Delhi District Court
Aditya Rana vs Dr Seema Prasad on 16 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF MS. RICHA GUSAIN SOLANKI,
DISTRICT JUDGE - 07, SOUTH EAST DISTRICT,
SAKET COURTS, DELHI
ARBTN No. 67/2023
CNR No. DLSE010109772023
IN THE MATTER OF:
ADITYA RANA
R/o- Plot No. 4, Secor 11,
Dwarka, New Delhi-110075 ... Applicant
versus
1) Dr. SEEMA PRASAD PANDEY
R/o- 1/187, GRT, Vadodara, Gujarat.
2) SOLE ARBITRATOR
Ms. Sangeeta Bharti,
C/o- 1-6, Janakpuri B, New Delhi-110014 .... Respondents
Date of institution: 18.11.2023
Date of order reserved: 16.04.2026
Date of pronouncement: 16.05.2026
ORDER
The present application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") assails the impugned Award dated 26.09.2014 passed by the Learned Sole Arbitrator/Respondent No. 2, whereby the claims preferred by the applicant were dismissed and the claims of Respondent No. 1 were partly allowed. The brief facts giving rise to the present proceedings are as under:
1. Respondent No. 1 filed a Statement of Claim asserting that ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 1/15 she was the owner of Flat No. 302, situated at Ranjit Vihar Part-
II, Sector-23, Dwarka, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the premises"). It was stated that the premises had initially been let out to the father of the applicant for a period of eleven months commencing from 01.12.2018. Thereafter, the premises were leased to the applicant vide Lease Deed dated 01.11.2019. It was further averred that, subsequently, the applicant became involved in disputes with other residents of the society. Since the lease was due to expire on 30.09.2020, Respondent No. 1 sent an email dated 31.08.2020 informing the applicant that the lease would not be extended and directing him to vacate the premises on or before the expiry of the lease term. However, the applicant allegedly continued in possession of the premises and also instituted a suit for mandatory and permanent injunction against Respondent No. 1 before the Dwarka Courts. The Learned Court restrained Respondent No. 1 from dispossessing the applicant except in accordance with due process of law. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 issued a legal notice dated 10.02.2021 calling upon the applicant to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the premises on or before the midnight of 21/22.02.2021 and further demanded a sum of ₹3.30 lakhs towards damages for unauthorised occupation. The applicant, vide reply dated 19.02.2021, refused to vacate the premises. A rejoinder notice was thereafter issued by Respondent No. 1 advising the applicant to vacate the premises within three days. Upon the applicant's failure to vacate, Respondent No. 1 invoked the arbitration clause and issued a notice proposing the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator. The applicant rejected the said nomination. Consequently, Respondent No. 1 approached the Hon'ble Delhi ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 2/15 High Court seeking appointment of an Arbitrator and, vide order dated 14.07.2021, Ms. Sangeeta Bharati/Respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Learned Sole Arbitrator.
2. Before the Learned Arbitrator, Respondent No. 1 preferred the following claims:
(i) Claim No. 1 for possession of the suit premises;
(ii) Claim No. 2 seeking recovery of ₹15.83 lakhs towards mesne profits and damages;
(iii) Claim No. 3 towards compensation for damages allegedly caused to the premises beyond normal wear and tear;
(iv) Claim No. 4 seeking litigation expenses amounting to ₹2.50 lakhs;
(v) Claim No. 5 towards arbitration costs; and
(vi) Claim No. 6 seeking interest.
3. The applicant filed his Statement of Defence contending, inter alia, that Respondent No. 1 had renewed the lease agreement till 31.10.2021. It was asserted that the actual dispute was between the applicant and the Resident Welfare Association (RWA), in respect whereof the applicant had already instituted civil proceedings before the Dwarka Courts and had obtained interim protection. The applicant alleged that the Executive Members of the RWA were causing harassment by unlawfully restraining the entry of his vehicle into the society, despite the tripartite agreement permitting such entry. It was further stated that criminal complaints had been lodged by the applicant against the Executive Members of the RWA for threatening and intimidating his family members. The applicant also contended that the arbitration clause could have been invoked only by the Army Welfare Housing Organisation and that Respondent No. 1 ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 3/15 lacked locus standi to invoke arbitration proceedings. It was further alleged that Respondent No. 1 had taken contradictory stands in the civil proceedings and in the arbitral proceedings; while in the civil suit she claimed that the premises were required for the education of her children, in the arbitration proceedings she asserted that the premises were required for her employment in Delhi. On this basis, it was argued that Respondent No. 1 had approached the forum with unclean hands and was disentitled to any relief.
4. The applicant also filed a Counter Claim stating that, at the time of execution of the tripartite agreement, Respondent No. 1 had agreed to fix the rent of the premises at ₹29,000/- per month for a period of two years, but had increased the rent in the very next year. It was further averred that Respondent No. 1 had thereafter extended the lease in favour of the applicant with effect from 01.11.2019 at a monthly rent of ₹30,100/-, which rent was regularly paid by the applicant even during the COVID-19 pandemic. The applicant alleged collusion between the respondents and further alleged that defamatory statements and threats were extended to him and his family members, including threats to forcibly evict them from the premises with the assistance of anti-social elements. It was contended that, owing to such acts, the applicant suffered severe mental harassment, loss of reputation in society, and sleepless nights. Accordingly, the applicant sought:
i) compensation of ₹25 lakhs towards defamation and mental harassment,
ii) ₹5 lakhs towards costs incurred in civil and criminal proceedings instituted by him, ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 4/15
iii) ₹5 lakhs towards damages for alleged breach of the lease agreement, and
iv) ₹2 lakhs towards arbitration costs.
5. Respondent No. 1 thereafter filed a rejoinder reiterating and reaffirming the averments made in the Statement of Claim and denying the allegations and assertions raised by the applicant in his Statement of Defence and Counter Claim.
6. In support of their respective cases, both Respondent No. 1 and the applicant entered the witness box and led evidence before the Learned Sole Arbitrator.
7. Vide Interim Award dated 21.03.2022, the Learned Arbitrator allowed Claim No. 1 preferred by Respondent No. 1, pertaining to possession of the premises.
8. Thereafter, vide Final Award dated 22.07.2023, the Learned Arbitrator partly allowed Claim No. 2 of Respondent No. 1 pertaining to mesne profits and damages, and awarded a sum of ₹6,87,000/- in her favour. However, no separate damages were awarded. Claim No. 3 relating to compensation for damages allegedly caused to the premises was rejected. Claim No. 4 seeking litigation expenses was also declined. Claim No. 5 pertaining to arbitration costs was partly allowed to the extent of ₹3,50,000/-, while Claim No. 6 seeking interest was allowed at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing of the Statement of Claim until realisation.
9. The Counter Claims preferred by the applicant were dismissed in their entirety.
GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE
10. Aggrieved by the said award, the applicant has preferred the present application, raising several grounds which may broadly ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 5/15 be classified into seven categories.
11. I have perused the record and heard the learned counsels for the parties.
12. The first ground urged by the applicant is that the Learned Arbitrator acted in a biased manner from the very inception of the arbitral proceedings. In this regard, it is contended that even the links for the virtual hearings were generated and circulated by Respondent No. 1. It is further alleged that the Learned Arbitrator failed to afford sufficient opportunity to the applicant to file replies and advance arguments, despite the personal difficulties faced by his counsel. It is submitted that, owing to such alleged bias, the Learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate the material placed on record and committed errors in law by not assigning due consideration thereto. On these premises, it is argued that the arbitral proceedings stood vitiated for non- compliance with the principles of natural justice as enunciated in K.V. George v. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum.
13. Per contra, Respondent No. 1 has opposed the aforesaid contentions, submitting that the applicant has failed to point out even a single instance demonstrating bias or prejudice on the part of the Learned Arbitrator. It is further submitted that, even assuming such allegations to be true, the applicant, having participated in the arbitral proceedings without objection, is deemed to have waived such objections and acquiesced in the proceedings. Consequently, he is estopped from challenging the impartiality of the Learned Arbitrator after the passing of the Award. Reliance has also been placed on Section 13(5) of the Act to contend that where a challenge to the Arbitrator is ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 6/15 unsuccessful, the aggrieved party must seek recourse under Section 34 of the Act only after raising such challenge before the Arbitral Tribunal itself. It is submitted that the applicant never raised any challenge to the constitution of the Tribunal or to the alleged lack of impartiality within the prescribed period. Reliance has been placed upon State Bank of India v. Ram Das & Anr., National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Wig Brothers Builders & Engineers Ltd., and Allied Dynamic Joint Venture v. Ircon International Ltd., Delhi.
