Tripura High Court
Convict vs The State Of Tripura on 14 December, 2018
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, Arindam Lodh
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL. A. (J) 09 of 2014
Sri Samar Das, S/O. Lt. Sachindra Das,
Of - North Padma Bill, P.S. - Panisagar,
District - North Tripura.
........... Convict-Appellant.
- Vs. -
The State of Tripura.
........... Respondent
BEFORE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY KAROL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH For the appellant : Mr. Ratan Datta, Advocate.
Ms. R. Purkayastha, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. A. Roy Barman, Addl. P.P.
Date of hearing : 16.11.2018.
Date of delivery of : 14.12.2018.
Judgment & order
Whether fit for : Yes
reporting
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Sanjay Karol, CJ.)
The following important issues arise for consideration in the present appeal: (a) As to whether a minor witness is competent to testify in the Court in terms of Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Evidence Act) and whether her deposition can be considered for examining the guilt of the accused; (b) As to whether her testimony necessarily requires corroboration; and (c) As to whether testimony of the parents of the victim can be considered, applying the doctrine of res gestae, in view of Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
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2. Assailing the judgment of conviction, wherein appellant Samar Das stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 376(1) IPC, learned counsel has made two submissions- (a) the appellant, on the date of the alleged crime, was a juvenile, hence the trial stands vitiated; (b) in any event, there is no corroborative medical evidence establishing the alleged crime.
3. We are dealing with a case where the appellant, who undisputedly claims himself to be more than 16 years of age, as on 28 th of September, 2012, the date of the crime, allegedly subjected the prosecutrix, aged 6 years, to a sexual assault.
4. In short, it is the case of prosecution that on 28th of September, 2012, accused subjected the prosecutrix to sexual assault. The incident occurred when her parents had gone out to the Uptakhali Primary Health Centre for getting their son medically treated. On return, they saw the accused flee away and their daughter i.e. the prosecutrix crying, when she narrated the incident firstly to her father and later to her mother. Written complaint was lodged with the police, whereafter an FIR No.58/12 dated 28.09.2012, (Exbt.1) was registered at Panisagar Police Station, North Tripura, Dharmanagar. During the course of investigation, prosecutrix was medically examined; statement of the witnesses recorded; documents for establishing certain facts, both of the accused and the prosecutrix obtained and taken on record; also other scientific evidence taken on record. With the completion of investigation, chalan was presented in the court for trial. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Section 376(1) IPC to which he did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. With the prosecution having examined 15 witnesses, statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which he Page 3 of 18 pleaded innocence. Despite opportunity being afforded, no evidence was laid by him.
6. The trial judge, after appreciating the evidence and discussing the same, by assigning reasons, concluded the prosecution to have established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
7. In Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171, the apex Court has cautioned the Court to adopt the following approach:
―The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses which are not of a substantial character.‖
8. The accused in his defence, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., pleaded that as on the date of the alleged crime, he was 16 years and 9 months of age. To establish such fact, before this court, learned counsel invites attention to the school certificate dated 2 nd of April, 2011, indicating date of birth of the accused to be 25th of December, 1995. The certificate is issued by the Headmaster, Teacher- in-charge of the school where the accused is stated to have completed his studies up to VIIth class. We notice that this certificate was put to Sri Radhika Ranjan Nath (P.W. 15) for proving the same. But then he denies having issued the same. There is another certificate dated 3rd of October, 2012 issued by the very same person and exhibited as Exbt.8. In this certificate, date of birth of the accused is recorded as 10th of December, 1993 and the accused having completed his course for class VIII. If this certificate is accepted then obviously, as on the date of the crime, accused was more than 18 years of age. Significantly, when we examine the testimony of P.W. 15, we notice the witness to have denied Page 4 of 18 having issued any such certificate dated 2nd of April, 2011, on which reliance is placed by the accused. According to the witness, it does not bear her signatures. We see no reason to disbelieve this witness despite his extensive cross-examination. It could not be elicited that contents of the document, Exbt.P8 to the extent of date of birth are false or incorrect. The relevant record of the school was produced to establish such fact. It is true that this witness admits the entry pertaining to the passing of class (VIII) to be wrong, but then this fact itself could not falsify the document or other contents thereof. On the issue of correctly recording date of birth, there is nothing rendering his testimony to be unbelievable or the witness to have deposed falsely.
9. Not only that, accused does not refute the testimony of the Investigating Officer, Sri Arun Debbarma (P.W. 11), who does state that he had made a prayer to the Juvenile Justice Board, Kailashahar for getting the school certificate of the accused. Before us, findings rendered by the learned trial court in Para 22 of the impugned judgment, to the effect that the Juvenile Justice Board, after conclusion that at the time of the offence accused had attained the age of majority, could not be pointed out to be false, incorrect or not borne out from the record. We have checked up the record and find there is order dated 06.10.2012 passed by the said appropriate authority, specifically holding the accused not to be a juvenile.
10. Thus, we see no merit in the first submission made by the learned counsel.
11. Coming to the second submission, we may only state that it is not the law of the land that statement of the prosecutrix or her parents requires to be corroborated by any medical evidence. Page 5 of 18
12. The Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the case where there was a conflict between medical evidence and ocular evidence of the prosecution and Dayal Singh v State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263 (SCC p.283, paras 35036) wherein the Court observed that possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour the accused. Only where contradictions and variations are of a serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the accused. The Courts, normally, look at expert evidence with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that the courts are not absolutely guided by the report of the experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory, unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to misdirect the prosecution.
13. It is also a settled principle of law that where the eyewitness account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive. [Dayal Singh (supra)].
14. After all the expert witness is expected to put before the Court all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the court on the technical aspect of the case by examining the terms of science, so that the court, although not an expert, may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert's opinion, because once the expert opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical officer but that of the Court.
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15. Reiterating its earlier view in Mohd. Iqbal v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 14 SCC 481; Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171, the Apex Court in Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2014) 10 SCC 327, has held that sole testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient to establish commission of rape, even in the absence of any corroborative evidence.
16. Be that as it may, we find the version of the prosecutrix and her parents to be absolutely inspiring in confidence with regard to the occurrence of the incident and culpability of the accused in relation thereto. Contrary to what is argued, in fact, we find the doctor to have clearly deposed the factum of rupture of hymen as a result of sexual assault.
17. Independent of our aforesaid observations, to satisfy our judicial conscience, also for appreciating the evidence, being first court of appeal, we have carefully considered and appreciated the entire evidence lead by the prosecution. The prosecution case primarily rest upon the testimonies of the prosecutrix (P.W.5), her parents, namely, Sri Subash Das (P.W. 1) and Smt. Alpana Das (P.W. 2) and the doctor, namely, Dr. Pulak Chakma (P.W. 13).
18. Since much emphasis is laid on the absence of corroborative evidence that of the doctor, we first consider what is so deposed by this person.
19. On medical examination conducted on the 28th of September, 2012, the doctor found that except for two small scratches in the pubic area and mouth, there were no external injuries on the body of the prosecutrix. The hymen, on physical examination, was not intact which the doctor clarifies, was ruptured due to sexual assault. Cross- examination part of the testimony of this doctor, suggesting that the Page 7 of 18 report is silent whether the victim was raped or not or as to whether rupture of the hymen was fresh or old, in our considered view, would not matter at all, for neither the doctor is a witness to the crime nor is the timing of rupture of the hymen important for considering the act of sexual assault and as such would not be a relevant fact.
20. It is a settled principle of law that absence of injuries on the external or internal parts of the victim by itself cannot be a reason to disbelieve the testimony of the prosecutrix. (See: Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2014) 10 SC 327); State of Haryana v. Basti Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 200; O.M. Baby (Dead) by Legal Representative v. State of Keral, (2012) 11 SCC 362; and State of U.P. v. Chhotey Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 550).
21. We notice the victim is a child. Her age at the time of crime to be just 6 years. It is a settled principle of law that while appreciating the testimony of a child witness, the court must adopt a careful and cautious approach. It needs to be ensured that the child is speaking the truth, voluntarily and is totally uninfluenced of any external factor. It needs to be doubly assured that the child is not tutored.
22. In cases involving sexual molestation and assault require a different approach - a sensitive approach and not an approach which a court may adopt in dealing with a normal offence under penal laws. Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. It is a crime against humanity. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in Page 8 of 18 a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted. It is necessary for the courts to have a sensitive approach when dealing with cases of child rape. The effect of such a crime on the mind of the child is likely to be lifelong. A special safeguard has been provided for children in the Constitution of India in Article 39. This is what stands laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan versus Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745.
23. In Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 77, the Apex Court held that the youthful excitement has no place. It should be paramount in everyone's mind that, on one hand, the society as a whole cannot preach from the pulpit about social, economic and political equality of the sexes and, on the other, some pervert members of the same society dehumanize the woman by attacking her body and ruining her chastity. It is an assault on the individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men. Rape is a monstrous burial of her dignity in the darkness. It is a crime against the holy body of a woman and the soul of the society and such a crime is aggravated by the manner in which it has been committed. We have emphasised on the manner because, in the present case, the victim is an eight year old girl who possibly would be deprived of the dreams of ―Spring of Life‖ and might be psychologically compelled to remain in the ―Torment of Winter‖. When she suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is historically abhorred by the society. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice Page 9 of 18 and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court.
24. In this backdrop we proceed to discuss the testimony of the child witness. But before that the issue with regard to her competence.
25. Section 118 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-
―118 Who may testify. --All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.‖
26. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997 (5) SCC 341), held that: (i) A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. (ii) Even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof.
(iii) The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. (iv) The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored. (v) The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. (vi) This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often Page 10 of 18 live in a world of make beliefs. (vii) Though child witnesses are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but if after careful scrutiny of their evidence, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.
27. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 16 SCC 769, the Apex Court while reiterating its earlier view held that:-
―11. 6.Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer J in Wheeler v. United States (159 U.S. 523). The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Surya Narayana v. State of Karnataka (2001) 1 SCC
1.‖
28. Recently, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar alias Sunny, (2017) 2 SCC 51, the Apex Court held as under:
―30. By no means, it is suggested that whenever such charge of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has to be treated as a gospel truth and the accused person has to be convicted. We have already discussed above the manner in which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the realities Page 11 of 18 of life as well. Various studies show that in more than 80% cases of such abuses, perpetrators have acquaintance with the victims who are not strangers. The danger is more within than outside. Most of the time, acquaintance rapes, when the culprit is a family member, are not even reported for various reasons, not difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is the fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor which many times prevent such victims or their families to lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of criminal justice system extremely intimidating coupled with absence of victim protection mechanism. Therefore, time is ripe to bring about significant reforms in the criminal justice system as well. Equally, there is also a dire need to have a survivor centric approach towards victims of sexual violence, particularly, the children, keeping in view the traumatic long lasting effects on such victims.
31. After thorough analysis of all relevant and attendant factors, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds, on which the High Court has cleared the respondent, has any merit. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance {See Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 8 SCC 551}. Notwithstanding this legal position, in the instant Page 12 of 18 case, we even find enough corroborative material as well, which is discussed hereinabove.‖ (Emphasis supplied)
29. In Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 688, the apex Court held as under:
―33. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of O.M. Baby v. State of Kerala, (2012) 11 SCC 362, where the Court observed:-
"17. ..... If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.
18. We would further like to observe that while appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the court must keep in mind that in the context of the values prevailing in the country, particularly in rural India, it would be unusual for a woman to come up with a false story of being a victim of sexual assault so as to implicate an innocent person.‖
30. In the instant case, we do find the prosecutrix to have deposed that one day around noon, when her parents had taken her brother to the hospital for treatment of the fracture which he had suffered on his hand, the accused, whom she does identify, came to her house and by folding her hands took her to the nearby jungle, where he committed an act of rape. She understands the meaning of the word ‗rape'. She did try to resist but failed. She narrated the incident to her aunt (jethi). She also narrated the incident to her father. We find the witness to have withstood the test of effective cross-examination. She stuck to her version so deposed in the examination-in-chief part of her testimony. She appears to be a truthful and reliable witness and her deposition to be inspiring in confidence. She denies having been tutored by her parents or aunt and only for the reason that she came to the court with Page 13 of 18 her aunt would not be a ground to infer it otherwise. After all, she is a child and had to be escorted to the court. She does state that at the time when accused came, she was playing in her house with her sister Riya Das. Such deposition, in any manner does not help the accused for it is nobody's case that such sister was older in age and attending to the prosecutrix. It has also come in her un-rebutted testimony that she cried for help by when her father arrived and the accused left the spot. We notice that immediately, prosecutrix narrated the incident to her parents, who arrived at the spot. Hence, we find, through her inspiring testimony, about which we have no doubt, the prosecutrix, rather with confidence to have fully established the prosecution case.
31. As already discussed, it is a settled position of law that solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, even that of a child, fully inspiring in confidence, accused can be held guilty of the charged offence. In the instant case, we find the prosecution to have proven its case, through her testimony, of which we have no doubt.
32. Independently we discuss the law with regard to admissibility of statements of the parents, for they are in the nature of hearsay.
33. Section 6 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-
―6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.--Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.‖
34. In Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54), the Supreme Court has held that previous statement of the prosecutrix to her mother, immediately after the occurrence, is not only admissible and relevant as to her conduct, but also constitutes corroboration of her statement under the provisions of section 157 of the Evidence Act. In Page 14 of 18 order to come to the aforesaid conclusions, illustration (j) to section 8 of the Evidence Act was relied upon. In that case, the victim, named Purni, was 7/8 years old. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and her statement believed.
35. The Apex Court in Sukhar versus State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507 has held that Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the purview of said Section, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. Also ―the statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act reads thus :
"Under the present Exception [to hearsay] an utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a carbrake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided, it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued."
36. Earlier the Apex Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A. P., (1996) 6 SCC 241, considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act held that the principle of law embodied in the said Section is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English Page 15 of 18 law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.
37. In Balram Prasad Agrawal versus State of Bihar and others, (1997) 9 SCC 338, the Apex Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of J. D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India, AIR 1982 SC 673: (1982) 1 SCC 143 wherein a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in paragraph 10 of the Report has made the following observations : (AIR p. 676, para 10: SCC p.148, paras 21 and 22) ―The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence).
The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed:
‗Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it Page 16 of 18 was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental, state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made'.‖
38. Applying the aforesaid principles, we find the testimonies of the parents, even if hearsay in nature, being in close proximity to the time of crime and relating to the act which is in issue, substantially contemporaneous to the acts in issue to be proven as a fact, can be referred to and relied upon for establishing the prosecution case. From the discussion hereinafter if we find the same to be inspiring in confidence we would not hesitate in relying thereupon for ascertaining the truthfulness of the genesis of the prosecution case.
39. P.W. 1 corroborates the version of the prosecutrix of having taken her brother (his son) to the hospital for treatment and on return finding the prosecutrix crying in the jungle and the accused fleeing away. Also that the prosecutrix narrated the incident to him, whereafter a written complaint (ejahar) was lodged at the Panisagar Police Station. Complaint is Exbt.1. Subsequently, police got the prosecutrix examined in the hospital. He identifies the accused in court. In cross-examination, he admits that in the ejahar there is no reference of his having noticed the prosecutrix cry, but then this would not in any manner render the witness to be unreliable or shatter his testimony, for ejahar is not a detailed manuscript of the incident or encyclopedia of the crime. We notice that the accused is a neighbour and as such, the child had no cause of concern, worry, apprehension, or danger in going with him to the jungle. He was not a stranger.
40. The accused wants the court to believe that there are houses of others in the neighbourhood and that, inferentially, had the incident, actually occurred, neighbours would have heard the cries and arrived at Page 17 of 18 the spot. Well this is a mere suggestion and nothing more than that and as such, would not, in any manner impeach the credit of the witness.
41. We find that even P.W. 2 has fully corroborated the version of the prosecutrix and her father. Simply because in her version recorded by the police, there is no reference that on her return from the hospital she hadn't seen the prosecutrix lie on the bed and/or cry would not render her statement of the prosecutrix having narrated the incident to her to be false or unbelievable. Even if it is an improvement, it wouldn't render her testimony to be false or the witness to be unbelievable.
42. We notice that Sri Kripesh Das (P.W. 9) and Smt. Malati Das (P.W.12) were the neighbours of the complainant, and have also testified of having heard the prosecutrix being raped by the accused, though these statements are only in the nature of hearsay.
43. Sri Pradyut Ch. Dutta (P.W. 14) is the Officer-in-charge, Panisagar Police Station, who recorded the FIR and Sri Arun Debbarma (P.W. 11) is the officer, who conducted the investigation.
44. Conjoint reading of testimonies of all the witnesses only establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution case of the investigation having been carried out in a just, fair and transparent manner.
45. Thus, when cumulatively viewed the testimonies of the victims and as corroborated by their mothers, squarely point towards the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt, and in our considered view the prosecution to have proved its case by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence.
46. We hold the victims to be witnesses, competent to depose in accordance with law; their testimonies fully proving the prosecution Page 18 of 18 case; fully corroborated by ocular and documentary medical evidence and the testimonies of their mothers who also could depose and narrate the incident, in accordance with law.
47. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and/or complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.
48. The appeal against the impugned judgment an order of conviction and sentence dated 08.11.2013 in S.T. 13 (NT/D) of 2013 titled as The State of Tripura vs. Sri Samar Das passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar stands dismissed.
49. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith.
(ARINDAM LODH), J (SANJAY KAROL), CJ sima