Gujarat High Court
Popatbhai Ramjibhai Moghariya And Ors. vs District Judge And Ors. on 2 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1993)2GLR1539, (1994)ILLJ568GUJ
JUDGMENT K.J. Vaidya, J.
1. The three important questions which have surfaced for consideration in group of the present three petitions are '.Firstly, "Whether in a case wherein the candidate stand to satisfy the requisite criteria as regards the age limit for appointment to any post on the date of publication of advertisement in the newspaper, and thereafter also, at the time of publication of the select list' of such candidate for appointment, can he ever be denied the appointment only on the ground that subsequently on the actual date of his appointment, he has crossed the upper-age limit so prescribed and that too for no fault of his own? Secondly, "Whether any candidate duly enlisted on the Select List if he is dropped from being considered for appointment on the ground of having crossed the upper age limit at the relevant time of his appointment, then whether he has any right to be informed about the same, by way of corresponding obligation on the appointing authority of its own to immediately inform him?" and Thirdly, "Whethr the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while issuing the writ of a mandamus directing the respondent to give appointment to the petitioners with retrospective effect, is also competent to give further direction for payment of full backwages to the appointees?"
1.1 The facts and circumstances constituting the back-drop of aforesaid three questions are stated as under:
1.2. At the very outset, it may be stated that in these three petitions, since the main substratum of facts giving rise to the common question of law to be decided is the same, at the joint request and consent of the learned Advocates for the respective parties, it has been decided to dispose of the same by this common judgment.
1.3. It may also be further stated that at the very commencement of the hearing, since the learned Advocate for the petitioners stated at the bar that he does not seek any relief against the candidates who have been joined as party-respondents in these petitions, their names are accordingly ordered to be deleted.
2. Factual background: In response to the advertisement dated February 27, 1984 given by Mr. B.M. Trivedi, District Judge, Surendranagar which appeared in Gujarathi daily Gujarat Samachar on March 2, 1984 for the post of English Section Writers, three petitioners herein, namely, (i) Popatbhai R. Moghariya, (ii) Jayashribehn R. Pancholi, and (ii) Anil R. Sanghvi, applied for the same, and thereafter, subsequently qualifying the proficiency test, were called for interview. Thereafter, having passed all the requisite tests, petitioners were selected as English Section Writers as mentioned in the Select List which came to be published on January 19, 1985 (Annexure "E"). In the said Select List, petitioners were listed at Serial Nos. 31, 16 and 30 respectively, they were so communicated by separate letters dated January 19, 1985. According to the petitioners, out of the selected 35 candidates, 15 were appointed in two batches somewhere in the year 1985-1986, and accordingly, rest of the 20 candidates were to be appointed as and when appropriate orders of appointment were to be made, according to the administrative convenience and expediency. It is further the case of the petitioners that though their names were at Sl. Nos. 31, 16 and 30 in the Select List, yet to their utter surprise on June 5, 1989, leaving them aside, 11 other candidates, quite below their serial numbers in the Select; List, came to be appointed vide appointment order dated June 5, 1989 (Annexure "C"). The surprising part is that instead of the present three petitioners who were Sl. Nos. 31, 16 and 30 in the said Select List, other three candidates, namely (1) Rajnikant V. Shah, (2) Rajesh C Vyas, (3) Jayant R. Balsania, (4) Kum. Kumud N. Bhatt, (5) Pratap J. Goshalia, and (6) Jitendra G. Ahmedabadi at Sl. Nos. 32, 33, 18, 23 26 and 28, respectively came to be appointed. On coming to know about the illegal appointments of the aforesaid candidates, Mr. Mogaria (one of the petitioners herein) voicing the grievance made a representation dated June 7, 1989 before the learned District Judge, Surendranagar. This was replied to vide letter dated June 12, 1989 stating therein that as the petitioner had crossed the upper-age limit, and accordingly not eligible for appointment, and, therefore, he was not given appointment. It is under these circumstances, that the petitioners have been constrained to approach this Court by way of filing the present writ petitions, inter alia praying - (i) to declare the Circulars dated February 8, 1988 and February 22, 1988 issued by the High Court of Gujarat to the District Judge illegal and inoperative as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and (ii) to issue writ of mandamus giving direction to the District Judge, Surendranagar to immediately give them their due appointments as English Section Writers from May 5, 1989, the date on which other candidates of the Select List from Sl. No. 16 onwards were given appointment, with all consequential reliefs.
3. Mr. Rupen N. Shah, the learned Advocate for the petitioners while challenging the impugned discriminatory action of the respondents submitted that the same was patently arbitrary, illegal and unjust. It was further submitted by Mr. Shah that the petitioners on coming to know that they passed the interview and their names have figured in the Select List of 35 candidates, were hopeful enough expecting that after the first 15 candidates, they also in due course of time and turn would be given appointment. Mr. Shah further submitted that labouring under this hope, petitioners did not make any efforts to find out any employment elsewhere to maintain themselves and their family members. According to Mr. Shah thereafter till 1989 no appointment was made as the ban was imposed by the State Government on new appointments, and accordingly, the petitioners were hopefully further waiting for the ban to be lifted to get their rightful turn of appointment. In the year 1989, some of the candidates from the said Select List from Sl. No. 16 onwards came to be appointed, leaving the present petitioners to their utter misfortune. When this grievance was made before the learned District Judge, he expressed his inability to help the petitioners on the ground that on the said date of appointment, they had already crossed the upper-age limit of 28. According to the learned District Judge, vide two Circulars dated February 8, 1988 and February 22, 1988 issued by the High Court of Gujarat he was directed not to appoint any candidate who had crossed the upper-age limit on the date of appointment. While attacking these two Circulars, Mr. Shah submitted that the same were ex facie unjust and illegal being quite against the settled legal position on the point. Under the circumstances what is now contended before this Court is that once the candidate stood to satisfy the requisite criteria as regards the age limit on the date of publication of advertisement, and thereafter, also at the time of publishing the Select List of such candidates for appointment, merely because for the circumstances entirely beyond the control and for no fault of their, if the petitioners came to cross the Upper-age limit, that by itself cannot be made a ground to deny them their frightful appointment. Mr. Shah also submitted that at no point of time, the petitioners were informed by the learned District Judge that since they have already crossed the upper-age limit, they were not entitled to get appointment. It is only when one of the petitioners made a representation to the learned District Judge that they were informed of their becoming ineligible to get appointment on the ground of having crossed the upper-age limit. This according to Mr. Shah has caused great deal of prejudice to the future prospects of the petitioners. Mr. Shah further submitted that had indeed the petitioners been informed well in advance, or thereafter at appropriate time that since they have crossed the prescribed upper-age limits, they will not be entitled to get appointment, the petitioners would have either tried their luck elsewhere, and perhaps, by this time might have settled in their respective jobs and/or would have challenged the impugned action at the earliest before this Court seeking redressal of their grievance. Mr. Shah further submitted that having been enlisted in the Select List and, thereafter if their case was not to be considered, the petitioners had certainly a right to be informed that they were found not eligible for consideration to the appointment for which they have in fact passed the requisite proficiency test and interview. On the basis of the above submissions. Mr. Shah finally urged thai all these petitions deserve to be allowed, and accordingly, the learned District Judge be directed to give appointment to the present petitioners from the date their names as per the Select List came to be superseded, alongwith other consequential benefits.
