Patna High Court
Amar Singh Yadav And Anr. vs Shanti Devi And Ors. on 22 September, 1986
Equivalent citations: AIR1987PAT191, 1987(35)BLJR351, (1990) 1 LJR 59, AIR 1987 PATNA 191, 1987 BLJR 351, (1987) PAT LJR 184
Author: N.P. Singh
Bench: N.P. Singh
JUDGMENT S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.
1. The meaningful and somewhat intricate questions, which emerge for adjudication in this reference to the Full Bench, merit formulation in the terms following :
(1) Where there is a direct conflict betwixt two decisions of the Supreme Court, rendered by co-equal Benches, which of them should be followed by the High Court and the Court below ?
(2) Whether a person, who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer, can maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order I, Rule 10 of the Civil P.C., in the reference proceedings before the District Judge, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act ?
2. The long and chequered history of the litigation, giving rise to the question aforesaid, need not be recounted in meticulous detail It suffices to mention that this arises from the land acquisition proceedings for the construction of a fire brigade station in Patna City itself, commenced sometime in the late nineteen-sixties. Shanti Devi, Opposite Party No. 1, who is the awardee in the case, purchased the land from Anand Ballabh Prasad Yadav by a registered sale deed executed way back on the 27th of June, 1964. In the somewhat protracted and long drawn out acquisition proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer, ultimately the 21st of Sept., 1971, was fixed for the payment of compensation to the awardee Shanti Devi. This payment was sought to be obstructed by Anand Ballabh Prasad Yadav, who filed a petition before the Land Acquisition Officer, primarily purporting to allege that the registered sale deed in favour of Shanti Devi was a Farzi one and that he was fraudulently kept out of the picture in the acquisition proceedings. This petition was, however, rejected. Aggrieved thereby, another petition was moved before the Additional Collector on the 27th of Sept., 1971, which met the same fate and was dismissed on the 6th of Oct. 1971. It is alleged on behalf of opposite party Shanti Devi that Anand Ballabh Prasad then set up his two sons as petitioners and moved an application on the 15th of Oct., 1971 before the Land Acquisition Officer claiming the identical relief. However, these petitions were also rejected in default on the 10th of Jan., 1972. On the 12th of Jan., 1972, payment of compensation money was made to the awardee Shanti Devi after obtaining an indemnity bond.
3. Meanwhile Rajendra Ballabh Prasad had moved a petition dated the 18th of July, 1969 before the Additional Collector, Patna, claiming to be the actual owner of the land and as such entitled to the payment of the compensation money. It seems that delays were endemic in the proceedings and it was not till six years later that the Additional Collector by his order dated the 15th of May, 1975 directed a case to be referred to under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act') to the Special. Land Acquisition Judge. It is unnecessary to advert to every detail of what has been earlier described as the long and chequered history of this litigation and in this context it would suffice that it was common ground before us that the parties meanwhile had intermittently attempted to carry the proceedings to the High Court as well.
4. In the pending reference proceedings before the Special Land Acquisition Judge, Patna, petitioners Amar Singh Yadav and Ajay Singh Yadav, sons of Anand Ballabh Yadav, preferred a petition under Order I, Rule 10 of the Civil P.C. (hereinafter called the 'Code') for being impleaded as a party. Later -- on the 10th of June, 1981 -- a similar petition and prayer was made on behalf of Anand Ballabh Prasad as well. The learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, Patna, by his exhaustive impugned order dated the 23rd of Jan., 1982, referred to the line of precedent in the Andhra Pradesh and the Calcutta High Courts and placed basic reliance on the Division Bench judgment in State of Bihar v.
Parsufam Prasad Verma, AIR 1977 Pat 78.
Therein it has been held that a person, who has not been a party before the Land Acquisition Officer and has not got a reference made therefrom, cannot be added as a party under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code in the reference proceedings before the Special Land Acquisition Judge. Consequently, both the applications were rejected.
5. Aggrieved thereby, the present civil revision has been preferred. It originally came up for hearing before a Division Bench constituted by my learned brothers N.P. Singh, J., and M.P. Varma, J. Before them the extreme proposition that a person, who was not a party to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer, can never be allowed to be impleaded in the reference proceedings before the Land Acquisition Judge and, indeed, Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code was wholly inapplicable in the context, was seriously assailed. Noticing the significance of the question and the conflict of precedent and casting some doubt on the view in State of Bihar v. Parsuram Prasad Verma (supra) the matter was referred to the larger Bench.
6. In course of argument it became common ground before us that the solitary question suggested in the reference was somewhat restricted and the real and meaningful issues which necessarily emerged for adjudication were those which have already been formulated at the very outset Equally, it was the common prayer that considering the protracted litigation and delay in the disposal of this civil revision, the case be also disposed of on merits.
7. The threshold question, pointedly raised on behalf of the respondents as virtually a primary objection was that any person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer was not a 'person interested' within the meaning of Section 18(1) and consequently was inherently ineligible to be impleaded as a , party before the District Judge. Primal reliance for this stand was taken on a long line of precedent in the Andhra Pradesh, in Mohammad Ibrahim Sahib v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 226; Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 305, culminating in the Full Bench judgment in A. P. Agricultural University v. Mohmoodinissa Begum, AIR 1976 Andh Pra 134. Support was also sought to be derived from the short order in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulat Shamaldas Patel, (1970) 1 SCWR 183.
