Allahabad High Court
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Shanti Devi And 6 Others on 14 October, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:183850
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 4377 of 2018
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Shanti Devi And 6 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
, Nagendra Kumar Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Amit Kumar Sinha, Deepali Srivastava Sinha, Shailendra Kumar Dwivedi
Court No. - 38 A.F.R.
HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.
Order on Cross Objection Learned counsel for the applicant submits that he does not want to press the cross objection.
The cross objection is dismissed as not pressed.
Order on Appeal
1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred by the insurer of Roadways Bus No. UP-32-CZ-4600 against the impugned judgment and award dated 24.08.2018 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court no.1, Allahabad, in MACP No.217 of 2012, Smt. Shanti Devi & Others vs.UPSRTC & Others, whereby compensation of Rs.81,35,000/- alongwith interest @ 7% per annum has been awarded to the claimants(wife and children) for the death of claimant?s husband/father Dr. Masi Lal due to injuries suffered by him in an accident which occurred on 08.03.2012 at about 9:45 AM.
2. Factual matrix is that the deceased Dr. Masi Lal was driving a motorcycle No. UP-63-H-1095 on 08.03.2012 then at 09.45 AM near Govindpur crossing, Mohalla Teliyarganj within the jurisdiction of police station Shivkuti, Allahabad the above Motorcycle was hit by a roadways bus No. UP-32-CZ-4600 which was being driven in rash and negligent manner by its driver. The offending bus collided head-on with the motorcycle, resulting in grievous injuries to Dr. Masi Lal, who succumbed on the spot. The deceased was aged about 46 years on the date of the accident and was professional doctor and was employed as Deputy C.M.O. in the office of the C.M.O., Mirzapur and was drawing salary of Rs.74,074/- per month. The claimants(wife and children) claimed compensation of Rs.1,05,00,000/- but the tribunal relying upon the Form-16 of the Income Tax Act of the deceased, assessed his annual income to be Rs.7,85,571/- and after deducting an amount of Rs.69,719/- towards the income tax, granted future prospect of 30%, applied multiplier of 13, awarded compensation of Rs.81,35,000/- alongwith 7% interest per annum to the claimants(wife and children) of the deceased, which was ordered to be paid by the insurer of the offending Roadways Bus No. UP-32-CZ-4600.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company submitted that from the site plan and the evidence of eye witness Raju PW-2, it is evident that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, who was driving motorcycle No. UP-63-H-1095 on the date of the accident, but the tribunal has erred in concluding that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the driver of the offending Roadways Bus No. UP-32-CZ-4600. It was also submitted that the offending bus did not possess the relevant route permit at the time of the accident, as such, the appellant is not liable to indemnify the claimants.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 submitted that at the time of the accident, the offending bus was being driven on the right side of the road, which itself shows that the driver of the bus was negligent in driving the bus. He further submitted that no evidence was adduced by the owner, driver and insurer of the bus regarding contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, as such, it cannot be presumed that there was any negligence on the part of the deceased. He further submitted that after investigation, a charge sheet has been submitted against the driver of the offending bus which itself proves that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the driver of the offending bus. He further submitted that the tribunal has recorded a categorical finding that the offending bus was being plied according to the terms and conditions of the policy, which was having a valid route permit on the date of the alleged accident as such, the above finding of the tribunal warrants no interference by this appellate Court. With these submissions, it was prayed that the appeal is meritless and is liable to be dismissed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The Apex Court in the case of ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajani Sahoo and Others (2025) 2 SCC 599, has held as under:-
"8. As regards the reliability of charge-sheet and other documents collected by the police during the investigation in motor accident cases, this Court in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819 : 2018 INSC 311] , held in para 27, thus(SCCp.672) ?27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 and 3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , noted that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by the tribunal.?
9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral and documentary evidence including the FIR, final report and such other documents prepared by the police in connection with the accident in question. The Tribunal had also taken note of the fact that based on the final report, the driver of the offending truck was tried and found guilty for rash and negligent driving. The High Court took note of such aspects and found no illegality in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal and consequently dismissed the appeal.
10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi [(2023) 13 SCC 510 : 2023 INSC 621] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 514, para 12) ?12. ? A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [(2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] which has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .?
11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the position that the question regarding negligence which is essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident claim should be considered based on the evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into such documents for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible or inadmissible.
12. It is also a fact that the appellant had attributed that the respondent claimants connived with police and fraudulently prepared the charge-sheet. The contention is that the vehicle insured with the appellant was not involved in the accident and the accident had occurred solely due to the rash and negligence on the part of the deceased. But the evidence on record would reveal that pursuant to the filing of the final report, cognizance was taken for rash and negligent driving which resulted in the death of Udayanath Sahoo."
