Delhi High Court
Sh. Bale Ram S/O Late Sh. Bansi Ram vs Land Acquisition Collector [Along With ... on 12 May, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005(83)DRJ179
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar, Madan B. Lokur
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. On 6.9.2004 the Land Acquisition Collector cum Additional District Magistrate, North East, Delhi passed the following orders in both the above noticed writ petitions:-
"W.P.(C) NO. 1179/2005 ORDER Reference U/s 18 of the L.A. Act made By Shri Bale Ram S/o Shri Bansi Ram resident of Vill-Usmanpur, Delhi, against Award No. 13/92-93 dated19-06-92 of Village Garhi Mendu has been considered by the Competent Authority.
The Award was announced on 19-06-92. The reference U/s 18 of the L.A. Act was made on 03.06.2002. Therefore, the reference was not made within 6 months of Award as provided in the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the reference is 'Time Barred'.
Hence the reference filed by Shri Bale Ram is hereby rejected.
(C.R. GARG) LAND ACQUISITON COLLECtor/A.D.M. (NORTH EAST) W.P.(C) NO. 1850/2005 ORDER Reference U/s 18 of the L.A. Act made By Shri Zile Singh S/o Shri Bansi Ram resident of Vill-Usmanpur, Delhi, against Award No. 13/92-93 dated19-06-92 of Village Garhi Mendu has been considered by the Competent Authority.
The Award was announced on 19-06-92. The reference U/s 18 of the L.A. Act was made on 31.05.2002. Therefore, the reference was not made within 6 months of Award as provided in the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the reference is 'Time Barred'.
Hence the reference filed by Shri Zile Singh is hereby rejected.
(C.R. GARG) LAND ACQUISITON COLLECtor/A.D.M.(NORTH EAST)
2. The petitioners pray in these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India that the above orders be quashed and request of the petitioners for reference application submitted by them under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') be transmitted to the Court of competent jurisdiction for decision of their prayer for enhancement of the awarded compensation. According to the petitioners they had the actual and/or constructive knowledge of the award on 15th April, 2002 and they had filed the applications under Section 18 on 30th May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002 respectively within the prescribed period of limitation and as such the impugned orders are patently contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500 and State of Punjab v. Musammat Qaisar Jehan Begum and Anr. AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1604. The preposition of law stated in the above cases is no way in controversy before us. The Court is primarily concerned, in the present petition, as to the application of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases to the facts and circumstances of the cases in hand. The facts are that the appropriate government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 23rd June, 1989 acquiring large parcels of land including the land belonging to the petitioners for a public purpose, namely 'Planned Development of Delhi'. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 20th June, 1990, the land was finally acquired by the Government and award no. 13/92-93 dated 19th June, 1992 was announced by the Collector. The land thereafter vested in the government, as per the provision of the Act.
3. According to the petitioners the Land Acquisition Collector did not send any prior information to the petitioners regarding the announcement of the award, therefore, the petitioners could not be present at the time of announcement of the award. The Collector also never gave any statutory notice as contemplated under Section 12(2) of the Act. Much subsequent thereto the petitioners came to know that the land was (land belonging to the petitioners in khasra no. 46 min, 71, 158, 205 min, 255, 246, 236) situated in the Revenue Estate of Village Garhi Mindu, Tehsil Nand Nagar, Delhi and the Collector was carrying out proceeding for the payment of compensation in respect of the same. The petitioners claimed to have approached the office of the Collector on two or three occasions but they were required to wait. Finally, on 15.4.2002 the compensation was paid to the petitioner and the copy of the award was also supplied to the petitioners on that very day. Having attained the knowledge of the award and its contents and having received the compensation amount on 15.4.2002, the petitioners filed their application for enhancement of the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Act. Bale Ram filed the application on 3.6.2002 while Zile Singh filed a similar application on 30.5.2002. After waiting for a considerable time, the respondents rejected these applications vide order dated 6.9.2004 on the ground of limitation. The respondents filed counter affidavits in both the writ petitions separately. It is stated that the award was announced in open Court on 19.6.1992, the possession of the land was handed over to Delhi Development Authority on 25.1.2000 in presence of the villagers, as such the villagers and the petitioners obviously had complete knowledge of the factum of award and its contents. According to the respondents there is no requirement in law for sending advance notice to the villagers for pronouncement of the award. The respondents claim to have issued a public notice on 26.5.2001 requiring the villagers/land owners to receive the compensation which had already been deposited. The petitioner had applied for receiving the compensation on 25.3.2001 which was paid to them after completion of formalities on 15.4.2002, but they have filed the reference application after a period of more than 15 months. In these circumstances, the allegations of the petitioners that they were not aware of the award is not only unfounded but cannot be believed. The respondents thus, pray for dismissal of the writ petitions.
4. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of the case pleaded on behalf of the parties to the lis, reference to Section 18 of the Act would be appropriate:-
"18. Reference to Court and Procedure thereon-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made-
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks fr5om the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2); or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."
5. The controversy in the present case is further narrowed in view of the common stand taken by the parties before us. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, during the course of argument, fairly stated that there is nothing on record to show that petitioners were present when the award was made. He also further conceded that the authorities concerned did not issue any specific notice to the petitioners or even in general, as required under Section 12(2) of the Act. The obvious result thereof is that the case of the petitioners cannot be rejected and in fact has not been rejected for filing an application beyond the prescribed period in terms of proviso (a) to Section 18(2) and first part of proviso (b) to section 18(2) of the Act. The only objection raised on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioners have failed to make an application under Section 18 of the Act to the Collector within six months from the date of the Collector's Award. It is for this reason alone that the application of the petitioners have been dismissed.
6. According to the petitioners, they have filed their applications for enhancement of compensation within a period of six months from the date of knowledge of award passed by the Collector. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent is that the applications filed by the petitioners are beyond the prescribed period of limitation and have rightly been rejected by the Competent Authority. It is an admitted fact on records that compensation was received by the petitioners on 15th April, 2002 while the award was announced on 19th June, 1992. They filed applications for reference to the Court of Competent jurisdiction under section 18 of the Act on 30th May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002 respectively. In the application filed by the petitioners, copy of which is annexed to the writ petition as annexure A-3, it has been specifically stated that the petitioners were not present at the time of making the award nor any notices were issued to them under section 12(2) of the Act. It is claimed by the petitioners that they came to know only on 15.4.2002 when they received compensation from the Land Acquisition Collector and have filed the application under section 18 within the prescribed period.
7. In the award which has been annexed to the petition as annexure A-1 by the petitioners themselves, it has been recorded that notices under sections 9 and 10 of the Act had been issued to all the interested persons and they had filed claims which have been noticed at serial No.68 of the award in relation to Zile Singh and Bale Ram both. It is also clear from the records produced before us by the respondents that the petitioners had filed their applications for payment of compensation on 23rd March, 2001 making a reference to the date and number of the award, the extent of land acquired and that the payment should be made to them in terms of the award. From this application two important facts are clear; firstly, that the petitioners did not submit this letter under protest; secondly they knew that for the acquired land they have been awarded compensation. Not only this, Bale Ram filed various documents including the surety bonds, indemnity bonds wherein exact amount of compensation to the extent of Rs.1,79,188/- was mentioned which according to the petitioners was the compensation payable to him for acquisition of his entire land in terms of the award. The matter remained pending before the authorities and finally for the amount indicated in the indemnity bond, a cheque was issued by the respondents on 15th April, 2002. Similar documents were also executed by Zile Singh.
8. From the other file produced by the respondents, it is clear that possession of the land was taken by the respondents vide Kabza Karbai dated 25th January, 2000 wherein officers of different departments had taken physical possession of the property and the authorities had also issued a `public notice' on or about 30th May, 2001 stating therein that all interested parties who have applied for compensation Along with requisite documents were requested to collect 80% of their compensation from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector. This notice was given to at the Panchayat Ghar and even copies thereof were delivered to the Pradhan of the Village Shri Rattan Singh. Various villagers had signed the said public notice.
9. On the strength of the counter-affidavit and the records produced before us during the course of hearing by the respondents, it is vehemently contended that petitioners have not disclosed true facts before the Court in the writ petition and they had definite knowledge of the award and its contents on 23rd March, 2001. The petitioners could file the application under section 18 of the Act at best within six months thereof which they failed. Thus, the applications have been rightly rejected by the authorities.
10. We have already noticed that it is not the case of any of the parties before us that the rejection was on any other ground except that it has not been filed within six months from the date of Collector's award. Therefore, we have to construe what is the reasonable and correct interpretation of the language `within six months from the date of Collector's award' appearing in later part of proviso (b) to section 18. Section 11 of the Act imposes an obligation upon the Collector to make an award while section 11(a) further imposes a limitation within which such an award shall be made. Section 12(2) requires the Collector to give immediately notice of his award to such interested persons as are not present personally or by their representative when the award is made. The period of limitation specified under section 18 of the Act in no certain terms relates to this obligation imposed upon the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act. If such a notice is not issued by the Collector and if the person was not present at the time of making an award, the Collector cannot reject an application of the owner under the proviso (a) and first part of proviso (b) as well to section 18(2) of the Act. Where the citizen is required to act within the stipulated period, there the authorities should also not lightly take their obligations particularly when they are statutory in nature. The legislature in its wisdom has directed the Collector to issue a notice under section 12(2) of the Act, has obvious reasons behind it. Firstly, the persons who are not present at the time of making of the award would be informed about the passing of the award and secondly the disbursement of compensation could be effected expeditiously and at the same time the land owners who are not satisfied with the award and have not so accepted it, would be liable to file application within six weeks of receipt of this notice. We would expect and in fact direct the concerned authorities in the State Administration to ensure that due steps, as contemplated under these provisions, are taken by the Land Acquisition Authorities within time and without fault. We express a pious hope that the higher authorities in the hierarchy of the State would take notice of these observations and act in accordance with law by issuance of proper guidelines and instructions to the concerned quarters. The award of the Collector is an expression capable of receiving a simple meaning. It obviously means the day on which the award is made or announced by the Collector. The most important incident is as to when the award is communicated or the interested person received the knowledge thereof. The making or announcement of the award would be relevant only in relation to the persons who were present at the time of the award, but such a date would be inconsequential for the persons who were not present on that date. For them, it will be the date on which the award was actually communicated to them or the date on which they have knowledge about the essential ingredients of the award whether actual or constructive. Thus it is not intimation alone of the award to the land owners or interested person but the essential requirements of fairplay and natural justice is that the date of Collector's award used in the proviso should mean the date on which the award is known by the parties either actually or constructively. The language of the proviso cannot be given a literal or mechanical meaning. The date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office. Important feature of this aspect is that applicant must know the contents of the award which are material for him to take further steps in accordance with law. A person who has not accepted the award and has received the compensation under protest would be able to take effective recourse to the provisions of section 18 of the Act praying for a reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction for enhancement of the awarded compensation only if he is aware about the extent of compensation, the extent of land and the number as well as the market value of the land determined there under. These basis would constitute a complete cause of action for an applicant desirous of invoking the provision of section 18 of the Act and subject to the conditions stipulated in law. Filing of an application within time is a sine qua none for its entertainment by the Collector in terms of the provisions of the statute. As the Collector is discharging its statutory functions he is bound by the provisions of the statute. The Land Acquisition Act is a complete court in itself and does not permit for application of general principles of law and even of the Limitation Act by the Collector. The Collector in fact has no power to condone the delay. Thus essentially he would have to reject an application which is beyond the prescribed period of limitation as per the provisions of section 18 of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and ors. (1996) 9 SCC 414 held in unambiguous term that the Act clearly makes a distinction between the Collector and the Court. This dichotomy cannot be loose sight of and the Land Acquisition Collector has no power to condone the delay.
11. Earlier the view taken by some of the High Courts was that mere intimation of the award would be sufficient and the prescribed period of limitation of six months would commence from that date, when the award was announced and mere intimation was sent to the claimant. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, this view cannot be regarded as correct law. The most fair and reasonable construction of this proviso would be the date of knowledge of contents of the award which would be sufficient to enable the applicant to pursue his remedy like a common prudent man and in accordance with law. Unlike other proviso to section, sources of information or knowledge would not be a material consideration. It is the ultimate provided by the legislature for preferring an application under section 18 of the Act. In other cases, it would be within six weeks from the date of receipt of notice by the claimant under section 12(2) and in the event of the party being present at the time of announcement of the award within six weeks from the Collector's award. In no event, the Collector would have jurisdiction to entertain and make a reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction under section 18 of the Act in excess of six months from the date of Collector's award. In other words, within six months from the date, the party had constructed and/or actual knowledge or information of the award in regard to its essential features. The last part of the second proviso has not defined the word "Collector's Award" and this would have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case but in view of the principle aforestated. Once the award has been made and the party has knowledge about its ingredients, the time limit on a realistic interpretation would commence from that date and has expired on lapse of six months. Prohibition of limitation in a statute is normally to be construed strictly and the equitable or ethical consideration would not normally be with the courts in giving it totally a liberal interpretation so as to wipe out the very effect of the limitation clause.
12. Reliance placed by the petitioners upon the judgments of the Supreme Court afore-referred is certainly well founded. It is a settled principle that the knowledge must relate to essential contents of the award and not merely the information that the Collector has passed the award. It will be necessary for us to refer to the relevant dictum of the supreme Court in this regard. In the case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra), the Court held as under :-
"The award made by the Collector under section 12 is, in a sence, a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceedings is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case, it is on the amount thus determined prejudicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or after made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for acceptance. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office, it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively."
13. This principle was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst.Quiser Jehan Begum (supra) with further expansion to the word `knowledge and/or information of the award' and clearly interpreting the expression `six months from the date of Collector's award, the Court held as under :-
(5) As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra). It was there observed that a liberal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award: occurring in the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression.... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676 :(AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S.12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award."
14. In the case of Bharat Chand Dilwali v. UOI 1988, Rajdhani Law Reporter 224 as well as a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in the case of Rsulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji v. H.P. Rathod 3rd Spl Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmd and Anr. 1975 (16) Gujrat Law Reporter 911 took the view that mere knowledge of the award or taking part in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act would not be helpful for holding that limitation had commenced from such a date. For this purpose, the date would be when either the award was communicated to the party actually or he had knowledge of essential contents of the award actually or constructively.
15. Now we would apply to the above well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case. In this regard, at the very outset, we may also notice that complete and correct facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners in these petitions. The award was announced on 19th June, 1992 and possession of the property in question was taken on 25th January, 2000. The claimants were obviously fully aware about the acquisition proceedings and they filed the application for receiving of compensation on 23rd June, 2001. In this application reference was made to the essential features including the number of the award. In regard to amount of compensation payable to the petitioners they had specified definite figures in the indemnity bonds and other documents annexed with the applications or filed subsequent thereto. The indemnity bond and surety bonds and other documents were filed by Bale Ram on 3rd December 2001 while the application was filed on 23rd March, 2001. These documents clearly show that the petitioners had complete and full knowledge and information about the passing of the award and essential contents thereof for the purposes of upholding their remedy under section 18 of the Act in accordance with law. The limitation for filing an application by the petitioner under section 18 thus would commence at best from 23rd March, 2001 and even if any liberal attitude, which is not called for, is given to the petitioners, then the limitation would commence from 3rd December, 2001 and would expire on 23rd September, 2001 and 3rd June, 2001 while admittedly the application under section 18 of the Act was filed on 30th May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Msmt. Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra) had granted relief to the petitioner because their Lordships of the Supreme Court as a finding of fact held that the claimants had no knowledge of the contents of the award and did not know the amount of compensation which have been awarded. This judgment, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners as they themselves had submitted all necessary documents for payment of compensation including all essential contents required for that purpose.
17. We may also notice here that the claimants filed application for payment of compensation and received the same without protest in the surety and indemnity bonds submitted by them before the authorities. It is nowhere stated that they were receiving the compensation under protest or without prejudice to their rights. However, in the applications submitted by them under section 18 of the Act in 2002, it is stated " that the petitioner had not accepted the market value of the Land Acquisition Collector and other contents of the award". The payment admittedly was received by them on 15th April, 2002 in pursuance to the documents and applications submitted without protest in March, 2001. In light of the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and Ors. JT 1997 (5) SC 123, it is held that the claimants having received the payment without protest; reference which was barred by limitation was also without jurisdiction, both the petitioners had submitted similar applications and similar documents and thus application under section 18 of the Act would also be not maintainable in addition to the fact that it is barred by limitation.
18. Argo, for the reasons aforerecorded, we find no merit in these petitions and the same are dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.