Madras High Court
M/S.Reliance Infratel Limited vs Mrs.T.Thangamma Mathew on 30 August, 2022
Author: R.N.Manjula
Bench: R.N.Manjula
C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and
C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on 15.07.2022
Pronounced on 30.08.2022
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE Ms.JUSTICE R.N.MANJULA
C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and
C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
1.M/s.Reliance Infratel Limited,
H-Block, 1st Floor,
Dhirubai Ambani Knowledge City,
Navi Mumbai – 400710.
Circle office at
No.6, Haddows Road, Nungambakkam,
Chennai 600 006.
2.The Manager,
Reliance Infratel Ltd.,
Reliance House,
No.6, Haddows Road,
Nungambakkam,
Chennai – 600 006.
... Petitioners
Vs.
Mrs.T.Thangamma Mathew
... Respondent
PRAYER : Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, to set aside the order dated 10.03.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2022 in
O.S.No.6842 of 2021 on the file of XXIV Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai.
For Petitioners : Mr.J.Ravikumar
1/26
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and
C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
For Respondent : Mr.P.Kannan
ORDER
This Civil Revision Petition has been preferred to set aside the order dated 10.03.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2022 in O.S.No.6842 of 2021 on the file of XXIV Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai.
2. Heard Mr.J.Ravikumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.P.Kannan, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the materials available on record.
3. The short facts of the case are as follows:
The revision petitioners are the defendants against whom the respondent / plaintiff has filed a suit for ejectment. The revision petitioners filed a petition under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in order to refer the parties to arbitration as per Clause 31 of the terms of the lease agreement dated 01.10.2008 and to dismiss the suit as not maintainable. The said petition was dismissed. Aggrieved over that, the defendants have preferred this Civil Revision Petition.2/26
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already held in the case of Suresh Shah Vs. Hipad Technology India Private Limited reported in (2021) 1 SCC 529 that the disputes between the lessor and lessee under the Transfer of Property Act are very much arbitrable and that it has to be referred to arbitration, if there is a valid arbitration agreement; in the above judgment reference was made about Booz Allen and hamilton Inc Vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others and Vidya Drolia and Others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation; since the arbitration clause is an independent or separate clause from the main agreement, even if the lease has lapsed by efflux of time or terminated or declared as void, the arbitration clause can still be enforced.
4.1. Reliance was also placed on Reva Electric Car Company P.Ltd. Vs. Green Mobil; in the said case, it is held that an arbitration clause which forms part of the contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract and a decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause; as per Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the 3/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 arbitration clause is an independent agreement by itself and hence even if the main agreement has lapsed due to efflux of time, the arbitration clause would survive; when the disputes have arisen between the parties in respect of the subject matter of the main agreement, the dispute needs to be referred to arbitration; the revision petitioners / defendants have filed a petition at the very first instance itself before filing the written statement; the arbitration clause 31 of the lease and maintenance agreement dated 01.10.2008, is binding on both parties and the plaintiff has to be referred to arbitration and the suit is not maintainable.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent is the owner of the suit property and the petitioners/defendants are the tenants; as per the lease and maintenance agreement dated 01.10.2008, the lease period was effected from 01.10.2008 to 31.09.2018; so the lease period is for 10 years; after expiry of lease on 31.09.2018, as per the request of the second defendant, it was extended upto 31.12.2018 and thereafter also the defendants did not vacate the property and that has caused legal notice to be sent by the respondent; the defendants did not send any reply; therefore, a suit has been filed by the plaintiff.
4/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 5.1. The lease agreement is not arbitrable and the tenancy matters are governed by the special statutes where the tenants enjoy statutory protection against eviction; it is held in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. Vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others reported in 2011 (5) SCC 532 that there are certain non-arbitrable disputes as listed below :
“(i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences;
(ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody;
(iii) guardianship matters;
(iv) insolvency and winding-up matters;
(v) testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate);
(vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes.” 5.2. The determination of lease agreement is not arbitrable as it is contrary to the public policy; hence, Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is not 5/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 applicable for the suits of this nature; the determination of lease arising out of Section 1(11) of Transfer of Property Act, cannot be decided by arbitration and the ruling given by the Apex Court in the case of Vidya Drolia and Others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation, is applicable to the matter in revision; the learned Trial Judge has rightly dismissed the petition filed by the revision petitioners and it does not require any interference.
6. The fact that the respondent is the owner of the premises where the revision petitioners were the tenants is not disputed. The revision petitioners and the respondent had entered into a lease agreement dated 01.10.2008. As per the lease agreement, the lease period starts from 01.10.2008 and expires on 31.09.2018. After the expiry of the lease period, a further grace extension was given till 31.12.2018. Even thereafter, the revision petitioners did not vacate and that resulted in the suit for eviction. The sole contention of the revision petitioners is that as per Clause 31 of the Lease Agreement, the disputes between the lessor and lessee in connection with the lease agreement should be referred to mediation. For the sake of convenience, Clause 31 of the lease agreement is extracted hereunder:6/26
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 “31. It is hereby expressly agreed that if at any time there shall arise any dispute, doubt or difference or question with regard to interpretation of this agreement or in respect or the right, duties & liabilities of the parties hereto arising out of these present, then every dispute, doubt, difference or question shall be referred to arbitration as per the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and the rules framed there under. The decision under the arbitration shall be final and binding to the parties to this deed.”
7. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since the lease itself got expired, the arbitration clause has got no application. But the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the arbitration clause by itself is a separate agreement and it is independent of the lease agreement and hence, even if the lease agreement is lapsed by expiry of time, the arbitration agreement is very well in existence and hence, the parties should be referred to arbitration. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Reva Electric Car Company P.Ltd. Vs. Green Mobil, reported in MANU/SC/1396/2011 or AIR 2012 SC 739. In the said judgment, it is held as under:7/26
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 “33. Even if, I accept the submission of Ms.Ahamadi that MOU was not extended beyond 31st of December, 2007, it would make little difference. Section 16(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that an arbitration clause which forms part of the contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. The plain meaning of the aforesaid clause would tend to show that even on the termination of the agreement/contract, the arbitration agreement would still survive. It also seems to be the view taken by this Court in Everest Holdings Ltd. (supra). Accepting the submission of Ms.Ahamadi that the arbitration clause came to an end as the MOU came to an end by efflux of time on 31st December, 2007 would lead to a very uncertain state of affairs, destroying the very efficacy of Section 16(1). The aforesaid section provides as under :
"16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction - (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose
(a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract;and 8/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause."”
8. However, it is claimed by the respondent that as per the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton INC. Vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others, the matters only which are arbitrable can be referred to arbitration. If the matter in question is not arbitrable, the arbitration clause will not bind the parties. In the above judgment, it is held as under:
“34. The term `arbitrability' has different meanings in different contexts. The three facets of arbitrability, relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, are as under :
(i) whether the disputes are capable of adjudication and settlement by arbitration? That is, whether the disputes, having regard to their nature, could be resolved by a private forum chosen by the parties (the arbitral tribunal) or whether they would exclusively fall within the domain of public fora (courts).
(ii) Whether the disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement? That is, whether the disputes are enumerated or described in the arbitration agreement as 9/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 matters to be decided by arbitration or whether the disputes fall under the `excepted matters' excluded from the purview of the arbitration agreement.
(iii) Whether the parties have referred the disputes to arbitration? That is, whether the disputes fall under the scope of the submission to the arbitral tribunal, or whether they do not arise out of the statement of claim and the counter claim filed before the arbitral tribunal. A dispute, even if it is capable of being decided by arbitration and falling within the scope of arbitration agreement, will not be `arbitrable' if it is not enumerated in the joint list of disputes referred to arbitration, or in the absence of such joint list of disputes, does not form part of the disputes raised in the pleadings before the arbitral tribunal.
35. Arbitral tribunals are private fora chosen voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place of courts and tribunals which are public fora constituted under the laws of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or non-contractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by the Legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. 10/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 Certain other categories of cases, though not expressly reserved for adjudication by a public fora (courts and Tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement of such disputes.
36. The well recognized examples of non-arbitrable disputes are : (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv) insolvency and winding up matters; (v) testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate); and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes.”
9. By citing the above decision, it is claimed by the respondent that since the dispute between the revision petitioners and the respondent is concerned with tenancy matters and eviction and about which there are special statutes, the 11/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause by claiming that the issue in hand is arbitrable. His further submission is that in the case of Himangni Enterprises Vs. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia reported in (2017) 10 SCC 706, it is held as under in paragraph No.11:
“11. The respondent opposed the application essentially on two grounds. First, the lease period initially fixed in the lease deed having come to an end by efflux of time, such lease deed was no longer enforceable by the appellant and second, the disputes, which are subject-matter of the civil suit, are incapable of being referred to an arbitrator. It was contended that the respondent has, therefore, rightly filed the civil suit in the civil court seeking the appellant's eviction from the suit premises and other ancillary reliefs arising there from and the same has to be tried by the civil court.”
10. The learned counsel for the respondent has also drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.24, 25 and 28 of the decision in the case of Himangni Enterprises Vs. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia reported in (2017) 10 SCC 706, which is extracted as under:
“24. The Delhi Rent Act, which deals with the cases relating to rent and eviction of the premises, is a special Act. Though it contains a provision (Section 3) by virtue of it, the 12/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 provisions of the Act do not apply to certain premises but that does not mean that the Arbitration Act, ipso facto, would be applicable to such premises conferring jurisdiction on the arbitrator to decide the eviction/rent disputes. In such a situation, the rights of the parties and the demised premises would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the civil suit would be triable by the Civil Court and not by the arbitrator. In other words, though by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to certain premises but no sooner the exemption is withdrawn or ceased to have its application to a particular premises, the Act becomes applicable to such premises. In this view of the matter, it cannot be contended that the provisions of the Arbitration Act would, therefore, apply to such premises.
25. We have gone through the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of her contention.
Having gone through the same, we are of the considered opinion that firstly, some decisions are rendered by the High Court; Secondly, remaining decisions are distinguishable on facts and lastly, in the light of two authoritative decisions of this Court, which are directly on the point and continue to hold the field, no reliance can be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on any decision of the High Court. Indeed, any such decision of the High Court, which has taken view contrary to the view of this Court, the same stands 13/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 overruled. Such is the case here.
...............
28. We accordingly direct the concerned Civil Court which is seized of the civil suit to proceed with the trial of the suit on the merits in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of our observations made herein, expeditiously.”
11. So in the above judgment, it is held that the cases are distinguishable on facts and hence, the suit filed in the Civil Court should be proceeded. On the side of the respondent, the attention of this Court has also been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court held in the case of Vidya Drolia & others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation reported in (2019) 20 SCC 406. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court has held that there are certain statutes in which the arbitration is excluded by necessary implication and the above reading of the statute implies that the disputes arising out of the said statute cannot be a subject matter of arbitration. However, the matter was referred to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench has held in the case of Suresh Shah Vs. Hipad Technology India Private Limited reported in (2021) 1 SCC 529 that even for the transactions made under Transfer of Property Act, the arbitration clause is applicable and the matter is arbitrable in nature. The very 14/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 same judgment was referred by the revision petitioners also and it has already been referred above. In the case of Vidya Drolia & others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation reported in (2019) 20 SCC 406, the following questions were taken up for examination in connection with the validity of the arbitration agreement:
“(i) Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing?
(ii) Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of letters, telecommunication, etc.?
(iii) Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled?
(iv) On rare occasions, whether the subject matter of dispute is arbitrable?”