(emphasis supplied)
7. The Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet and another vs. Abdul Kayam Neb and another 2025 SCC OnLine Sc 497, has held as under:-
"4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the bus driver."
(emphasis supplied)
8. The Apex Court in the case of Jiju Kuruvila & Ors. vs. Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 166, held as under:-
?20.5. The mere position of the vehicles after accident, as shown in a scene mahazar, cannot give a substantial proof as to the rash and negligent driving on the part of one or the other. When two vehicles coming from opposite directions collide, the position of the vehicles and its direction, etc. depends on a number of factors like the speed of vehicles, intensity of collision, reason for collision, place at which one vehicle hit the other, etc. From the scene of the accident, one may suggest or presume the manner in which the accident was caused, but in the absence of any direct or corroborative evidence, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there was negligence on the part of the driver. In absence of such direct or corroborative evidence, the Court cannot give any specific finding about negligence on the part of any individual.
20.6. The post-mortem report, Ext. A-5 shows the condition of the deceased at the time of death. The said report reflects that the deceased had already taken meal as his stomach was half-full and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in a fluid with strong smell of spirit. The aforesaid evidence, Ext. A-5 clearly suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but on the basis of the same, no definite finding can be given that the deceased was driving the car rashly and negligently at the time of accident. The mere suspicion based on Ext. B-2 ?scene mahazar? and Ext. A-5 post-mortem report cannot take the place of evidence, particularly, when the direct evidence like PW 3 (independent eyewitness), Ext. A-1 (FIR), Ext. A-4 (charge-sheet) and Ext. B-1 (FI statement) are on record.?
9. The Apex Court in the case of Prabhavati & Ors. vs. Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation 2025 SCC OnLine SC 455, held as under:-
?10. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court on the 25% contributory negligence of the deceased and 75% upon the driver of the bus. We find ourselves to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal on this issue. The Tribunal rightly, after considering the evidence on record and on perusal of the Ex. P3 Spot Mahazar, came to the conclusion that there wasn't any sufficient evidence on record, indicating that the accident occurred due to negligent driving on the part of the deceased, and after considering the oral evidence of P.W.1, held the cause of the accident to be rash and negligent on the part only of the offending vehicle.
11. Thus, in our considered view, the contributory negligence taken by the High Court at 25% of the deceased is erroneous. We advert to the principles laid down in Jiju Kuruvila v. Kunjujamma(supra) where it was held that in the absence of any direct or corroborative evidence on record, it cannot be assumed that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles. This exposition came to be followed in Kumari Kiran v. Sajjan Singh (2015) 1 SCC 539. In the present case, therefore, on an allegation simpliciter, it cannot be presumed that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of both vehicles, for having driven at high speed.?
10. It is apparent that the claimants have examined three witnesses before the tribunal PW-1 Shanti Devi, PW-2 Raju and PW-3 Mohd. Shakeel Ahmad. PW-1 is not an eye witness of the accident. PW-3 has proved the salary certificate of the deceased and PW-2 is the alleged eye witness of the accident.
11. PW-2, Raju has deposed before the tribunal that on the date of the accident, he was present at the spot. Dr. Masi Lal was driving the motorcycle No.UP-63-H-1095 on the Govindpur crossing, who was going towards Teliyarganj, Sanjeev Singh was pillion rider, then Bus No. UP-32-CZ-4600 which was being driven in rash and negligent manner came from the wrong side and collided with the motorcycle, resulting in injuries to Dr. Masi Lal, who died instantaneously on the spot. He further deposed that after the accident, the offending bus stopped and subsequently, the driver of the offending bus fled. He further deposed that the deceased was driving the motorcycle in a normal speed, on the left side of the road and the accident was seen by other persons also. In cross examination, he also deposed that he saw the accident and due to festival, there was less crowd on the Govindpur crossing. He denied the suggestion that he did not witness the accident. It is evident that after the accident, an FIR was registered on 08.03.2012 at 11:30 hours by Shekhar Azad(nephew of deceased) in which after investigation, a charge sheet has been submitted against the offending bus driver Zuber Khan under Sections 279, 338, 427, 304-A IPC.
12. It is further apparent that in the technical inspection of the motorcycle No. UP-63-H-1095, it was found severely damaged. Further, according to the postmortem report of the deceased, a 4x4 c.m. bone deep laceration was found in the occipital region of his head. The cause of death was opined to be ante-mortem brain injury. It is also apparent that neither the owner, driver of the offending bus nor the insurer have appeared in the witness box to contradict the claim. No contra evidence was led by the opposite parties before the tribunal, as such, there was no evidence to presume that the accident occurred due to the contributory negligence of the deceased who was driving motorcycle No. UP-63-H-1095 at the time of the accident.
13. The tribunal has also recorded a categorical finding that the offending bus was under contract with the UPSRTC and was having a valid route permit from Allahabad to Lucknow.
14. The Apex Court in the case of UPSRTC Vs. Regional Transport Authority & others (1998) 7 SCC 436, has held that combined reading of Section 68-B, 68-F(1-E) and Rule 10 of the UP State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1974 shows that in so far as the notified routes are concerned, for which the Corporation has an exclusive right to ply their vehicles under the scheme framed under the Act, the duration of permit obtained by the Corporation for plying those vehicles is coterminous with the life of the scheme. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 says that the permit issued as aforesaid shall remain valid till the scheme remains in force.
15. The Apex Court in the case of UPSRTC vs. Kulsum and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 142 has held that where the vehicle was given on hire by the owner of the vehicle together with its existing and running insurance policy, in view of the terms and conditions of the agreement, the Insurance Company cannot escape its liability to pay compensation. Though, for all practical purposes, for the relevant period, the hirer becomes the owner of the vehicle for the specific period. But in case the vehicle is insured at the instance of original owner, it will be deemed that the vehicle is transferred along with the Insurance Policy in existence to the hirer and thus, the Insurance Company would not be escaped from its liability to pay the amount of compensation. The liability to pay compensation is based on statutory provision and the liability of the owner to have compulsory insurance is only in regard to the third party and not to the property.
16. Further, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bajaj Allianz General Isnurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Mamta Devi & Others, 2015 SCC OnLine All 8613 has held that once the vehicle is insured, the owner as well as any person can use the vehicle with the consent of the owner. Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not provide that any person who uses the vehicle independently, a separate insurance policy should be taken. It was further held that route on which vehicle was being plied was a notified route and operation was not illegal for want of any valid permit, as such, the liability to pay compensation was fastened on the insurance company. It is further held that the Corporation had produced the documentary evidence which established that Gorakhpur-Maghar-Khalilabad-Basti was a notified route and the scheme no. (2) was in force and thus it cannot be said that the operation was illegal for want of any valid permit.
17. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. UPSRTC & Others 2015 (33) LCD 2814 has held as under:-
?10. The procedure provided under Rule 10 of the Rules of 1974 is very clear and explicit, which says that as and when an application under Sub-Rule (1) is made, the State Transport Authorities or Regional Transport Authorities, as the case may be, may issue a permit to the State Transport Undertaking for the notified route or notified area accordingly.
11. Counsel for UPSRTC has laid emphasis on the words ''notified route or notified area' are the only requirement as contemplated under the Act and to substantiate his case, he has further drawn the attention of the Court towards Form IV Part A of the permit. Form IV part A goes to indicate that notified route or notified area is the only requirement and nothing more than that. And the requirement is also to the same effect that the State Transport Authorities or Regional Transport Authorities are required to issue permit to the State Transport Undertaking indicating notified route or notified area.
12. Once the requirement for issuance of permit for notified route or notified area has been made, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that bus number must be mentioned on the permit cannot be accepted and neither termed to be statutory requirement as contemplated under the Act or Rule. The further argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that the said permit has not been proved. It is to be noted that photostat copy of the permit was filed by UPSRTC. The UPSRTC happens to be a public body. The custodian of the original record is the said public body and, therefore, attested photostat copy of the same has been filed by UPSRTC before the Tribunal, therefore, it cannot be said that it is not a correct document and the same cannot be considered ?
(emphasis supplied)
18. In view of the above law laid down by the Apex Court and the Division Benches of this Court, it is apparent that if the route was notified then the duration of the permit obtained by the Corporation for plying the vehicle is coterminous with the life of the scheme and even if, the number of the bus is not mentioned in the permit, it is not fatal.
19. In the instant case, the tribunal has recorded a categorical finding that the bus was plying on the Allahabad-Lucknow route and was having a valid permit. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the route was notified and as such, the submission that the bus was being plied without valid route permit, is liable to be rejected.
20. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant.
21. Accordingly, this appeal has got no merit and is liable to be dismissed.
22. The appeal is dismissed.
23. The impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal dated 24.08.2018 is affirmed.
24. Office is directed to remit back the statutory deposit made by the Insurance Company to the Tribunal concerned, forthwith, if not already remitted.
25. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
26. The tribunal is directed to disburse the compensation to the claimants as per its judgment without any delay, if not already disbursed.
(Sandeep Jain,J.) October 14, 2025 Himanshu