4. As against the above Mrs. Shaikh, the learned AGP, submitted that at the time when the petitioners were likely to be appointed to the post of English Section Writers, they had already crossed the prescribed upper-age limit, and therefore, they were not eligible to be so appointed, and it was precisely under this circumstance that the petitioners were not given appointment as such. In support of this contention, the learned AGP has relied upon the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Subordinate Judicial Services (Class-Ill & IV Services) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1978, wherein it has been postulated that for appointment to the post of Section Writer, a candidate must not be less then 18 years and more than 28 years. In this regard, however, an exception is made whereby upper-age can be relaxed upto 33 years in favour of candidates belonging to SC/ST. According to the learned AGP, as per the aforesaid provisions of the Rules and further as per the instructions issued by the Administrative side of the High Court of Gujarat, a candidate must be within the prescribed age limit not only on the date on which he applies, but also on the date of actual appointment being offered to him. According to the learned AGP, in the instant case, the petitioners have crossed the prescribed upperage limit, and therefore, they were not entitled to be appointed as English Section Writers. The learned AGP further submitted that mere inclusion of a candidate in the Select List or Waiting List does not by itself give any indefeasible right to the concerned candidate to get appointment in violation of the Recruitment Rules. Under the circumstances, the learned AGP submitted that the petitioners merely because their names appeared in the Select List that by itself did not vest any right to be appointed. The learned AGP in support of this contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shankarandas v. Union of India reported in (1992-II-LLJ-18). On the basis of the above submissions, the learned AGP finally urged that the petitioners having failed to make out any case entitling them to order any of the reliefs prayed for, all these petitions deserve to be dismissed.
5. Now before entering into appreciation of the rival contentions, it may incidentally be stated that this Court (Coram :B.S. Kapadia, J) on June 15, 1989 issued 'Rule' granting ad interim relief by way of slaying appointments of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and other candidates whose numbers were after the petitioner in the 'Select List'. The notice as to the interim relief was made returnable on June 27, 1989. Thereafter, on June 27, 1989, ad interim relief was vacated and ultimately by anorderdated July 11, 1989, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the matter was placed on final hearing Board on July 27, 1989 with the permission to the petitioners to move the learned District Judge to reconsider their appointment on the basis of Circular dated November 20, 1987, with the further liberty to the learned District Judge to take appropriate decision in the matter. Thereafter, though the matter was fixed for final hearing on July 24, 1989, the same for whatever reasons could not be taken up for hearing till today.
6. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties at length, it clearly transpires that the petitioners have been quite illegally discriminated against by not giving them their rightful appointments on June 5, 1989, the date on which other candidates whose names were after the petitioners in Select List came to be appointed as Section Writers bypassing them; more particularly, when it is not disputed (in fact rather, it can never be disputed) that on the date of publication of advertisement and thereafter on the date of publication of the Select List, the petitioners duly stood to satisfy all the requisite criterion, including the age-limit. It is also not disputed before this Court that for crossing the prescribed upper-age limit, the petitioners were not at fault. Under such circumstances, merely because the circumstances entirely beyond their control, if they could not be given appointment earlier before they came to across the prescribed upper-age limit, they certainly cannot be blamed at all and penalised. In fact, it is too well known to be stated that in-between the date of publication of advertisement, thereafter publication of the Select List, and ultimately when the appointment orders were issued, there are very many factors which come in the way intervening and delaying the appointment. To illustrate few such circumstances, for example : (i) it can as well happen that in a given case, sometime some aggrieved candidate obtains Stay Orders from the Court and as we know because of some belated disposal of the case, the candidate for no fault of his own may cross the upper-age limit; (ii) it can also as well happen that in a given case because of some natural calamities like flood, famine, drought, earthquake and/or under some such type of extraordinary circumstances or some unforeseen unfortunate events taking place and due to which Government imposes ban because of the financial constraints which may as well result in delaying the appointments. Thus, the actual date of appointment may vary from one candidate to another for different reasons, and more particularly, on availability of posts on different dates. Now, these are the circumstances for which the candidates who are duly selected have no control whatsoever, and, therefore, they cannot be made scapegoat. If under such circumstances, the candidate crosses the prescribed upper-age limit and on that ground alone, if his appointment is denied, the same is quite harsh, unjust and unfair. The obvious reason is that the person having passed the requisite proficiency test, interview, etc., when found suitable, and therefore, gets his name enlisted in the 'Select List' would quite legitimately hope and expect that if outof the total 35 candidates from the said Select List, when a group of 15 are already appointed, then with the passage of time, he would also get that turn to be appointed and obviously under this expectation only, he may not apply elsewhere for employment. If such a reasonable hope and expectation is to be arbitrarily belied on quite artificial and unjust criteria by saying that the selected hand has crossed the upper-age limit, then the same is nothing less than an unfortunate slip between the cup and lip, where before cup reaches the lip it slips or snatched away. Apart this, in the matter of public appointments, the administration is required to have a pragmatic approach bearing in the mind the question of public money being drained out in getting published advertising in the newspapers, and thereafter repeating the same, in case of candidates crossing the upper-age limit and the precious time of the authority like the District Judge in repeating the exercise of processing the papers, conducting interview and the ministerial staff preparing the Select List, etc., etc. This unnecessary and avoidable burden and pressure on the public exchequer and public time should and ought to be certainly avoided, more particularly, when enough vacancies exist and the candidates are already selected, cannot be held responsible for not being appointed in time on they crossing the upper-age limit. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the view that this Court is taking in principle is quite duly supported by some of the decisions of the Supreme Court and various other High Courts of the nation. To mention few of them, the Supreme Court in case of A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad & Ors., v. B. Saratchandra and Ors., reported in (1990-II-LLJ-135) in para-7 has observed as that (p. 137):
"If the word 'selection' is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of Select List for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting application, scrutiny of application, rejection of defective application or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview for viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule - 3 of the Rules of procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attend the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word 'selection' only as the factum of the preparation of select list."
In yet another decision of this Court rendered in the case of (Dr.) Kamal Singh Bengali v. State Public Service Commission, reported in (1992-I-LLJ-719), the petitioner when he applied for the post was within the age limit prescribed, but he became over- aged on the date of his actual appointment. It is held that the same did not render the petitioner disqualified on the ground that eligibility as to the age is referable to the last date specified for making application and not the date when actual appointment was given. It was further held that the candidate who fulfilled the age criteria when he applied for the post does not become ineligible because of the reason that he crosses the upper-age limit on the actual date of his appointment. Merely because the date of appointment is subsequent, thatdoes not make him ineligible for first appointment or for consideration on subsequent occasion under the Provision of Rule 8(5). There is no reason to refer the date of eligibility to the date of appointment because that actual date of appointment might vary for different candidates for different reasons and availability of posts on different dates. However, the eligibility of all those persons to be considered in response to the same advertisement has to be with reference to a fixed date and the last date of receipt of applications is the rational and reasonable date with reference to which the prescribed age limit can be ascertained. Thus, examining the question involved from all its surrounding aspects and angles, more particularly in the light of the aforesaid two decisions, to deny appointment on the ground of they having crossed the upper-age limit sounds quite illogical, hence, unreasonable as not being consistent with either the public interest or the interest of an individual. Apart this, even the Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Shankaran Dash v. Union of India (supra) and relied upon by the learned AGP, if read fully and in proper context, the same supports the view taken by this Court At this stage, we may quite usefully have a look at para 6 of the said judgment which reads as under: (at p. 20):
"6. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation of qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in cases of (i) State of Haryana v. Subhash Chandra Marwaha, reported in (1973-II-LLJ-266) (ii) Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana reported in (1986) 4 SCC 268: or (iii) Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab reported in (1985) 1 SCC 122."
In view of the aforesaid decisions the impugned action of the respondent on face of it being quite illegal and unjust, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. In fact, the feeble attempt of the learned AGP relying upon the relevant rules and circulars pale into total insignificance and cannot be given any weightage as they clearly offend the reason, justice, fair play and the settled legal position, as discussed above.
7. Coming to the second point regarding right of a selectee to be informed of not fit to be considered on the ground of having crossed the upper-age limit, it must be stated that any decision or order which may directly or indirectly affect the interest of any such selectee, when the same is passed behind his back, the courtesy and the public duty both demands that he should be informed about the same, and in this regard, the Appointing Authority is under unquestionable obligation to inform the affected candidate at its earliest best. This would clearly enable the concerned selectee on the first hand to challenge the impugned action/order, if he so desires and on the second hand, may try elsewhere for getting job. It may be clarified that while giving the prescribed lower and upper-age limits, if it was also made clear in the advertisement itself that in the event of selectees crossing the upper-age limit, they shall not be so considered for appointment, then in that case, the appointing authority perhaps would be quite justified in dropping their names from consideration. Such an advertisement would take care of otherwise hoping and expecting selectees on the one hand, and on the other, the appointing authority by not giving them appointment on the ground of having crossed the upper-age limit This would give sufficient notice to the candidate that in case if he is not immediately appointed before the prescribed upper-age limit, and after getting his name enlisted on the select list, if for whatever j reasons, the time passes he happens to cross the upper-age limit, then in that case, he can know that he would not be getting appointment, may have a reasonable opportunity to try his luck for employment somewhere else.
8. That takes us now to the third point regarding awarding of backwages to the petitioners-appointees. On this point, Mr. Shah vehemently submitted that right from the date petitioners came to be selected, they were quite hopefully expecting and awaiting for their due turn thinking that in due course of time, they would also be appointed like similarly placed other selectees and precisely on that ground alone they did not make any efforts elsewhere for being employed. Under such circumstances, if this Court was inclined to hold that the petitioners were arbitrarily denied the appointment on the ground of having crossed the upper-age limit, they are indeed quite rightfully entitled to backwages as a natural, obvious and unavoidable consequence following the impugned illegal action. In support of this contention, Mr. Shah, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman reported in (1991-II-LLJ-570), wherein it has been held that an employee cannot be deprived of any benefits including salary of promotional post on the principle of "no work no pay". Mr. Shah further submitted that the date June 5, 1989 on which the petitioner came to be illegally bypassed by the other selectees, from that date only they should be deemed to have been appointed entitling them to backwages therefrom. While opposing this submission of Mr. Shah, the learned AGP submitted that this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was quite within its power to quash and set aside the impugned action/order, if the same is found to be pervese, arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Not only that but this Court may as well grant relief of being appointed in favour of the petitioners, if they establish that the impugned action/order is perverse, arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. However, according to the learned AGP, so far as the question of payment of backwages is concerned, this Court shall not grant it and rather stop merely at issuing directions to appoint the petitioners. In support of this contention, the learned AGP has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Anr., v. Shri Vinay Narayan Vajpayee, reported in (1980-I-LLJ-222) wherein in para -18, it has been observed to the effect that in writ jurisdiction, the High Court can only quash the order of dismissal, however, it was not competent to give further directions for payment of full backwages.
8.1. Now on carefully examining the aforesaid two decisions, it appears that the one cited by the learned AGP in case of the Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation (supra) having regard to more or less similar facts situation is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The fact remains that the petitioners are yet to be appointed. The fact also remains that at this stage, there is no material before this Court to find out whether during the relevant interregnum period, the petitioners were gainfully employed elsewhere or not. Precisely, these are the facts within the special knowledge of the petitioners only to which none has any access, except the petitioners. Thus, unless and until the material regarding not gainfully employed elsewhere is brought on the record for being tested, verified and challenged, it would be quite illegal and improper to straightway order the backwages. Of course an attempt has been made during the course of arguments that the petitioners were prepared to place on record the requisite affidavits stating therein that during the relevant period, they were not gainfully appointed anywhere. But it appears to this Court that such an affidavit without its contents being properly tested by the otherside is of no assistance to the Court to reach any just decision on quantum of backwages to be awarded. Awarding the back-wages and for that purpose any monetary award to the claimants is a matter of great concern and responsibility for the Court, and the same should not be light-heartedly undertaken. The reason is that when the Court is to award the backwages or any such other monetary benefits, there should be some definite date on which the same could be awarded. Further still, these backwages are ultimately going to be paid from the Public Exchequer, i.e., to say from the money belonging to the people and not from the personal pocket of any Appointing Authority or any such other Authority. Under such circumstances, before giving such backwages or passing monetary awards, it is indeed necessary to inquire into the matter whether any appointee was gainfully employed elsewhere or not, and for this the person claiming backwages must produce a definite material before the Court, and for this, the High Court in its writ jurisdiction is hardly a forum. Further still, on facts also, this being not a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Shah in case of Union of India v. K V. Jankiraman (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of these cases. Apart this, when the petitioners quite hopefully expecting that they will be appointed in due course of time, they did not engage themselves elsewhere, and therefore, are entitled to the loss suffered by way of back-wages. But then, what should be the quantum of that backwages is a factor which this Court will not like to take upon itself to decide in absence of any materials. It is under these circumstances that though in principle while prima facie hold-ing that the petitioners are entitled to backwages then the second question as to whether in fact they are entitled to same or not and in case if they are entitled, then for what amount, and for this they are required to make suitable application to the learned District Judge, Surendranagar. The learned District Judge after holding necessary inquiry and satisfying himself as to whether the petitioners were gainfully employed elsewhere or not and/or for what period, may grant the same. In case if it is found that the petitioners were gainfully employed, then in that case, to the extent the concerned petitioner has financially gained, that much amount be deducted from the total backwages which shall be deemed to be due to them from June 5, 1989, the date on which they came to be superseded. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present cases wherein petitioners have suffered serious injustice since last four years of not being appointed for no fault of them, it would indeed be quite just and fair if they are awarded some ad hoc relief, say Rs. 10,000/- to each one of them towards their outstanding backwages within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment. In case, at the end of the inquiry the learned Judge reaches the conclusion that petitioners were gainfully employed for all these years or for some period, then in that case, the ad hoc amount of Rs. 10,000/- paid to them may be suitably recovered from their salary. The learned District Judge is accordingly directed to expeditiously complete the inquiry preferably within nine months from the date of receipt of such applications from the petitioners. Mr. Shah, on behalf of the petitioners has stated that the petitioners will not seek any adjournment and will fully co-operate with the proceedings to be disposed of as directed by this Court.
8.2. To briefly summarize, the answer to the three questions raised at the commencement of this judgment it may be stated that - (i) once the candidate is found to be within the prescribed age-limit on the date of publication of advertisement and/or thereafter even on the date of publication of the Select List, and further still, for no fault of the candidate, he becomes over-aged, then merely on that ground, he cannot be denied his rightful appointment, (ii) in case any candidate duly enlisted on the select list, if he is dropped from being considered on the ground of he having crossed the upper-age limit at the relevant time of his appointment, then in that case, he has a right to be informed about the same and the Competent Authority is under corresponding obligation of its town to immediately inform him, and (iii) High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution while issuing the writ of mandamus directing the respondent to give appointment to the petitioners with retrospective effect, in cases like the present one, is not competent to give further directions for payment of full backwages to the appointees, and that what it could do at the most is to direct the concerned appointee to make suitable application in the said regard to the Appointing Authority, who in its turn after holding necessary inquiry may pass appropriate orders regarding payment of backwages due.
9. In the result, these three petitions succeed and are allowed in the light of the directions given above. The impugned order superseding the right of petitioners to be appointed on the post of English Section Writers as well as two Circulars dated February 8, 1988 and February 22, 1988 issued by the High Court of Gujarat to the District Judges are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to appoint the petitioners with retrospective effect, i.e., from June 5, 1989, within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment. Rule made absolute with costs. The coat is quantified at Rs. 500/- each.