Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Dr Chandra Deo vs Indian Council Of Agricultural ... on 25 September, 2025
(Reserved on 08.09.2025)
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench
Allahabad
****
This is the 25th Day of September, 2025
Original Application No.177/2017
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial)
Hon'ble Mr. Anjani Nandan Sharan, Member (Administrative)
Dr. Chandra Deo, 51 years, S/o Sri Ramman, Posted as Principal Scientist, Central
Avian Research Institute Izzatnagar, Bareilly U.P., R/o 114-B, Vatika Suncity Vistar
Pilibhit by pass Izzatnagar, Bareilly Pin 243122.
...........Applicant
By Advocate: Shri S.M. Ali
Versus
1. Union of India through Secretary Indian Council of Agriculture Research
(ICAR) Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.
2. The Director General , Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) Krishi
Bhawan, New Delhi.
3. The Chairman, Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (ASRB) Krishi
?anusandhan Bhawan-I Pusa Road, New Delhi.
4. Deputy Secretary (Personal, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR)
Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.
............. Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava
ORDER
Delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial) Heard Shri S.M. Ali, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. Instant Original Application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 seeking the following relief(s):-
"i. to quash the impugned order dated 18.02.2016, 30.08.2013 and 18.12.2012 passed by respondent (Annexure No. A-1, A-2 and A-3 to SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.2 the compilation No.I) in the light of Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment.
ii. to promote the applicant as principal scientist from due date dated 21.03.2009 with all consequential benefits."
3. The brief facts of the case, as stated in the Original Application, are as follows:-
3.1 The applicant was working as Senior Scientist in ICAR and became eligible for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist under the Revised Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), 2009. As per the scheme, a Senior Scientist completing three years of service in the grade pay of ₹9000/-
could be considered for promotion, provided he obtained 75% marks in the overall assessment. The scheme also provided for "deferred placement" for those who fell short by not more than two marks.
3.2 The applicant submitted three copies of his duly filled score card along with supporting documents to the Director, Central Avian Research Institute, Izatnagar on 06.03.2012 for onward transmission to Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (in short ASRB). He was thereafter called by ASRB for interview scheduled on 05.09.2012. The applicant appeared before the duly constituted Selection Committee and performed his interview.
3.3 By letter dated 18.12.2012, ICAR informed the applicant that he could not secure the qualifying marks of 75. However, under the "deferred placement" scheme, he would stand promoted to the post of Principal Scientist after one year from the due date. The applicant was not informed of the detailed reasons or break-up of marks at that stage.
3.4 The applicant made representations to the Director General, ICAR and to ASRB in 2013 requesting review of his marks and proper evaluation of his case. However, by order dated 30.08.2013, the ICAR authorities rejected his representation stating that there was no provision SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.3 in the rules to review or interfere with the recommendations of the Selection Committee.
3.5 The applicant thereafter sought information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding his assessment. He was informed that he had secured 74 marks out of 100, just one short of the qualifying 75. He found that only 4 marks had been given in A-03 head in a lump-sum manner, though as per the record and marking pattern he was entitled to 8.25 marks. He was also awarded only 6 marks out of 20 in the interview, which he alleges was arbitrary.
3.6 Dissatisfied with the incomplete information, the applicant approached the Central Information Commission (CIC). The CIC in its order dated 18.02.2015 directed ASRB to clarify that parameter-wise break-up of marks under A03 head was not available. In compliance, ASRB informed on 03.03.2015 and 07.05.2015 that the Selection Committee had given lump-sum marks without parameter-wise distribution.
3.7 The applicant submitted further representations in 2015 to the Ministry of Agriculture pointing out that ASRB had not followed the prescribed marking pattern and had acted arbitrarily in awarding low marks, which resulted in loss of one year in his promotion. According to him, this adversely affects his entire service career and pensionary benefits. These representations were also rejected on the ground that there was no provision to review the recommendations of the Selection Committee.
3.8 The applicant relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DG, ICAR v. D. Sundara Raju (2011) and similar decisions of the Tribunal, where arbitrary assessment by ASRB was interfered with. He therefore challenges the impugned orders dated 18.12.2012, 30.08.2013 and 18.02.2016 as being arbitrary and illegal, and prays for promotion to SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.4 the post of Principal Scientist from the due date i.e. 21.03.2009 with all consequential benefits.
4. Counter Affidavit has been filed from the side of the respondents on 21.11.2017, wherein they have denied the claim of the applicant and stated as under:-
4.1 The applicant's proposal for promotion was duly received and considered by ASRB. After evaluation of his record and interview, he secured 74 marks out of 100, whereas the minimum requirement under the Revised CAS, 2009 was 75 marks. Therefore, he could not be promoted from 21.03.2009, but under the scheme he became eligible for deferred promotion, which was rightly granted to him w.e.f. 21.03.2010.
4.2 The Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), 2009 clearly lays down three categories: (i) those scoring 75 or above are promoted from the due date, (ii) those securing 73-74 marks are given deferred promotion after one year, and (iii) those scoring below 73 must re-apply after two years.
Since the applicant fell in the second category, his case was correctly decided as per rules.
4.3 The applicant's complaint that he was given lesser marks in A03 head and in the interview is misconceived. The marks are awarded by a duly constituted Selection Committee comprising ASRB Chairman/Member, DG ICAR's nominee, subject experts and Director of the concerned Institute. This Committee evaluates overall performance strictly on the basis of the prescribed score card.
4.4 It is not open to the applicant to award marks to himself or claim that he deserved more. The assessment of experts cannot be challenged or substituted by the Tribunal. In fact, the CAT Chandigarh Bench in Dr. Raj Kumar vs. ICAR (OA No. 1443/HR/2013, decided on 12.01.2016) has SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.5 held that the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the evaluation of an expert body.
4.5 The representations made by the applicant in 2013 were duly examined and rejected by ICAR on 30.08.2013. It was clarified that there is no provision for review of the recommendations of the Selection Committee. Thus, his repeated request for reconsideration of marks is outside the scope of rules.
4.6 The issue of disclosure of marks was also addressed under the RTI Act. ASRB had already provided the total marks awarded. As per the CIC's directions in 2015, ASRB clarified that parameter-wise break-up under A03 was not available. Hence, the allegation that ASRB withheld information or acted with mala fide intention is incorrect.
4.7 The allegation that low marks were given deliberately to the applicant is baseless and without any evidence. The Selection Committee awarded marks after due assessment of his record and interview and the applicant was in fact awarded 80% marks (4 out of 5) under A03. The marks in interview were also decided collectively by the Committee, not by any individual.
4.8 The reliance placed by the applicant on Dr. D. Sundararaju's case is misplaced because that case was decided under an earlier scheme with different marking criteria. The present case is governed by the Revised CAS, 2009, which has a different framework. Therefore, the applicant cannot claim parity with Dr. Sundararaju.
4.9 In view of the above, the respondents submit that the applicant failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks and was rightly given deferred promotion as per rules. His allegations of arbitrariness, violation of Articles 14 and 16, and mala fides are imaginary and untenable. Hence, SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.6 the Original Application is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed with costs.
5. In reply to the Counter Affidavit, the applicant has filed Rejoinder, wherein the averments made in the Counter Affidavit have been denied and the facts stated in the Original Application have been reiterated.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the action of the respondents in awarding only 74 marks is arbitrary and contrary to the prescribed marking pattern. It is submitted that under the head A03 the applicant was entitled to 8.25 marks but was awarded only 4 marks in a lump-sum without parameter-wise assessment and only 6 marks in the interview, which shows non-application of mind by the Selection Committee. It is stated that the "deferred promotion" has caused loss of seniority, service benefits and pension, which cannot be cured subsequently.
6.1 It is further stated that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed as they violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The applicant relies upon the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore passed in WP No.19516/2004 (The Director General, Indian Council for Agricultural, research & Ors. Vs. D. Sundara Raju which was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2714/2005 decided on 30.3.2011 and similar Tribunal decisions (OA No.88/2011-Dr. Jai Gopal vs. Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi and OA No.1833/2012-Dr. Khajan Singh vs. Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Ors), where arbitrary assessment of ASRB was interfered with. It is stated that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine whether the selection process was conducted fairly and since the applicant lost only by one mark due to arbitrary marking, he deserves promotion to the post of Principal Scientist from the due date i.e. 21.03.2009 with all consequential benefits.
SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.7
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents stated that the assessment was carried out strictly in accordance with the Revised CAS, 2009 by a duly constituted Selection Committee comprising subject experts, ASRB members and ICAR representatives. The applicant secured 74 marks out of 100, which placed him in the category eligible only for deferred promotion after one year. The applicant was accordingly promoted from 21.03.2010 and therefore no illegality has been committed by the respondents.
7.1 It is further contended that the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the evaluation of an expert body or substitute its own opinion for that of the Selection Committee. The reliance on Dr. Sundara Raju is misplaced since that case pertained to a different scheme. The present CAS, 2009 framework does not provide for review or reassessment of marks once awarded. Hence, the allegations of arbitrariness or mala fides are imaginary, and the Original Application is liable to be dismissed with costs.
8. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties, examined the pleadings available on record and also perused the judgments cited during the course of arguments.
9. The grievance of the applicant is essentially two-fold. First, that he was awarded lesser marks under the A03 head and in the interview, resulting in denial of promotion from the due date and second, that the respondents acted arbitrarily and contrary to the prescribed scheme.
10. According to the applicant, he was entitled to at least 8.25 marks under A03 but was awarded only 4 marks and he was further given only 6 marks out of 20 in the interview. It is further stated that the absence of SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.8 parameter-wise break-up of marks, as revealed under the RTI Act, establishes the arbitrariness of the process.
11. To the contrary, the stand of the respondents is that the applicant secured 74 marks out of 100, which is admittedly short of the minimum requirement of 75 marks as laid down under the Revised Career Advancement Scheme, 2009. The Scheme itself provides for three distinct categories of placement, namely (i) immediate promotion for those securing 75 marks and above, (ii) deferred placement after one year for those securing 73-74 marks, and (iii) re-consideration after two years for those scoring below 73.
12. Since the applicant comes under the second category, he was rightly extended the benefit of deferred promotion from 21.03.2010. According to the respondents, the evaluation of performance is within the exclusive domain of the Selection Committee, which comprised subject experts and this Tribunal cannot re-appraise the marks awarded by such an expert body.
13. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the settled position of law. The Apex Court has consistently held that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to selection and promotion is extremely limited. The Court/Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the decision of an expert body or reassess the comparative merits of candidates.
14. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan & Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 305, it was held that the decision of the selection committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or its procedure vitiating the selection or proved mala fides.
SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.9
15. In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, the Apex Court emphasized that the selection process is to be left to the discretion of experts and interference is warranted only where the procedure adopted is illegal, arbitrary or mala fide.
16. Further, in M.V. Thimmaiah & Ors. v. Union Public Service Commission & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 119, it was reiterated that the courts cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor is the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion.
17. In Union of India v. Pushpa Rani & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 242, the Apex Court held that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the decision-making process, and courts cannot reassess or re- appreciate the evaluation of experts.
18. In B.C. Mylarappa v. Dr. R. Venkatasubbaiah & Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 306, the Court observed that the decision of the Selection Committee comprised of experts is not to be lightly interfered with unless it is shown to be vitiated by mala fides or extraneous considerations.
