Allahabad High Court
Ajit Kumar Roy vs Union Of India And 3 Others on 2 July, 2024
Author: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
Bench: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ? Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:106703-DB Court No. - 29 Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 315 of 2024 Appellant :- Ajit Kumar Roy Respondent :- Union Of India And 3 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Shatrughan Sonwal,Shivendu Ojha,Sr. Advocate Counsel for Respondent :- Arvind Singh,Siddharth Khare Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.
Hon'ble Prashant Kumar,J.
Order on Delay Condonation Application
1. For the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application, the delay is condoned and application is allowed, accordingly.
2. Present special appeal is treated to have been filed well within the time.
3. Office is directed to allot regular number to the appeal.
Order on Special Appeal
4. Heard Sri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Shivendu Ojha, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner; Sri Arvind Singh, learned counsel for Union of India and Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent nos.2 to 4.
5. Present intra-court appeal is preferred questioning the validity of judgment and order dated 26.02.2024 passed in Writ-A No.265 of 2015 (Ajit Kumar Roy Vs. Union of India and 3 others) by which learned Single Judge of this Court has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition. The operative portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"........6. Court after considering in detail, has held that petitioner could not demonstrate a single person junior to him, who has been promoted on the post of Head Clerk and ultimately accepting the preliminary objection raised by the respondents, writ petition was disposed of with direction to concerned department to decide the representation of the petitioner. In compliance of the said order, representation of the petitioner was decided on 28.10.2014.
7. I have also perused the impugned order dated 17.09.2010. Petitioner has filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30203 of 2010 before this Court for expunction of adverse entries, which was disposed of vide order dated 24.05.2010 with liberty to petitioner to file representation. The representation of the petitioner has been decided vide impugned order dated 17.09.2010 without granting any relief to the petitioner, which he may challenge by way of amendment application in Writ A No. 58427 of 2008 as it was pending at the time of issuance of impugned order dated 17.09.2010, but same has never been challenged. Now, during the pendency of present petition, by way of amendment application, same has been challenged.
8. There is inordinate delay in challenging the order dated 17.09.2010, but in the amendment application, nothing has been explained about the laches for challenging the order in the year 2020 in present writ petition. Therefore, without explanation of delay while challenging the order dated 17.09.2010, no relief can be granted to petitioner by entertaining the writ petition against the impugned order dated 17.09.2010. Accordingly, relief (iA) i.e. writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 17.09.2010 can not be granted on the ground of laches.
9. Now, coming to second order dated 28.10.2014, order is speaking & reasoned and being confronted by the Court, petitioner could not point out any ground as to how order dated 28.10.2014 is bad. Even, Court repeatedly asked him about the ground of challenge, but petitioner continuously talking about some seniority list and non grant of MACP without raising any ground for challenge.
10. From the perusal of impugned order, it is clear that petitioner was considered thrice for grant of promotion by Departmental Promotion Committee and was not found fit on the ground of adverse entries. Further, adverse remarks against the petitioner have been affirmed by impugned order dated 17.09.2010, which has never been challenged. In present writ petition, order dated 17.09.2010 is challenged, but this Court has declined to grant any relief.
11. Once, it is undisputed that till date, adverse entries so awarded to petitioner has not been reversed or quashed by any competent authority, this Court find no illegality in rejection of promotion and other consequential reliefs. Therefore, preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is having substance.
12. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs."
6. It appears from the record that the appellant-petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) after due selection by the Competent Authority/Director, Inland Waterways Authority of India (in short "Authority") on 12.10.1987. His services are governed by Inland Waterways Authority of India Service Rules, 1992 (in short "Rules, 1992"). The seniority list of LDC was published on 01.07.1996, wherein petitioner's name found place at serial no.1. It was initially alleged that juniors to the petitioner had been promoted on the next post i.e. Upper Division Clerk (UDC) in the year 2002 and the petitioner was discriminated. As such, he moved various representations to the competent authority with a request for according him promotion as UDC w.e.f. 11.10.1992 as well as for according benefits of Modified Assured Career Progession Scheme (MACPs) for Central Government Civilian Employees 2009 as per pay grade applicable and commensurate to the said post. Once he was not reprieved, he preferred Writ-A No.58427 of 2008 (Ajit Kumar Roy vs. Union of India and others) for a direction to the respondents to accord promotion on the post of UDA since 12.10.1992; thereafter, to grant subsequent promotion on the post of Head Clerk/Assistant on 12.10.1997 after completion of five years of service and further promote him to the post of Section Officer on 12.10.2005 after completion of further eight years. Finally, the aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by learned Single Judge on 15.4.2014 with following observations:-
"From the prayer as set out in the writ petition, it is clear that the writ petition was instituted in the year 2008 in respect of a cause of action which accrued way back in 1992 so far as the promotion on the post of U.D.C. is concerned. Likewise, on the post of Head Clerk the cause of action, if any , would have accrued in the year 1997.
As regards the grievance with regard to prayer for promotion on the post of Upper Division Clerk and also on the post of Head Clerk, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show as to whether any junior person to him was promoted by over looking his claim. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a seniority list of Lower Division Clerks issued on 1.7.1996 according to which no person below his name , has been promoted on the post of Upper Division Clerk. It is not made out as to who are the junior persons to the petitioner promoted on the post of Upper Division Clerk in 1992 giving rise to a cause of action in favour of the petitioner and in respect of whom the petitioner has been making representations ever since 1993.
Once the grievance as regard promotion to the higher posts is not clearly made out on the basis of any admissible evidence, the right of consideration of the petitioner is incapable of being looked into by this Court.
The objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of laches has also force and deserves acceptance in absence of any suitable explanation.
Notwithstanding the observations made herein above, the petitioner may raise his grievance before the authority concerned by filing a representation, if any such representation is made, the same may be looked into by the respondent no.2 and decided preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him."
7. It transpires from the record that later on vide order dated 28.5.2014 the petitioner was promoted and transferred on the post of UDC at Chennai Sub Office, where he joined under protest on 26.6.2014. Subsequently, the Authority had rejected the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 28.10.2014, which was challenged in the writ petition in question viz. Writ-A No.265 of 2015, wherein he had not only prayed for quashing the order dated 28.10.2014 but also to accord promotion on the post of UDC since 12.10.1992 and thereafter subsequent promotion as Head Clerk/ Assistant w.e.f. 12.10.1997. Learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 26.2.2024 had dismissed the writ petition with aforequoted observations.
8. Sri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner-appellant has vehemently contended that since very beginning the petitioner-appellant is discriminated in the department and he was liable to be accorded promotion on the post of UDC and after satisfactory service he was liable to be accorded promotion as Head Clerk from 1997. He submits that ground of delay and laches had been considered by learned Single Judge while disposing of the Writ Petition No.58427 of 2008 on 15.4.2014 and relegated the matter to the Authority but in most arbitrary manner instead of deciding the claim set up by the petitioner on merit, the same was rejected in arbitrary manner without any cogent reason. Such situation again impelled the petitioner to agitate his grievance as other similarly situated employees in the Authority were accorded benefits but the petitioner appellant was denied the said benefit. The claim cannot be negated merely on the ground of laches.
9. He further submits that in the midst of the proceeding before learned Single Judge in the second round of litigation the petitioner-appellant had moved an amendment application on 27.2.2020, wherein he had challenged the legality of the order dated 17.9.2010 passed by the Authority with certain other grounds. Once the learned Single Judge had allowed the Amendment Application No.37 of 2020 vide order dated 9.11.2020, in such situation, the delay, if any, was already condoned by learned Single Judge and the petitioner-appellant had every right to question the validity of the order dated 17.9.2010 passed by the Authority. He submits that instead of considering the illegality in the order dated 17.9.2010, learned Single Judge has utterly failed to appreciate the correct fact and also failed to adjudicate whether the Authority has rightly passed the order dated 17.9.2010 or not, while negating the rights of the petitioner. He submits that learned Single Judge has erred in law as on one hand he had allowed the amendment application and on the other hand has held that the order dated 17.9.2010 qua adverse remarks has never been challenged well within time and as such no relief could be accorded. He submits that on the face of record there is infirmity in the order passed by learned Single Judge and as such the same is liable to be set aside and the claim of the petitioner is liable to be entertained on merit.
10. Per contra, Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the Special Appeal and placed reliance on the proceedings of the Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as 'DPC'), which was constituted to consider the promotion on 17.12.1998, which is appended at page 158 of the paper book, wherein on the basis of performance as recorded in their respective dossiers for the last five years, the DPC had rejected the claim of the appellant-petitioner for promotion with note 'not yet fit'. Later on, the DPC had also considered the claim of the promotion of the appellant-petitioner on 29.03.2001 on the basis of performance as reflected in the respective ACRs for the last five years and certain observations were made, which is as under:-
"Deferred. His ACRs for the year 1998-99 and 1999-2000 contain adverse remarks which are considered to be of sufficient gravity to influence the DPC's assessment. The adverse remarks have not been communicated to him. The DPC also observed that the instructions relating to filling up the 'integrity column' in these ACRs have not been followed. DPC recommends that the adverse remarks be communicated to Shri Roy and his representation, if received, be disposed off within three months and the case be again referred to DPC for making its assessment and necessary action in view of the criminal case pending against him."
11. Sri Khare further submits that the Committee had considered the ACRs of the appellant-petitioner for the last five years and the ACRs of the appellant-petitioner for the years 1998-99 and 1999-2000 contained adverse remarks, which were considered to be of a sufficient gravity to influence the DPC's assessment. As the adverse remark of 2001 was not communicated to the appellant-petitioner. The DPC also observed that the instructions relating to filing up "integrity column" in these ACRs have not been followed. DPC recommends that the adverse remarks be communicated to appellant-petitioner and his representation, if received be disposed off within three months and the case be again referred to DPC for making its assessment and necessary action in view of the criminal case pending against him. Thereafter, the same has been considered by the DPC on 12-09-2002 and observed as follows:-
"The DPC consisting of Shri S.Jayaraman, CAO and Shri K.S. Rao, Assistant Secretary met on 12-09-2002 in terms of office no.2-IWAI/Estt/57/92 pt Dated 5.9.02. The D.P.C. was informed that one vacancy of UDC was available which is a resultant vacancy caused due to promotion of Shri Shiv Bachan Chaudhary, UDC to the post of Head Clerk at Patna. As per the post based roaster is required to be filled by the general candidate DPC was also informed that no disciplinary and vigilance case either pending or contemplated against any of the eligible LDCs except Shri Ajit Kumar Roy against whom a criminal case under Section 392 of IPC filed by Farakka police in the court of SDGM, Jangipur, West Bengal is pending.
Based on the performance as depicted in the respective ACRs for the preceding five years the DPC recommends that the case of of the senior most LDC in the eligible LDC list Shri Ajit Kumar Roy is deferred to the criminal case under Section 392 of IPC is pending against him besides the DPC has also noticed the adverse remarks in his ACR for the year 1998-99 and 99-2000 and subsequent act thereon is recommended.
The DPC after assessing the ACR of the next candidate Shri Jagbir Singh, recommends that Shri Jagbir Sinch is fit for promotion to the post of UDC."
12. In this background, Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the respondents submits that both the aforesaid orders have not been assailed by the appellant-petitioner till date and for all practical purposes, the same have attained finality. The adverse remarks, which were considered at the time of DPC, undisputedly have never been assailed. He further submits that the order dated 17-09-2010, which is assailed through an amendment application, was only an order passed by the Inland Waterways Authority of India in response to the High Court's order dated 24-05-2010 passed in Writ-A No.30302 of 2010, wherein the petitioner has prayed for expunction of an adverse remarks from his ACRs. After considering the detail of previous ACRs the authority had rejected the representation of the petitioner. He submits that in this background learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence, which warrants no interference in the matter.
13. Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the respondents lastly apprised the Court that the appellant-petitioner was accorded promotion as UDA in the month of May, 2014 and later on, also accorded next promotion as Assistant/S.O. in the month of December, 2023. He submits that in absence of any serious challenge to the recommendations of DPC, at this belated stage any challenge to the same is also unsustainable, the appeal is liable to be rejected.
14. Heard rival submissions and perused the record.
15. We find that in earlier round of litigation learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition vide order dated 15.4.2014 had observed that the writ petition was instituted with inordinate delay in the year 2008 in respect of a cause of action, which accrued way back in 1992, so far as the promotion on the post of UDC is concerned. It was also held that likewise, on the post of Head Clerk, the cause of action, if any, would have accrued in the year 1997. The case was set up before learned Single Judge that junior persons to the petitioner were promoted by overlooking the claim of the petitioner. Even though the writ petition was instituted with inordinate delay, learned Single Judge had considered the grievance with regard to prayer for promotion on the post of UDC and also on the post of Head Clerk. Learned Single Judge while considering the claim set up by the petitioner had held that the promotion to the higher post is clearly not made out on the basis of any admissible evidence, therefore, the right of consideration of the petitioner is incapable of being looked into by this Court. However, leave was accorded to the petitioner to press the representation before the respondent no.2.
16. In response to the aforesaid order, the claim of the petitioner was considered and rejected by the order, which is subject matter of challenge in the second round of litigation. It is admitted by the parties that the order dated 15.4.2014 has attained finality. We find that the appellant was appointed as an LDC in the department in October, 1987 and his ACRs for the year 1998-99 and 1999-2000 contain adverse remarks, which have been affirmed by the order dated 17.09.2010. The petitioner was not found fit for promotion on three previous occasions by the DPC based on the performance as reflected in his ACRs for the last five years. It is undisputed that both the adverse remarks have not been assailed by the petitioner and till date these adverse entries have not been reversed or quashed by any competent authority. Learned Single Judge has rightly considered the said aspect of the matter and asserted that at this belated stage, no challenge can be made to the order dated 17.09.2010 merely on the ground that the amendment application was allowed by the learned Single Judge previously.
17. It is well established principle of law that in old and stale cases the Court should not even pass an order directing the respondents to decide the representation and even if any representation is decided on such direction, still the said order will not give rise to any new cause of action.
18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedywere afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with 5 in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
19. In the case of C. Jacob V. Director of Geology and Mining and another (2008) 10 SCC 115 the Supreme Court has held that for the purposes of limitation the Court has to see as to when the original cause arose and in any case no fresh cause of action arise on the decision of the representation. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 14 read as under:
"9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
10. Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of acknowledgment of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
12........
13........
14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for "consideration". If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing "consideration" of such claims."
20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59 has held as under:
"15. When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliancewith a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches."
21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass reported in (2011) 4 SCC 374 has held as under :
"26. On the other hand, where only the affected parties approachthe court and relief is given to those parties, the fence-sitters who did not approach the court cannot claim that such relief should have been extended to them thereby upsetting or interfering with the rights which had accrued to others.
27. In Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, the appellants whowere general candidates belatedly challenged the promotion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates on the basisof the decisions in Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab, Union of India v. Virpal 13 Singh Chauhan and R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab and this Court refused to grant the relief saying: (Jagdish Lal case, SCC pp. 562-63, para 18) "18. ? this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to reiterate all the catena of precedents in this behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake up whenthey had the impetus from Virpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh ratios. But Virpal Chauhan and Sabharwal cases, kept at rest the promotion already made by that date, and declared them as valid; they were limited to the question of future promotions given by applying the rule of reservation to all the persons prior to the date of judgment in Sabharwal case which required to be examined in the light of the law laid in Sabharwal case. Thus earlier promotions cannot be reopened. Only those cases arising after that date would be examined in the light of the law laid down in Sabharwal case and Virpal Chauhan case and equally Ajit Singh case. If the candidate has already been further promoted to the higher echelons of service, his seniority is not open to be reviewed. In A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh case a Bench of two Judges to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ. were members, had reiterated the above view and it was also held that all the prior promotions are not open to judicial review. In Chander Pal v. State of Haryana a Bench of two Judges consisting of S.C. Agrawal and G.T. Nanavati, JJ. considered the effect of Virpal Chauhan, Ajit Singh, Sabharwal and A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh cases and held that the seniority of those respondents who had already retired or had been promoted to higher posts could not be disturbed. The seniority of the petitioner therein 14 and the respondents who were holding the post in the same level or in the same cadre would be adjusted keeping in viewthe ratio in Virpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh; but promotion, if any, had been given to any of them during the pendencyof this writ petition was directed not to be disturbed."
22. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Chaman Rana reported in (2018) 5 SCC 798 has held as under:-
"10. Mere repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for grant of relief, was considered in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. Kasbekar [Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. Kasbekar, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 64 : AIR 1954 Bom 202] , by Chagla, C.J. observing as follows: (SCC OnLine Bom : AIR p. 203, para 2) "2. ? Now, we have had occasion to point out that the only delay which this Court will excuse in presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extra-legal or extra-judicial. Once the final decision of the Government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not 19 pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner."
23. After considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and upon perusing the impugned judgment and order, we notice that there is inordinate delay in challenging the order dated 17.09.2010 and no satisfactory explanation is furnished before us to justify such inordinate delay in approaching the writ court. In an Intra-Court Special Appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order, we do not notice any such palpable infirmity or perversity. As such, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order.
24. The appeal fails, and is, accordingly dismissed with no order as to the costs.
Order Date :- 2.7.2024 pks