8. It appears to me that in examining the aforesaid stand, it would now be wasteful to digress into an exhaustive discussion on principle. Undoubtedly, there is earlier a sharp divergence of judicial opinion on the issue, and the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the respondents lend a considerable hand to the stand taken by them. However, the authority and the weight thereof now stands considerably eroded if not altogether obliterated by the decision of the Final Court in Himalaya Tiles arid Marble (Private) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo, AIR 1980 SC 1118, to which detailed reference necessarily follows. Therefore, it would suffice to briefly advert to the statutory provisions and the principle involved before evaluating the effect of the precedent covering the issue.
9. Inevitably, the controversy herein revolved around the language of the statute and the relevant provisions of Sections 3, 18 and 20 may, therefore, be read at the very outset;
"3(b) the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land, if he is interested in an easement affecting the land."
"18. Reference to Court-- (1) Any person interested, who has not accepted the award, may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested."
"20. Service of Notice-- The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely :
XX XX XX
(b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded:-
XX XX X"
10. Now the plain language of Section 3(b) would indicate that it is sought to be couched in wide terms. But, at the out set, it deserves highlighting that this is an inclusive definition and in no way cuts into the larger connotation of the expression "person interested". It includes within its sweep all persons claiming any interest in the compensation to be made. Not only that, the law extends it by a deeming fiction to persons who have even an interest in the easement affecting such a land. There appears to be now little doubt, in view of the binding precedent that the definition of "person interested" in Section 3(b), as also the use of the phrase in Section 18(1) and Section 20 of the Act, are to be liberally construed. Therefore, on principle, the true test herein is whether a person comes within the wide sweep of the definition of a "person interrested" and not necessarily the question whether or not he had missed to be a party or to put in appearance before the Land Acquisition Officer. The solitary fact that a person did not appear before the Land Acquisition) Officer is thus not wholly conclusive.
11. The view aforesaid is then buttressed by precedent. A reference in this connection may first be made to M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.), (1967) 1 Mad LJ 329, wherein Venkatadri, J., interpreting the definition of "person interested" observed as follows : --
"The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the petitioner is a person interested, as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The definition section says that the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. The expression 'person interested' is very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an exhaustive definition. The expression 'person interested' has been interpreted by various Courts, and, the trend of the opinion seems to be that I should give a liberal interpretation.
On a review of the case-law on the subject, it seems to me that the expression 'person interested' does not require that a person must really have an interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the property sought to be acquired. As long as a person claims an interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within the meaning of the definition of the expression."
The aforesaid view has been approved and reiterated by their Lordships in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P.) Ltd., (AIR 1980 SC 1118) (supra). The facts therein deserve somewhat pointed notice. Therein the appellant-Company had moved the Government for acquiring additional land for the purpose of its existing factory and, accordingly, notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were duly issued and the proceeding culminated in an award under Section 12 of the Act. This acquisition was challenged by some of the land owners by way of a writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that the land was not required for any public purpose, as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act, and the Government was not competent to acquire the same for the purpose of a Company, which could not be said to be a 'public purpose'. In this writ petition, the appellant-Company was impleaded as a party, though expressly no relief was claimed against him. The learned single Judge, before whom the matter came initially, quashed the acquisition proceedings. The appellant Company then preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. Therein an objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that the appellant-Company had no locus standi to maintain the Letters Patent Appeal. This objection was upheld by the Letters Patent Bench in Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Private) Limited v. Francis V. Coutinbo, AIR 1971 Bom 341 primarily on the ground that the appellant Company, as such, was npt a 'person interested' within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the Company appealed to the Supreme Court.
12. Now a reference to the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court makes it plain that the primal question that was agitated before them was with regard to the scope and width of the phrase 'person interested' employed in the statute. After examining the issue, the principle, the statutory provisions and the precedent, it was concluded as under :--
"It seems to us that the definition of a 'person interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government, Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all."
And, again, in Para 13 : --
"Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital T For holding as above, their Lordships approved the earlier view in Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas, (1968) 1 SCR 362 : (AIR 1968 SC 366), Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries. Limited v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 Punj and Har 59, Comilla Electric Supply Limited v. East Bengal Bank Limited Comilla, AIR 1939 Cal 669 and M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar, (1967) 1 Mad LJ 329.
13. Now, faced with the aforesaid stonewall of precedents against them, and, in particular what appear to me as the binding observations of the Final Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Limited, (AIR 1980 SC 1118) (supra), learned Counsel for the respondents launched a shrewed counter attack. They placed in the forefront the order of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, (1970-1 SCWR 183) (supra). Relying heavily on the isolated and solitary observation in the order, learned Counsel for the respondents had forcefully contended that the judgment of their Lordships in the Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Limited, (AIR 1971 Bom 341) (supra) had failed to notice the earlier binding precedent in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) and, therefore, it must be assumed that they did not intend to deviate from the law as declared in the earlier case. With great vehemence it was contended that in face of the direct conflict, the earlier view, which had not been noticed and was not expressly dissented from, must necessarily have the pride of place. On the other hand, Mr. Rama Kant Varma, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has contended that the more elaborate and exhaustive enunciation of the law, which has been rendered in the Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Limited (supra) must necessarily be followed in preference to the earlier view.