19. Further in Dr. Prasannanshu v. Selection Committee for Vice Chancellor, NLUD decided on 22.09.2020, Supreme Court has consistently held that where the jurisdiction to make selection is vested in a Selection Committee comprising of expert members, Courts have to trust their assessment unless it is actuated with malice or mala fide or arbitrariness or there are violations of Statutory Rules.
SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.10
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the applicant has not been able to demonstrate any specific violation of the statutory scheme or mala fides on the part of the Selection Committee. His grievance is essentially that he deserved more marks than what was awarded. Such a contention cannot be accepted, for it would amount to the Tribunal stepping into the shoes of the evaluators and awarding marks, which is impermissible. It may also be noticed that the applicant has himself admitted to having secured 74 marks, which squarely places him within the category of "deferred promotion"
envisaged under the scheme. The benefit of deferred promotion from
21.03.2010 has, in fact, been extended to him.
21. The argument regarding parameter-wise break-up of marks also does not carry the matter any further. The CIC, while dealing with the RTI application of the applicant, had already observed that the parameter- wise distribution of marks under A03 was not available. The Selection Committee awarded lump-sum marks and this procedure was applied uniformly to all candidates. The absence of a break-up cannot, by itself, vitiate the entire process, unless it is shown that the same was intended to discriminate against the applicant, which is not the case here.
22. The reliance placed by the applicant on the judgment in DG, ICAR v. D. Sundara Raju (2011) is misplaced. That case was decided in the context of an earlier Career Advancement Scheme which had different benchmarks and criteria. The present case is governed by the Revised CAS, 2009, and the framework of that scheme is materially different. Therefore, the ratio of D. Sundara Raju cannot be extended to the facts of the present matter. Likewise, reliance on certain orders of other Benches of this Tribunal does not assist the applicant, as those cases turned upon their own facts and do not lay down any general principle applicable here.
SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.11
23. We may also note here that even if the applicant's plea is accepted that he should have been given some additional marks, the overall scheme of evaluation still treats 75 as the qualifying benchmark and this Tribunal cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the experts. In any event, the benefit of deferred promotion has already accrued to him from 21.03.2010, and therefore, no prejudice of a continuing nature survives which would warrant interference.
24. Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the applicant has already been retired. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Government of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Dr. Amal Satpathi & Ors., reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3512 by referring the case of Bihar State Electricity Board and Others v. Dharamdeo Das reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1768 has categorically settled the legal position regarding the effectivity and timing of promotions. It has been held:
"It is a well settled principle that promotion becomes effective from the date it is granted, rather than from the date a vacancy arises or the post is created. While the Courts have recognized the right to be considered for promotion as not only a statutory right but also a fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to the promotion itself... Bihar State Electricity 10 Board and Others v. Dharamdeo Das"
25. In the same decision, the Apex Court again by referring the case of State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath & Ors, reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334 further held that:
"Retrospective seniority cannot be given to an employee from a date when he was not even borne in the cadre, nor can seniority be given with retrospective effect as that might adversely affect others... Promotion only becomes effective upon the assumption of duties on the promotional post and not on the date of occurrence of the vacancy or the date of recommendation."
26. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the contention of the applicant that he ought to have been granted promotion as Principal Scientist from an earlier date is wholly untenable. It is trite that while an employee has a right to be considered for promotion, there is no vested right to promotion itself, nor to claim retrospective seniority or benefits from a date when he was not actually SUSHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA Page No.12 found qualified or placed in the promotional post. The scheme itself provides a mechanism of deferred placement for those who narrowly fall short and the applicant was duly extended that benefit from 21.03.2010. Therefore, his plea for ante-dating his promotion to 21.03.2009 cannot be accepted.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the impugned orders dated 18.12.2012, 30.08.2013 and 18.02.2016 passed by the respondents do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The applicant has failed to establish any arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Original Application, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
28. There shall be no order as to costs.
All pending MAs, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Anjani Nandan Sharan) (Justice Rajiv Joshi)
Member (A) Member (J)
Sushil
SUSHIL
KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA