Allahabad High Court
Anand Pratap vs State Of U.P. And Another on 23 April, 2026
Author: Deepak Verma
Bench: Deepak Verma
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:91057
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 16521 of 2026
Anand Pratap
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Arif Ikbal, Raees Ahamad
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
G.A.
Court No. - 74
HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.
1. Heard counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the State.
2. The present 528 B.N.S.S. application has been filed to quash the impugned summoning order dated 15.01.2024 as well as entire proceedings in Complaint Case No.1064 of 2023 (Sanjesh Kumar vs. Anand Pratap), under Section 138 N.I.Act, Police Station Indirapuram, District Ghaziabad.
3. It is alleged in the complaint that the applicant and opposite party no.2 are having good relation and the applicant is engaged in business of manufacturing furniture. Opposite party no.2 had given order of manufacturing furniture to the applicant and opposite party no.2 paid Rs.7,50,000/- to the applicant but applicant had not manufactured furniture. Then opposite party no.2 asked the applicant several times to return the above mentioned amount, then applicant gave complainant a Cheque No.266454 of Canara Bank Branch Etawah of Rs.7,50,000/- dated 23.05.2023. Opposite party no.2 submitted cheque in the Bank and same was dishnoured on 24.05.2023. Opposite party no.2 informed the applicant in regard to dishonour of cheque, then applicant requested the opposite party no.2 to put the cheque after sometime to the Bank and same will be encashed. Again opposite party no.2 submitted cheque before the Bank and same was dishonoured on 06.07.2023. Thereafter, opposite party no.2 issued notice on 31.07.2023 to the applicant but applicant did not return the amount, then opposite party no.2 filed present complaint against the applicant. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. The present complaint is not maintainable, as it is lodged with much delay and trial court has not considered these facts and issued summon against the applicant. On perusal of complaint and other material evidence, complaint is defective and no prosecution can take place.
4. Per contra, learned A.G.A. opposed the submission raised by learned counsel for the applicants and submitted that argument raised by learned counsel for the applicant are disputed questions of fact.
5. Considered the argument raised by learned counsel for the applicant and perused the record. From the record, it is apparent that the applicant issued cheque in favour of opposite party no.2 for discharge of legal liability. Same was presented before Bank by the opposite party no.2 and the cheque was dishonoured on 24.05.2023. Thereafter on request of applicant, cheque was again presented before the Bank and same was dishonoured on 06.07.2023. Opposite party no.2 issued statutory notice to the applicant on 31.07.2023, thereafter, on 16.09.2023 lodged present complaint. Considering the period provided under N.I.Act, present complaint is very much in time and cognizance and summoning by learned magistrate is based upon facts and documents produced by the complainant. Complaint lodged by opposite party no.2 is very much maintainable in the eye of law and summoning by learned Magistrate does not require any interference. On perusal of documents and order-sheet, it is apparent that before the trial court case is posted for statement of the accused-witnesses, the proceeding is going on before the trial court and case is being examined. Applicant will have remedy to raise objection before trial court.
6. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay Patel and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has considered following judgments:
"14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that a presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability unless the contrary is proved and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in entertaining and accepting the plea of the accused at the initial stage of the proceedings and quash the complaint.
15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It was observed that such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must raise its defense in the trial.
16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the High Court should not quash the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act by going into disputed questions of fact regarding the cheque in question being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a statutory presumption as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or liability.
17. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court held that when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, it would not be judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed question of fact at a pre-trial stage to quash the complaint. The relevant observations in the judgment are extracted below:
"17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defense without having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.
18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as the accused will have the opportunity to adduce defense evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.
19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the criminal process is not merited.""
7. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in paragraphs 13 and 18 has observed that:
"13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, proceeded to test whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. In our view, such an exercise was unwarranted because, under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence led in trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be decided either at the trial, or later, upon conclusion of trial, by the appellate/ revisional court."
"18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the provisions of Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our view, was not merited in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I. Act are prima facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial stage."
8. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by this Court. The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Deepak Verma,J.) April 23, 2026 SKD