Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Sumeet Kumar vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 17 February, 2026
1
Court No. II
O.A. No. 216/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 216/2024
Reserved on: 02.02.2026
Pronounced on: 17.02.2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Sh. Sumeet Kumar,
(Aged about 36 years),
S/o Sh. Maha Singh,
R/o V.P.O. Silana, District Sonipat - 131408
..Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Shivanshu Bhardwaj)
Versus
1. Central Bureau of Investigation,
Through its Director,
Delhi Special Police Establishment,
Plot No. 5-B, 7th Floor,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003.
2. Deputy Director,
Central Bureau of Investigation,
Delhi Special Police Establishment,
Plot No. 5-B, 7th Floor,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003.
3. Superintendent of Police (Pers.),
Central Bureau of Investigation,
Delhi Special Police Establishment,
Plot No. 5-B, 7th Floor,
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar)
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Court No. II
O.A. No. 216/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr.B.Anand, Member (A):
By way of filing of this Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant seeks the following relief(s):
"i) To set-aside and quash the impugned dismissal order dated 24.11.2023, as also the order dated 11.01.2022, being utterly against the procedure of law established under the Indian Constitution and against the principles of natural justice;
ii) To pass any other or as this Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper in view of facts and circumstances of the case;
iii) To allow the present O.A."
2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed reply and have disputed and contested the claim of the applicant. The applicant has filed rejoinder and reiterated his claim and the grounds pleaded in support thereof.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant joined the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) at Headquarters w.e.f. 10.09.2012 and was posted to CBI, ACB, Delhi. He was subsequently transferred to CBI, EO-I, Delhi in October 2019 and thereafter to CBI, ACB, Mumbai vide order dated 30.12.2020.
4. While posted at Mumbai, allegations arose that the applicant entered into a criminal conspiracy with a private individual associated with a housekeeping agency engaged by M/s Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. It was alleged that, being the custodian of a sensitive crime file, he prepared and photographed certain internal ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 3 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 note-sheets and shared the same with the said individual with an intent to exert pressure upon the company for obtaining undue advantage. He was also alleged to have misused official records and committed theft of an official stamp.
5. On the basis of these allegations, case FIR No. RC-DAI-2021-A- 0044 dated 21.12.2021 was registered against the applicant and others u/s 120-B, 381, 465, 466of the IPC and Sec. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The applicant was arrested on 22.12.2021 and the criminal case is stated to be under investigation.
6. Considering the gravity of the allegations, the Disciplinary Authority, invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India read with Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, dispensed with the regular departmental inquiry on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry and dismissed the applicant from service vide order dated 11.01.2022.
7. Aggrieved, the applicant preferred a departmental appeal, which came to be rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 24.11.2023. Challenging the orders of dismissal and rejection of appeal, the applicant has filed the present O.A. before this Tribunal.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 10.09.2012 and was confirmed as a permanent employee after successful completion of probation. He ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 4 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 was transferred and posted to CBI, ACB, Mumbai, with effect from 31.12.2020.
9. On 21.12.2021, an FIR was registered against the applicant under Sections 120-B, 381, 465, 466, 474 of the IPC and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Consequent thereto, the applicant was placed under deemed suspension with effect from 21.12.2021. While the criminal case was still under investigation and no charge-sheet had been filed, the Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 11.01.2022, dismissed the applicant from service by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India read with Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, dispensing with the holding of a regular departmental inquiry.
10. The applicant preferred a statutory appeal dated 22.06.2023 against the dismissal order. During the interregnum, he approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 2906/2023 challenging the dismissal order dated 11.01.2022. The statutory appeal was subsequently rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 24.11.2023. Thereafter, the applicant filed O.A. No. 4138 of 2023 assailing the appellate order.
11. Both the aforesaid Original Applications were withdrawn by the applicant on 10.01.2024 with liberty to file a consolidated Original Application. Accordingly, the present Original Application has been filed challenging the dismissal order dated 11.01.2022 and the appellate order dated 24.11.2023, primarily on the ground that the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) was invoked without justification and in violation of the principles of natural justice. ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 5 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024
12. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned orders of dismissal dated 11.01.2022 and the appellate order dated 24.11.2023 are illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law, being in gross violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice.
13. It is contended that the applicant has been dismissed from service without holding any regular departmental inquiry and without affording him any opportunity of hearing. The extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution read with Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, has been invoked mechanically and without recording cogent, objective, and relevant reasons to demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry. Learned counsel submits that the normal rule under Article 311 is that no civil servant can be dismissed or removed without an inquiry, and dispensation of such inquiry is only an exception which must be strictly construed.
14. It is further argued that at the time of passing, the dismissal order, the criminal case against the applicant was still under investigation and no charge-sheet had been filed. Mere registration of an FIR or pendency of a criminal case cannot, by itself, justify dispensing with a departmental inquiry. The disciplinary authority has failed to establish the existence of any compelling circumstances such as threat, intimidation of witnesses, or an atmosphere of violence or indiscipline, which alone could warrant invocation of Article 311(2)(b), as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 6 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 362.
15. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned dismissal order does not disclose any reasons, even briefly, as to why holding an inquiry was impracticable. The alleged reasons, if any, are vague, based on presumptions, and reflect non-application of mind. Such an unreasoned and cryptic order has serious civil consequences and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. The appellate authority has also failed to independently examine the legality and validity of the disciplinary authority's action and has merely affirmed the dismissal order in a routine and mechanical manner.
16. It is also urged that the action of the respondents is discriminatory and arbitrary, as similarly placed employees against whom criminal cases were registered have been proceeded against through regular departmental inquiries, whereas the applicant alone has been singled out for the extreme penalty of dismissal without inquiry. This amounts to hostile discrimination and is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
17. Learned counsel emphasizes that the applicant has rendered more than ten years of unblemished service and has consistently expressed his willingness to face a fair and impartial departmental inquiry. Denial of such an opportunity has resulted in grave prejudice to the applicant and has irreparably damaged his career and livelihood.
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18. On these grounds, learned counsel for the applicant prays that the impugned orders dated 11.01.2022 and 24.11.2023 may be quashed and set aside, and appropriate relief may be granted in the interest of justice.
19. Learned counsel for the applicant places strong reliance upon the judgment of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 3598/2019 titled Bhagwan Singh v. Commissioner of Police, wherein the Tribunal exhaustively examined the scope and limitations of invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
20. In the said case, the Tribunal held that dispensation of a regular departmental inquiry is an exception to the normal rule and can be resorted to only in rare and exceptional circumstances. It was categorically observed that the disciplinary authority is under a mandatory obligation to record clear, cogent, and convincing reasons in writing demonstrating as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. Mere allegations, apprehensions, or general observations regarding public interest or the nature of the organisation cannot substitute the constitutional requirement of recording objective reasons.
21. The Tribunal further held that unless there is material on record to show intimidation of witnesses, threat to the disciplinary authority or inquiry officer, or existence of an atmosphere of violence or indiscipline, invocation of Article 311(2)(b) would be arbitrary and unsustainable. The satisfaction of the disciplinary authority must be based on objective facts and cannot rest on ipse dixit or presumptions.
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22. Learned counsel for the applicant, in addition to the earlier submissions, submits that subsequent events and documents placed on record completely demolish the very foundation on which the extreme power under Article 311(2)(b) was invoked by the respondents.
23. It is submitted that the respondents justified dispensing with the departmental inquiry on the ostensible ground of gravity of allegations and pendency of a serious criminal case. However, the final report/charge-sheet filed under Section 173 CrPC clearly demonstrates that the allegation under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has not been substantiated during investigation and stands dropped. The prosecution itself has concluded that no evidence was found to support the PC Act offence, and the case has been confined only to certain IPC offences. This subsequent development clearly shows that the initial assumption of an exceptional and extraordinary situation warranting dismissal without inquiry was misconceived and exaggerated.
24. Learned counsel further submits that the filing of a detailed charge-sheet, examination of a large number of witnesses, and reliance on documentary and forensic evidence by the prosecution itself conclusively establishes that there was no impediment whatsoever in conducting a regular departmental inquiry. If a full- fledged criminal trial involving dozens of witnesses can proceed in accordance with law, there could be no rational basis to contend that a departmental inquiry was "not reasonably practicable". This ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 9 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 directly attracts the ratio of Tulsi Ram Patel (supra) and Bhagwan Singh (supra), rendering the impugned action unconstitutional.
25. It is also argued that the trial court orders dated 19.07.2025 and 30.08.2025 show that the criminal proceedings are being conducted in a routine and orderly manner, with the applicant participating in the proceedings and seeking statutory remedies under the Cr.PC. There is no material on record to suggest that the applicant has ever attempted to threaten witnesses, tamper with evidence, or obstruct the course of justice. In the absence of any such conduct, the respondents' apprehension of impracticability of inquiry is purely illusory and unsupported by facts.
26. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned dismissal order was passed at a pre-trial stage, even before investigation was complete. Such an action amounts to pre-judging the guilt of the applicant, which is impermissible in service jurisprudence. The disciplinary authority acted in haste, without waiting for the outcome of investigation, and without considering the less drastic alternatives available under the CCS (CCA) Rules, such as continuation of suspension and initiation of regular disciplinary proceedings.
27. It is also contended that the appellate authority has completely failed to consider these subsequent and material developments, including the nature of the charge-sheet and dilution of allegations. The appellate order is thus vitiated by non-application of mind and failure to discharge its statutory duty.
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28. On the cumulative strength of these additional submissions, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the continued sustenance of the dismissal order would result in grave miscarriage of justice, and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed, with consequential reliefs, on this ground alone.
29. Relying upon the above judgment, learned counsel submits that in the present case also, the respondents have failed to record any such compelling reasons or to demonstrate the existence of circumstances which rendered the holding of a departmental inquiry impracticable. The impugned orders are bereft of any material particulars and reflect complete non-application of mind, rendering them liable to be quashed on the same reasoning as adopted by the Tribunal in Bhagwan Singh (supra).
30. Learned counsel therefore submits that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts of the present case and supports the applicant's contention that the dismissal without inquiry is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violative of the principles of natural justice.
31. Learned counsel for the applicant also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra), which authoritatively delineates the scope and limitations of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
32. It was submitted that in Tulsiram Patel (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that dispensation of a departmental inquiry is permissible only when the disciplinary authority is satisfied, on the ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 11 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 basis of objective material, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. The expression "not reasonably practicable" does not mean mere inconvenience or expediency, but refers to situations where holding an inquiry is rendered impracticable due to compelling circumstances such as intimidation or terrorisation of witnesses, threat to the disciplinary authority or inquiry officer, or a prevailing atmosphere of violence or indiscipline.
33. Learned counsel emphasized that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority cannot rest on ipse dixit, conjectures, or surmises, and that reasons for dispensing with the inquiry must be recorded in writing and must bear a rational nexus to the conclusion that an inquiry was not reasonably practicable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that although Article 311(3) accords finality to the decision of the disciplinary authority, such finality does not oust the power of judicial review, and the Courts/Tribunals are duty-bound to examine whether the conditions precedent for invoking Article 311(2)(b) were in fact satisfied.
34. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel submitted that in the present case no such compelling or exceptional circumstances existed, nor have any objective reasons been recorded to justify the dispensation of a regular departmental inquiry. The impugned orders, therefore, are squarely contrary to the law laid down in Tulsiram Patel (supra) and are liable to be set aside.
35. Opposing the O.A., the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present O.A. is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed both on facts and in law. The applicant ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 12 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 has failed to demonstrate any illegality, arbitrariness or procedural infirmity in the impugned order passed by the competent authority.
36. It is submitted that the impugned action has been taken strictly in exercise of the constitutional powers conferred under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The Disciplinary Authority, upon careful consideration of the entire material on record, including oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, and keeping in view the gravity of the allegations and surrounding circumstances, arrived at a bona fide and objective satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular departmental inquiry. The said satisfaction has been recorded with reasons and is based on relevant considerations and therefore warrants no interference.
37. It is further submitted that the allegations against the Applicant pertain to corruption, abuse of official position and conspiracy, which are grave and serious in nature. Such misconduct strikes at the root of integrity, discipline and public trust in administration. More particularly, when the employee belongs to a premier investigating agency entrusted with combating corruption, any delay or leniency would severely erode public confidence. Hence, prompt and exemplary action in public interest was fully justified.
38. The constitutional validity and scope of dispensing with inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra) authoritatively held that where the competent authority records satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the safeguard of Article 311(2) stands ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 13 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 legitimately excluded and such action is based on considerations of public interest and public policy. The said judgment clearly recognizes that the inquiry is not an absolute requirement in exceptional circumstances. The present case squarely falls within the ratio of the said decision.
39. It is also submitted that integrity in public life is paramount. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that public office is a trust and any deviation from the path of rectitude must be dealt with firmly and expeditiously. The Respondents' action is fully consistent with these principles.
40. The contention of the applicant that the departmental action by way of resorting to Article 311(2)(b) and dismissing the applicant cannot proceed during the pendency of the criminal proceedings is misconceived and untenable in law. The law is well settled that criminal prosecution and disciplinary proceedings operate in different fields and can proceed simultaneously. In Depot Manager APSRTC v. Mohd. Yusuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699, it has been categorically held that the purpose of departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline and efficiency in service and there is no legal bar to conducting such proceedings simultaneously with criminal trial. The standard of proof in departmental proceedings being preponderance of probabilities, is entirely different from that of criminal trial.
41. The same principle has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417, wherein it was held that staying disciplinary proceedings pending criminal trial should not be a ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 14 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 matter of course and that the objectives of both proceedings are distinct and independent.
42. Similarly, in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that departmental and criminal proceedings may proceed simultaneously and independently as there is no bar in law.
43. Further, the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is extremely limited. Courts and Tribunals cannot act as appellate authorities or re-appreciate evidence. In Indian Overseas Bank v. P. Ganesh, (2008) 1 SCC 650 and CBI v. R.B. Sharma, (2004) 7 SCC 27, it has been held that interference is warranted only where the decision is mala fide, perverse or without any material, which is not the case here.
44. In O.A. No. 2796/2018 titled Neeraj Aggarwal v. Union of India relied by the respondents' counsel, it has been held that when the competent authority records reasons demonstrating that holding of a regular inquiry is not reasonably practicable, action under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be faulted merely on technical or procedural grounds. The facts of the present case are fully covered by the said judgment.
45. It is thus submitted that the satisfaction recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is based on cogent material, the action is lawful and proportionate, and there is neither mala fide nor procedural violation. The Applicant is merely seeking re-appreciation of the decision of the authority, which is impermissible in judicial review.
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46. In view of the settled legal position, binding precedents and the facts of the present case, the O.A. deserves outright rejection.
47. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have carefully gone through the pleadings available on records.
48. It is an admitted position that the reasons assigned for dispensing with the regular departmental enquiry while dismissing the applicant are identical to those recorded in the case of the delinquent official Bhagwan Singh (supra) to the effect that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It is also undisputed that the statutory appeal preferred by the applicant has been rejected by the respondents.
49. Undisputedly, the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Tribunal in Bhagwan Singh (supra), wherein the judgment passed in O.A. No. 1383/2020 titled Ct. Sumit Sharmav. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others was duly considered. In the said case, the applicant, Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra), who was working as a Constable(Dvr)in Delhi Police at the relevant point of time, was dismissed from service by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The said O.A. was partly allowed by this Tribunal vide order dated 22.05.2025, and appropriate directions were issued to the respondents. For the sake of clarity, the judgment rendered in Ct. ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 16 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 Sumit Sharma (supra), as reproduced and relied upon in the case of Bhagwan Singh (supra), is extracted hereunder:-
"By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs in the OA:-
"a) To quash and set aside impugned Order No.2170-99/HAP (P-1)/North District Delhi dated 23.02.2018 (A-1) and Order dated 25.10.2019 (A-2) and reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits including the arrears.
b) To declare the action of respondents in dismissing him from service without holding regular inquiry as per provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 and accordingly set aside the impugned orders with further directions to treat the suspension period w.e.f. 08.11.2018 to
23.02.2019 as spent on duty.
c) To allow the OA with cost.
d) Any other orders may also be passed as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case."
2. The facts leading to filing of the present OA are that the applicant was appointed as Constable (Dvr) in Delhi Police on 28.03.1989 and was promoted to the post of Head Constable and thereafter as Assistant Sub-Inspector. According to the applicant, on 6.11.2017, when he was chatting with other persons in front of YMC Club, he was arrested by NIA under misconception that he was also a part of the terrorist group involved in supplying currency to separatist and terrorist. Further, the undisputed facts are that on the basis of the aforesaid information received by the respondents that the applicant was arrested on 7.11.2017 by NIA in the case No. RC- 10/2017/NIA/DLI registered at PS NIA, Delhi under Sections 120B, 121 & 121A of IPC and 13,16,17,18,20,38,39 & 40 of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967, the respondents have placed the applicant under suspension vide Office Order No.10572-93/HAP/P-I/N dated 8.11.2017. Although vide order dated 1.2.2018, passed by the learned Special Judge in the said RC-10/2017/NIA/DLI case, the applicant along with certain other persons were released with immediate effect, however, after having regard to the investigation done by the said NIA team and that as per the respondents the applicant has committed the gravest misconduct of criminal activity, the respondents have dismissed the applicant by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India vide Order dated 23.2.2018 (Annexure A/1). The relevant portion of the said order reads as under:-
"...Accordingly, ACP/P.G. Cell/North has submitted the P.E. report dated 22.01.2018 with the conclusion that on the basis of information received by Central Government, a case vide FIR No. RC-10/2017/NIA/DLI dated 30.5.2017 u/s 120B, 121 & 121A IPC and 13,16,17,18,20,38,39 & 40 of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 was registered at PS NIA, Delhi. During investigation of this case, ASI Bhagwan Singh s/o Sh. Deewan Singh R/o H.No. 22A/19, Sainik Farm, New Delhi-62 was apprehended alongwith Ford Ecosport car No. DL-12CQ4739 having demonetized Indian Currency Notes in the denomination of ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 17 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 Rs.500/- & Rs.1000/- containing in 6 card board cartons at opposite YMCA, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi. On counting the above said demonetized Indian Currency Notes by RBI Bank officials, the amount was found Rs.28,88,500/- which was recovered from Ford Ecosport No. DL-12CQ4739 car driven by ASI Bhagwan Singh. The other persons, as mentioned above, were also apprehended/arrested alongwith ASI Bhagwan Singh in this case. ASI (Dvr) Bhagwan Singh was arrested in this case on 07.11.17 at 16.20 hrs by Sh. Arvind Digvijay Negi, IPS, SP, NIA, New Delhi (chief investigation officer of this case) in the presence of witnesses namely Mukesh Kumar Mishra, SI, NIA, New Delhi and Lalit Mohan Pandey, Constable of NIA, New Delhi. Personal search of Bhagwan Singh was made in which some articles i.e. Pan Card No. ASIPS8220L, Delhi Police I-Card etc as mentioned in the personal search memo were found. Hence, the allegations leveled against ASI (Dvr) Bhagwan Singh, No. 264/N are substantiated.
The facts and circumstances of the case are that it would not be reasonably practicably to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the defaulter depose against him due to intimidation, inducement and affiliation of material PWs by the defaulter ASI. It also calls for great courage to depose against desperate person and that task becomes more acute and difficult where the defaulter is police official who may use his job to influence the statement/deposition of the witnesses. The misconduct of accused ASI (Dvr.) Bhagwan Singh, No. 264/N who has been arrested in the aforesaid case is such a grave in nature that warrants exemplary punishment of dismissal in order to send a clear message to such undesirable person and to prevent the recurrence of such crimes. Taking into account the holistic facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned above, the undersigned is of the firm opinion and satisfied that the act and grave misconduct of accused ASI (Dvr.) Bhagwan Singh, No. 264/N from service under Article 311 (2)(b) of Constitution of India and make him completely unfit for police service. Thus, keeping in view the facts of the case and overall implication of such misconduct for disciplined force and the matter being sensitive in nature, I, Harendra K. Singh, Addl. Dy. Commissioner of Police-I/North Distt., do hereby dismiss ASI (Dvr.) Bhagwan Singh, No. 264/N from service under Article-311(2)(b) of Constitution of India with immediate effect. His suspension period from 08.11.2017 to the date of issue of this order is hereby decided as period "Not spent on duty" for all intents and purposes which will not be regularized in any manner.
2.1 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the disciplinary authority dated 23.2.2018, the applicant has preferred an appeal dated 26.03.2018 before the appellate authority, which was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 25.10.2019. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the applicant has filed the present OA and placed reliance on the Order/Judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 7883/2010, titled Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others vs. Ex. Constable Sudesh Pal Rana, dated 16.9.2011, vide which an identical issue decided by this Tribunal has been upheld by the Hon'ble High Court, for redressal of his grievances.
3. Pursuant to the notice, the respondents have filed their counter reply opposing the OA. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder reiterating the averments made in the OA.
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4. When this matter was taken up for hearing, at the outset, Shri Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the Order/Judgment dated 16.9.2011 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ex. Constable Sudesh Pal Rana (supra) as also by the common Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 passed by this Tribunal in the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others in OA 1383/2020 and a batch of cases, and that the said common Order/Judgment was implemented by the respondents vide order dated 29.3.2022. He has further submitted that this identical issue was also considered by this Tribunal subsequently in a catena of cases. Learned counsel has further submitted that in view of the fact that reasons deducted by the disciplinary authority, while passing the aforesaid order, as noted hereinabove, are not sustainable in law as the similar grounds have already been considered and held to be not justified by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and this Tribunal while deciding the aforesaid cases.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the disciplinary authority has not correctly applied its mind to the facts of the case and, therefore, the impugned orders are absolutely illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. He has further submitted that the applicant is entitled to the constitutional protection as envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as it is a trite law that dispensation of departmental enquiry is an exception whereas holding of a departmental enquiry is a rule. On the face of the above impugned orders, it is clear that the applicant has been condemned unheard as the allegations against the applicant have not been established by way of a regular departmental enquiry and the applicant has been denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself. He has also submitted that the applicant is a regular employee of the respondents and therefore, he cannot be just thrown out of service without any enquiry.
