Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi
Anil Sanghi vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 7 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: [2003]85ITD73(DELHI)
ORDER
First appeal against order of block assessment passed under Chapter XIV B Catch Note:
For period from 1-7-1995 to 31-12-1996, provisions of section 249(4) were not applicable in respect of first appeal before Tribunal under section 253(1)(b) .
Ratio:
For period from 1-7-1995 to 31-12-1996, provisions of section 249(4) were not applicable in respect of first appeal before Tribunal under section 253(1)(b).
Held:
Various parts of Chapter-XX are independent by themselves as they operate in different spheres. There cannot be any overlapping of one into the other since these deal with appeals at different forums, i.e., the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal, the High Court and thereafter, the Supreme Court and lastly, there is the part pertaining to the revisions before the Commissioner. Consequent to the insertion of Chapter XIV-B with effect from 1-7-1995 there was a conscious consequential amendment in section 253(3)whereby a proviso was inserted to the effect that the first appeal to the Tribunal in respect of the block assessment would have to be filed within a period of 30 days of the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee and it must be stated in contradistinction that other appeals to the Tribunal contain a time limit of 60 days. In case the legislature so desired it could have brought the provisions of section 249(4) to Part B of Chapter XX in respect of such first appeals, but this was not done.
Therefore, for the period from 1-7-1995 to 31-12-1996 provisions of section 249(4) are not applicable in respect of the first appeals filed to the Tribunal against a block assessment.
Case Law Analysis:
V. N. Sudhakaran v. Asstt. CIT (2002) 83 ITD 159 (Chennai-Trib) and Pawan Kumar Ladha v. Asstt. CIT (2003) 84 ITD 178 (Ind-Trib) relied on.
Application:
Not to current assessment year.
Decision:
In favour of assessee.3 Assessment Year:
Block Period 1-4-1986 to 1-11-1996 Cases Referred:
Nalin Doshi v. Asstt. CIT (1997) 59 TTJ 298 (Ahd-Trib), Jai Bhagwan Aggarwal v. Dy. CIT (IT(SS) Appeal No. 125 (Delhi) of 1997), V. Baskaran v. Asstt. CIT (1998) 62 TTJ 698 (Chennai-Trib), S. Venkatesh v. Asstt. CIT (2000) 112 Taxman 31 (Chennai) (Mag) , Union of India v. Onkar S. Kanwar (2002) 258 ITR 761 (SC), Union of India v. Kawumnudini Narayan Dala (2001) 249 ITR 219 (SC), CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 128 ITR 294 (SC), CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 156 ITR 323/23 Taxman 14J (SC), Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum (1981) 129 ITR 440 (SC), Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548 (SC) and Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 155 ITR 120 (SC).
Income Tax Act 1961 s.253 Income Tax Act 1961 s.249(4) ORDER R.M. Mehta, Vice-President
1. The present Special Bench has been constituted to decide the following question and on which apparently there is a divergence of opinion between certain Benches of the Tribunal:-
Whether the provisions of Section 249(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961 are applicable in respect of the first appeal before the Tribunal under Section 253(1)(b) ?
2. Before we proceed to decide the question we find in necessary to give a brief background pertaining to a "first appeal" before the Tribunal when it is generally understood and which has been the position all along since the Tribunal came into existence that it is to decide a second appeal against the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and subsequently the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). We must emphasize at this stage that the terms "first appellate authority" and "second appellate authority" do not appear anywhere in the Income-tax Act, but these are terms of common and general use when a reference is made to the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal.
3. A special procedure for assessment of search cases was evolved by inserting Chapter XIV-B consisting of Sections 158B to 158BH, inserted by the Finance Act, 1995 with effect from 1st July, 1995. This newly inserted Chapter pertained to the assessment of search cases where :
(i) A search was initiated under Section 132; or
(ii) The books of account, other documents or any assets were requistioned under Section 132 A;
on or after 1st July, 1995.
