or is interested in denying the plaintiff's legal character or title;
(iii) The declaration sought is that the plaintiff is entitled to such legal character or right; and
(iv) The plaintiff is not in a position to claim any further relief beyond a bare declaration of title.
Even if all these conditions are met, the Court still has discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief, depending on the circumstances of each case."
11. Further, reliance was placed on the case of Tamalo Das alias Sethi and Another v. Sefali Pradhan Through Her L.Rs. (AIR Online 2024 ORI 86), wherein neither party to the suit had title to the property, yet both
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 sought recovery of possession under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court held that in such situations, where neither party has a valid title, possession must be determined based on prior occupancy, and the party in earlier possession is to be protected through adjudication of the suit.
11.1. Accordingly, where the respondent-plaintiffs herein have not prayed for recovery of possession, a suit seeking mere declaration and injunction would not be maintainable in a case where the defendants No. 2 and 3, who had purchased the suit property through registered transfer deeds from the successor-in-title of the original grantee, are admittedly in possession.
11.2. In the above-mentioned case, the Court further held that a suit for a declaration of title, in the absence of the rightful owner, where the Government was not made a party, was not maintainable. However, the plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession was held to be maintainable. Based on this precedent, it was contended that the present suit is not maintainable.
12. In Mool Raj v. Atma Ram (1984 SCC OnLine J&K 27), the plaintiff, in a suit for declaration, challenged the defendant's status as a permanent resident of Jammu and Kashmir. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 allowed the appeal and restored the Trial Court's judgment, which had rejected the plaint, holding: "In a suit for declaration, the plaintiff must rely on his own right. The plaintiff cannot seek a declaration in a negative form regarding the defendant's status. Without establishing his own right, the plaintiff cannot claim a declaration merely to negate the status of the defendants."
12.1. Accordingly, in the present case, due to the absence of any description of the plaintiffs' rights that have allegedly been infringed upon by the defendants, a suit for declaration would not be maintainable.
13. In Sree Surya Developers and Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad & Others (2022) 5 SCC 736, the Supreme Court dealt with a case where the plaintiffs had filed an independent suit challenging a compromise decree that had been entered into during their minority under Order 23 Rule 3-A of the CPC. The Trial Court, exercising its power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, rejected the plaint, holding that such a suit was not maintainable under law. The Supreme Court upheld this view, clarifying that a party challenging the validity of a compromise decree on the ground that it is unlawful must approach the same court that recorded the compromise, and a separate suit
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 challenging the decree is not maintainable. However, in the present case, this decision is found to be inapplicable.
14. The petitioners further contended that a plaint can be rejected even after the framing of issues or the placing of evidence. Reliance was placed on I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Others (1998) 2 SCC 70, wherein the respondent bank had refused to honor a letter of credit in favor of the appellant on the ground that the buyer had allegedly committed fraud by failing to supply goods to the seller.
14.1. While analyzing the rejection of the plaint, the Court observed that it was not within the bank's purview to determine whether mere non-supply of goods constituted fraud. The Court further held that a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage, even after the framing of issues or when the matter is at the stage of evidence. It was clarified that when an application for rejection of the plaint is taken up for consideration, the Court is not permitted to refer to any extraneous material beyond the plaint itself to determine whether a cause of action exists.
15. In Saleem Bhai & Others v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 1 SCC 557, the appellants had not yet filed their written statements, and the respondents
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 sought rejection of the plaint. However, the Trial Court had directed the appellants to file their written statements instead of deciding on the application for rejection of the plaint.