6. Shri Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that the respondents have themselves through various instructions/circulars, including the one dated 27.8.2007 provides that the disciplinary authority should not take resort of Article 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India lightly and should take action only in rarest of rare case where it is not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry and that a Govt. servant is entitled to have an opportunity to defend himself when there are allegations against him and only in exceptional circumstances law permits the department to dispense with the enquiry and other legal formalities, which is not the case of the applicant. Learned counsel has further submitted that despite the fact that the applicant was released by the learned Special Judge from the said case, the same has not been taken into considered by the disciplinary and appellate authorities while passing the aforesaid orders impugned in the present case.
7.Per contra, Shri Yadav, learned counsel for the respondents, with the assistance of the counter reply and by referring to the aforesaid impugned orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities, has submitted that the applicant has rightly been dismissed from the service by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and that too, after holding a preliminary inquiry in the matter in the interest of justice. He has also submitted that keeping in view the allegations levelled against the applicant under Sections 120B, 121 & 121A of IPC and 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39 & 40 of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and in view of the fact that it would not be ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 19 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the applicant due to intimidation, inducement and affiliation of material PWs by the applicant and that it also calls for great courage to depose against desperate person and that task becomes more acute and difficult where the defaulter is police official who may use his job to influence the statement/deposition of the witnesses.
8. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material placed on record.
9. Since the counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on a common Order/Judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) in support of the claim of the applicant, we have put it to the learned counsel for the respondents that as to why the present case be not decided on the basis of the aforesaid common Order/Judgment passed by this Tribunal (authored by one of us, namely Shri R.N. Singh, Member (J)), while deciding a batch of cases titled Ct. Sumit Sharma vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (supra), as the similar kind of grounds, as taken by the disciplinary authority for invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India in the case of the applicant, have already been dealt with by this Tribunal, paras 45 to 48 of which read as under:--
"45. In the cases in hand, it is evident that in most of the cases preliminary inquiry had admittedly been done and regular enquiry had been dispensed with on the ground of possibility of witnesses likely to be unduly harassed or pressurized by the delinquent(s). In all the case FIRs, chargesheet had been filed, list of witnesses had been filed, a few witnesses had been examined or after trial the accused(s) had been acquitted. In a few cases, the reason for dispensing with the enquiry had been given that the material had come on record to prove the criminal acts of the applicants. The reason had been also of threat to discipline, integrity and morality of the entire police force. On perusal of the impugned orders, it is evident that either the authorities have passed the orders of dispensing with the enquiry on jumping to the conclusion that delinquency or guilt of the applicants as alleged in the case FIRs stood proved even without regular enquiry in the departmental proceedings or trial in the concerned learned court(s). In most of the cases, conclusion about delinquency and commission of the offence(s) by the applicant(s) had been arrived merely on the basis of the preliminary inquiry report/investigation conducted by them and a copy of which had not been provided to them. In none of the aforesaid cases, there was any evidence/material before the authorities as evident from the impugned orders nor as such had been brought before us, to indicate that the applicants were having terror in their area and/or were having link with the terrorists and they were involved in any case of espionage. Nothing has been recorded in the order(s) or shown to us that the applicant(s) had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness(es) and/or the prospective witness(es). There is no evidence or document to indicate that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case(s), any efforts was made to summon the witness(es) to lead the evidence against the applicant(s) or anything was found that on regular enquiry or by summoning the witness(es) the relation with foreign countries was likely to be adversely affected. In the impugned order(s), the respondents have not disclosed that any effort was made by ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 20 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 them to conduct the enquiry nor there is any evidence that in spite of their efforts, they had not been able to produce the witness(es) to lead evidence against the applicant(s). Rather the respondents have themselves filed the challan(s) with a list of witness(es) before the concerned learned court(s) and in a few cases, the accused(s) had been acquitted as well. In a few cases, witnesses have been examined before the concerned learned Court(s). Moreover, co-delinquent in the cases of Neeraj Kumar (supra) and Ramesh Kumar (supra), the similar impugned orders have been set aside by the Tribunal and the orders of the Tribunal have also attained finality.