For purposes of disposing of the present reference before us, we need not refer to the numerous sections vis-a-vis the said Chapter XIV-B, but would straightaway go to Section 158BG and which describes the authority competent to make the block assessment under the said Chapter. We in fact reproduce the said section as it stands today :-
158BG. The order of assessment for the block period shall be passed by an Assessing Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner [or Deputy Commissioner] or an Assistant Director [or Deputy Director], as the case may be :
Provided that no such order shall be passed without the previous approval of- ,
(a) the Commissioner or Director, as the case may be, in respect of search initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under Section 132A; after the 30th day of June, 1995 but before the 1st day of January, 1997;
(b) the [Joint] Commissioner or the [Joint] Director, as the case may be, in respect of search initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under Section 132A, on or after the 1st day of January, 1997.
4. It is apparent that in between the period 1-7-1995 and 31-12-1996 the order of assessment for the block period was to be passed by an Assessing Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner and as per proviso to the said section no such order could be passed by an authority competent to do so without the previous approval of the Commissioner or Director as the case may be. The law underwent a change after this period since the previous approval needed was not that of the Commissioner, but that of the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director as the case may be.
5. Consequent to the insertion of Chapter XIV-B with effect from 1-7-1995 a corresponding change was made in Part B of Chapter XX, which pertained to "Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal". A new Clause (b) was inserted after Clause (a) of Section 253(1) and which provided that an assessee aggrieved by an order passed by an Assessing Officer under Section 158BC(c), newly inserted by the Finance Act, 1995 could appeal within 30 days to the Appellate Tribunal against such an order. It is quite apparent that the first appeal was provided to the Tribunal since the order in block assessment framed by the competent authority had to be approved by the Commissioner and an appeal against such an order could not have been provided to the CIT (Appeals) as had been the case earlier and which as of now is against the orders passed by Assessing Officers whether on quantum or on penalties. During the course of the present hearing, the learned Departmental Representative very fairly admitted that there was no reason other than the hierarchical set up in the Income-tax Department for providing the first appeal to the Tribunal. As already noted by us, the provision pertaining to the first appeal to the Tribunal lasted for a limited period only i.e. 1-7-1995 to 31-12-1996 and subsequently once again with reference to the hierarchical changes in the Income-tax Department the first appeal against a block assessment reverted back to the CIT. (Appeals).
6. Before we come to the arguments of the parties, we find it necessary to mention that Chapter XX contains various parts i.e. A to E and the main heading is "Appeals and Revision". Part A deals with appeals to the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) and Commissioner (Appeals), Part B deals with the appeals to the Appellate Tribunal Part C deals with references to High Court, Part CC deals with appeals to High Court, Part D deals with the appeals to the Supreme Court and lastly, Part E pertains to revisions to the Commissioner under Section 263 and Section 264.
7. We would also like to reproduce Section 249(4) which finds place in section A of Chapter XX dealing with appeals to the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals)/CIT (Appeals) as follows :-
[(4) No appeal under the Chapter shall be admitted unless at the time of filing of the appeal,-
(a) where a return has been filed by the assessee, the assessee has paid the tax due on the income returned by him; or
(b) where no return has been filed by the assessee, the assessee has paid an amount equal to the amount of advance tax which was payable by him :
Provided that, [in a case falling under Clause (b) and] on an application made by the appellant in this behalf, the [***] [Commissioner (Appeals)] may, for any good and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, exempt him from the operation of the provisions of [that clause].]
8. In the aforesaid background, we now proceed to the terms of the reference to the Special Bench itself and wherein it is noticed that the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Nalin Doshi v. Asstt. CIT [1997] 59 TTJ 298 took the view that provisions of Section 249(4) were not applicable in a case where the "first appeal" had been filed before the Tribunal under Section 253(1)(6). According to the Bench once an appeal was filed before the Tribunal the procedure for disposal was as prescribed under Section 254 and there was no separate provision like that of Section 249(4) in the case of an appeal filed before the Tribunal. The learned Members of the Ahmedabad Bench further observed that Section 253 fell in Part B of Chapter XX and not in Part A of the said Chapter. The Bench further opined that the provisions of Section 249(4) had not been made applicable to the Tribunal since the Tribunal had the inherent power of staying the demand in a given case and such powers had not been barred by Section 249.
9. The other decision which according to the Division Bench had endorsed the view of the Ahmedabad Bench (supra) by way of an obiter was that of the Delhi Bench in the case of Jai Bhagwan Aggarwal v. Dy. CIT in I.T. (SS) Appeal No. 125 (Delhi) of 1997. The decisions taking a view to the contrary were set out in the reference by the learned Members of the Division Bench and these were V. Baskaran v. Asstt. CIT[l998] 62 TTJ 698 (Chennai) and the other 'being of the same Bench in the case of S. Venkatesh v. Asstt. CIT [2000] 112 Taxman 31 where the Judicial Member was of the view that provisions of Section 249(4) were applicable only to the appeals filed before the Dy. CIT (Appeals) and the CIT (Appeals) and not before the Tribunal, but the Accountant Member taking a view to the contrary, but in conclusion both the Members agreed that since the admitted tax had been paid before the hearing of the appeal, there was no point of difference to be referred for the opinion of the Third Member.
10. We now come to the arguments of the parties before us and the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, at the outset, contended that provisions of Section 253(1)(&) appeared in Part B of Chapter XX and which gave the power to the Tribunal to hear a first appeal on the orders passed in block assessment by the Assessing Officer during the period 1st July, 1995 to 31st December, 1996. Coming to Section 249(4) itself the learned counsel emphasized that the words used were "this Chapter" and which referred to appeals to the CIT (Appeals) who had also been empowered to grant exemption in respect of situations falling in Clause (b) in terms of the proviso to Section 249(4). It was further emphasized by the learned counsel that the provisions of Section 249(4) had not been extended to the Tribunal whose powers were separately defined in Part B of Chapter XX. According to the learned counsel there was an apparent difference between a regular assessment and a block assessment pursuant to search and seizure since in the case of the former an assessee was expected to pay up his taxes on the returned income whereas in the case of the latter, the Department was more than likely to be in possession of assets such as cash, jewellery, shares etc. and it would, therefore, be a very harsh measure in case an assessee was asked to pay huge amounts pertaining to the income for the block period comprising a number of years before his appeal could be taken up by the Tribunal.
11. Coming to the facts of the present assessee, the learned counsel invited our attention to page 19 of his paper-book No. 2,more so, the note below the figures emphasizing that on the returned income of Rs. 27.64 crores the tax liability came to Rs. 16.58 crores whereas the amount seized was to the tune of Rs. 23.28 crores. It was his submission that the assessee on the aforesaid facts could not be expected to pay a sum of Rs. 16 crores and odd, which was the tax liability on the returned income.
12. The further submissions on the part of the learned counsel were to the effect that Parts A and B of Chapter XX were independent and operated in entirely different spheres the former in respect of appeals before the CIT (Appeals) and the latter pertaining to the appeals before the Tribunal. According to him one could not have an over-lapping effect on the other. He also invited our attention to the forms by which appeals were filed before the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal, the former in Form No. 35 and the latter in Form No. 36. It was emphasized that whereas in Form No. 35 there was a specific column pertaining to the payment of taxes on the income returned, this was absent in the form pertaining to the appeal to the Tribunal.
13. Coming now to the decisions the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of V.N. Sudhakaran v. Asstt. CIT [2002] 83 ITD 159 (Chennai); that of the Indore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Pawan Kumar Ladha v. Asstt. CIT [2003] 84 ITD 178 (Indore) and lastly, another decision of the Indore Bench of the Tribunal, this being the one in the case of Malwa Texturising (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2002] 77 TTJ 995 (Indore). Thereafter, the learned counsel with reference to the decisions of the Tribunal which had expressed a view to the contrary placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Onkar S. Kanwar [2002] 258 ITR 7611 (SC) and this was for the proposition that if two views were possible, then the one in favour of the assessee was required to be accepted.
14. Before we go to the submissions made on behalf of the Department, we would like to mention that during the course of the hearing of the present reference the learned counsel proceeded at one stage to go to the merits of the case contending before the Tribunal that the amount seized by the Department be treated as payment of tax on the returned income, but we cautioned him not to proceed in this direction since the present Special Bench was to decide only the question of law proposed for its consideration and nothing more. As this aspect of the matter can be taken care of by the Division Bench after the present reference is disposed of, we need not say anything on the submissions made and nor do we propose to deal with the authorities cited in respect of the aforesaid submissions. The only other submission on the part of the learned counsel was that the rule of consistency be kept in mind before taking a decision and by this he probably had in mind the decisions of the Tribunal, which had taken a view in favour of the assessee. The learned counsel also made a statement before us to the effect that the un-reported decision of the Tribunal in the case of Jai Bhagwan Aggarwal (supra) which had been mentioned in the reference for constituting a Special Bench had become final as no appeal had been filed against the said decision to the Hon'ble High Court. Relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalai [2001] 249 ITR 2192 (SC), the learned counsel contended that the Revenue could not blow hot and cold at the same time by taking different stands on identical issues.
15. As against the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the assessee the learned Departmental Representative, at the outset, took the stand that the words "this Chapter" referred to Chapter XX which included Parts A to E and these were not independent chapters as was the stand taken on behalf of the assessee. The subsequent submission on the part of the learned Departmental Representative was that provisions of Section 249(4) pertained to "first appeals" to the Tribunal as well. In referring to the Income-tax Act itself the learned Departmental Representative sought to point out that there were certain independent chapters classified as A, B etc. such as Chapter VI, Chapter VI-A and Chapter VI-B, but this was not so in case of Chapter XX and he reiterated that these were mere headings and not chapters.
16. The other limb of his argument was that the entire scheme of Chapter XX be considered as an integrated code and be accorded a harmonious construction since the present could turn out to be a case where even on the basis of the returned income an assessee would contend that he is not obliged to pay the admitted tax.
17. In support of the Revenue's case the learned Departmental Representative reiterated reliance on the two decisions of the Chennai Bench (supra) as also the decisions reported in :
(i) CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 2941 (SC);
(ii) CIT v. J.H. Gotla [1985] 156 ITR 323 (SC);
(iii) Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum [1981] 129 ITR 440 (SC);
(iv) Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [1989] 178 ITR 548 (SC); and
(v) Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 1203 (SC).
18. We have examined the rival submissions and have also taken into account the decisions cited at the bar by both the parties. Coming first to the decisions relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative, these are not found to be applicable vis-a-vis the specific question of law posed before us. In the case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty (supra). Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were dealing with the question of capital gains on the transfer of goodwill initially generated in a business and the main point connected thereto was whether capital gains were exigible in respect of an asset for which there was no cost of acquisition. It was with reference to the aforesaid point that their Lordships took the view that a charging section and a computation provision constituted an integrated code. The learned Departmental Representative on the basis of the aforesaid judgment wants to convey a view that all Parts of Chapter XX i.e. A to E should be considered as an integrated code and what is stated in one should be read in the other as well. By this we mean the specific issue before us i.e. whether provisions of Section 249(4) are applicable to first appeals filed before the Tribunal. To go a little further it is the stand of the Department that what is stated in Part A should apply to Part B, Part C and thereafter Parts to D and E and vice versa, but this argument, in our opinion, falls to the ground.
19. Coming to the decision in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra) the question pertains to the determination of the shares of heirs in coparcenary property subsequent to the death of the coparcener visa-vis an HUF and it was in this context that their Lordships referred to the "legislative intent". In the present reference the learned Departmental Representative has not been able to pin-point as to what was the legislative intent in bringing on the statute book the provision of a direct appeal to the Tribunal in respect of block assessments when it is categorically stated before us on query from the Bench that it was only to tackle the question of the hierarchy in the Department since even on legal grounds an appeal to an equally placed authority would not be appropriate since the assessment order was to be approved by a Commissioner. The question of legislative intent, therefore, in our opinion, does not arise in the present case.
20. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghubir Singh (supra) deals with the question of precedence vis-a-vis the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it also details the situations in which the Supreme Court of India can depart from its earlier decision. This decision probably has been cited before us by the learned Departmental Representative for the proposition that decisions of the Tribunal which are in favour of the Revenue should be followed whereas the learned Departmental Representative ignores the well laid down legal position that where there are two views, then the one favouring the assessee should be followed. The learned counsel for the assessee in support of the same very proposition has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Onkar S. Kanwar (supra). We cannot help, but observing at this stage that the other decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel i.e. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal's case (supra) is not found applicable since that speaks of the stand taken by the Revenue in one particular case and thereafter it wants to take a different stand in respect of an assessee who is identically placed. In the present Special Bench, we are to resolve the legal issue posed to us and this situation has arisen because certain Benches of the Tribunal have taken divergent views i.e. the Madras Bench taking contrary views, the Indore Bench in two decisions taking an identical view i.e. in favour of the assessee and the Ahmedabad Bench once again taking a view in favour of the assessee. The un-reported decision in the case of Jai Bhagwan Aggarwal (supra) of the Delhi Bench upholding the decision of the Ahmedabad Bench by, an obiter is stated to have become final and this statement made by the learned counsel for the appellant remains unchallenged on the part of the learned Departmental Representative. In other words, the situation that has emerged is that the decisions which are in favour of the assessee are more in number as against the solitary decision of the Madras Bench, which is stated to be in favour of the Revenue since in the other decision of the same Bench the Members differed on the applicability of Section 249(4) to the first appeals filed before the Tribunal, but the conclusion was the same.
21. The other decision relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative was J.H. Gotla's case (supra) which deals with the question of interpretation of statutes and their Lordships stressed the necessity of an equitable construction where a strict literal construction led to injustice or an absurd result. This decision, in our opinion, is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case as the subsequent discussion would show and our comments in the earlier part of the present order would show that there is no absurdity or a construction which is not equitable or which has resulted in any injustice.
22. We now come to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and in considering these we would, at the outset, opine that the various Parts of Chapter XX are independent by themselves as they operate in different spheres. There cannot be any over-lapping of one into the other since these deal with appeals at different forums ie. the CIT (Appeals) the Tribunal, the High Court and thereafter the Supreme Court and lastly, there is the part pertaining to the revisions before the Commissioner. Consequent to the insertion of Chapter XIV-B with effect from 1-7-1995 there was a conscious consequential amendment in Section 253(3) whereby a proviso was inserted to the effect that the first appeal to the Tribunal in respect of the block assessment would have to be filed within a period of 30 days of the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee and it must be stated in contra distinction that other appeals to the Tribunal contain a time limit of 60 days. In case the Legislature so desired it could have brought the provisions of Section 249(4) to Part B of Chapter XX in respect of such first appeals, but this was not done. We straightaway refer to the decision of the Madras Bench of the Tribunal in the case of V.N. Sudhakaran (supra) where in dealing with an identical issue, the Bench observed as under :-
The fundamental rule of interpretation of a statute is that the Act has to be applied in the manner it was intended to be applied by the Legislature and it is not open to the Tribunal or any Court to substitute any word, add or delete any word in the Act when it is so applied to a circumstance. Therefore, it was quite clear that the claim of departmental representative that the appeal in the instant case could not be admitted by the Tribunal because the assessee had not paid the tax on the returned undisclosed income as is required by Section 249(4), was an unacceptable proposition as it went against the very intention of the Legislature. What the lawmakers never intended could not be assumed by any party.
The provisions of Section 249(4) were in the Act when Chapter XIV-B was added as part of the Act. The lawmakers perhaps considering that Chapter XIV-B talked of income that was not disclosed by an assessee did not feel the necessity to introduce provision similar to the one as in Section 249(4). The lawmakers had placed stages of appeal is individual parts and there is no indication, made by them that any portion of the enactment of any part is to extend to or govern another part containing appeal procedures. It is clear without any shade of doubt that the provisions grouped in each part of Chapter XX are meant to be applicable within that part and not to travel into other parts of said Chapter.
The legislative intent in introducing Section 249(4) was to ensure that the appeals before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) are filed only on payment of tax on returned income. Filing of an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) has not been categorized anywhere in the Act as 'filing of first appeal' and filing of appeal before the Tribunal as 'filing of second appeal' but there is recognition of hierarchy of judicial forums like the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) the Tribunal, the High Court and the stages of movement of appeal are from the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) to the Tribunal and from the Tribunal to the High Court. Merely for the reason that for certain issues the appeal from the order of assessment lies before the Tribunal and by the process, it is termed as first appeal as a matter of expression by the parties, it does not lead to the conclusion that restriction on admission of appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) is to be extended to the Tribunal, more so, when as observed earlier, the Legislature never intended so.
23. The Tribunal in expressing the aforesaid views considered the decision of the same Bench in the case of S. Venkatesh (supra) as also the decision once again of the same Bench in the case of V. Balasubramanian (supra) and both of which are stated to be in favour of the Revenue and relied upon before us by the learned Departmental Representative.
24. An identical view has been expressed by the Indore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Pawan Kumar Ladha (supra). The relevant observations of the Bench are reproduced as under :-
The entire Chapter XX has been divided in six main headings like, A, B, C, D, E and F there is no such mandatory condition under the head 'B' like Section 249(4)(a) under heading 'A' that an assessee must pay the due tax admitted in its return before or at the time of filing of the appeal before the Tribunal. The revenue would have certainly a case if in place of the wordings 'Appeals to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and Commissioner (Appeals)', the words 'first appellate authority' would have been mentioned with the heading 'A' or in the proviso to Section 249(4).
Furthermore, there is a column in Form No. 35 issued under rule 45 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962,wherein an assessee is required to give information as to whether the tax due on the income returned had been paid in full and if the answer is in the affirmative, to give details of date of payment and the amount paid. Form No. 35 is the proforma for filing appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) while Form No. 36 under Rule 47(1) is the form of appeal to the Tribunal. However, in Form No. 36 there is no such column or in other words no such information regarding payment of tax due on the income returned has been sought for from the assessee as in Form No. 35 for filing appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals).
25. In the other decision of the Indore Bench i.e. in the case of Malwa Texturising (P.) Ltd. (supra). The observations of the Bench were to the following effect :-
The provisions of Section 249(4) cannot be applied for filing of appeals before the Tribunal. Before the introduction of Chapter XIV-B w.e.f. 1st July, 1995, there was no provision for filing first appeals directly to the Tribunal. When Chapter XIV-B was introduced, corresponding Clause (b) was also inserted in Section 253 by which first appeal against the orders under Section 158-BC was required to be filed directly with the Tribunal. It seems that when these amendments were made corresponding provision of Section 249(4) was omitted to be inserted in Part-B of Chapter XX. It is not the duty of Courts to fill up omissions. Other view could be that legislature intentionally did not insert provision equivalent to Section 249(4) in Part B of the Chapter XX.
26. A similar view was expressed by the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Nalin Doshi (supra).
27. We are also in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant when he contends that a distinction was to be kept between the regular assessment proceedings and the block assessment proceedings since the latter the availability with the Department of seized assets in the form of movables and immovables was likely to be strong and in fact a certainty and under such circumstances it would be improper and in certain circumstances neigh impossible for an assessee to pay taxes on the returned income pertaining to the undisclosed income for the block period. We have, however, in the earlier part of the present order referred to the legislative intent, the manner in which the provision is to be interpreted as also the independent and specific operation of each of the Parts of Chapter XX and in the final analysis, we hold that provisions of Section 249(4) are not applicable in respect of the first appeals filed to the Tribunal against a block assessment.
28. The opinion of the Special Bench is now returned back to the Division Bench for the purposes of taking up the appeal for hearing and deciding the same on merits.