15.1. The Supreme Court, while setting aside the Trial Court's decision, held that the direction to file a written statement without first deciding on the application for rejection of the plaint was unsustainable. The Court clarified that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised at any stage of the suit--before registering the plaint, after issuing summons to the defendant, or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
16. Similarly, in R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu & Another (2016) 14 SCC 275, aggrieved by the rejection of their plaint in relation to an election petition, the appellants had filed an appeal. They contended that the Trial Court had not provided them an opportunity to file a written statement. The Apex Court, relying on the ratio laid down in Saleem Bhai's case, reiterated that directing a party to file a written statement without first deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC constitutes a procedural irregularity affecting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court. Consequently, the impugned order of the Trial Court was set aside, with the Court holding that
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 proceedings cannot continue without first disposing of an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
17. In C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Others (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330), the plaintiff had filed a suit for cancellation of a sale deed after a lapse of 10 years from its execution. The plaintiff argued that the period of limitation should commence from the date of discovery of fraud, as per Section 17 of the Limitation Act. However, the Court found that an earlier suit challenging the same sale deed had been instituted by the minor plaintiff. Upholding the rejection of the plaint on the ground that it was barred by limitation, the Court opined that a plaintiff cannot circumvent the limitation period through clever drafting.
17.1. Hence, in the instant case, the petitioners seek rejection of the plaint on the ground that the limitation period has expired by more than 40 years.
18. In Arulmigu Chokkantha Swamy Koil Trust v. Chandran (2017) 3 SCC 702, the Apex Court dealt with a suit where the plaintiff had sought a declaration and injunction concerning a parcel of land but failed to produce any document establishing ownership or possession. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the High Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Upon analyzing Section 34 of the
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Supreme Court held that a suit filed by a plaintiff who is not in possession but seeks a mere declaration, without a consequential relief for possession, is not maintainable.
19. In Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd v. Manorama Sirsi (2004) 3 SCC 172, the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed a case where an employee sought a declaration to continue in service despite a complete breakdown of trust between the parties. The Court held that enforcing a contract of personal service is barred under the law, and a plaint filed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC is liable to be dismissed at the threshold if it seeks such a remedy.
20. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Another (1977) 4 SCC 467, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Trial Court must, upon a meaningful--not merely formal--reading of the plaint, exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint if it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, failing to disclose a clear right to sue.
20.1. Therefore, in the present case, the petitioners seek rejection of the plaint on the ground that it is based on an illusory cause of action, as the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any legal right or public character vested in them.
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023
21. In Lingam Ramaseshayya v. Myneni Ramayya & Others (AIR 1957 AP 964), villagers instituted a suit to prevent the defendant from unlawfully interfering with the use of a common village tank. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, allowing the suit, held:
"The rule under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC does not bar a member of a village community from maintaining a suit in his own right for a wrong done to him, even if the act in question also injures other villagers. A suit seeking a declaration under Section 92(h) CPC that certain property belongs to a public charity can be instituted by persons interested in the charity without the consent of the Advocate-General."
21.1. However, in the present case, the suit seeks a declaration of title in favor of the Government. The plaint does not reveal that the property in question was either gomal land or land reserved for public purposes, or property belonging to a public trust prior to or during the subsistence of the grant. The plaintiffs have merely sought a negative declaration in favor of the Government without establishing any public right of their own over the suit property.
21.2. Thus, when the plaint fails to disclose any infringement of a legal right vested in the plaintiffs, the
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 above decision would not enure to the benefit of the respondent-plaintiffs.
22. In view of the statutory prescription contained in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the aforementioned judicial precedents, the plaintiff must establish a present interest in the nature of the property at the time of filing the suit for declaration. However, in this case, the plaintiffs have neither stated that their rights have been affected nor claimed any interest in the suit property. A plain reading of the plaint reveals that the plaintiffs have not disclosed any right to the property or any legal character concerning it.
23. Before pronouncing the order, it is pertinent to address the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff.
24. In H.S. Deekshit & Another v. M/s.
Metropoli Overseas Ltd. & Others (ILR 2022 Kar 4531), the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined on the issue of the commencement of the limitation period in relation to a challenge against a registered instrument on the grounds of forgery and fraud. It held that when the averments in the plaint disclose disputed facts and allegations of fabrication, such issues must be decided based on evidence at the trial stage. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 settled principle that evidence cannot be appreciated at the stage of summary dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC.
24.1. However, in the present case, the plaint warrants rejection at the threshold, as the averments do not disclose any right or legal character in favor of the plaintiffs that would justify the institution of a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Consequently, the issue of limitation need not be addressed.
