Jharkhand High Court
Sukru Kharia Aged About 60 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 16 October, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:32243
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 396 of 2018
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1. Sukru Kharia aged about 60 years, Son of Late Dharu 1. Kharia, Resident of Villag Jago Pahaar, New Area, P.O. Morhabadi, P.S. Bariatu, District Ranchi.
2. Gopal Manjhi aged about. 58 years, Son of Late Jagan Manjhi, Resident of 79, Old A.G. Colony, Kadru, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi.
.....Petitioners Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Department of Energy, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, having its Office at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
3. Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its Office at bevomet Engineering Bhawan, H.E.C., at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
4. Managing Director, Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its Office at Engineering Bhawan, H.E.C., at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
5. The General Manager (Human Resource), Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its Office at Engineering Bhawan, H.E.C., at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
6. Deputy General Manager (Human Resource), Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its Office at Engineering Bhawan, H.E.C., at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. ....Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Adv For the Respondents : Mr. O.P.Tiwari, Sr. Standing Counsel
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C.A.V. ON: 18.08.2025 PRONOUNCED ON:-16/10/2025 The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs;
(a) To Declare and hold that the proviso to Rule 12(III) of Bihar (now Jharkhand) State Electricity Board, Electrical Engineers (General) 1 2025:JHHC:32243 Cadre Rules 1976 as adopted by Respondent No.3 is Ultra Vires to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, besides hit by Doctrine of Class within Class and thereby hostile discrimination, accordingly to quash the same.
(b) Consequently, to quash the Letter No. 1107 dated 18.07.2017 (Annexure-10) issued under the signature of Deputy General Manager (Human Resources), Respondent No. 6, Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, whereby and whereunder the representation made by the petitioners for promotion to the Cadre of Superintending Engineer and so on w.e.f. the date, his juniors has been granted promotion from common cadre of Executive Engineer, has been rejected making reference to aforesaid Impugned Rule, which is equally arbitrary, irrational, unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India;
(c) Accordingly, for direction upon the respondents to grant promotion/notional promotion to the petitioners to the Cadre of Superintending Engineer and so on, w.e.f. the date his juniors have been granted from the common cadre of Executive Engineer and to accordingly pay the entire service benefits including differential arrears of salary and/ or corresponding post retrial benefits.
2. After filing of this writ application, the petitioners filed I.A. No. 7152/2025 which was allowed vide order dated 16.06.2026. This I.A. was filed praying for deletion of prayer for declaration of the impugned Rule as Ultra Vires and amendment by way of addition of the following relief:
A. For direction upon the respondent JBVNL and its subsidiaries to act in accordance with the policy of the State Govt. (being wholly owned State Govt. Company in the matter of grant of promotion from the post of Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer (Now Deputy General Manager Technical) and implement the policy/Rules of the State Govt. in this regard without discrimination and not to press for the condition of "Degree Holder"
in view of the Rule 8 (i)(c) of the Bihar State Electrical Engineers' (General) Cadre Rules, 1976 as adopted and amended upto date by the Respondent No. 3 and its subsidiaries and in the light of the fact that all the Rules/Notification/Policies applicable on the State Govt. employees have been adopted/made applicable by the concerned Respondents governing the service condition of the Petitioners and similarly situated persons viz. pay scale, service duration for promotion, reservation, disciplinary actions etc. B. For a declaration that the action of the concerned respondents sitting tight over the matter for years together in spite of the several communication made by the State Govt. and the other authorities amounts to misfeasance in the office for which the Petitioners 2 2025:JHHC:32243 cannot be allowed to suffer and subjected to hostile discrimination as compared to their contemporaries in the service of the State Govt. who although not holding any Degree in engineering or its equivalent have been granted promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer in one or another department of the State Govt. including the department of Energy, Govt. of Jharkhand which is the administrative Department of the respondent no. 3.
Facts of the case
3. In support of the relief prayed by the Petitioners, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners submits that from bare perusal of Annexure-3 of the writ petition, it is evident that the erstwhile State of Bihar framed "Bihar Engineers Service Class-1 Rules, 1939" and there was no embargo with respect to the Degree or Diploma Holder Engineers for promotion from the post of Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer and above.
Aforesaid extract of the Rule is enclosed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition which reads as under:-
"Rule (8):- Technical qualifications: No person shall be appointed to the service unless he holds a Degree or Diploma from an Indian Engineering College or an Associate Member of the Institute of Engineers (India) or holds a degree from one of the universities in the United Kingdom Enumerated in Appendix to these rules or has passed the examination mentioned therein".
It has been submitted that perusal of Annexure 3 discloses that the then Public Works Department, Govt. of Bihar vide Circular No. 3964 dated 26.02.1969 made certain amendment in the said Rule 8 of Rules' 1939; whereby Appointment and Promotion of the Diploma Holders in the Engineering Service Cadre was prohibited to the post of Executive Engineers or above.
Amended Rule 8 reads as under:-
"Rule (8):- Technical qualifications:- No person shall be appointed or promoted to the service unless he is graduate in Engineering from the Indian Universities or Institution or is a pass in section 'A' and 'B' of the Associate member of Institution of Engineers (India), Or hold degree from 3 2025:JHHC:32243 one of the universities in United Kingdom enumerated in the Annexure to these rules or has passed the examination mentioned therein".
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that on the demand of the affected employees, the Public Works Department, Govt. of Bihar vide Notification No. 24053 dated 01.12.1971 made certain amendment in the said Rule (8) whereby Diploma Holders were allowed to be appointed in the Engineering Service Class 1, with a restriction that they cannot be promoted to the post of Superintending Engineers and above unless they possess Degree in Engineering and the same reads as under:-
"Rule (8) Technical Qualification:- (a) For direct appointment to the service and for promotion to the rank of Superintending Engineers and higher posts, no person shall be eligible unless he is graduate in Engineering from an Indian University or Institution or is a pass Institute of Engineers, India or holds a degree from one of the Universities in the United Kingdom enumerated in the Annexure to the rules or has passed the examination mentioned therein.
(b) For promotion to the rank of Executive Engineer, it may not be necessary for Assistant Engineers promoted from the Sub-ordinate Engineering Circle, to possess a Degree in Engineering or a pass in Section 'A' and 'B' of the Associate Member of the Institution of Engineers (India)".
5. He further submits that the above bar of promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer was done away on 23.09.1986 vide Notification No. E1/M1-1037/86 RC- 5283 (S) Patna by the State of Bihar. The Government of Bihar, Road Construction Department, under Article 309 of the Constitution issued GSR E1/M1-1037/86RC - 5596 (S) Patna dated 02.12.1987 amended the 1939 Rules and lifted the aforementioned embargo with respect of promotion of Diploma Holders from the post of Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer and above.
6. The amendment dated 02.12.1987 reads as under:-
42025:JHHC:32243 "In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Bihar is pleased to make the following amendment to Rule 8 of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-1 Rules, 1939 published with the Government of Bihar, Public Works Department, Notification No. 24053 dated 01.12.1971 namely:-
AMEDMENT:- For Rule 8 of the said rules, the following Rule shall be substituted:-
"Rule 8:- Technical qualification:- No person shall be appointed to the service unless he holds a degree or diploma from an Indian Engineering College or is an Associate member of the Institution of Engineers (India) or holds a degree from one of the universities in the United Kingdom enumerated in the Annexure to these Rule or has passed the Examination mentioned therein.
By the order of the Governor of Bihar".
7. He further submits that in between the aforementioned Notification dated 01.12.1971 and 02.12.1987 of the State Govt., the then Bihar State Electricity Board in exercise of power under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 framed "Bihar State Electricity Board Electrical Engineers' (General) Cadre Rules, 1976"
(Annexure-11 to I.A. no. 9058 of 2018); which is nothing but replica of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-1 Rules, 1939. Bare perusal indicates that the Rule prohibiting Diploma Holders to be promoted from the post of Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer and above, which was in force during 01.12.1971 till 01.12.1987 by the State Govt. was also incorporated in the Rules, 1976.
8. The relevant Rule reads as hereunder: -
"Rule 12(ii) (b):- Promotion to the rank of Superintending Engineer from the rank of Executive Engineer shall be on the basis of merit-cum- seniority and suitability subject to a minimum of seven years experience as Executive Engineer.
(c) .................
(iii) ................
Provided that no member of the service shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Superintending Engineer and above unless he possesses the qualification prescribed in Rule 8 (i) (c). Rule 8(i)(C) reads as hereunder:
Rule 8 (i) (a) .........
(b).........
(c):- Degree in Electrical/ Electronics Engineering from a recognized University or Institute in India or its equivalent.5
2025:JHHC:32243 Provided that in the matter of Judging what qualifications are equivalent to a Degree in Electrical/Electronics Engineering, the Board shall be guided by the principles laid down by the State Government".
"Rule 8 (ii) Not withstanding anything said in sub - rule (i) above the age qualification shall be relaxed in the case of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates as per State Government Directives from time to time".
Attention of the Court has also been drawn to the preamble of the 1976 Rules which shows that since 1958 large number of electrical and mechanical engineers borne on the cadre of the State Government's Electricity Department have been permanently transferred to Electricity Board, although they continue to be Government Servant and they have to be mixed up with Bihar State Electricity Board's Engineers to man the position on the side of distribution and supply of electricity.
9. It has also been submitted by learned counsel for the Petitioners that in the light of above factual background, the appointment and promotion rules for the BSEB Electrical Engineers was required to compulsorily match the service rules of their counterparts still under the State Government's Electricity Department but serving in the Electricity Board.
Contention of the Petitioners is that under aforesaid circumstances, whenever there was an amendment in the 1939 Rules, in order to maintain uniformity of service conditions, the Electricity Board has to extend the same on its Electrical Engineers lest it would result in dichotomy of service benefits to those who were transferred from State Government's Electricity Department and those who remained in the State Government's Electricity Department, both falling in the State Government Service. Hence it has been argued that once the bar of promotion to the diploma holders was done away by the State Government in its 1939 Rules, the respondents could not continue with the impugned 6 2025:JHHC:32243 stipulation to the detriment of the employees in Electricity Board.
He further submits that in the light of Electricity Act 2003, the Jharkhand State Electricity Board was unbundled and four companies wholly owned by the State were created/constituted vide Gazette Notification dated 06.01.2014 and revised Notification dated 20.11.2015. In the given circumstances when the Respondent JUVNL and its subsidiaries are wholly owned companies of the State of Jharkhand and Secretary of Energy Department is the Chairman cum Managing Director of the Holding/Mother Company - JUVNL, the service benefits like promotion of the contemporaries of the Petitioners under State Government cannot be denied to the Petitioners particularly when the service rules framed in 1976 were on the same conditions as of Engineers in State Electricity Department.
10. Referring to the documents brought on record by supplementary affidavit, it has been contended that even the Hon'ble Governor of Jharkhand has directed the Respondent in the years 2009 to rectify the 1976 Rules in consonance with Road Construction Department Letter No. 5283 dated 23.09.1986 and grant promotions accordingly in anticipation of cadre division. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has drawn attention of the Court to several promotion orders of Road Construction Department, and correspondences with Energy Department and Road Construction Department by the Respondent to suggest that in principle the claim of the Petitioners and similarly placed engineers was actively under positive consideration by the respondents but change of incumbent in office / posts under Respondent Company has 7 2025:JHHC:32243 resulted in inordinate unexplained delay and latches leading to forced litigation.
11. It has been argued that the Respondents have no reason to invoke the bar under Rule 8(i) (c) of 1976 Rules since all the gazette notifications and policy decisions taken by the State Government have been implemented in the Respondent Company. It has further been contended that reservation policy and roster of the State Government, Notifications prescribing time period of service for promotion and its relaxation in given circumstances, pay scales and pay revisions etc., are all applicable on the Petitioners. Further, when the Administrative Department i.e., Department of Energy which is categorized under Public Works Department has granted promotion to the Diploma Holders on the post of Superintending Engineers, the Respondents cannot discriminate against the Petitioners by sitting tight over the issue of modifying the relevant Rules in the light of several correspondences by Respondents with Road Construction Department, Energy Department, Governor's Secretariat, etc.
12. The Respondents on the other hand have tried to justify their stand by stating that since the Respondent company has not formally accepted the amendment of Rule 8
(i)(C) of 1939 Rules, the Petitioners cannot be granted any relief. It has been argued by the Respondents that Respondent Company is not bound to follow the Government Notifications and vide para 9 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that the Respondents have rejected the grievance of the Petitioners.
13. By referring to the averments in the counter affidavit, Counsel for the Respondents has tried to justify the action on the premise that position of Superintending 8 2025:JHHC:32243 Engineer or above are of higher responsibility and requires in-depth technical knowledge which can be acquired during Engineering Degree and other higher qualifications and the knowledge is lacking in qualification of Diploma in Engineering.
However, the Respondent could not dispute that Annexure A to the Counter Affidavit which is a report of Four Member committee dated 17.04.2012 speaks that the matter was placed before the JSEB on 23.12.2008 and 10.05.2010 but the Board has deferred the matter. The Committee has thus observed to continue with the existing situation.
14. This Court is unable to accept the contention because if the Department of Energy, Government of Jharkhand which is the Administrative Department of Respondent Company can grant promotion to Diploma Holders to post of Superintendent Engineer or above, it cannot be argued that the Petitioners would not be able to discharge higher responsibility. It also sounds irrational and is beyond reason that when Diploma Holders in Road Construction Department and Energy Department (which are all categorized under Public Works Department) can discharge higher responsibility which as per the Respondents requires in depth technical knowledge and which can be acquired during Engineering Degree, then what classified data or distinguishing factor is relied by the Respondents to conclude against the Petitioners. Merely making high sounding arguments without justifiable and legally sound reasoning cannot permit the Respondents to negate equality of treatment to the Petitioners.
92025:JHHC:32243
15. The Respondents JUVNL have filed written submissions in support of their contention justifying the action. The Respondents have formulated the following issues:
A. Whether impugned proviso to Rule 11(III) of Bihar Electricity Board Electical Engineers [General] Cadre Rules 1976 is Ultra Vires the Article 14 and 16 and hit by doctrine of Hostile Discrimination? B. Whether consequential Impugned order dated 18.07.2017 is equally illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional being in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution?
C. Whether impugned proviso to sub rule 11(III) is in conflict to sub rule (b) of Rule 11 itself, which provides for 7 years of service as Executive Engineer will only be considered for promotion to Superintending Engineer?
D. Whether the employee having been appointed in cadre of Assistant Engineer either by direct recruitment or promotion after acquiring requisite experience of 7-8 years can be further discriminated on the basis of educational qualification which stands obliterated by experience?
16. The Respondents in the abovementioned issues seems to be concentrating on the vires of the Rules, which has been given up by the Petitioners before the Division Bench of this Court by way of amendment through I.A. No. 7152/2025 allowed on 16.06.2026.]
17. It is settled legal position that two similarly placed persons are to be treated equally and that unequal treatment would amount to hostile discrimination, arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Further, right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right and two yard-stick in the same State for consideration for promotion, one by the State Government and other by its wholly owned company does not stand to logic and reasoning in the factual background of the instant case. As the Respondent Company is wholly owned by State, the Respondents cannot justify the delay in observance of the directions issued from the Governor's Secretariate or the Energy Department. The apathy of the Energy Department to 10 2025:JHHC:32243 the approach of the Respondent Company in the matter of promotion to Diploma Holders to the post of Superintendent Engineer and above is also unanswered.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India,1 has held as hereunder:
"69. This was further clarified in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. [A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn., (1984) 3 SCC 316 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 497] , following Royappa [E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] and holding that arbitrariness is a doctrine distinct from discrimination. It was held : (A.L. Kalra case [A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn., (1984) 3 SCC 316 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 497] , SCC p. 328, para 19)
"19. ... It thus appears well settled that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equality of (sic) protection by law. The Constitution Bench pertinently observed in Ajay Hasia case [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] and put the matter beyond controversy when it said : (SCC p. 741, para 16) '16. ... Wherever therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an "authority" under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action.' This view was further elaborated and affirmed in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] . In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] it was observed that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is thus too late in the day to contend that an executive action shown to be arbitrary is not either judicially reviewable or within the reach of Article 14."
The same view was reiterated in Babita Prasad v. State of Bihar [Babita Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 268 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1076] , SCC at p. 285, para 31".
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa,2 has held as hereunder:
"19. It is now well settled that the expression "matters relating to employment" used in Article 16(1) is not confined to initial matters prior to the act of employment, but comprehends all matters in relation to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment, such as, provisions as to salary, increments, leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation, promotion and even termination 1 (2017) 9 SCC 1 2 (1979) 1 SCC 477 11 2025:JHHC:32243 of employment. It is further well established that Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1) form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. ......"
20. The Respondents could not dispute that Annexure A to the Counter Affidavit which is a report of Four Member committee dated 17.04.2012 and speaks that the matter was placed before the JSEB on 23.12.2008 and 10.05.2010 but the Board has deferred the matter. The Committee has thus observed to continue with the existing situation.
21. In the written submission it has been contended that on 17.04.2012, the representation of the Petitioners was considered but rejected. It is a fallacious contention in as much as the said decision at Annexure A to the Counter affidavit only deferred the resolution of grievances without due application of mind.
22. The submission of the Respondents that Rules and Regulations of other public sector undertaking dealing in electricity business were obtained by them is an indicator of process to modify the Rules 1971 in line with the Rules in vogue under the State Departments. When after obtaining the same no conscious decision was arrived at by the Respondents keeping in view the positive recommendation of Governor's Secretariat and Energy Department. Rather, it is an indication that officers, then at the helm of affairs were proceeding in a direction of positive consideration but subsequently callousness, lethargic and lackadaisical approach has been adopted for more than a decade on the pending issue leading to negating equality.
23. The contention of JUVNL, being an autonomous organization having power to frame its own Rules and Regulations cannot be a justification of executive inaction in 12 2025:JHHC:32243 derogation to instructions by the Energy Department and Governor's Secretariat. Entrustment of power to frame rules does not mean right to insubordination. The entrustment of an authority or power upon a public functionary is to subserve the principles enshrined under Constitution of India and such power is to be exercised under 'Doctrine of Trust'. Non-exercise of the power also amounts to misuse of power by the authority concerned. Rule of law is paramount in a democratic set up and the conduct of the Respondents sitting over the matter for more than a decade cannot be said to qualify the 'Rule of Law'.
24. The Respondents have relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandan Banerjee V. Krishna Prasad Ghosh & Ors,3; wherein paragraphs 18,19, 25,26, 28,30,33,38 and 40, it has been submitted that classification of employees on educational qualification, in the same cadre for the purpose of promotion is a valid classification.
There is no dispute to the above proposition. However, the same is not the case in hand. The Respondents in their submission appears to be unaware of the developments in the case before the Division Bench of this Court; whereby the prayer for ultra vires has been given up by the Petitioners.
25. It further transpires from the cited judgment that it was a case where the Respondent, had two distinct service cadres in the Engineering Department: (i) Subordinate Engineering Service; and (ii) Engineering Service. The entry post in the Subordinate Engineering Service is a Subordinate 3 (2022) 15 SCC 453 13 2025:JHHC:32243 Assistant Engineer (SAE), for which the minimum qualification is a Diploma in Engineering in Civil/Mechanical/Electrical branches. Although the minimum requirement is that of a diploma, a person holding a degree in Engineering is also eligible to participate in the selection process. The selection process involves a written examination, followed by an interview conducted by the Municipal Service Commission. Pursuant to this, a merit list was prepared. The cadre of Subordinate Engineering Service comprises of persons holding a diploma or degree in Engineering, many of the degree-holders having acquired the qualification after appointment. The first promotion from the post of SAE is as an Assistant Engineer (AE), after which an SAE can aspire for successive promotions, right up to the post of Chief Engineer. The AE is the entry level post in the Engineering Service cadre, for which direct recruitment is conducted from persons holding an Engineering degree. Thus, the post of AE may be filled through direct recruitment or through promotion of SAEs.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether persons drawn from a common source who have been integrated into a cadre can be differentiated on the basis of educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion to supernumerary posts.
For brevity, Paragraphs 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,40 and 43 of Chandan Banerjee (Supra) are reproduced herein.
"28. The principles which emerge from the above line of precedents can be summarised as follows:
28.1. Classification between persons must not produce artificial inequalities. The classification must be founded on a reasonable basis and must bear nexus to the 14 2025:JHHC:32243 object and purpose sought to be achieved to pass the muster of Articles 14 and
16. 28.2. Judicial review in matters of classification is limited to a determination of whether the classification is reasonable and bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Courts cannot indulge in a mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification or replace the wisdom of the legislature or its delegate with their own.
28.3. Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid ground for classification between persons of the same class in matters of promotion and is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
28.4. Persons drawn from different sources and integrated into a common class can be differentiated on grounds of educational qualification for the purpose of promotion, where this bears a nexus with the efficiency required in the promotional post.
28.5. Educational qualification may be used for introducing quotas for promotion for a certain class of persons; or may even be used to restrict promotion entirely to one class, to the exclusion of others.
28.6. Educational qualification may be used as a criterion for classification for promotion to increase administrative efficiency at the higher posts.
28.7. However, a classification made on grounds of educational qualification should bear nexus to the purpose of the classification or the extent of differences in qualifications.
30. At the outset we must point out that the appellants have not contested the fact that educational qualification is not a valid ground for classification in matters of public employment, or that promotional avenues are not available to diploma-holder SAEs to the post of AE. The appellants seek to challenge the impugned circular on the limited ground that the eligibility conditions for promotion to the supernumerary posts of AE are different for diploma-holder SAEs, who require twenty-five years of experience to be eligible, as opposed to degree-holder SAEs, who require thirteen years of experience.
32. In our view, the reading of Triloki Nath Khosa [State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] as urged by the appellants is fundamentally flawed. The appellants have sought to lay emphasis on the fact that the decision in Triloki Nath Khosa [State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] was dependent on the existence of two different sources of recruitment, while in the present case there is a single source of recruitment. To read the decision in this light is to miss the wood for the trees.
In Triloki Nath Khosa [State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 :
1974 SCC (L&S) 49] , the Court had adverted to the well-established principle that once direct recruits and promotees are integrated into a common pool, they cannot be treated differently based on the "source of recruitment". This however does not imply that they cannot be classified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether there are two different streams of recruitment, or a single source of recruitment merged into a common pool, the classification that was upheld in Triloki Nath Khosa [State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 :
1974 SCC (L&S) 49] was based on educational qualification which was linked to the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency in the organisation. We are unable to agree with the submission of the appellants that the decision in Triloki Nath Khosa [State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] is not applicable in the present case.
34. The unamended Recruitment Regulations for KMC formulated in December 1994 provided that 50% of the total cadre strength of AEs shall be filled through 15 2025:JHHC:32243 promotion from SAEs, while the remaining 50% would be filled by direct recruitment. The SAEs in turn were to be recruited from candidates who had achieved the qualification of a Diploma in Engineering or above. Thus, the Recruitment Rules initially did not stipulate different conditions for promotion between diploma-holder SAEs or degree-holder SAEs.
35. On 7-8-1997, the Recruitment Regulations were modified and a quota was introduced for the promotion of degree-holder SAEs. By this amendment, 45% of AEs were to be directly recruited; 45% were to be promoted from SAEs (either diploma or degree-holder) having ten years of experience and 10% was reserved for degree-holders SAEs who had served for ten years. A classification was made between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs, giving the former a preference over the latter. However, the promotional avenues for diploma-holder SAEs were not completely restricted.
36. The Recruitment Regulations were modified again by a Circular dated 20-2-
2002. By this amendment, the proportion of AEs to be recruited directly was reduced from 45% to 35%. The advantage of this 10% reduction was given to both sets of promotees, that is, the reservation for degree-holder SAEs was enhanced to 15%, while the balance 50% was to be filled by promotion from SAEs (either diploma or degree-holders) having ten years of experience. This circular was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court.
37. The amendments made to the Recruitment Regulations indicate that in matters of promotion, KMC has repeatedly sought to create a distinction between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs since 1997, by introducing a quota for the promotion of the former. In doing so, it did not foreclose promotional avenues for diploma-holder SAEs. In fact, in 2002, the promotional avenues were fairly enhanced for both degree and diploma-holder SAEs, while maintaining a preference for the former.
38. KMC also sought to provide career incentives to reduce stagnation amongst SAEs. The First Career Advancement Scheme was introduced in 2008 which stipulated increasing of the scale of basic pay of an SAE to that of an AE. In matters of pay, no distinction was made between degree or diploma-holder SAEs as the duties and work performed by both sets of SAEs remained the same. The Second Career Advancement Scheme introduced by the impugned circular sought to create supernumerary AE posts. Promotion to these posts was made available to both SAEs holding degrees and diplomas. However, the eligibility conditions, in terms of the years of service of these SAEs in KMC, are different. A challenge has been raised against these conditions.
39. The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequent amendments by KMC suggest that the administration has continued to create a distinction between degree and diploma-holder SAEs for the purpose of promotion. In regular promotion, this distinction is made by way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, while in terms of supernumerary promotion, it has been by way of difference in eligibility conditions. Be it one way or the other, it is evident that the administration has sought to employ a higher number of degree-holders at the position of AE than diploma-holders. In 1994, when the Recruitment Regulations were introduced, 50% of posts were for direct recruits, who were degree-holders and in the balance 50% which was to be filled by promotees it can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holding degrees. Thus, in total more than 50% of AEs were to be degree-holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45% of AEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10% of AEs were to be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45% of posts were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated that more than 55% of AEs would be degree-holders. Similarly, in 2002, more than 50% of the AE posts were to be filled by degree-holders (35% of AEs were direct recruits 16 2025:JHHC:32243 holding degrees, 15% of AEs were to be filled by degree-holding SAEs and the balance 50% were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs). The reason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertise required for the superior post, increase in managerial and technical workload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court to decide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexus between the educational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held that educational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency and thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
40. The challenge before us however is not related to the classification made in matters of regular promotion. In fact, as the record indicates, the SAEs have not challenged the initial circulars dated 7-8-1997, or 20-2-2002 (which was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court in another petition). The issue before us solely deals with the restrictions imposed for promotion to supernumerary AE posts.
43. Another aspect to be considered is that while creating supernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career, although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detriment of diploma-holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the policy domain."
26. It has already been held that it is not a case of validity of classification; rather a case of arbitrariness on part of the Respondents. However, in view of the judgment relied by the respondent JUVNL, it is necessary to deal with the same for the satisfaction of the Respondent.
As already observed, neither the Rule nor any other document demonstrate the nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. The criteria was originally introduced on the basis of amended Bihar Engineering Service Rules 1939, which admittedly was omitted by subsequent amendment. The justification of administrative efficiency also does not hold water and is apparently fanciful and artificial, because the counterparts in the Energy Department are not 17 2025:JHHC:32243 prevented from promotion to Superintending Engineer or above.
Attempt has been made in the counter affidavit to introduce the criteria of 'administrative efficiency' without appreciating that similarly qualified persons are promoted to Superintending engineer and above in the Administrative / Energy Department. The case in hand is a case of foreclosure of promotion above Executive Engineer, whereas in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court it was not the case as is evident from para 35 to 37 quoted above. Before the Hon'ble Apex Court, challenge was to the eligibility of number of years in service one has to put in without having a Bachelor's Degree. In the present case, there is complete ban on promotion above the post of Executive Engineer.
27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation4 vide para 20,21,and 22 has held as hereunder:
"20. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [(1970) 2 All ER 294 : 1970 AC 1004 (HL)] Lord Reid said (at All ER p. 297g-h), "Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances". Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed:"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [(1972) 2 WLR 537 [sub nom British Railway Board v. Herrington, (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)]] Lord Morris said : (All ER p. 761c) "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
21. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
22. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680] , AIR p. 688, para 19) "19. ... Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may 4 (2002) 3 SCC 496 18 2025:JHHC:32243 alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
*** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B. Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy,5 has held:
"19. We may gainfully extract the note of caution sounded by Krishna Iyer, J. in His Lordship's separate but concurring judgment in Triloki Nath case [(1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] : (SCC pp. 41-42, para 56) "56. ... The dilemma of democracy is as to how to avoid validating the abolition of the difference between the good and the bad in the name of equality and putting to sleep the constitutional command for expanding the areas of equal treatment for the weaker ones with the dope of 'special qualifications' measured by expensive and exotic degrees. These are perhaps meta-judicial matters left to the other branches of Government, but the court must hold the executive within the leading strings of egalitarian constitutionalism and correct, by judicial review, episodes of subtle and shady classification grossly violative of equal justice. That is the heart of the matter. That is the note that rings through the first three fundamental rights the people have given to themselves."
29. It is also settled legal proposition that the precedential value of a judgment is not what can be logically deduced from it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.,6 has held as here under:
"59. A decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.".
30. The Petitioner No. 1 being Diploma in Electrical Engineering, was appointed as Junior Engineer on 18.12.1984 in the then Bihar State Electricity Board. After having successfully completed 8 years of service, he was promoted/appointed to the post of Assistant Exe. Engineer by 5 (2010) 3 SCC 314 6 (2003) 2 SCC 111 19 2025:JHHC:32243 way of promotion w.e.f. 16.12.1992 and his service was confirmed in the Cadre of Assistant Engineer. Thereafter in due course, he was also promoted to the grade of Executive Engineer w.e.f. 28.4.2000.
31. Similarly, the Petitioner No. 2 being Diploma in Electrical Engineering was appointed on the post of Junior Engineer under parent Bihar State Electricity Board on 22.12.1984, in due course he was also promoted/appointed to the post of Assistant Engineer by way of promotion and his service was also confirmed w.e.f. 13.09.1993. He was also promoted to the grade of Executive Engineer w.e.f. 08.11.2002.
32. As both the Petitioners retired during the pendency of the instant writ petition on attaining the age of superannuation, in the given circumstances, remanding the matter would defeat the ends of justice. The Respondents in their Counter Affidavit have not denied that juniors to the Petitioners have been promoted. However, Respondents have tried to justify their action in the light of existing Rule 8(i)(C) of Rules 1976. Thirteen years have lapsed since the deferment of the issue by the Respondent Company in the year 2012 as per Annexure-A to the Counter Affidavit. Such an action of the Respondents cannot be countenanced in a welfare State.
33. In view of the discussions made above and the law laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it can be safely held that the action of the Respondents suffers from arbitrariness. A Rule may not suffer from ultra vires on the touchstone of classification but the executive action of sitting tight over the grievances of the Petitioners in spite of positive instructions 20 2025:JHHC:32243 from the Energy Department, Governors Secretariat and intermittent but inconclusive action of the Respondents in proceeding to resolve and bring the Rule in line with the Rules/Policy of the State [Departments] is definitely arbitrary.
This Court is unable to appreciate the helplessness of the Energy Department to tackle the lethargic and dilatory action of the Respondent Company. The treatment meted out by the Respondent Company to the Petitioners is high handedness of the mighty State Undertaking and amounts to arbitrariness and negation of equal treatment particularly when similarly placed employees in the Parent/Administrative Department are not barred from promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer and above keeping in mind that those similarly placed employees in the Energy Department does not perform any lesser responsibility on the post of Superintending Engineer or above.
34. As a matter of fact, there is no distinguishing fact in the counter affidavit between Diploma Holders under the Respondent JUVNL and Diploma Holders under Energy Department in relation to the nature of responsibilities being discharged by the two, to justify the contention that Superintending Engineers or above discharging higher responsibility require in-depth technical knowledge can be acquired during Engineering Degree and other higher qualifications.
It is settled legal principle that lis between the parties crystallizes when the lis is instituted and subsequent events could be considered by the Court only to mould the relief. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Nidhi V Ram 21 2025:JHHC:32243 Kripal Sharam (Dead) through Legal Representative,7 wherein para 16 has held that "Ordinarily, rights between the parties stands crystalized on the date of institution of the suit. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events to mould the relief in the event the relief has become inappropriate; taking note of changed circumstances would shorten the litigation and enable complete justice and such subsequent change in circumstances is brought to the notice to the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law".
35. Having regard to the discussions made hereinabove, Rule 8(i)(C) of Rules 1976 putting a bar on the consideration for promotion to Diploma Holders to the post of Superintending Engineer and above does not stand to logic and reasoning and the inaction of the Respondents is actually negation of equality as observed herein above in the light of order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Govt. Branch Press" (Supra).
In the interest of justice and to shorten the litigation, Respondents are directed to take a decision and modify the same in accordance with law, in the light of prevailing Rules/Policies governing the cases of promotion of Diploma Holder Engineers in the Department of Energy and Road Construction as also other State Departments within a period of Sixteen weeks from date of communication of the order.
36. As the Petitioners have already suffered a lot at the hands of the Respondents, and superannuated, therefore the Court is of the considered opinion that it would be in the 7 (2017) 5 SCC 640 22 2025:JHHC:32243 interest of justice that Respondents shall consider the cases of the Petitioners for granting promotion from the due dates of their entitlement / dates when the juniors are promoted, within a further period of Twelve weeks, and issue appropriate office orders/notifications to that extent. The Petitioners would be at liberty to demonstrate before the Respondent Company, with evidence that juniors to the Petitioners have been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer and above.
37. Consequently, Petitioners shall also be at liberty to claim their monetary and pensionary benefits arising out of such promotion by making a representation to the Respondent Company, which shall be decided in accordance with law by the Respondent No.4 within the time frame as mentioned above. Needless to say, if the Petitioners are found entitled to any monetary or pensionary benefit, same shall be released in their favour within further period of four weeks thereafter.
38. Resultantly the impugned letter no. 1107 dated 18.07.2017 is quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed. Pending I.A. if any also stands disposed of.
(Deepak Roshan, J.) October 16, 2025 Amardeep/-
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