14. To appreciate the rival contentions, one may hearken back to the short order in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, (1971) 3 SCC 821. In a recent Full Bench of this Court in Commr. of Income-tax v. Sheo Kumari Debi, (1986) 157 ITR 13 : (1986 Tax LR 633) it has been observed that a mere interlocutory order, without notice to the other side and without a considered discussion of the rival issues involved, is not necessarily a judgment as contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution. But that apart, it seems to be plain that in the case of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra), a short order was recorded whilst upholding a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal or otherwise. Their Lordships observed that the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, for whose benefit the land had been acquired, could not maintain an appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court setting aside that notification. It is evident from the brief order that the matter was disposed of at the very threshold, without any reference to either principle or adverting to any authority. The summary disposal of the issue is evident, from the undermentioned total discussion on the point: --
"The Municipal Corporation was; impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court, but no relief was claimed against the Municipal Corporation. The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially the grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld, but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has, which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent."
15. In fairness to the learned Counsel for the respondents, it must be said that the aforesaid observation indicates that there isa direct conflict on this point herein with the ratio in the Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Limited, (AIR 1980 SC 1118) (supra). However, both the judgments have been rendered by a Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges and cannot possibly be reconciled. This situation at once brings to the fore the somewhat intricate question posed at the outset, which has come to be of not infrequent occurrence, namely, when there is a direct conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court, rendered by co-equal Benches which of them should be followed by the High Courts and the Courts below.
16. Now the contention strongly urged on behalf of the respondents that the earlier judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have preeminence, irrespective of any other consideration, because the latter one has missed notice thereof, does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior Courts are of co-equal Benches, and, therefore, a matching authority, then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rational and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstance of the timeand date on which they were rendered. Equally, the fact that the subsequent judgment failed to take notice of the earlier one or any presumption that a deviation therefrom could not be intended, cannot possibly be conclusive. Vital issues, pertaining to the vital questions of the certainty and uniformity of the law, cannot be scuttled by such legal sophistry. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority exist, then both of them cannot be binding on the Courts below. A choice, however difficult it may be, has to be made in such a situation and the date cannot be the guide. However, on principle, it appears to me, that the High Court must in this context follow the judgment, which would appear to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time, whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the superior Court are earlier or later, and whether the later one missed consideration of the earlier, are matters which appear to me as hardly relevant, and, in any case, not conclusive.
17. The view I am inclined to take has the support of the high authority of Jessel M. R. in Hampton v. Holman, (1877) 5 Ch D 183. Therein also the learned Master of the Rolls was faced with the difficult task of choosing between the two decisions of equal authority, which were directly in conflict with each other. He observed as follows : --
"Now I take it that both the cases to which I have referred are not to be reconciled with Hayes v. Hayes, (1828) 38 ER 822 at all events, they differ from it so far as to leave me at liberty now to say that Hayes v. Hayes is not sound law; indeed it appears that Sir John Leach himself was dissatisfied with his decision."
Again in Miles v. Jarvis, (1883) 24 Ch D 633, Kay, J., was similarly faced with two judgments of equal weight which were in conflict. He observed as follows :--
".......... The question is which of these two decisions 1 should follow, and, itseems to me that 1 ought to follow that of the Master of the Rolls as beingthe better in point of law."
Reference in this context may in particular be made to the celebrated case of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) KB 718. Therein, in a similar context of the Court of appeal being bound by its previous decisions, it was held that it was not only entitled but indeed duty bound to decide which of the two conflicting decisions of its own will it follow in case of a clear divergence of the opinion in the earlier precedents.
18. I am not unaware that in Govindnaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Company Limited, AIR 1980 Kant92, a narrowly divided Full Bench has taken the view, by majority of three : two, that in such a situation, the later of the two decisions should be followed. A perusal of the judgment would, however, show that, in fact, there were two questions firmly posed before the Full Bench -- firstly that where there was a conflict of two decisions of the Supreme Court of unequal Benches, which one is to be followed and, secondly, when these decisions are of co-equal Benches, then which decision is to be followed. It seems somewhat patent that the majority view adverted to the first of the two questions alone, and, there does not appear to be any discussion whatsoever on the second question. The minority decision, however, while agreeing with the majority view on the first question, adverted to the second question and considered the matter in detail, concluding as follows : --
".....It seems to us, therefore, the High Court would be well advised to consider which of two conflicting decisions it will follow in the interest of the administration of justice and it ought to follow that which is better in point of law than in point of time."
With great respect, I am inclined to wholly agree with the aforesaid view of the minority and it bears repetition that the majority view does not seem to have even adverted to this question in essence.
19. It is also necessary to advert to a note of discordance in the Allahabad High Court. It would appear that entirely as an ancillary and insignificant issue, some conflict of two Supreme Court judgments was noticed in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate (Tribunal), U.P., Lucknow, AIR 1977 All 1. Without even remotely going into the matter and far from there being any discussion on either principle or precedent, the Bench made the following passing observations: --
"It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's decision in Mysore State Transport Corporation, (AIR 1974 SC 1940) is later in time. Even if there in some conflict in the two Supreme Court decisions, we have to follow the law as declared in the later case of Mysore State Transport Corporation."
However, in the later Full Bench, in Gopal Krishna Indley v. 5th Add). District Judge, Kanpur, AIR 1981 All 300, it appears that the question before us was pointedly raised. Learned Counsel relied upon Miles v. Jarvis, (1883) 24 Ch D 633, and Baker v. White, (1877) 5 Ch D 183 (sic). The Full Bench, however, did not consider the question on the ground that they were bound by the earlier Full Bench decision in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. (supra). It was observed as follows :--
"We do not wish to express opinion on this aspect of the matter. We would only content ourselves by saying that since we are bound by the latter decision of the Supreme Court, we must follow the same. To us, it appears that the latter decision has impliedly overruled the earlier."
It would be somewhat patent from the above that there has been no meaningful consideration of this significant issue in the Allahabad decision, and, with the deepest deference, I would wish to record my dissent therewith.
20. I am not unmindful of the legal aphorism that a living authority is not to be quoted. Yet, because of the eminence, Mr. Seervai's authoritative Constitutional Law of India already achieved, it is necessary to notice his opinion in this context, in the latest edition of that work at page 2244 (Third Edn.).
"But judgments of the Supreme Court, which cannot stand together, present a serious problem to the High Courts and to the subordinate Courts. It is submitted that in such situations, the correct thing is to follow that judgment which appears to the Court to state the law accurately, or more accurately than the other conflicting judgment."
21. Yet again, it appears to me that the tenuous theory of pre-eminence by time alone in judicial precedent has now been conclusively exploded. As a matter of recent legal history, it may be recalled that it was earlier advocated that the latest judgment of the Final Court must be followed irrespective of the fact whether it was rendered by larger or smaller Bench. It was so held in A.J. Aramha v. Mysore Road Transport Corporation, (1974) 1 Kant LJ 344. Such a view now stands overruled by the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radheylal, AIR 1974 SC 1596. Therein the Court was itself faced with two directly contradictory judgments. Bhagwati, J., (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench, in following the earlier judgment in preference to the later one, observed as follows :--
"Now there can be no doubt that these observations made in Smt. Kamla Soni's case, (1969-2 SCWR 679) are plainly in contradiction of what was said by this Court earlier in Sarvate T.B.'s case, 1965 MPLJ 26 (SC). It is obvious that the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case was not brought to the notice of the Court, while deciding Smt. Kamla Soni's case, or else this Court would not have landed itself in such patent contradiction. But , whatever be the reason, it cannot be gainsaid that it is not possible to reconcile the observations in these two decisions. That being so we must prefer to follow the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case as against the decision in Smt. Kamla Soni's case, as the former is a decision of a larger Bench than the latter. Moreover, on principle the view taken in Sarvate T.B.'s case commends itself to us and we think that that is the right view."
It seems manifest from the underlined observations above, that even in such a situation, their Lordships considered the principle and the correctness of the view to be not only a relevant, but virtually an overriding factor. Again in the Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian, AIR 1976 SC 2433, a similar issue arose and Mr. Justice M.H. Beg then held as follows : --
"But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger Benches of this Court in the manner in which it had done this. The proper course for High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger Benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller Benches of the court. That is the practice followed by this Court itself. The practice has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by this Court. If, however, the High Court was of opinion that the view expressed by larger Benches of this Court were not applicable to the facts of the instant case it should have said so giving reasons supporting its point of view."
In this Court, however, an earlier note of discordance also must be noticed. In Jamuna Rai v. Chandradip Rai, AIR 1961 Pat 178 the tenor of observation is to the contrary. It seems, however, plain that the same is no longer a good law, in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 (Para 10), and the above quoted observations in AIR 1976 SC 2433 (Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian with the greatest respect, the decision in Jamuna Raiv. Chandradip Rai, AIR 1967Pat 178 has, therefore, to be overruled,
22. From the aforesaid discussiohs it would be manifest that the theory of preeminence of a judgment by virtue of its time and the latest alone has now been conclusively laid to rest. In the present context also the anomalies inherent in such a rule would interestingly be highlighted, if one were to interchange the dates of the two judgments in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamladas Patel, (1970-1 SCWR 183) (supra). If the judgment in the .Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad had been delivered later, then on the time theory had to be followed, even though no intricate question of law had been considered, whilst disposing of a preliminary objection. With great respect, doing so, in my view, can hardly be justified and would tend to make a mockery of the theory of precedent, which is necessarily rested on the logic, reasoning and the ratio of a judgment.
23. I am more than amply conscious of the difficulties of making a choice between decisions of the superior court when they are in direct conflict with each other. But, such a duty can neither be skirted nor evaded. It was rightly and forcefully pointed out by Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All ER 155 that when a Judge comes up against such a truck, he is not to fold his hands and it is his duty to iron out the creases. Therefore, when such a divergence arises and the litigant's fortune depends thereon, the issue has to be frontally adjudicated upon. Obviously, in such a situation, it is not the province of the High Court or the subordinate court to comment on the judgment of the Supreme Court, which are patently entitled to respect. Its plain duty, in the interest of justice, is to respectfully follow that which appears to it to state the law accurately or, in any case more accurately than the other conflicting judgment. The view I am inclined to take is not only fortified, but in a way derived from the Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 213. It, perhaps, deserves highlighting that though on another point the learned Judges of the Full Bench differed but on this particular momentous issue there was an absolute unanimity. The subsequent Full Bench decision in Kulbhushan Kumar and Co. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 Punj & Har 55 is also in a way relevant and instructive.
23A. It is refreshing to notice that within the jurisdiction an identical view has" been taken in the recent Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. 29 of 1985 (Ram Krishna Mission Ashrama v. Amla Kama Choudhary) decided on 29th May, 1986. My learned Brother N.P. Singh, J., speaking for the Bench observed : --
"In the aforesaid background, I am of the view that it is open to this Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas, AIR 1968 SC 366 and Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P.) Ltd. v. F.V. Coutinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118. The result will be that it has to be held that the appeal filed on behalf of the appellant is maintainable and it cannot be dismissed on that ground."
24. To conclude on this aspect, it is held that where there is a direct conflict betwixt two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches, the High Court must follow that judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and accurately. The answer to question (1) posed at the outset is rendered in these terms.
25. Applying the aforesaid principle, I hold and, with great respect, prefer to follow the more elaborate and well reasoned judgment rendered in the Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Private) v. F.V. Coutinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118 in preference to the brief observations in the order in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, (1970-1 SCWR 183) (supra).
26. Once the issue of precedent is out of the way, then, in the light of the preceding discussions, it is to be held that the concept of the 'person interested' in the Land Acquisition Act, has to be construed somewhat widely and literally. The mere fact that a person or a party may not have been before the Land Acquisition Officer would not by itself conclusively bar and exclude him from the ambit of being a 'person interested.'
27. Though the petitioners succeed on the aforesaid preliminary threshold question, it would seem that this is a somewhat pyrrhic victory. A further hurdle remains in their way, namely, that even though the petitioners may well be within the ambit of being a 'person interested', the question still remains, whether, in the absence of any appearance before the Land Acquisition Officer, they can now barge in and claim to be a party before the District Judge in a proceeding arising entirely from a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, by the Land Acquisition Officer.
28. Now the core of the stand on behalf of the opposite parties is that any person, who was not before the Collector in the compensation proceedings and, therefore, could not have claimed a reference under Section 18, cannot later barge in as a party before the District Judge in the reference. It was the stand that the foundational base of the special proceeding before the District Judge is the reference made by the Collector and, in essence, is a continuation thereof and, consequently, a person who was not present before the Collector cannot later become an interloper in the proceeding. It was contended that irrespective of the fact of the applicability or otherwise of the provision of Order I, Rule 10 of the Civil P.C. such an outsider cannot just be allowed to intervene in the proceedings because of the special nature of the jurisdiction under the Act.
29. Inevitably the controversy herein will have to turn on the sections of the Act the relevant provisions whereof may be noticed . at the very outset-
"18. Reference to Court.-
(1) If any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken :
Provided that every such application shall be made :--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, Sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever, period shall first expire."
"19. Collector's statement to the Court.--(1) In making the reference the Collector shall state, for the information of the Court, in writing under his hand,--
(a).....
(b) the names of the persons whom he has reason to think interested in such land;
X XX (2) To the said statement shall be attached a schedule giving the particulars of the notices , served upon, and of the statements in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively."
"20. Service of notice.-- The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely :
(a).....
(b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the amount of compensation awarded;.....
X X X"
"21. Restriction on scope of proceedings. --The scope of the enquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection."
In construing the aforesaid provisions, one must hearken back to the authoritative pithy observation of their Lordships with regard to the very nature of this jurisdiction in (Raj) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 PC 64 :-
"Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the 'matter' referred, and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it."
The aforesaid enunciation undoubtedly lends the greatest weight to the stand taken by the opposite parties. Nevertheless it is necessary to take notice in somewhat greater detail of the aforequoted provisions. As an elementary proposition of construction it may be recalled that in the Act Section 18 has not to be construed in isolation but harmoniously with the other provisions which seem to impose and indeed completely control it. It is plain from the language of Section 18 itself that a reference is not to be claimed by any and everybody but only by a person interested who has not accepted the award. This necessarily implies that he was before the Collector in the proceedings under the Act. It is only such a person who must make a written application requiring that the matter may be referred to the Court and the nature of objections which are allowed to be raised is indicated in Sub-section (1) of Section 18 itself. Yet, again the statute requires that in the reference application the grounds on which the objections to the award are taken must be clearly indicated. Equally significant in this context is the prescription of a special limitation of six weeks or six months under Clauses (a) and (b) respectively in the proviso to Sub-section (2) for making such a reference application. Learned counsel for the opposite parties had forcefully argued that this special period of limitation is in order to prevent any one to come into the reference arena later and plainly the expeditious disposal of these matters is writ large, under this provision. Reference in this connection may be made to Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 wherein even though a liberal construction of Section 18(2) proviso (b) has been given, yet the judgment is patently an authority for the proposition that the limitation within which a reference application is to be made has to be adhered to.
30. It would thus appear that the very requirements of Section 18 are clearly indicative of the assumption that the person claiming a reference has been before the Collector and is a person interested who has 'not accepted the award and has specific objections to make with regard thereto.
31. Now apart from the above, a combined reading of Sections 19 and 20 is equally instructive. For making the reference the Collector is enjoined to indicate the name of the person who, he has reason to think, is interested in such land and shall also attach a schedule giving particular of the notices served upon and the statement in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively. This in a way is again a pointer to the fact that the parties before the Court are those which have been before the Collector whom he either thinks to be persons interested or who have already been duly served with notices in the proceeding. Yet again, the service of notice by Section 20 is enjoined only upon the applicant, the person interested in the objection, and the Collector, if necessary. On the basis of these provisions it was argued and, in my view rightly, that the Us before the Court is in a way confined to the person indicated in Sections 19 and 20 and rank outsiders cannot later trespass into the special jurisdiction on the plea of being persons interested despite the fact that they may have never chosen to appear before the Collector.
32. Particular reliance was placed on Section 21 which in unequivocal terms lays down that the scope of the proceeding before the District Judge shall be restricted to the consideration . of the interest of the persons affected by the objection. It was contended that this cannot be extended and the issues before the Court cannot be set at large and put at sea despite the clear confining parameters laid out by the legislature. Reliance was rightly placed yet again on the following observations in (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur's case, (AIR 1930 PC 64) (supra): -
"By Section 20 the function of the Court upon a reference being made is 'to determine the objection' and only persons 'interested in the objection' are to be summoned before it, by Section 21 the scope of the inquiry is to be :
'restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection'."
33. Lastly reference was made to the unamended provisions of Section 25 earlier which was in the following terms : --
"25. Rules as to amount of compensation.-
(1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11.
(2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient jeason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
(3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector."
It is true that this has now been substituted by the present Section 25 by Act 68 of 1984. However, learned counsel for the opposite parties rightly referred to it as being indicative of the earlier larger scheme of the statute which remains unaffected by the amendment. It was rightly contended that the aforesaid amendment would indicate that a person joining afresh could not possibly be bound by the conditions prescribed therein. Consequently adding an altogether new party in the proceeding before the Court would in a way have run counter to the letter and spirit of the said provision as well.
34. Now apart from the clear pointers emanating from the afore-noticed provisions of the Act, the issue deserves consideration in the larger prospect and the larger principle as well. Once it is held, which must undisputedly be so, that the jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction, the interpretative exercise has to take care that the basic premise of the statute is not overriden to convert it into a general one.
35. It seems somewhat patent that entertaining and allowing persons who were not before the Collector to become parties to the proceeding before the District Judge would run counter to the letter and spirit of the statute and is bound to enlarge the arena and bring in issues which would be extraneous to what had been earlier considered by the Collector. Doing so would be deviating from the very nature of the special jurisdiction, and would, thus, be opening a pandora's box of ills on which later the lid cannot be pressed down. Learned counsel for the opposite parties were at pains, therefore, to highlight the difference between the general proceedings in a civil suit governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the special nature of the proceedings under the Act under Sections 18 to 25. These in essence provide for Land Acquisition Judge as a special court in a limited jurisdiction confined to the matters specifically referred by the Collector based upon the application by the objector. This has to be kept in focus because if it were not to be so, then there would remain no difference in essence between a title suit by the parties laying out claims and rights qua the acquired land and a reference under Section 18 specifically. Learned counsel for the opposite parties rightly pinpointed the need to zealously. guard this limited forum and jurisdiction for speedy grant of compensation to persons whose land had been acquired because otherwise every reference under Section 18 would tend to become a title suit with intricate disputes about a wide variety of rights inter se between rival claimants. This would boggle down the proceeding and hamstring the very object of the statute for providing a forum for summary and quick decision of compensation and related matters for acquiring lands which are the need of the hour. Therefore, it deserves reiteration that the District Court when acting as a court of reference cannot proceed beyond such a reference. It would be transgressing its jurisdiction to bring in persons by back door who were not even before the Collector in the course of the proceeding and who alone could possibly claim a reference. Since the very jurisdiction of the District Judge is rested upon and confined to the reference made by the Collector, impleading of a party other than persons who were before the Collector would in a way be creating a fresh reference with regard to such a person. That is why precedent has repeatedly reiterated that the District Court cannot make a reference to itself. The core of the matter, therefore, under Section 18 is that the Collector must make the reference and the District Court must adjudicate only with regard to that reference and those parties which were before the Collector preceding such a reference. On behalf of the petitioners the objection was that such a strict view may render a genuine claimant who had missed appearance before the Collector without a legal remedy. This submission is well met by the reply that in a situation where a genuine claimant despite the wide ranging provisions of the Act does not choose to appear before the Collector then he has only to blame himself for the. result. This apart, if there is a genuine and weighty reason for having failed to appear before the Collector, it is always open for him to show cause for such absence, and if he could get over the limitations of reference under Sub-section (2) of Section 18, to claim a fresh reference to the District Court. Where any such genuine claim is wrongly denied to him by the Collector, the doors of the writ jurisdiction are always open for the correction of any such erroneous order. Any remedial impediments cannot possibly impel one to misconstrue the spirit and letter of the statute and bring in rank outsiders at the reference stage before the District Court as of first instance under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code. It was rightly urged and apprehended on behalf of the opposite parties that the law can either bar the door but having let a person in, it is not easy to bar his raising extraneous issues and claims afresh once he has been impfeaded as a party. The grave danger, thus, of converting the proceeding in a reference court into a title suit for adjudicating intricate questions of inter se claims betwixt the parties has to be designedly guarded against. The facts of the present case are indeed an illuminating example of how chequered and prolonged litigative claims may, thus, be thrust., into this specialised and limited jurisdiction.