14. I find no merit in the aforesaid contention raised by the applicant. It is a settled principle of law that where a party, despite being aware of the alleged defect in jurisdiction or allegations of bias against an Arbitrator, participates in the arbitral proceedings without protest, such party is disentitled from subsequently raising the said objection after an adverse award has been rendered. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 has rightly relied upon State Bank of India v. Ram Das, (2003) 12 SCC 474, in support of the aforesaid proposition.
15. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pam Development (P) Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 366, wherein it was observed as under: "16. As noticed above, the appellant not only filed the statement of defence but also raised a counterclaim against the respondent. Since the appellant has not raised the objection with regard to the competence/jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal before the learned arbitrator, the same is deemed to have been waived in view of the provisions contained in Section 4 read with Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996."
16. In the present case as well, the applicant not only accepted the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal without any demur, but also actively participated in the proceedings and filed an ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 7/15 elaborate Counter Claim. Even after the alleged acts indicating bias had purportedly occurred, the applicant never sought recusal of the Learned Arbitrator nor challenged her mandate in accordance with law. Significantly, even the challenge to the Interim Award dated 21.03.2022 was also abandoned. Such continued participation without objection clearly amounts to waiver of the right to challenge the competence or impartiality of the Learned Arbitrator. The applicant is, therefore, estopped from raising such objections after having fully participated in the arbitral proceedings and after the passing of the Final Award.
17. Furthermore, the record reveals that the Learned Arbitrator did not grant all the reliefs claimed by Respondent No. 1. Several claims, including the claim for damages to the premises and litigation expenses, were declined. This itself demonstrates that the Learned Arbitrator acted independently and adjudicated the disputes on merits, thereby dispelling the allegation of bias.
18. The second ground urged by the applicant is that Respondent No. 1 lacked locus standi to invoke arbitration, as, according to the applicant, the arbitration clause could have been invoked only by the Army Welfare Housing Organisation.
19. I do not find any merit in the aforesaid submission either. The applicant never challenged the invocation of arbitration at the relevant stage and, on the contrary, himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal by filing a Counter Claim. Having participated in the proceedings without protest, he cannot now contend, after an adverse award, that the arbitration proceedings themselves were incompetent. Reliance may also be placed upon BSNL v. Motorola India (P) Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 337, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 8/15 "39. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a party which knows that a requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and still proceeds with the arbitration without raising an objection, as soon as possible, waives their right to object... The appellants therefore had clearly failed to meet the stated requirement to object to arbitration without delay.
As such their right to object is deemed to be waived."
20. Moreover, the Learned Sole Arbitrator was appointed pursuant to an order passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The appointment of the Arbitrator having attained finality, the applicant cannot now indirectly assail the very invocation of arbitration in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
21. The third ground urged by the applicant is that the Learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the lease stood extended by virtue of an email allegedly sent by Respondent No. 1. It is further contended that Respondent No. 1 adopted inconsistent stands before the Learned Civil Court at Dwarka and before the Arbitral Tribunal.
22. Learned counsel for the applicant has further argued that the monthly rent of the premises was never ₹33,000/-, and yet the Learned Arbitrator erroneously proceeded to award mesne profits on the basis of the said amount. It has also been contended that the Learned Arbitrator failed to adjudicate upon the application filed by the applicant under Section 340 Cr.P.C., even after passing of the impugned Award.
23. I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The question as to whether the tenancy stood validly extended was a matter squarely falling within the domain of appreciation of evidence by the Learned Arbitrator. The Award reflects that the Learned Arbitrator duly considered the material placed on record and returned findings of fact upon evaluation thereof. Merely ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 9/15 because another view may have been possible on the basis of the evidence led, the same would not justify interference under Section 34 of the Act. It is trite that this Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator and cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because the applicant seeks a different interpretation of the material on record.
24. Moreover, the Learned Arbitrator has furnished cogent and detailed reasons for awarding mesne profits at the rate of ₹33,000/- per month, inter alia, by relying upon Clause 10(w) of the lease agreement, which expressly provided for an annual enhancement of rent at the rate of 10%.
25. Insofar as the contention regarding the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the same is also devoid of merit. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand, (2001) 5 SCC 407, has categorically held that an Arbitral Tribunal does not constitute a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable before an Arbitral Tribunal.
26. The fourth ground urged by the applicant is that the Learned Arbitrator erred in granting interim relief in favour of Respondent No. 1, which allegedly amounted to grant of final relief at the interim stage. It is further submitted that the Learned Arbitrator wrongly assumed certain admissions on the part of the applicant and granted relief without recording evidence.
27. These contentions pertain to the Interim Award dated 21.03.2022. Admittedly, the applicant neither challenged the said Interim Award effectively nor pursued the remedy available to ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 10/15 him under law. The record further reveals that the applicant complied with the Interim Award and also withdrew the petition preferred under Section 37 of the Act against the said order. Consequently, the aforesaid grounds do not survive for consideration in the present proceedings.
28. The fifth ground urged by the applicant is that he had been regularly paying rent to Respondent No. 1 and that the actual dispute was between the applicant and the Resident Welfare Association.
29. The said contention is devoid of merit. The existence of disputes between the applicant and the Resident Welfare Association could not confer upon the applicant any right to continue in possession of the premises beyond the subsistence of the lease. The relationship between the parties was admittedly that of landlord and tenant. Upon expiry of the lease period and refusal of renewal by Respondent No. 1, the applicant had no legal right to retain possession of the premises indefinitely.
30. The sixth ground raised by the applicant is that the disputes arose due to the alleged illegal acts of Respondent No. 1 and the Resident Welfare Association, compelling the applicant to engage in litigation and incur substantial legal expenses. It is submitted that the award of arbitration costs exclusively in favour of Respondent No. 1 demonstrates bias on the part of the Learned Arbitrator.
31. Learned counsel for the applicant has further contended that the Learned Arbitrator mechanically and summarily dismissed all the Counter Claims preferred by the applicant without proper appreciation of the evidence on record, merely observing that the Counter Claim was in the nature of a counterblast to the ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 11/15 Statement of Claim filed by Respondent No. 1.
32. Per contra, Respondent No. 1 has submitted that the findings of the Learned Arbitrator are based upon a proper appreciation of facts and applicable legal principles. It is further contended that a challenge to an arbitral award must be founded upon recognised legal grounds under Section 34 of the Act and cannot rest merely upon dissatisfaction with the outcome of the proceedings.
33. I find no merit in the aforesaid submission of the applicant. The settled principle governing costs is that costs ordinarily follow the event, meaning thereby that the successful party is entitled to recover costs from the unsuccessful party. Though there may be exceptional cases warranting denial or reduction of costs, such circumstances are absent in the present case. The present matter essentially arose out of a landlord-tenant relationship. The applicant, being an advocate understood the scope of his rights in the premises. He admittedly, continued in possession of the premises till after the Interim Award was passed. The Learned Arbitrator, therefore, rightly exercised jurisdiction in awarding arbitration costs in favour of Respondent No. 1 and furnished cogent reasons for the same, including the fact that the arbitral tribunal fee itself had been fixed at ₹2 lakhs.
34. Insofar as the dismissal of the Counter Claims is concerned, the applicant failed to lead any cogent or independent evidence, apart from his own bald assertions and ipse dixit, to substantiate the allegations of defamation, threats, or harassment. Once the Learned Arbitrator arrived at the finding that the lease had expired and that the applicant had continued in unauthorised ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 12/15 occupation of the premises thereafter, no occasion arose for grant of litigation expenses allegedly incurred by the applicant or for awarding damages on account of the purported breach of the lease agreement.
35. The seventh and final ground urged by the applicant is that all the submissions advanced on his behalf were neither recorded nor discussed in detail in the impugned Award. It is further contended that the hearing links were circulated from the office of counsel for Respondent No. 1 and that, during the course of virtual hearings, the voice of counsel for the applicant occasionally got muted, thereby causing disruption in his submissions.
36. These submissions, in my considered view, do not advance the case of the applicant in any manner. Merely because every argument advanced by a party has not been reproduced verbatim in the Award does not render the Award liable to be set aside. An Arbitrator is only required to record reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at and is not obligated to discuss each and every contention in minute detail. Similarly, minor technical glitches during virtual hearings, absent any demonstrable prejudice, cannot constitute a ground for interference under Section 34 of the Act. The applicant has failed to establish that any prejudice of such magnitude was caused to him as would vitiate the arbitral proceedings or the impugned Award.
37. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 has also rightly contended that the present petition under Section 34 of the Act is not accompanied by an affidavit in the nature of a Statement of Truth and is not signed, as mandated in law. It is submitted that compliance with the said requirement is mandatory in nature and ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 13/15 failure to adhere thereto renders the filing non-est in the eyes of law. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed upon Jay Polychem (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. SE Investment Ltd. and ONGC v. Planetcast Technologies Ltd.
38. I find merit in the aforesaid submission. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises (SREE) & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Ltd. (MEIL), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10456, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed as under:
"43. The common thread that runs in the aforesaid judgments is that 'non est' filing cannot stop limitation and cannot be a ground to condone delay. Thus, for a petition filed under Section 34 of the Act to be termed as a 'properly' filed petition must fulfill certain basic parameters such as:
a) Each page of the Petition as well as the last page should be signed by the party and the Advocate;
b) Vakalatnama should be signed by the party and the Advocate and the signatures of the party must be identified by the Advocate;
c) Statement of Truth/Affidavit should be signed by the party and attested by the Oath Commissioner;
44. This in my view is the minimum threshold that should be crossed before the petition is filed and can be treated as a petition in the eyes of law. The rationale behind insisting on these fundamental compliances to be observed while filing a petition, is not far to seek. Vakalatnama is an authority which authorizes an Advocate to act on behalf of a party as a power of attorney and to carry out certain acts on his behalf. Therefore, the vakalatnama is the first step and a precursor to the preparation of a petition. The Statement of Truth accompanying a petition or an application is sworn by the deponent who states on oath that the contents of the accompanying petition have been drafted under his instructions and are true and correct to his knowledge or belief. Surely, this affidavit must be signed after the petition is made and the attestation must also be done on the affidavit when the petition is filed. This is also a requirement under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The petition needs to be signed by the Advocate as well as the party before the same is filed as this would indicate that both have read the petition and there is authenticity attached to the pages filed in the Registry. If these basic documents are not annexed or the signatures as required are absent, one can only term the documents which are filed as a 'bunch of papers' and not a petition."
39. In the present case, the petition cannot be regarded as a ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 14/15 validly instituted petition under Section 34 of the Act in the eyes of law. Rather, it is a fundamentally defective and incomplete set of papers lacking the essential attributes required for proper institution of proceedings. The petition is not signed by the applicant on all pages; the signatures appearing on the vakalatnama have not been duly identified by the Advocate; and the accompanying affidavit is not in conformity with the prescribed format of a Statement of Truth. These defects are not merely procedural irregularities capable of routine rectification, but go to the very root of the institution of the proceedings, thereby rendering the filing non-est and devoid of legal sanctity.
40. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present petition is held to be not maintainable. Even otherwise, no ground warranting interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is made out on merits. Accordingly, the present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands dismissed.
41. All pending interim applications also stand disposed of.
42. Costs ordered in favour of respondent no.1.
43. File be consigned to record room only after due completion and necessary action. RICHA Digitally signed by RICHA GUSAIN GUSAIN SOLANKI SOLANKI Date: 2026.05.16 18:01:16 +0530 Pronounced in the open court (RICHA GUSAIN SOLANKI) on 16th May 2026 District Judge-07, South East Saket Courts, New Delhi ARBTN No. 67/2023 Aditya Rana vs Seema Prasad Pandey & Anr page 15/15