12. One more judgment of the Supreme Court held in the case of Sri K.M.Manjunath Vs. Sri Erappa.G (dead) through Lrs reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 561, it is held that mere acceptance of the rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of lease. When the lease is determined by efflux of time, no further termination is required by issuing a statutory notice.15/26
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13. By citing the above judgment to the case in hand, it is submitted that the tenancy agreement was determined due to efflux of time and there is no jural relationship between the revision petitioners and the respondent as landlord and the tenant. It is further submitted that in the latest Full Bench judgment of the Supreme Court which was held on an earlier reference made by the Division Bench in the case of Vidya Drolia and Others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court laid down a fourfold test to determe when the subject matter of a dispute in an arbitration agreement is not arbitrable and the same is as under:
“76. In view of the above discussion, we would like to propound a four-fold test for determining when the subject matter of a dispute in an arbitration agreement is not arbitrable:
76.1. (1) when cause of action and subject matter of the dispute relates to actions in rem, that do not pertain to subordinate rights in personam that arise from rights in rem.
76.2. (2) when cause of action and subject matter of the dispute affects third party rights; have erga omnes effect;
require centralized adjudication, and mutual adjudication would not be appropriate and enforceable;
16/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 76.3. (3) when cause of action and subject matter of the dispute relates to inalienable sovereign and public interest functions of the State and hence mutual adjudication would be unenforceable; and 76.4. (4) when the subject-matter of the dispute is expressly or by necessary implication non-arbitrable as per mandatory statute(s).
76.5. These tests are not watertight compartments; they dovetail and overlap, albeit when applied holistically and pragmatically will help and assist in determining and ascertaining with great degree of certainty when as per law in India, a dispute or subject matter is non-arbitrable. Only when the answer is affirmative that the subject matter of the dispute would be non-arbitrable.
76.6. However, the aforesaid principles have to be applied with care and caution as observed in Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd.:
“35...Reference is made there to certain disputes like criminal offences of a public nature, disputes arising out of illegal agreements and disputes relating to status, such as divorce, which cannot be referred to arbitration. It has, however, been held that if in respect of fats relating to a criminal matter, say, physical injury, if there is a right to 17/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 damages for personal injury, then such a dispute can be referred to arbitration (Keir v. Leeman). Similarly, it has been held that a husband and a wife may refer to arbitration the terms on which they shall separate, because they can make a valid agreement between themselves on that matter (Soilleux v. Herbst, Wilson v. Wilson and Cahill v. Cahill).” ............
79. Landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable as they are not actions in rem but pertain to subordinate rights in personam that arise from rights in rem. Such actions normally would not affect third-
party rights or have erga omnes affect or require centralized adjudication. An award passed deciding landlord-tenant disputes can be executed and enforced like a decree of the civil court. Landlord-tenant disputes do not relate to inalienable and sovereign functions of the State. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not expressly or by necessary implication bar arbitration. Transfer of Property Act, like all other Acts, has a public purpose, that is, to regulate landlord- tenant relationships and the arbitrator would be bound by the provisions, including provisions which enure and protect the tenants.
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80. In view of the aforesaid, we overrule the ratio laid down in Himangni Enterprises and hold that landlord-tenant disputes are arbitrable as the Transfer of Property Act does not forbid or foreclose arbitration. However, landlord-tenant disputes covered and governed by rent control legislation would not be arbitrable when specific court or forum has been given exclusive jurisdiction to apply and decide special rights and obligations. Such rights and obligations can only be adjudicated and enforced by the specified court/forum, and not through arbitration.”
14. In the said judgment, it is held that the landlord – tenant dispute can also fall under the category of arbitrable dispute but if certain disputes between the landlord and tenant governed by the rent control legislation, there are special Courts or forum designed to deal with those cases. Those rights and obligations should be adjudicated only by the special Court or forum and not through arbitration. Atlast, the following conclusions were arrived:
“244. Before we part, the conclusions reached, with respect to question no. 1, are:
244.1. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to judicial interference.
244.2. Usually, subject matter arbitrability cannot be 19/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 decided at the stage of Sections 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it’s a clear case of deadwood.
244.3. The Court, under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of non existence of valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he is entitled to such a finding.
244.4. The Court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down above, i.e., ‘when in doubt, do refer’.
244.5. The scope of the Court to examine the prima facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only:
a. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? or b. Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of letters, telecommunication etc? c. Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled?
d. On rare occasions, whether the subject matter of dispute is arbitrable?”
15. In the above summary, it is stated that when the Court has a doubt about the validity of the arbitration agreement and it cannot be determined on the prima facie basis, it is better to refer to arbitration. If the party could 20/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 establish a prima facie case of non-existence of valid arbitration agreement and if he is entitled to such a finding, the Court is not obliged to refer the matter to mediation. So the arbitrability of the subject matter even though cannot be decided at the stage of Section 8 to 11, if the case is a patent deadwood, the Court need not hesitate to conduct the matter by recording a finding that the matter is not arbitrable.
16. The matter in hand can be resolved by applying the above test. The lease agreement entered into between the revision petitioners and the respondent got expired on 31.09.2018. Since the lease agreement was terminated by efflux of time, the jural relationship between the revision petitioner and the respondent as that of landlord and tenant has seized to exist. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in K.M.Manjunath Vs. Sri.Erappa.G (dead) through Lrs. Reported in 2022 Livelaw (SC) 561 that mere acceptance of rent by the landlord after expiry of the period of lease, would not amount to waiver of the termination of the lease. In the case in hand, the lease got terminated not only due to efflux of time, but also by the act of the parties wherein the respondent has issued legal notice by expressly determining the 21/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 lease at the expiry of the lease period. Though a short grace time till 31.12.2018 was extended that will not hold the revision petitioners / tenant in any better position and the fact remains that the jurd relationship between the parties has seized to exist.
17. In fact, Clause 31 of the lease agreement which speaks about arbitration would only say that in case there is any dispute, doubt or difference or question with regard to the interpretation of the lease agreement or in respect of right, duties and liabilities of the parties, then those disputes shall be referred to mediation. The lease for 10 years got concuded between the parties without any dispute, doubt or difference. Even the legal notice sent by the respondent landlord to the revision petitioners by terminating the lease also, received by the revision petitioners silently. The conduct of the revision petitioners in not sending any reply would also show that the lease was determined without any dispute or doubt and that was accepted by the tenant as well. If the tenant chooses to remain in the suit property subsequent to the termination of the lease, the matter would fall under the statutes which would govern the rights of the parties and not the lease agreement which has already become a deadwood. 22/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022
18. Though it is true that the arbitration agreement is itself a separate agreement independent that of the main agreement in the absence of any doubt, difference or dispute during lease period would only show that the necessity to use the said agreement (arbitration agreement) had not occurred. Since the present dispute has arisen after the jural relationship between the parties had seized to exist, the capacity in which the main agreement or the lease agreement entered into between the parties would also seize to exist. In that case, the one and only prima facie presumption in favour of the respondent/plaintiff on the basis of the deadwood agreement is that there is nothing survives between the parties to be remedied by a referrence to arbitration.
19. The one and only legal point which has to be determined by the Civil Court is whether the lease got terminated legally and whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree for the recovery of possession of the suit property. Since no other dispute, doubt or difference surrounding the lease agreement had ever arisen before or during the termination of the lease, the parties need not subject themselves for arbitration. Since the respondent could prove that both the main agreement and the arbitration clause have become lifeless, nothing will prevent 23/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 the Civil Court to get along with the suit proceedings. Hence, it is right for the learned Trial Judge to dismiss the petition filed by the revision petitioners under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and it does not warrant any interference.
20. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed and the order passed by XXIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, dated 10.03.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2022 in O.S.No.6842 of 2021 is confirmed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
30.08.2022 Index: Yes/No Speaking / Non Speaking Order gsk 24/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 To XXIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai.
25/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 R.N.MANJULA, J.
gsk C.R.P.No.2101 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.10871 of 2022 30.08.2022 26/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis