Karnataka High Court
High Court Of Karnataka vs M D Rajanna on 24 May, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 KAR 289, 2018 (3) AKR 289, (2018) 4 KCCR 3748
Author: R.B Budihal
Bench: R.B Budihal
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF MAY 2018
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDIHAL R.B.
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
CRL. CCC No.6/2017
BETWEEN:
High Court of Karnataka
Represented by the Registrar General
Bengaluru - 560 001. ...Complainant
(By Sri P.M. Nawaz, SPP-I for (Suo-Motu)
AND:
M.D. Rajanna
S/o Late Doddaveeraiah
Aged 54 years
R/of # 2014, 3rd Cross, Subashnagar
Mandya ...Accused
(Party-in-Person)
This Crl. CCC is filed under Section 15 of the contempt
of courts act, 1971 r/w article 215 of the Constitution of
India, praying to initiate (suo-motu) criminal contempt of
court proceedings against accused herein M.D.Rajannna s/o
late Doddaveeraiah, aged about 54 years, R/o No.2014, 3rd
cross, Subashnagar, Mandya, under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 and to punish him in accordance with law.
2
This Crl.CCC having been heard and reserved for order
on 05.04.2018 and coming on for pronouncement of order
this day, BUDIHAL R.B. J., made the following:-
ORDER
This is a Suo Motu criminal complaint case filed by the High Court of Karnataka, represented by the Registrar General, against the accused one Sri M.D. Rajanna under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts' Act, 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
2. Brief facts as narrated in this contempt petition is that it is filed on the basis of the letter dated 27.12.2016 addressed by the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, requesting this Court to initiate Criminal Contempt proceedings against the accused herein. The letter dated 27.12.2016 of the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, addressed to the Registrar General, High Court of 3 Karnataka is produced as per Annexure-A. The further averments is that the accused was the revision petitioner in Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 on the file of the Court of IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya. He filed the said revision petition under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 14.09.2016 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and JMFC, Mandya in PCR No.736/2016 dismissing his complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. against Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India, and two Hon'ble sitting Judges of the Supreme Court, Chief Ministers of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and Chief Secretaries of the respective States, Minister of irrigation of Karnataka Government and others. The said PCR No.736/2016 was dismissed holding that it is not maintainable. The IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, vide order Annexure-B dated 30.11.2016 dismissed Crl.R.P.162/2016 and proposed for initiating necessary action against the accused herein for contempt of Court. 4 It is averred in the petition that the Division Bench of this Court in another case i.e., in W.A. No.2986/2011 connected with W.A. No.4154/2011 (L-TER) on the basis of the complaint submitted by the very same individual Sri M.D. Rajanna, accused herein and on the basis of the affidavit filed by Sri S.B. Mukkannappa, counsel for Sri M.D. Rajanna, has directed to place the matter before Hon'ble The Chief Justice for further orders and for taking necessary action. Hon'ble The Chief Justice passed an order on 23.4.2015 for initiation of suo-motu contempt of Court proceedings against Sri M.D. Rajanna, the accused herein and the same is numbered as Crl.C.C.C. No.11/2015 and the said case is also still pending. Therefore, the accused herein is facing the criminal contempt in another case.
3. It is contended that the accused herein has made reckless allegations against the respondents in private complaint No.736/2016, filed under Section 200 5 of Cr.P.C., and on dismissal of the same, further agitated the same in Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 with an intention to damage the reputation of the Hon'ble Judges but also to scandalize and lower the authority of The Courts and thereby attempted to lower the authority of Courts and interfere/obstruct with the due course of judicial proceedings and the said conduct of the accused herein is contemptuous in nature.
4. Hon'ble The Chief Justice passed the order dated 2.2.2017 for initiation of criminal contempt against the accused herein and accordingly, the same is placed before us. It is pleaded that the conduct of the accused amounts to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. Therefore, it is prayed before the Court to initiate (Suo-Motu) Criminal Contempt of Court Proceedings against the accused herein M.D. Rajanna s/o. late Dodveeraiah, under the 6 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and to punish him in accordance with law.
5. After appearance in the case, the accused filed affidavit dated 23.10.2017 by way of reply contending that the complainant has not made out any one of the ingredients which constitute the contempt and prayed for dismissal of the present contempt petition. The accused has further contended that he has not committed any contempt and in spite of that, the complainant has registered a false case against him. He has submitted that he has filed copy application on 30.6.2017 seeking certified copies in C.R. No.5090/2017 in the above case for having entries made in the register at the time of registering the above case as per Chapter II of Section 1(n)(o)(p)(q) of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959. But he was not given the said copies which he sought in the copying application. But instead of furnishing the same, they 7 issued certified copy of the contempt petition. The concerned officer did not furnish the certified copies of the said register even though the accused was entitled as per Chapter II of Section 1(n)(o)(p)(q) of the High Court of Karnataka Rules 1959 and the said documents were material documents to prove that he had not committed contempt. Non furnishing the said certified copies amounts to violation of Article 22(5) of Constitution of India. Accused filed another affidavit dated 4.12.2017 contending that he has filed a copy application on 4.12.2017 seeking certified copies under Order XIII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, in civil appeal No.2456/2017 on the file of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, applied through registered post on 4.12.2017 (postal receipt No. ..........). The said documents are the material documents to prove that he has not committed contempt and submits his written arguments, thus, he sought time to file his written arguments. Further, he seeks dismissal of the petition. 8
6. After hearing both sides, this Court framed charge against the accused stating that he has committed contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2(c) read with Sections 10 and 15 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, punishable under Sections 11, 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act within the cognizance of this Court. The plea of the accused in the charge was recorded. He denied the charge claimed trial. Therefore, the matter was posted for recording the evidence.
7. On the side of the complainant, three witnesses were examined as C.Ws.1 to 3 and the documents Exs.P.1 to P.8 were got marked.
8. Then the accused was examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. with reference to incriminating evidence and his statement was recorded. On the side of the 9 accused, the accused got himself examined as D.W.1 and no documents were got marked.
9. We heard the arguments of the learned SPP on the side of the complainant.
10. The accused contended that he has filed the written arguments and he has no further arguments in the matter.
11. Learned SPP in his arguments submitted that in the private complaint filed before the trial Court, accused has made reckless allegations against Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the other respondents. He further submitted that the order dated 30.11.2016 passed in Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 by the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, indicates that the learned Sessions Judge, orally asked the revision petitioner to withdraw the revision petition 10 unconditionally or otherwise, the same will be reported to this Hon'ble Court for taking necessary action against the petitioner for contempt of Court proceedings, in spite of that the revision petitioner proceeded with the revision petition contending that he has not committed any wrong and the matter may be referred to this Court for necessary action. The learned SPP further submitted that the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court cannot be challenged before the Magistrate Court by the accused herein in a private complaint, if it at all, he is aggrieved by the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, he was at liberty to move necessary application before the said Court in the proceeding where such an order has been passed. He submitted that, without taking such legal process, only for the publicity, the accused filed such private complaint making baseless allegations against the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judges, Chief Minister, and the Secretaries of the Karnataka and Tamil Nadu etc. He submitted that the contents of the 11 private complaint filed before the Magistrate Court, per se amount to contempt of the judicial Court.
12. In support of his contentions, the learned SPP has relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
1. (2017)3 SCC 362 - State of Karnataka Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others.
2. AIR 1998 SC 3299 - Ajay Kumar Pandey Vs. Veerendra Saran Hence, he seeks to allow the contempt petition and to punish the accused as prayed for in the petition.
13. We perused his written arguments dated 8.2.2018. We perused the contents of the contempt petition, oral evidence of C.Ws.1 to 3 and D.W.1 and also perused the documents Exs.P.1 to P.8. 12
14. Ex.P.1, is the certified copy of private complaint filed by the accused herein, under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Principal Civil Judge and JMFC at Mandya. In Ex.P.1, it is averred that the complainant being aggrieved by the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cauvery dispute in civil appeal No.2456/2007 has preferred the complaint and the accused persons thereon were fully aware that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has no right to adjudicate Cauvery dispute, because as per Article 262 of the Constitution, only the Parliament has got right to consider the same. It is further averred in the complaint that in view of the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has no power to admit any interstate water dispute, in spite of that accused Nos.4 to 9 approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court pertaining to Kavery water dispute in the above said civil appeal and accused Nos.1 to 3 being the Hon'ble Justices of the Supreme Court have passed the order of 5.9.2016 13 directing the State of Karnataka to release 15 cusecs of water per day for ten days which is nothing but abusing the process of law and the said act of accused persons amounts to an offence under Section 219 of IPC namely, corruptly making and pronouncing the order, verdict or decision in a judicial proceeding which he knows to be contrary to law, accused Nos.1 to 3 knowing fully well the said settled law have passed the above said order.
Therefore, the allegations made in the private complaint that accused Nos.1 to 3 being the Hon'ble Chief Justice and other two Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have passed the order by corrupt practice, is per se contemptuous.
15. C.W.1-Smt H.V. Anitha, Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya, in her oral evidence, has deposed that the accused who is in the Court had filed FR/PCR No.736/2016, before her Court, on 9.9.2016. On 14.9.2016, it was dismissed. The accused appeared 14 personally in the said case. The accused had arrayed the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and two other sitting Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Chief Minister, and other dignitaries as accused. C.W.1 has produced the certified copies of the complaint as per Ex.P.1 and the certified copy of the order sheet of the proceedings as per Ex.P.2.
16. C.W.2-Sri Krishnaji B. Patil, XI Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru City, has deposed that as on 3.10.2016, he was performing the duties of the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya. He identified the accused who was present in the Court. He deposed that the accused had filed Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 before his Court, personally appeared in the said case and made submissions. The certified copy of the Crl.R.P. is produced and marked as per Ex.P.3. C.W.2 has further deposed that by order dated 30.11.2016, he dismissed Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 15 confirming the order passed by the Magistrate. The certified copy of the said order is as per Ex.P.4. While dismissing the said Crl.R.P., he directed the office to send the copy of the said order to the High Court of Karnataka for initiating the contempt of court proceedings against the accused for making baseless allegations and abuse of the due process of law. The certified copy of the order sheet in the Crl.R.P. is produced as per Ex.P.5 C.W.2 has further deposed that during the proceedings, he orally asked the accused as to whether he is willing to withdraw the Crl.R.P. and the accused replied that he was not willing to do so and stated that he would contest the matter. He had addressed the letter dated 27.12.2016 to the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, with regard to the said matter and seeking to initiate appropriate proceedings against the party and the same is produced as per Ex.P.6. The first respondent in the Crl.R.P. is the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India along with two other 16 Sitting Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The other respondents therein are the Chief Minister and the other dignitaries. So far as the evidence of C.Ws.1 and 2, the accused did not choose to cross examine them. Therefore, their evidence stood accepted.
17. C.W.3 is Smt. K.S. Varalakshmi, Deputy Registrar, High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru. In her evidence, she has deposed that the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, by his letter dated 12.10.2017, authorized her to appear in this case. The authorization letter is produced as per Ex.P.7. She deposed that the Registrar General has received communication dated 27.12.2016 addressed by IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, vide Ex.P.6, the file was placed before Hon'ble The Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka, who by order dated 2.2.2017 directed initiation of proceedings for contempt against the accused. Thereafter, suo motu contempt 17 proceedings have been filed before this Court as per Ex.P.8. She has further deposed that one more proceeding for criminal contempt numbered as Crl.CCC No.11/2015 filed against the accused is pending adjudication before this Court. In her cross examination by the accused, C.W.3 has denied the suggestion that because of the complaint lodged against the previous Registrar General with regard to the scandal which was submitted to the then Chief Justice of Karnataka on 23.6.2016, the present proceedings have been initiated against the accused. The witness further denied the suggestion that only because the accused is litigating number of labour related cases, as a party in person, the present proceedings are initiated against the accused.
18. On the side of the accused, the accused himself has been examined as D.W.1. In his examination in chief, the accused (D.W.1) admits he 18 filing a private complaint in PCR No.736/2016 before the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dvn.) and JMFC, Mandya against nine persons and dismissal of the same by the Civil Judge. He has further deposed that the accused persons in the complaint knowing fully well that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has no power to adjudicate the dispute regarding Cauvery water in terms of Article 262 of Constitution of India and only the Parliament has got power to consider the same, have committed the offence under Section 219 of IPC. He says aggrieved by the order of dismissal of his complaint, he preferred a Criminal Revision Petition No.162/2016 before the IV Additional Sessions and District Judge, Mandya, which was also dismissed by the order dated 30.11.2016. The accused has further deposed that since he had complained against the scandal in the Court to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, the present proceedings are initiated against him. He states that he has also made allegations of corruption against the 19 Hon'ble Chief Minister and another Minister and for that reason, the High Court advocates and others are prosecuting him. He does not intend to cause any disrespect to the Court or to the judges.
In the cross examination by learned SPP, the accused admits that respondents-accused Nos.1 to 3 in PCR No.736/2016 are the Chief Justice of India and two judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, he was not a party to the dispute being adjudicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India or by the Tribunal. He has denied the suggestion that he has no right to initiate proceedings against the accused in the said PCR. He has stated that he has a statutory right to initiate proceedings against the said accused who are public servants. He denied the suggestion that only because he had made scurrilous allegations against the Hon'ble Judges, the present proceedings are initiated against him. He has not challenged the order dated 30.11.2016 passed in Crl.R.P. No.162/2016 by the IV 20 Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya. He has deposed that having read and understood the law, he himself drafted the PCR as well as the Crl.R.P. He admitted that Crl.C.C.C. No.11/2015 is pending before this Court against him. He admitted that he made allegations against the then Sitting Judge in the said case and submitted an affidavit to Hon'ble Chief Justice of India as well as Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka. He denied the suggestion that he does not have any right to initiate proceedings against the said accused.
19. The appraisal of the oral evidence of the aforesaid parties adduced in this proceeding and the contents of the private complaint filed before the JMFC Court at Mandya, shows that the accused herein, who was the complainant in the said private complaint has made the allegation that as per Article 262 of the Indian Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has no power to adjudicate the water dispute of the inter State, in 21 spite of that, illegally passed the order dated 5.9.2016 in Civil appeal No.2456/2014 and it is nothing but the abuse of process of law and the said act of the accused persons amounts to an offence under Section 219 of IPC. As per the said Section, in a judicial proceedings corruptly making and pronouncing an order, verdict or decision knowing the same to be contrary to law amounts to an offence and according to him, the accused persons in the said private complaint despite being fully aware of such well the settled law have passed the said order and hence it amounts to offence under section 219 of IPC.
20. The materials to show that the learned Sessions Judge before passing the order dated 30.11.2016 in the criminal revision petition No.162/2016 asked the accused herein specifically to withdraw the revision petition unconditionally, or otherwise, the same will be reported to the High Court 22 of Karnataka for taking necessary action against him for contempt of court proceedings. In spite of the same, the revision petitioner said to have submitted before the revisional Court that he wants to proceed with the revision petition. In spite of giving such an opportunity to correct himself by withdrawing the criminal revision petition, unconditionally, the accused proceeded with the criminal revision petition also. The same came to be dismissed. Admittedly, the accused herein has not challenged the order of dismissal of revision petition passed by the revisional Court before any other Forum. Therefore, the order passed in the criminal revision petition attained finality.
21. The contention of accused person is that as per Article 262 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to pass any orders in Civil Appeal No.2456/2007. In this connection, learned SPP has relied upon the Full Bench decision of the 23 Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS reported in (2017)3 SCC 362. We have perused the said decision. Paragraph Nos.72 to 83 are the relevant paragraphs and they read as under:
72.The second limb of submission of Mr. Rohatgi as regards the maintainability pertains to the language employed under Section 6(2) of the 1956 Act, which reads as follows:-
"6(2) The decision of the Tribunal, after its publication in the Official Gazette by the Central Government under sub- section (1), shall have the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court."
73. Relying on Section 6(2), which was introduced by way of the Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 14 of 2002) that came into force from 6.8.2002, it is submitted by Mr. Rohatgi that the jurisdiction of this Court is ousted as it cannot sit over in appeal on its own decree. The said submission is seriously resisted by Mr. Nariman and Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel contending that the said provision, if it is to be interpreted to exclude the jurisdiction of the 24 Supreme Court of India, it has to be supported by a constitutional amendment adding at the end of Article 136(2) the words "or to any determination of any tribunal constituted under the law made by Parliament under Article 262(2)" and, in such a situation, in all possibility such an amendment to the Constitution may be ultra vires affecting the power of judicial review which is a part of basic feature of the Constitution. The Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has drawn a distinction between the conferment and the exclusion of the power of the Supreme Court of India by the original Constitution and any exclusion by the constitutional amendment. Be that as it may, the said aspect need not be adverted to, as we are only required to interpret Section 6(2) as it exists today on the statute book. The said provision has been inserted to provide teeth to the decision of the Tribunal after its publication in the Official Gazette by the Central Government and this has been done keeping in view the Sarkaria Commission's Report on Centre-State relations (1980). The relevant extract of the Sarkaria Commission's Report reads as follows:-
"17.4.19 The Act was amended in 1980 and Section 6-A was inserted. This 25 section provides for framing a scheme for giving effect to a Tribunal's award. The scheme, inter alia provides for the establishment of the authority, its term of office and other conditions of service, etc. but the mere creation of such an agency will not be able to ensure implementation of a Tribunal's award. Any agency set up under Section 6A cannot really function without the cooperation of the States concerned. Further, to make a Tribunal's award binding and effectively enforceable, it should have the same force and sanction behind it as n order or decree of the Supreme Court. We recommend that the Act should be suitably amended for this purpose.
17.6.05 - The Inter-State Water Disputes Act,1956 should be amended so that a Tribunal's Award has the same force and sanction behind it as an order or decree of the Supreme Court to make a Tribunal's award really binding."
74 The Report of the Commission as the language would suggest, was to make the final decision of the Tribunal binding on both the 26 States and once it is treated as a decree of this Court, then it has the binding effect. It was suggested to make the award effectively enforceable. The language employed in Section 6(2) suggests that the decision of the Tribunal shall have the same force as the order or decree of this Court. There is a distinction between having the same force as an order or decree of this Court and passing of a decree by this Court after due adjudication. The Parliament has intentionally used the words from which it can be construed that a legal fiction is meant to serve the purpose for which the fiction has been created and not intended to travel beyond it. The purpose is to have the binding effect of the Tribunal's award and the effectiveness of enforceability. Thus, it has to be narrowly construed regard being had to the purpose it is meant to serve.
75. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition by G.P. Singh. The learned author has expressed thus:-
"In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, the Court is to 27 assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. But in so construing the fiction it is not be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. It cannot also be extended by importing another fiction. The principles stated above are `well-
settled'. A legal fiction may also be interpreted narrowly to make the statute workable.
76. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 661 a three-Judge Bench has ruled thus:-
"37. In State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 326 the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the deeming provision in a statute, ruled that the role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is well settled. Reference was made to Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar, J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, M. Venugopal v.
LIC, and Harish Tandon v. ADM, Allahabad, and eventually, it was held that 28 when a statute creates a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between which persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to and thereafter, the courts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion.
38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of the term "deemed" has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term "deemed" has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind."29
77. In Hari Ram (supra), the Court has held that (SCC P.293, Para 18) in interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining the same, the court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction.
78. In this regard, reference to the authority in Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan and Dombivali, would be apposite. It has been held that a legal fiction has to be applied having regard to the legislative intent and a restrictive meaning can be attributed to make the statute workable.
79. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands.
80. In this context, fruitful advertence may be made to a passage from Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., wherein Subba Rao, CJ speaking for the Bench has opined (AIR pp.1992-93, para14):-
30
"14... the fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, namely, that the court will have to find out the expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be."
81. When we apply the aforesaid principles of statutory interpretation to understand the legislative intendment of Section 6(2) it is clear as crystal that the Parliament did not intend to create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction of this Court. The said provision was inserted to give the binding effect to the award passed by the Tribunal. The fiction has been created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act, as stated earlier, bars the jurisdiction of the courts and needless to say, that is in consonance with the language employed in Article 262 of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power on this Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is luminescent from the language employed in Article 131 of the Constitution and from the series of pronouncements of this Court. Be it clearly stated that Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the words 31 "same force as an order or decision" cannot be treated as a decree for the purpose for excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. To elaborate, it cannot be a decree as if this Court has adjudicated the matter and decree is passed. The Parliament has intended that the same shall be executed or abided as if it is a decree of this Court. It is to be borne in mind that a provision should not be interpreted to give a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object of the legislation. The exposition of the principles of law relating to fiction, the intendment of the legislature and the ultimate purpose and effect of the provision compel us to repel the submissions raised on behalf of the Union of India that Section 6(2) bars the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 136.
82. We would like to clarify one aspect. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka as well as the State of Tamil Nadu have commended us to various authorities which we have already referred to in the context of Article 136 of the Constitution, but the purpose behind the said delineation is to show the broad canvas of the aforesaid constitutional provision in the context of maintainability of the civil appeals. How the final order passed by the Tribunal would 32 be adjudged within the parameters of the said constitutional provision has to be debated when we finally address the controversy pertaining to the subject-matter of the Civil Appeals.
83. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we express the opinion that the civil appeals are maintainable. Let the appeals be listed at 3.00 p.m. on 15.12.2016 for further orders. Interim order passed on 18.102.106 to continue.
22. Referring to these paragraphs, the contention of the learned SPP is that the allegation of the accused that the Hon'ble Apex Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Civil Appeal itself is not correct. Therefore, even if the accused herein is having any grievance against the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the Civil Appeal, he should move the Hon'ble Apex Court for the remedy by making the necessary application, if legally, it is permitted. Instead of doing so, he filed a private complaint before the Magistrate Court challenging the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court making the allegation that by passing 33 such order, accused Nos.1 to 3 in the private complaint committed the offence punishable under section 219 of IPC. This means, according to him, Their Lordships have passed the order by corrupt practice. Such scurrilous allegations have been made recklessly and intentionally to scandalize the Court and to tarnish the image of the entire judiciary.
23. We have also perused the other judgment relied upon by learned SPP in case of AJAY KUMAR PANDEY VS. VEERENDRA SARAN reported in AIR 1998 SC 3299. Paragraph Nos.18 and 22 of the said judgment are relevant for our purpose. In the said paragraphs, Their Lordships have held as under:
"18. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and if the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts has to be respected and protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those 34 for contempt of Court who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine the authority of the Courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby obstructing them from discharging their judicial duties without fear or favour. This power is exercised by the courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised but with a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself".
22. On Rule being issued in suo motu contempt proceedings, the contemner was punished and sentenced under the Contempt of Courts Act. Before this Court, questioning his conviction and sentence, the contemner advocate filed an appeal and at the same time tendered his apology. Rejecting the apology, this Court observed:
"We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go 35 unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a 'licence' to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their self- respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price for it And no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were to be countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts" and such course cannot be permitted.
(Emphasis ours) 36 Again, in Re: Shri Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 JT (SC) 538: (19954 AIR) SCW 2203), a three Judge Bench of this Court, while dealing with an affidavit filed by a public functionary causing aspersions on the Court, which (affidavit) had the tendency to malign the Court, while assailing the correctness of an order made in a writ petition filed in this Court, held the contemner guilty of criminal contempt of court and observed (at P. 2208 of AIR SCW):
"Abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and defiance are no methods to correct the errors of the courts. In the discharge of their functions the Courts have to be allowed to operate freely and fearlessly but for which impartial adjudication will be an impossibility. Ours is a Constitutional government based on the rule of law. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible legislative measure. Those living and functioning under the Constitution have to accept and submit to this obligation of respecting the constitutional authority of the Courts. Under a Constitutional government, such final authority has to vest in 37 some institution. Otherwise, there will be a chaos. The Court's verdict has to be respected not necessarily by the authority of its reason but always be reason of its authority. Any conduct designed to or suggestive of challenging this crucial balance of power devised by the Constitution is an attempt to subvert the rule of law and an invitation to anarchy.
The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his role and over-zealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored die above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a judge in his own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to discharge its functions but also its authority to do so.
(emphasis supplied)"
24. At the time of giving his evidence, D.W.1- accused herein had not produced any documents nor made any reference to any of the documents. But on the date of hearing of the arguments, he filed a memo along with ten documents. Firstly, there is no 38 opportunity for the complainant to cross examine him with reference to those documents. Secondly, the accused has not stated in what way those documents are relevant to the present case. Therefore, the said documents produced and also the decisions he relied upon, will not come to his aid and assistance in the matter.
25. In the private complaint present accused alleged that the accused in the said private complaint committed an offence under Section 219 of IPC. Those allegations make it clear that it is not a fair criticism of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the allegations also show that they intend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Court. The allegations also amount to interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings and also amount to obstruct the administration of justice by the Courts of law. 39
26. We have also perused the provision under Section 219 of IPC, which reads as under:
" 219. Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making repot, etc, contrary to law. - Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any stage of a judicial proceeding, any repot, order, verdict, or decision which he knows to be contrary to law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. "
27. Therefore, looking to the legal position and also the material produced by the complainant by way of oral and documentary evidence, in this case, the complainant has clearly established that the accused person has committed criminal contempt as defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and he is liable for the punishment as per Section 12 of the said Act.
40
28. Perusing the entire material, we hold that the charge for the offence of Contempt of Court is proved to the satisfaction of the Court and we convict the accused for the said offence. Further, he is hereby sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs.2,000/- for the said offence.
The contempt petition is accordingly allowed. The Registry is hereby directed to furnish the certified copy of this order free of cost to the accused, immediately.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE Cs/-
CT:MHP