46. It is found that the authorities while passing the impugned orders have very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the delinquent(s) and there being a possibility that witness(es) may not come forward to depose against the applicant(s). Such acts/orders of the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own aforesaid circulars dated 21.3.1993 and 11.9.2007 as well. Hence, we are of the considered view that reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which cases are referred to hereinabove.
47. It cannot be in dispute that there must be zero tolerance towards corruption and misconduct in public service. However, without there being sufficient ground(s) to be recorded in writing, the protection given to the public servant of hearing under Article 311 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by the respondents. Our view is supported by the binding judicial precedents, referred to hereinabove.
48. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that the aforesaid OAs deserve to be partly allowed and the same are partly allowed with the following directions:--
(i) Order(s) passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities in the aforesaid OAs are set aside with all consequential benefits to the applicants in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject; and
(ii) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant(s) in accordance with law."
Moreover, the aforesaid Common Order/Judgment of this Tribunal has attained finality, as the respondents therein are stated to have implemented the same. No cogent reason has been given on behalf of the respondents as to why the Order/Judgment in the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) is not applicable in the present case. However, the learned counsel for the respondents has reiterated his submissions as noted above. We find that nothing has been recorded in the impugned order or shown to us that the applicant had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness(es) and/or the prospective witness(es) and further there is no evidence or document to indicate that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, any efforts was made by them to summon the witness(es) to lead the evidence ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 21 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 against the applicant or anything was found that on regular enquiry or by summoning the witness(es) the relation with foreign countries was likely to be adversely affected. From the impugned orders, it is evidently clear that neither any effort was made by them to conduct the enquiry nor there is any evidence that in spite of their best efforts, the respondents had not been able to produce the witness(es) to lead evidence against the applicant and further nothing is brought on record that witness(es) has/have been threatened by the applicant or they are too scared of the applicant to come forward in the regular enquiry proceedings. It is also found that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order has very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant and there being a possibility that witness(es) may not come forward to depose against the applicant. The same is the position when the appellate authority rejected the appeal of the applicant. Further both the above authorities have failed to take into consideration while passing the aforesaid orders the fact that the applicant has been released by the learned Special Judge while deciding the aforesaid case No. RC-10/2017/NIA/DLI (supra). Such acts/orders of the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own aforesaid instructions/circular dated 27.8.2007. Hence, we are of the considered view that reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which cases are referred to hereinabove.
10. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that this case is squarely covered by the common Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 in Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) and a batch of cases. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be partly allowed and accordingly, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Orders dated 23.02.2018 (A-1) and Order dated 25.10.2019 (A-2) passed by the Disciplinary and Appellate authorities respectively are set aside with all consequential benefits to the applicant in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject;
(ii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid direction within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and
(iii) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law."
51. It is trite that holding of a departmental inquiry is the rule and its dispensation is an exception to be invoked only in rare and compelling circumstances. The respondents have failed to demonstrate, by way of any cogent, objective or contemporaneous material, that it was "not reasonably practicable" to hold such inquiry. Mere gravity of allegations or pendency of criminal proceedings ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 22 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 cannot, by itself, justify invocation of the extraordinary constitutional power under Article 311(2)(b). If the respondents had, at the outset, taken the preliminary steps towards initiating disciplinary proceedings, such as issuing a charge memorandum and commencing a regular inquiry, and during the course of such proceedings, found it virtually impossible to continue on account of threat, inducement, or deliberate non-cooperation on the part of the applicant, the situation would have stood on a different footing. Had such circumstances arisen and been duly recorded with specific instances demonstrating that it was not reasonably practicable to proceed with the inquiry, and only thereafter a conscious decision had been taken to invoke Article 311(2)(b), the matter would have been entirely different.
52. The impugned orders reveal absence of any specific material showing intimidation of witnesses, threat to the disciplinary authority, or existence of such extraordinary circumstances as would render conduct of inquiry impracticable. The chances of the applicant who is merely a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the CBI terrorizing and intimidating witness(s) is also not very plausible. The satisfaction recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is based on presumptions and general observations and does not meet the strict constitutional threshold laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra) and consistently followed by judicial precedents. The following three conditions become relevant for invoking sub-clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2):
"(a) Where a civil servant, alone or together with his associates terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are likely to give evidence against him with fear or reprisal in order to prevent them from doing so; so or
(b) Where the civil servant by himself or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family or the Inquiry Officer or his family members, so that the officers are afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held; or ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 23 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024
(c) Where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails at the time of the attempt to hold the inquiry is made."
53. In B.K. Meena (supra), the applicant therein, an IAS Officer, had sought a stay of the disciplinary proceedings, including continuation of the charge memorandum to its logical conclusion, during the pendency of the criminal trial. The Court declined to grant such relief and permitted the disciplinary proceedings to continue. In the present case, however, no charge-memo was issued at all, and to circumvent the regular process of disciplinary proceedings, the respondents have taken recourse to Article 311(2)(b) to dismiss the applicant. Therefore, the said judgment is of no assistance to them.
54. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Depot Manager, APSRTC (supra) does not assist the case of the respondents. The said decision lays down that departmental proceedings may be conducted simultaneously with a criminal trial, as both operate in distinct spheres. The principle enunciated therein contemplates the holding of a regular departmental inquiry. In the present case, however, the Disciplinary Authority dispensed with the inquiry itself by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. The issue before this Tribunal is not the permissibility of parallel proceedings, but the legality of dispensing with the inquiry. Accordingly, the reliance placed upon the said judgment is misplaced and distinguishable on facts as well as on the legal issue involved.
55. The reliance placed by the respondents upon the judgments on, Vineet Narain (supra) is misconceived. The said judgment was ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 24 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 rendered in the context of ensuring probity in public life and strengthening mechanisms for investigation and prosecution of corruption. It does not deal with, nor dilute, the constitutional safeguards embodied under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. The issue in the present case is not the necessity of stern action against corruption, but the legality of dispensing with a regular departmental inquiry on the ground that it was "not reasonably practicable." Vineet Narain does not lay down that the seriousness of allegations or involvement in corruption, by itself, justifies bypassing a departmental inquiry. Accordingly, the said judgment is distinguishable and has no direct application to the controversy involved herein.
56. The reliance placed by the respondents upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) is misconceived as in this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a case where regular departmental proceedings were initiated through issuance of a charge-sheet and conducted in accordance with law. In the present case, no charge memorandum was issued and no inquiry was conducted. Instead, the respondents invoked Article 311(2)(b) to dispense with the inquiry altogether and dismiss the applicant. Therefore, the ratio of the cited judgment, which concern regular disciplinary proceedings, has no application to a case where the constitutional safeguard of inquiry has been bypassed.
57. The reliance placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indian Overseas Bank (supra) is equally misconceived. The said judgment merely reiterates the settled proposition of law that the ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 25 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is extremely limited. Interference by the Court/Tribunal is warranted only in cases where the decision is vitiated by mala fides, is perverse, or is based on no evidence. In the present case, the challenge is to the very invocation of Article 311(2)(b) and the dispensing with of the inquiry itself. Hence, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment does not advance the case of the respondents and is clearly distinguishable.
58. The reliance placed by the respondents upon the judgment of this Tribunal in Neeraj Aggarwal (supra) is also misconceived and wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In the said matter, a trap was laid by the CBI against its own officer, who was caught red- handed while accepting illegal gratification. The misconduct stood established on the basis of direct trap proceedings and recovery, thereby constituting grave and incontrovertible material against the delinquent officer. In contradistinction, in the present case, the allegation against the applicant is merely that he entered into a criminal conspiracy with a private individual. There is no allegation of his being caught red-handed in any trap proceeding. The factual backdrop and evidentiary circumstances are thus entirely different. Accordingly, the ratio laid down in Neeraj Aggarwal is clearly distinguishable and does not support the case of the respondents.
59. Further, the facts of the present case are substantially covered by the ratio laid down by this Tribunal in Bhagwan Singh (supra) and the batch matters including Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra), wherein identical reasons for dispensing with inquiry were held to be ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 26 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024 unsustainable. No distinguishing circumstance has been shown by the respondents warranting a different view.
60. In view of the foregoing discussion, analysis of the pleadings, and the settled position of law governing the scope and application of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, we are of the considered view that the action of the respondents in dispensing with the regular departmental inquiry and imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal upon the applicant cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the impugned dismissal order dated 11.01.2022 and the appellate order dated 24.11.2023 suffer from illegality, arbitrariness and violation of principles of natural justice and are liable to be interfered with in exercise of judicial review.
61. Consequently, the present O.A. is partly allowed with the following directions:
(i) The impugned order dated 11.01.2022 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 24.11.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority are hereby quashed and set aside;
(ii) The applicant shall be reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order;
ANJALI 2026.02.24 ANJALI 16:45:15+ 05'30' 27 Court No. II O.A. No. 216/2024
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate and conclude regular disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, strictly in accordance with law.
62. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) (Member (J)
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