25. The decision of this Court in M. Manjula & Others v. Deputy Commissioner & Others (W.A. No. 210/2023) also dealt with the issue of limitation and dismissed an appeal challenging the grant of land to the petitioners after a lapse of 12 years from the date of grant. The Court held : "...Restoration of land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of laches would come into play. Since 12 years have passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust, and inequitable, as well as against the law, to grant any relief to the original grantee."
As in the above case, the issue of limitation need not be addressed.
26. In the case of Hari Ram v. Jyoti Prasad & Another (AIR 2011 SC 952), the plaintiff had filed a suit
- 24 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 claiming that his right to use a public street (10 feet wide) was prejudicially affected due to encroachment by the defendant. The Supreme Court, under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allowed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, recognizing the right to sue against encroachment. However, in the present case, there is no disclosure in the plaint indicating that the suit schedule property was ever used for a public purpose.
26.1. In fact, a bare perusal of the prayer in the plaint reveals that the defendants are in possession of the suit property (now, Defendant No. 3), and the plaintiffs having merely prayed for a declaration and consequential injunction against the attempted alienation of the property by the defendants, the suits must be rejected at the threshold.
27. In the case of Madho Singh & Others v. Moni Singh (D) by L.Rs & Others (AIR 2004 SCC 4316), a group of villagers had filed a suit in a representative capacity, seeking a declaration and a permanent injunction on the grounds that the disputed land was grazing land and not a grove. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, analyzing Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC and Section 257 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, held that if the possession of land by the defendant affected the
- 25 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 specifically pleaded rights of the villagers, a suit filed in a representative capacity was maintainable.
27.1. Further, the Court held that under Section 257 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, a suit cannot be rejected merely because the subject matter belongs to a private party.
27.2. However, in the present case, the plaintiffs have not claimed any title, possession, or interest in the suit property. Nor have they alleged that the defendant's possession of the land has affected the public right of villagers to access the suit property. Therefore, the ruling in Madho Singh (supra) does not apply to the present case.
28. It is also relevant to refer to a few other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue at hand.
28.1. In the case of Vasantha (Dead) through L.Rs v. Rajalakshmi (2024 INSC 109), the plaintiff had filed a suit for a declaration of title without seeking recovery of possession. The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier decision in Arulmigu Chokkantha Swamy Koil Trust v. Chandran (2017) 3 SCC 702, held that a plaintiff who is not in possession and seeks only a declaratory relief must
- 26 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 also claim the relief of recovery of possession. Failure to do so makes the suit not maintainable.
28.1.2. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court as it failed to include the necessary relief of possession.
28.2. In the case of Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC 126, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "right to sue accrues"
under Article 58 of the Limitation Act and held that the period prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act begins to operate when the right to sue first accrues. There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least, a clear or unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant.
29. In the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to establish any interest, title, right, or possession over the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no right to sue. This Court, in light of defendants' denial of title in favor of the Government, cannot presume a case of infringement of any right or interest accrued to the plaintiffs, in the absence of any specific pleading in the plaint.
- 27 -
NC: 2025:KHC:11977 CRP No. 739 of 2023 29.1. As regards the issue of limitation, this Court does not express any opinion on the issue of, whether the challenge posed by the plaintiffs herein to the grant of scheduled property to the 'original grantee - Shri Dodda Siddappa', or 'to the interests of defendant purchasers, who have purchased the suit schedule property vide registered sale deeds', is barred by limitation or not. As such, no opinion is expressed even in respect of the issue of, whether the issue of limitation herein is a mixed question of fact and law or a pure question of law.
30. In view of the above, it may be concluded that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the defendants' application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC.
31. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed, and the subject plaint in O.S. No. 636/2022 stands rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC, 1908.
32. It is also felt prudent to observe herein that this Court has not expressed any opinion in relation to the validity of the grant made in favour of the original grantee.
Sd/-
(HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR) JUDGE HR, List No.: 1 Sl No.: 158