36. The main reliance of Mr. R.K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, was on precedents under Section 30 of the Act. It was sought to be argued that under Section 18 apportionment of compensation was as much an integral part of Section 18 whilst Section 30 deait exclusively with the said subject. On this premise it was sought to be contended that the legal position under both the sections was identical and specific reliance was placed on Mr. Sakalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh AIR 1967 Pat 243, Bhadar Munda v. Dhuchua Oraon 1970 BUR 8 : (AIR 1970 Pat 209) and Kishan Chand v. Jagannath Prasad (1903) ILR 25 All 133. Reliance was also made on a number of other judgments under Section 30 of the Act. It is unnecessary to notice them individually. It is also unnecessary to repel the argument that the position under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act is identical elaborately on principle. It suffices to mention that the language, content and purpose of Sections 18 and 30 cannot possibly be said to be in pan materia.
As has already been shown in the aforementioned discussion, Section 18 is otherwise confined by the limitations and constrictions of the subsequent provisions of Sections 19 to 25 of the Act. The provision of Section 30 which falls in the different Chapter VI of the Act and obviously comes later serially is in no way controlled or affected by the earlier provisions. This apart, it seems to me that conclusive answer to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is now rendered by binding precedent in Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237. Their Lordships noticed the significant legal difference betwixt the two as under : --
"There are two provisions. Sections 18(1) and 30, which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. By Sub-section (1) of Section 18 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by Sub-section (2) of that Section of a person interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under Section 11, any dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under Sub-section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him since the award. Whereas under Section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by Sub-section (2) Clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under Section 30. Again under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector is under Section 30 not enjoined to make a reference: he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the matter declared by his award.";
and concluded as under : --
"In our judgment the powers exercisable by the Collector under Section 18(1) and under Section 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not overlap."
37. In view of the aforesaid categoric enunciation it would not only be inapt but indeed be erroneous to derive any analogy or sustenance from judgment under Section 30 in this context. In the present case we are not called upon to construe the correctness or otherwise of the view of this Court under Section 30 of the Act. Inevitably that would be done only in an appropriate case where the issue directly arises. It suffices to mention that AIR 1967 Pat 243, 1970 BLJR 8 : (AIR 1970 Pat 209) and (1903) ILR 25 All 133 (supra) and all other cases under Section 30 of the Act are plainly distinguishable and would not in any way aid or advance the case of the petitioners.
38. At this very stage, it would be apt to notice Mr. Verma's reliance on Babulal Mehtar v. Fakira Mehtar AIR 1985 Pat 249. This would undoubtedly lend some handle to his submission that the legal position under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act is identical. However, a reading of the judgment would indicate that neither principle nor a single precedent was cited on an issue, which is obviously replete with intricacies. A reference to para 7 of the report would make it manifest that the matter was considered wholly in the light of Section 30. It was, however, cryptically concluded as under : --
"Thus, in my view it appears that the provisions of the Civil P.C. are applicable in the proceeding under the Act, in reference to Court as well as made either under Section 18 or under Section 30 of the Act."
It is patent that there is no discussion whatsoever on the matter and any logical reasoning for equating Section 18 and Section 30 was even attempted. The authoritative decision of their Lordships in AIR 1966 SC 237 clearly holding that Sections 18 and 30 are distinct seems to have been altogether missed. With the deepest deference, it appears that the judgment does not lay down the law correctly and runs counter to Dr. G. H. Grant v. The State of Bihar (supra) and has, consequently, to be overruled.
39. The view 1 am inclined to take is buttressed by a long line of consistent precedent in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It is perhaps unnecessary to delve further than the Division Bench judgment in Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram AIR 1958 Andh Pra 226. This was elaborated and followed in Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin AIR 1964 Andh Pra 305, even under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, which corresponds to Section 30 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., speaking for the Division Bench was categoric in the undermentioned terms : --
"Once a reference is made the question is whether a person who is not a party to the proceedings when the reference is made can be made a party before the Court. In other words, has the Court jurisdiction to entertain the claim or the petition of such a person if any reference under Section 18 is made. It has no such jurisdiction. On the same parity of reasoning it will also have no such jurisdiction on reference under Section 30. The Calcutta High Court has consistently taken the view that even under Section 30 a person not a party to the proceedings before reference cannot be made a party nor can he urge his claim on that reference."
To the same tenor are the observations in the later Full Bench judgment in The Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, Rajendranagar v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum AIR 1976 Andh Pra 134. It is true that the basic finding of the Full Bench in the said case that a person or company for whom the land has been acquired is not a person interested, now stands eroded by the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho AIR 1980 SC 1118.
However as regards the point before us no contrary observation whatsoever appears in that judgment.
40. In the Calcutta High Court also stream of precedent is consistent beginning with Mahananda Roy v. Srish Chandra Tewary (1910) 7 Ind Cas 10, Sm. Indumati Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani AIR 1942 Cal 53 and Manjur Ahmad v. Rajlakshmi Dassi AIR 1956 Cal 263. In fairness, however, it must be noticed that there appears to be a slight touch of discordance in one of the very early cases, viz., Hashim Ibrahim Saleji v. Secretary of State (1927) 31 Cal WN 384 : (AIR 1927 Cal 352).
41. In Des Raj v. Mansa Ram AIR 1981 J and K87, Andhra Pradesh view was followed to hold that the District Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction by allowing the impleading as a party of a person who was not before the Collector and whose name was not mentioned in the reference.
42. Within this jurisdiction also, judicial thought on the point is consistent. In Panchi Paswan v. Premlal Khan AIR 1972 Pat 218 N.L. Untwalia, J. (as he then was) categorically held : --
"If they would have raised a dispute before the Collector earlier, they had a right to, ask him to make a reference under Section 18 of the Act. But in these two references made at the instance of different persons, they cannot come and say that they are entitled to the compensation money as they are the owners of the land acquired and, therefore, they should be heard and the Civil Court awards should be made in their favour. They may have their right to pursue the matter in a properly constituted civil suit by claiming the money from the person who, according to them, has wrongly taken it, but that is a different matter."
The later Division Bench judgment in The State of Bihar v. Parsuram Prasad Verma, AIR 1977 Pat 78 taking the same view is the more considered one where L.M. Sharma, J., speaking for the Bench, unequivocally held that even a co-owner having a distinct and specified share in the property acquired, who was not before the Collector, could not be impleaded as a party before the District Judge under Order I Rule 10 of the Code.
43. Now, with the aforesaid long line of precedent both within this Court and without it, facing Mr. R.K. Verma, he had to fairly concede that there was no judgment to the contrary directly holding that a person not before the Collector in the proceedings could nevertheless be impleaded as a party in the reference proceeding under Section 18 before the District Judge. A somewhat tenuous though vain attempt was made to distinguish the case of AIR 1977 Pat 78 (supra) and to sophistically wriggle out of its unequivocal ratio. However, in my view, nothing meaningful could be shown to bypass that judgment nor could any serious challenge be laid to its correctness resting as it does on a long line of unbroken precedent. The reasoning and ratio of AIR 1977 Pat 78 have consequently to be affirmed.
44. In fairness to Mr. Verma, one must also notice his reliance on the Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao AIR 1981 Punj and Hary 213. However, that can hardly be of any meaningful consequence to him. On that issue it has already been held in his favour that on a liberal construction the petitioners might well "be within the ambit of being a person interested. However, in view of the very ' special nature of the jurisdiction herein, there is no entitlement for every interested person to being impleaded as a party in the reference proceedings under Order I Rule 10 of the Code, even in face of the crucial fact that such a person was never before the Collector in the acquisition proceeding. In view of this it becomes somewhat unnecessary to consider and adjudicate on the extreme abstract a position, whether Order 1 Rule 10 is not applicable at all to the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. Even on the assumption that Order 1 Rule 10 may be attracted, the application for impleading has to be considered in the tight constrains of Sections 18, 19 and 21. It may be well said that of the two extremes -- one that Order I Rule 10 is totally barred and the other one that the same is attracted herein, as if in every ordinary civil suit, the golden mean is that even though Order I Rule 10 may not be barred, yet, its application has to be narrowly confined in special and constricted jurisdiction. It is this synthesis which, to my mind, alone can subserve the cause of justice in this narrow context.
45. To conclude, the answer to Question No. (2) posed at the outset is rendered in the negative. It is held that a person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer cannot successfully maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order I, Rule 10, of the Civil P.C. in the reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
46. Once it is held as above, the present case is a glaring one of the dangers inherent in converting the proceeding under Section 18 into a complicated title suit with regard to the individual rights involving all the intricacies of the liabilities and rights of coparceners in a Mitakshara Hindu joint family. It is common ground that herein the land in dispute was sold by the father of the present petitioners to Smt. Shanti Devi way back on the 27th of June, 1964. Nor is it in dispute that the petitioners filed Title Suit No. 51 of 1973 to assail the said transfer. The said suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on the 28th of Nov. 1978. Thereafter it was again restored and again dismissed in default on the 21st of Jan. 1984. The petitioners at no stage attempted to intervene in the proceeding before the Collector earlier or in any case when if they did, they were forthwith nonsuited. They did not choose to come up by way of revision against non-suiting or move the High Court on writ side for being made party to the acquisition proceedings. The reference was claimed only by the land-owner, Smt. Shanti Devi, who had the registered sale deed in her favour. She alone was a party in the proceeding before the Collector. The attempt now is to enlarge the scope of the enquiry under Section 18 into the inter se rights of the vendor, his coparceners and the vendee, and whether the vendor had the power to transfer and even if he had, what was the nature of his share etc. Contentious issues of Hindu Law are questions totally alien to the reference under Section 18 as made. Consequently, it must be held that the court below was wholly right in rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil P.C. The petition, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.
47. I agree.
M.P. Varma, J.
48. I agree.