Gujarat High Court
Naginbhai Chandubhai Solanki vs State Of Gujarat on 26 April, 2018
Author: J.B.Pardiwala
Bench: J.B.Pardiwala
R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 6079 of 2018
==========================================================
NAGINBHAI CHANDUBHAI SOLANKI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR TEJAS M BAROT(2964) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1,2
for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2
MS. MOXA THAKKAR, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR(2) for the
RESPONDENT(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 26/04/2018
ORAL ORDER
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. Moxa Thakkar, the learned APP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondents.
2. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicants - original accused persons seek to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Case No. 171 of 2018 pending in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anklav, arising from the First Information Report being CR No. I-124 of 2017 registered with the Anklav Police Station, District: Anand, for the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 114 of the IPC.
Page 1 of 28R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER
3. The First Information Report came to be lodged by a Police Constable i.e. the respondent no. 2 herein. The First Information Report is extracted hereunder:-
"I, Rajvirsinh Ghanshyamsinh Chauhan, Aged 31 years, Occupation Business, residing at Anklav Police Line, Taluka Anklav, District Anand, Native place at Gagad, Chauhan Faliyu, Taluka Bavla, District Ahmedabad, Mobile No. 9825090518.
Being personally present state facts of my complaint - that I stay at the above mentioned address and I work as an unarmed Police Constable at Anklav Police Station for past 1 year.
Yesterday evening, when we were patrolling in a private car having number GJ 12 CG 3483 within the limits of Anklav Police Station and when we were going from Anklav to Umta, we received a secret information that a Brezza car bearing no. GJ 23 BD 9087 was coming from Padara side carrying foreign liquor. Upon receiving this information, the informant Shakeel Pathan was taken in our private vehicle and waited on Gambhira bridge on the road leading to Padra and at that time, around 8 o'clock at night, the car about which secret information was received came from Padra side and we started following the car in our private vehicle and as the car about which secret information was received became suspicious that the police was following it, the driver of the car drove the car towards Gambhira from Gambhira Chowkdi and we followed the car and the driver of the car passed through Gambhira village and reached an open place and as our car came closer to his car, the driver of the car turned back his car and our car came behind his car and on turning the car backwards, I saw the driver of the car and identified him to be Naginbhai sarpanch of village Sankhyal who was driving the car and on the passenger seat, Page 2 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER Rangitbhai who's father's name is not known to me, was seated. Following their car, we reached Gambhira Chowkdi and on our way from Gambhira Chowkdi to Kikhlod Chowkdi after about 1 kilometer, in order to stop a car ahead of us, we overtook the said car and called out the driver of the car by his name Naginbhai and asked him to stop the car; when we were following his car aroung 8:45 pm at night, Naginbhai with an intention to murder me, dashed his car on the side of our car and due to this our car hit a tree on the side of the road and the car of Naginbhai fell in gutter on the side of the road and got stuck there and Naginbhai and his companion passenger Rangitbhai got down from the car and fled away. I received injuries on my face and on the left knee and my companion Shakeelbhai Pathan also got some injuries on his body. I telephoned my colleague Aspakbhai, who came there and took me for treatment. Thus, said Naginbhai with an intention to murder me, dashed his car with my car causing injuries to me, for which I am making the present which complaint may be legally investigated. My witnesses are those who are mentioned in the complaint and those who may be revealed in the course of investigation.
The facts of my complaint as narrated by me hereinabove are true and correct."
4. Thus, the case of the prosecution is that the police had an information that the applicants were to pass through a particular route in a read coloured Brezza Car carrying foreign liquor. The police kept a close watch and when the car was spotted, the police asked the applicants to stop the car. However, instead of stopping the car, the applicants are alleged to have accelerated the speed and tried to run away. While doing Page 3 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER so, the police officer got injured.
5. The case of the prosecution is that, the applicants attempted to commit murder of a police officer while on duty.
6. Mr. Barot, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants made himself very clear that he was restricting his case only to the extent of the applicability of Section 307 of the IPC.
7. According to Mr. Barot, even if the entire case of the prosecution is accepted as true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of an attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC are spelt out. Mr. Barot would submit that the filing of the charge-sheet for an offence punishable under Section 307 is nothing, but an attempt on the part of the police to make the offence more serious and grave. He would submit that in the present case, all the witnesses are police officers.
8. Mr. Barot would submit that the police party was trying to apprehend the applicants and when they realized that the applicants were trying to make his escape desperately, they tried to prevent them from escaping. Mr. Barot would submit that such an act, as alleged, would not constitute an attempt to commit murder.
9. Mr. Barot would submit that atleast Section 307 of the IPC should Page 4 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER be ordered to be deleted from the charge-sheet.
10. On the other, hand this application has been vehemently opposed by Ms. Moxa Thakkar, the learned APP appearing for the respondents.
Ms. Thakkar would submit that the law governing the trial of the Criminal offence provides for an alternative charge at any stage of the proceedings depending upon the evidence adduced in the case. She would submit that it is too premature to arrive at any decision whether the applicants have a requisite intention or the knowledge. She would submit that ultimately, on the overall appreciation of the entire evidence, the trial Court would take an appropriate decision in that regard. The learned APP would submit that the framing of an appropriate charge should be left best to be decided by the trial Court at an appropriate stage of the trial.
11. In such circumstances, the learned APP prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected.
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Investigating Agency could have filed a charge-sheet for the ofence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC.
13. When a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed so far as a particular offence is concerned, the test to be applied by the Page 5 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegation as made, prima facie, established such offence. It is for the Court to take into consideration any special feature which appears in a particular case and to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue so far as a particular offence is concerned. It is equally well settled that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the Court should be extremely conscious and loath to interfere with the investigation or the trial of a criminal case and should not scuttle a legitimate prosecution, except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the material on record does not disclose commission of a particular offence or the entire offence itself and that the continuance of the criminal prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of the Court.
14. The Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code should also consider the broad probability of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced and basic infirmity if any appearing in the case and so on. This, however, does not mean that the Court should make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial.
15. In the present case, it ultimately transpires that the police party was Page 6 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER keeping a watch and having noticed a car, they tried to block the road and the accused is alleged to have driven his car with full speed to escape from the place and thereby, prevent his arrest. It also appears that when the First Informant proceeded towards the car, the accused rashly and negligently drew the car on the public road and this is the reason why Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code has also been invoked. While driving the car in reverse, as alleged, the car dashed with the motorcycle of the First Informant which was parked on one side of the road resulting into damage to the motorcycle as well as a 'Ota' of the house of one of the witnesses. As alleged, after getting dashed with the 'Ota' of the house of the witness, the accused was apprehended. The search of the car did not result into recovery of any contraband articles, except four mobiles which were seized.
16. In my view, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are spelt out. I had the occasion to deal with almost an identical issue in the case which has been referred to above and relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor.
17 In the case of Hanif Usmanbhai Kalva and others Vs. State of Gujarat (in the Criminal Misc. Application No. 3120 of 2014 decided on 06.01.2015), this Court observed as under:
Page 7 of 28R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER "21. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus:
Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to a [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts. When any person offending under this section is under sentence of a [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
22. An offence under section 307 has the following essential ingredients;
(i)That the accused did an act;
(ii) That the act was done with intention or knowledge and under such circumstances to cause a bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or that such bodily injury was in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause such death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; and
(iii) That the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.
23. For liability under section 307, the prosecution has to prove the following facts:
(1) That the accused did an act, and Page 8 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER (2) that the act was done with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act caused death he would be guilty of murder. If hurt is caused by such act, the offender becomes liable to imprisonment for life, otherwise the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed is 10 years. Thus the section itself does not take into consideration the effect of the act of the accused except as a measure of sentence to be imposed upon him.
24. Thus, from the above, the most important ingredient to constitute the offence of an attempt to commit murder punishable under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code is the intention and knowledge. To attract the provisions of this section, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that the intention of the accused was one of the three kinds mentioned in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. A person commits an offence under section 307, IPC when he has the intention to commit murder, and in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. Section 307 requires that the act must be done with such intention or knowledge or in such circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of murder will emerge.
25. At least one thing is very clear that causing such injury as would endanger life is not an essential condition for the applicability of section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Even if the injuries inflicted are simple in nature, that by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal, if the offence otherwise falls under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.
26. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man.
27. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it Page 9 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person can't be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:
1. The nature of the weapon used.
2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.
3. The nature of the injuries caused.
4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.
28. I may quote with profit a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Sanku Sreedharan Kottukallil Veettil Konathadi Kara vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 KERALA 98 (V. 57 C 20).
15. Intention and knowledge are a man's state of mind; direct evidence thereof except through his own confession cannot be had; and apart from a confession they can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. In other words, they are matters for inference from all the circumstances of the case such as the motive, the preparations made, the declarations of the offender, and, in the case of homicide, the weapon used, the persistence of the assault, and the nature of the injuries actually inflicted as also their location. In the case of what are generally described as unpremeditated offences or as offences committed on the spur of the moment, intention may be contemporaneous with the physical act, at best of just an instant before, and is generally to be gathered from the nature and consequences of the act and the attendant circumstances. It is here that the much criticised maxim that every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act Page 10 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER comes into play.
16.Like most words, the word "intention" is capable of different shades of meaning. In the Indian Penal Code it is used in relation to the consequences of an act, the effect caused thereby, not in relation to the act itselfthe voluntariness required to constitute an act is implied by that very word. Thus, in the case of murder. The intention required is (omitting clause secondly of Section 300 which rarely comes into play) the intention of causing death or the intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, more or less the malice aforethought of the English law, the former being generally described as specific intent or malice and the latter as implied malice or some times as constructive malice, though the use of the latter term seems open to criticism. It seems to us clear from the illustrations to Sections 88, 89 and 92, that the Code uses the word "intention", in the sense that something is intentionally done if it is done deliberately or purposely, in other words, is a willed though not necessarily a desired result or a result which is the purpose of the deed. The surgeon of the illustrations certainly does not desire the harm that may be caused; nor is that his purpose. Nevertheless, the provisions of the sections show that he could have intended the harm, and is saved from being a criminal only by those provisions. Likewise a man who shoots another in the heart and kills him in selfdefence might not desire, on the contrary might very much dislike, causing the latter's death. His purpose is not to cause death but to save himself. Yet his case falls squarely within the first clause of Section 300 he has undoubtedly caused death by doing an act with the intention of causing death and is saved from being a murderer only by Section 100.
Lang v. Lang 1955 AC 402 rather than Rex v. Steane 1947 KB 997 at p. 1004 or Hosegood v. Hosegood, (1950) 66 TLR 735 illustrates the sense Page 11 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER in which the word, intention is used in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code of course none of these cases was construing that statute. And, once you dispense with desire or purpose, it follows that foresight of the consequences of an act gains the upper hand in determining whether the consequences were intended or not. And the foresight of a particular person is prima facie to be gauged by the foresight of an ordinary, reasonable man. in other words, by what is sometimes disparagingly referred to as the objective test or external standas if that were enough to condemn itof the reasonable and probable consequences of the act.
17. Illustration (a) to Section 106 of the Evidence Act shows that the intention with which a person does an act is generally to be gathered from the character and circumstances of the act It says that:
"When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him".
An inference drawn from the character and circumstances of the act is sufficient proof of intention. Thus, if a man uses a knife on another so as to pierce the latter's heart and kill him, the character and circumstances of his act would suggest that he intended to kill him, for, death is the natural and probable, nay, the wellnigh certain, result of such an act. But a surgeon doing this could readily rebut this inference by showing that he did this not with the intention of causing death but with the intention of curing the man of a dangerous disease. Nevertheless the surgeon would still have intentionally caused 'hurt, and can even be said to have intentionally caused bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and as we have already said, is saved from penal consequences only by reason of the exception in Section 88 of the Code.
Page 12 of 28R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER
18. The maxim to which we have referred, namely, that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act, is sometimes expressed as if it embodied something thing more than a permissible inference, something more than the "may presume" of Sections 4 and 114 of the Evidence Act, or at the worst the "shall presume"
of Section 4, and created an irrebuttable presumption, the "conclusive proof of Section 4. A form in which it is thus expressed is that every person must be presumed to intend the natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of his acts whether in fact he intended them or not. In this form it is certainly objectionable and it is the belief, some would have it in the mistaken belief, that it was countenanced in this form by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961 AC 290 as if the mens rea for murder were not the intention in the mind of the alleged offender, but were the foresight of a reasonable man of the likelihood of death, that that decision has come in for so much adverse criticism from quarters both academic and professional. And it is to the maxim in this objectionable, form, "must be taken to intend" that Wallis C. J. took exception when, basing himself on paragraph 100 of the first report on the Penal Code by the Indian Law Commissioners; he observed in Vullappa v. Bheema Row, ILR 41 Mad 156 at p. 162 : (AIR 1918 Mad 136 (2) at p. 139) (FB) that Macaulay and the other Indian Law Commissioners regarded the maxim as a fiction which should not be recognised in the Penal Code. But surely that the Code draws a clear distinction between "intent"
and "knowledge of likelihood" is no impediment to the latter leading to an inference regarding the former, or to same circumstance leading to an inference regarding both.
19. But properly viewed, namely as a mere objective test enabling a rebuttable inference to be drawn regarding the mental element attending an Page 13 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER act, we think that the maxim is not merely unexceptionable but indispensable. The whole difficulty it seems to us arises from, to borrow the words of Bowen L. J. in Angus v. Clifford, 18212 Ch D 441, confusing the evidence from which an inference may be drawn with the inference itself which has to be drawn after you have weighed all the evidence. In this connection the following classic statement by Sir William Holdsworth in the History of the English Law, Vol. III, page 374 is worth quoting:
"The general rule of the common law is that crime cannot be imputed to a man without mens rea. It is, of course, quite another question how the existence of that mens rea is to be established. The thought of man is not triable by direct evidence; but if the law grounds liability upon intent, it must endeavour to establish it by circumstantial evidence. Much of that circumstantial evidence will be directed to showing that a man of ordinary ability, situated as the accused was situated, and having his means of knowledge, would not have acted as he acted without having that mens rea which it is sought to impute to him. In other words, we must adopt an external standard in adjudicating upon the weight of evidence adduced to prove or disprove mens rea. That of course, does not mean that the law bases criminal liability upon an external standard. So to argue is to confuse the evidence for a proposition with the proposition proved by that evidence".
20. Perhaps, in Indian Law, the objective test of the maxim would cover every degree of mens rea from negligence to intention, depending on the degree of probability of the consequenes. If the effect caused by an act is the natural and probable consequence of that act it would, we think, be right to infer that the actor caused that effect voluntarily as that word is defined in Section 39 of the Code. If the degree of probability is so low so that the effect cannot be described as a natural and probable consequence, the inference to be drawn might only be of Page 14 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER negligence or rashness; little higher it might be that the actor had reason to believe that he was likely to cause the effect; still higher it would be reasonable to infer that he knew that he was likely to cause it; and if the degree of probability is so high that the effect may be described not merely as a probable but as a natural, natural in the sense ordinary result of the act it would be reasonable to infer that he intended to cause it. It might be noted that it is on the high degree of probability of the effect of death that the intention or knowledge (to be inferred from, among other things, the natural and probable consequences of the act) of clauses secondly, thirdly and fourthly of Section 300 are equated with intention to cause death of the first clause.
21. So far as the English Law is concerned, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 applies the necessary corrective to the grossness of the rule supposed to have been laid down in 1961 AC 290. This section provides that "A Court or jury in determining whether a person has committed an offence.
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequences of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inference from the evidence as appear, proper in the circumstances".
That is a statement of the law which we would adopt. The natural and probable consequences of a man's act is only one of the factors from which his intention as to the result may be gathered. It is no doubt a very important factor and might sometimes be the only available factor from which the inference of intention is to be drawn. Still, there is Page 15 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER no "must" about it, only "may" and the Court is not bound in law to infer that a man intended the result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions. The intention is to be gathered from all the circumstances appearing in the evidence.
22. Much the same thing was said by Denning L. J. in 195066 TLR 735 with reference to the animus deserendi, in other words, the intent to bring the married life to an end, necessary to constitute desertion for the purpose of divorce.
"When people say that a man must be taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts, they fall into error; there is no 'must' about it; it is only 'may'. The presumption of intention is not a proposition of law but a proposition of ordinary good sense. It means this: that as a man is usually able to foresee what are the natural consequences of his acts, so it is, as a rule, reasonable to infer that he did foresee and intend them. But, while that is an inference which may be drawn, it is not one which must be drawn. If on all the facts of the case it is not the correct inference then it should not be drawn".
In their book on Criminal Law, Geanville Williams, one of the foremost critics of 1961 AC 290 and Smith and Mogan themselves no admirers of that decision, regard this as a clear exposition of the true place and value of the presumption in the proof of intention. Denning L. J. then thought (as he later, in the light of 1955 AC 402, confessed, mistakenly) that intent in the context of desertion meant that the party must have the desire or purpose to bring the married life to an end. But, as we have seen, neither the desire nor the purpose to bring about the consequences is necessary to constitute intention within the meaning of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. With regard to what we might call this lesser intention the presumption to be drawn from the natural and probable Page 16 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER consequences of the act is stronger.
23.In English law, in order to constitute the offence of attempt to murder, the specific intent to cause death is necessary though for the completed offence of murder the lesser mens rea of intent to cause grievous bodily harm suffices. What might be called the implied or constructive intent to cause death of clauses secondly, thirdly and fourthly of Section 300 of our Code is not enough. But, in Indian law, Section 307 of the Code makes it quite clear that the mental element described in any of the four clauses of Section 300 is sufficient and that it is not necessary that the act should have been done with the specific intention of causing death. This difference should not be overlooked. We should not have thought it necessary to voice this caution but that we find that in some Indian decisions and in some commentaries on the Code, English cases are cited to make out that the specific intent to kill is necessary without noticing that Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code lays down the law differently. The above is the correct statement of law.
29. I may also quote with profit the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Balram Bama Patil, AIR 1983 SC 305. The observations made in paragraphs9 and 10 are as under:
9. Shri Rana appearing for the State strenuously contended that the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the offence under Section 307, I. P. C. was not made out merely because the injuries inflicted on the witnesses were in the nature of a simple hurt and in these circumstances it is not possible to hold any of the accused persons guilty in respect of that offence.
We find considerable force in this contention. A bare perusal of Section 307, I. P. C. would show that the reasons given by the High Court for acquitting the accused of the offence under Section Page 17 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER 307 were not tenable. Section 307, I. P. C. reads :
"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, be would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; andif hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An. attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
10. The High Court, in our opinion, was not correct in acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 307, I. P. C. merely because the injuries inflicted on the victims were in the nature Page 18 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER of a simple hurt. Therefore, that part of the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 11 of the offence under Section 307, I. P. C. cannot be sustained and must be set aside.They have, however, already served out sentence of imprisonment for two years for the offence under Sections 147 and 148, I. P. C. in pursuance of the order of the High Court. When the State filed an appeal against them they were arrested again and had to remain in jail for three months before they could be released on bail. Thus, they have already served a sentence of two years, three months. In the circumstances the ends of justice should be met if the sentence is limited to the period already undergone.
30. Thus, the aforenoted decision of the Supreme Court makes it very clear that merely because the injuries inflicted on the victims are found to be simple in nature by itself can never be a ground to acquit the accused of the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the nature of the injury actually caused would definitely provide considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused.
31. Therefore, everything boils down to intention and knowledge. The learned APP invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bejoy Chand vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 SC 105 and submitted that where the accused is charged under section 307, Penal Code, he may be convicted under sections 323, 324 and 325 as the case may be even in the absence of a charge in respect of it, if on the facts of the case he could be charged alternatively under sections 307 and 326 IPC. The sum and substance of the submission of the learned APP is that if the charge is under section 307, the accused could be convicted for a lesser offence even in the absence of such charge, but if a charge is framed of a lesser offence, than the Court concerned would not be in a position to convict the accused of a graver offence like 307 Page 19 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER IPC. Well, I am not impressed by such submission because it comes to this that in all cases, the trial court should frame the charge of the graver offence only as an abundant caution and ultimately if not established, than convict the accused of the lesser offence. That is not the correct way of looking at the matter. This is the reason why I am laying much emphasis on the fact that the police should bear in mind the fine distinction between the offence under sections 323, 324, 325, 326 and 307 of the IPC. For such purpose, the guiding factors would be the nature of the weapon used, the place where the injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries caused and the opportunity available which the accused gets.
32. Having considered the position of law as discussed above, could it be said that the accused applicants had the requisite intention or knowledge so as to try them for the offence under section 307 of the IPC. To answer this question, at times, the Court may have to sift the evidence. Although the papers of the charge-sheet would throw some light in this regard, yet, ultimately, it is for the Court concerned to appreciate this aspect by considering the evidence which the prosecution and the defence may adduce during the trial.
33. The law governing the trial of criminal offences provides for alteration of charges at any stage of the proceedings depending upon the evidence adduced in the case. If the trial is being held before a Court of Magistrate it is open to that court at any stage of trial if it comes to the conclusion that the material on record indicates the commission of an offence which requires to be tried by a superior court, it can always do so by committing such case for further trial to a superior court as contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). On the contrary, if the trial is being conducted in a superior court like the Sessions Court and if that court comes to the conclusion that the evidence produced in the said trial makes out a lesser Page 20 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER offence than the one with which the accused is charged, it is always open to that court based on evidence to convict such accused for a lesser offence. Thus, arguments regarding the framing of a proper charge are best left to be decided by the trial court at an appropriate stage of the trial. Otherwise as has happened in this case proceedings get protracted by the intervention of the superior courts (see Criminal Appeal No.1508 of 2003 reported in AIR 2004 SC 1189).
34. In fact the Supreme Court has not approved such exercise to be undertaken by the High Court while entertaining a petition under section 482 of the Code. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Salman Salimkhan & Anr. (supra), had the occasion to consider an identical issue. In the said case, the respondent was originally charged of an offence punishable under section 304A, 279, 337, 338, 427, IPC and section 134(a)(b) read with sections 181 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 as also under section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. All these offences are triable by a court of Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. The charge-sheet, at a later stage, came to be modified based on the additional statement of th complainant, and instead of section 304A, IPC, section 304, Part II, IPC was substituted which is an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session. The learned Magistrate, who had taken cognizance of the offence, committed the said case to the Court of Session for trial. On the framing of the charge under section 304, Part II, IPC, the accused filed Criminal Application No.463 of 2003 in the Court of Session alleging that the facts as narrated in the complaint did not constitute an offence punishable under section 304, Part II, IPC and if at all, only a charge for an offence punishable under section 304A could be framed against him, apart from other offences triable by the Court of Magistrate. The said application came to be rejected by the Sessions Court and the Sessions Judge, thereafter, Page 21 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER proceeded to frame charges, one of which, was for an offence punishable under section 304, Part II, IPC.
35. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of his application and the consequential framing of charge under section 304, Part II, IPC, the accused preferred a criminal application under section 482 of the Code before the Criminal Appellate Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court allowed the said application and quashed the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge framing charge under section 304, Part II, IPC against the accused while it maintained the other charges and directed the Magistrate to frame de novo charges under various sections including one under section 304A, IPC.
36. The State of Maharashtra, feeling dissatisfied, filed special leave petition before the Supreme Court and challenged the order passed by the High Court. The Supreme Court made the following observations:
Mr. Harish N Slave, learned senior counsel representing the respondent--accused, per contra, contended that from a plain reading of the complaint which is the only material available at this stage for the purpose of framing charges, no reasonable person could ever have come to the conclusion that the respondent ever had any knowledge that by his act of driving the motor vehicle, he would cause such an act which would lead to the death of any person. He further submitted that from the material on record itself it is clear that if at all any act of the respondent is responsible for the death of the victim same cannot be termed anything other than a rash and negligent act punishable under section 304A. Learned senior counsel further submitted that since the learned Sessions Judge while rejecting the application of the petitioner filed before it in altering the charge from section 304 Part II to 304A, IPC, had itself Page 22 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER passed a lengthy order which indicated that the said court had formed a conclusive opinion as to the nature of offence which definitely would have prejudiced the case of the respondent in the trial, the High Court was left with no choice but to decide this question as to the nature of offence if at all committed by the respondent.
But for the fact that two courts below i.e. the Sessions Court and the High Court having gone into this issue at length and having expressed almost a conclusive opinion as to the nature of offence, we would not have interfered with the impugned order of the High Court because, as stated above, neither of the sides would have been in any manner prejudiced in the trial by framing of a charge either under section 304A or section 304 Part II, IPC except for the fact that the forum trying the charge might have been different, which by itself, in our opinion, would not cause any prejudice. This is because at any stage of the trial it would have been open to the concerned court to have altered the charge appropriately depending on the material that is brought before it in the form of evidence.
But now by virtue of the impugned judgment of the High Court even if in the course of the trial the Magistrate were to come to the conclusion that there is sufficient material to charge the respondent for a more serious offence than the one punishable under section 304A, it will not be possible for it to pass appropriate order. To that extent the prosecution case gets preempted.
We are of the opinion that though it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under section 482 of the Code to quash charges framed by the trial court, same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to Page 23 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER be believed, would it constitute an offence or not.
The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of charge can be done only at the stage of trial. By relying upon the decisions of the apex Court most of which were with reference to appeals arising out of convictions, we think the High Court was not justified in this case in giving a finding as to the nonexistence of material to frame a charge for an offence punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC, therefore, so far as the finding given by the High Court is concerned, we are satisfied that it is too premature a finding and ought not to have been given at this stage. At the same time we are also in agreement with the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents that even the Sessions Court ought not to have expressed its views in such certain terms which indicates that the Sessions Court had taken a final decision in regard to the material to establish a charge punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC.
Therefore, we think it appropriate that the findings in regard to the sufficiency or otherwise of the material to frame a charge punishable under section 304, Part II, IPC of both the courts below should be set aside and it should be left to be decided by the court trying the offence to alter or modify any such charge at an appropriate stage based on material produced by way of evidence.
The next question which then requires our consideration is whether in view of our above finding, the charge framed by the Sessions Judge for an offence punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC be sustained or one under section 304A as has been done by the High Court, should be retained ?
We have been informed that pursuant to the judgment of the High Court, the Metropolitan Magistrate, 12th Court, Bandra, Mumbai, has already framed fresh charges under section 304A Page 24 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER and other provisions mentioned hereinabove and the trial has commenced. Since any interference at this stage would not further the cause of justice and would lead only to delay the course of justice, we think it appropriate that the proceedings before the said Magistrates Court should continue and the trial should proceed on the basis of the charges framed by it but we make it very clear that at any appropriate stage if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient material to charge the respondent for a more serious offencethan the one punishable under section 304A, he shall proceed to do so without in any manner being hindered or influenced by the observations or findings of the High Court in the impugned order or by the order of the Sessions Court which framed the charge punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC. Such decision of the Magistrate shall be purely based on the material brought in evidence at the trial."
18. In the above noted decision, the facts were quite gross and altogether different from the facts of the case in hand. In Hanif Usmanbhai (supra), the First Informant along with his colleagues intercepted a truck allegedly carrying bullocks for the purpose of slaughter. In the process, the First Informant and his colleagues were allegedly attacked and assaulted by the applicants with sticks and swords.
The injuries were inflicted on the head of the three persons. The injuries were also quite serious in nature. In such circumstances, this Court took the view that it was too premature to arrive at any decision whether the accused person had the requisite intention or the knowledge.
Page 25 of 28R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER
19. In the present case, the police officer concerned sustained multiple injuries on the left hand and on the base of the nose. These injuries were suffered by the witnesses concerned on account of the attempt on his part to prevent the applicants to run away by accelerating their car. The attempt on the part of the applicants was to see that they are not arrested.
By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the act of the applicants was done with an intention or knowledge and under such circumstances, if they, by their act, caused death, they would be guilty of murder.
20. It is true that for the purpose of offence under Section 307 of the IPC, it is not essential that any bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although, the nature of the injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any.
"At the same time, as observed by Lord Denning that "when people say that a man must be taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts, they fall into error; there is no 'must' about it; it is only 'may'. The presumption of intention is not a proposition of law but a proposition of ordinary good sense. It means this: that as a man is usually able to foresee what are the natural consequences of his acts, so it is, as a rule, reasonable to infer that he did foresee and intend them. But, while that is an inference which may be drawn, it is not one which must be drawn. If on all the facts of the case Page 26 of 28 R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER it is not the correct inference then it should not be drawn". In fact, some of the observations made by this Court in the case of Hanif Usmanbhai (supra) are helpful to Mr. Shah to fortify his submissions. In para 31 of the judgment, this Court observed thus:
"...The learned APP invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bejoy Chand vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 SC 105 and submitted that where the accused is charged under section 307, Penal Code, he may be convicted under sections 323, 324 and 325 as the case may be even in the absence of a charge in respect of it, if on the facts of the case he could be charged alternatively under sections 307 and 326 IPC. The sum and substance of the submission of the learned APP is that if the charge is under section 307, the accused could be convicted for a lesser offence even in the absence of such charge, but if a charge is framed of a lesser offence, than the Court concerned would not be in a position to convict the accused of a graver offence like 307 IPC. Well, I am not impressed by such submission because it comes to this that in all cases, the trial court should frame the charge of the graver offence only as an abundant caution and ultimately if not established, than convict the accused of the lesser offence. That is not the correct way of looking at the matter. This is the reason why I am laying much emphasis on the fact that the police should bear in mind the fine distinction between the offence under sections 323, 324, 325, 326 and 307 of the IPC. For such purpose, the guiding factors would be the nature of the weapon used, the place where the injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries caused and the opportunity available which the accused gets."Page 27 of 28
R/CR.MA/6079/2018 ORDER
21. Thus, in the overall view of the matter, I am convinced that Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code could not have been invoked and the filing of the charge-sheet to that extent is not justified."
22. As pointed out above, charge-sheet has been filed and the filing of the charge-sheet culminated in the Criminal Case No. 6079 of 2018 pending in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anklav. The Criminal Case is yet to be committed to the Court of Sessions.
23. In the result, this application is allowed. Section 307 of the IPC is ordered to be deleted from the charge-sheet. The effect of deletion of Section 307 of the IPC shall be examined by the Court concerned and thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law.
24. Let me clarify that hurt has been caused therefore, it is upto the trial Court to frame appropriate charge with regard to the hurt alleged to have been caused by the applicants.
25. With the above, this application is disposed of. Rule made absolute. Direct service is permitted.
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J) Bhoomi Page 28 of 28