Karnataka High Court
Nagappayya Bhat And Others vs Maharajaswamy Varaha Devaru Of Sri ... on 20 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: ILR1998KAR2313, 1998(4)KARLJ186
Author: M.P. Chinnappa
Bench: M.P. Chinnappa
JUDGMENT
1. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that the plaintiffs and their family are entitled both by custom and by hereditary right to the perquisite of performing the panchakajjaya seva attached to the office of Keelu Shanti Archakas in the 1st defendant temple and for consequential relief of a perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant temple, its trustees and all persons claiming through or under them from interfering in any way with the performance of panchakajjaya seva by them. They also sought for setting aside the order of the 4th defendant (Commissioner of H.R. and C.E.) Bangalore, dated 11-9-1969 and also for ancillary relief.
2. The material allegations are that the 1st defendant is an ancient Hindu Public Temple situated in Maravanthe village of Kundapura Taluk in Dakshina Kannada District. It is one of the oldest temple and governed under the provisions of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, and also by well recognised custom and usage. It is alleged that the joint family of the plaintiffs has been holding the office of Keelu Shanti Archaka in the 1st defendant temple, since time immemorial and doing Keelu Shanti Service by hereditary right in the 1st defendant temple. Venka Bhatta was doing Keelu Shanti Service and after his death his son Shesha Bhatta was doing the same. After Shesha Bhatta it was Linga Bhatta the father of the plaintiff who was performing the Keelu Shanti Service to the 1st defendant. Therefore, it is their claim that the family has been performing Keelu Shanti Service for generations and that right is vested to the plaintiff family. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants 2 and 3 are Melu Shanti Archakas of the 1st defendant. According to the plaintiffs, it was by virtue of custom and usage that the 1st defendant is entitled to collect only a Kanika at a certain rate which was fixed at 30 paise in a rupee of Panchakajjaya Seva "Suvana Pusha" (Dakshina) for Brahmaropana i.e., for offering the Panchakajjaya prepared by Keelu Shantis to the deity of the 1st defendant temple by way of 'Naivedya'. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that Keelu Shanti Archakas are entitled to get their own right for the Panchakajjaya Seva. However, the same is variable from time to time depending upon the prices of the various items required for preparing Panchakajjaya. The daily collections except on Amavasya day is not considerable. In the Amvasya coming in the month of Ashada, the collection exceeds Rs. 4,000/-. The plaintiffs assert that even the temple had recognised this right as a perquisite attached to the office of Keelu Shanti Archakas. On 11-9-1969 Mr. Shankaranarayana Rao, the then managing trustee of the temple served an order on the 1st plaintiff directing them not to prepare pachakajjaya and it would be done by temple itself which resulted in filing a suit registered as O.S. No. 237 of 1970, on the file of Munsiff of Kundapura for permanent injunction and an ex parte temporary injunction was obtained on 29-7-1970. Subsequently that injunction order was vacated which resulted in filing M.A. No. 11 of 1970 on the file of the Civil Judge, Udupi, unsuccessfully. Being aggrieved by that order, C.R.P. No. 1110 of 1971 was filed before this Court and this Court was pleased to grant injunction. Thereafter, O.S. No. 237 of 1970 came to be dismissed holding that suit is not maintainable. However, in R.A. No. 71 of 1973 preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, the Civil Judge, was pleased to allow the same holding that the suit is maintainable and the matter was remanded to Munsiff, Kundapur. As against that order, the defendants preferred MSA No. 3 of 1974 before this Court. This Court has held that the dispute comes within the purview of Sections 57 and 93 of the Act and held that to sell panchakajjaya and retain its sale proceeds after paying to the deity and Melu Shanti Archakas is a perquisite attached to the office of the Keelu Shanti Archaka. Therefore, the application was filed before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 57(e) of the Act. The same came to be dismissed on 24-2-1992 holding that the panchakajjaya seva is the exclusive right of the temple. The said order was unsuccessfully carried before the Commissioner of HR and CE, Bangalore, who only confirmed the order. Hence the appellant filed the suit in O.S. No. 61 of 1993 on the file of the Civil Judge at Udupi along with I.A. I under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC for temporary injunction. The temporary injunction was granted. Subsequently, the defendants filed counter to I.A. I and also I.A. III for setting aside the order of temporary injunction granted on 29-6-1993: The learned Civil Judge after hearing both sides vacated the temporary injunction granted on I.As I and III filed under Order 39 Rule 4 of CPC. Being aggrieved by the said order, this appeal is presented.
3. Heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties.
4. The appellant has contended that the Civil Judge has not properly appreciated the facts and failed to hold that there is a prima facie case notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was able to establish prima facie case. The documents produced by the appellants were not properly assessed to come to the conclusion that the valuable rights of the appellant have been violated. The Court below has merely relied on the order passed by the D.C. of Coimbatore in the year 1954 and the report of the Assistant Commissioner submitted in the year 1993. There is no prohibition for the Civil Court to grant temporary injunction but the prohibition is only to stay the order passed by the Commissioner. The High Court has held that to sell the panchakajjaya and to retain its sale proceeds in MSA No. 3 of 1974 was not taken into consideration. He also submitted that if the injunction is not granted, the valuable right vested in the joint family of the plaintiff would be defeated and they have no other alternative remedy and greater hardship would be caused.
5. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently submitted that the suit as brought is not maintainable. The Court below has correctly held that no prima facie case is made out and no irreparable injury would be caused to the appellant and even if any injury is caused it can be compensated in terms of money. There is no vested right on the appellants to claim an injunction against the defendants. He also submitted that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellant and so far as that finding of the Court below is concerned, it is illegal and contrary to the provisions of law.
6. From the above arguments, it is abundantly clear that following points arise for consideration in this appeal:
(1) Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction to protect the rights of the appellants?
(2) If yes, whether the appellants have made out a prima facie case?
(3) In whose favour the balance of convenience weighs?
(4) Whether irreparable injury would be caused to the appellants if injunction is vacated? And (5) What order?
7. From a perusal of the order of the Court below, it is clear that the Court has raised a question which reads:
"Whether the injunction application is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 62(ii) of the H.R. and C.E. Act?"
Elaborately discussing the various decisions, the Court has passed the order in so far as it relates to this point at para 17 which reads:
"In view of the above facts and circumstances in general and having regard to the statutory interpretations and especially when there is no mention that the Court cannot grant any injunction, I hold this point in negative".
So from this it is clear that the Court has come to the conclusion that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant injunction and Section 62(ii) of the HR and CE Act does not prohibit the Civil Court from granting injunction. The respondents have not preferred any appeal or cross-objections questioning the finding of the Court on this point. However, it is always open to the respondent in the appeal to urge that question before this Court notwithstanding the fact that no appeal or cross-objections are filed in the appeal as the final order is in favour of the respondents. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that in view of Sections 57 and 93 of the Act the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant any injunction against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner HR and CE Endowment or the Commissioner. From the narration of facts, it is clear that the appellant has been agitating the matter right from the year 1952 to establish their rights of preparing panchakajjaya which is their joint family right. This Court has granted injunction in CRP No. 1190 of 1971 which is extensively quoted in para 25 of the impugned order. It is also held that the 2nd defendant had no right to illegally prevent the plaintiffs of their right even for a short period and since he has no right, it is necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiffs as they will suffer injury which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Therefore, it is clear that this Court has held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant injunction in a suit filed under the special statute.
8. However, the learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Division Bench of this Court has held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief which is not provided under the spe cial statute. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Banga lore and Another v The Committee of Management of the Jeeva Samadhi of Sri Yerriswami Tata, Chellagurki, Bellary and Others , where in it is held:
"The suit under Section 62 is a special suit under the Statute. Unlike the suits under general law, Court has no competence to grant relief other than the one contemplated by the Section. The limited power of the Court is to modify or cancel the orders of the Commissioner under Section 61. ... If the original Authority under Section 57 could not grant such a relief, it is obvious that the Court, under Section 62 cannot grant. A new Statute, replacing the old one on the subject, does not clothe the parties with a right to agitate concluded matters unless it is so specifically provided. . . Further Section 103(a) of the 1951 Act provides that any proceeding or action taken under the repealed Act, insofar as they are not consistent, shall be deemed to have Authority with the corresponding provisions of the Act. Therefore, it follows, that the order of the Board of Commissioners should be considered as having been passed by the Deputy Commissioner... The judicial scrutiny is restricted to find out the correctness of orders passed under Section 57 by the Deputy Commissioner and by the Commissioner under Section 61 of the Act. It has no power of remand, in other words, it is not Appellate Court. Further, whereas under Section 84(2} of the 1927 Act, application to modify or cancel the orders is to be made before the District Court, under the 1951 Act, an independent suit is provided before the Sub-Judge's Court. The Sub-Judge entertaining a suit under Section 62 has no jurisdiction to decide the correctness or legality of proceedings, if they have become final before the 1951 Act came into force. The learned District Judge could not have gone into this question. It is beyond judicial scrutiny.
(ii) Under Section 62 of the 1951 Act read with Section 6(ii) the suit is to be filed before Subordinate Judge's Court, within one year. On 1st July, 1964, Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 was brought into force, sub-section (2) of Section 12 provided that the Court of Subordinate Judges shall be deemed to be Court of Civil Judges established under the Act".
In that case, the plaintiff had sought for declaration to the effect that Jeeva Samadhi of Sri Yerriswami Tata is not a temple within the meaning of the Act 27 of 1915 and that institution does not come under the purview of the Act. On 2-8-1944 the Board of the Commissioners adjudicated that it is a public temple. It has proceeded on the assumption that it is a valid order passed by the statutory Board, the remedy open to the aggrieved party under the then existing statute was to file an application before the District Judge within one year. That remedy not having been availed of, the adjudication was allowed to hold the field for more than three decades and it became final. On the date the 1951 Act came into force, there was no "dispute" which needed adjudication by the Deputy Commissioner. Being a successor authority to the Board, Deputy Commissioner could not have set aside the order nor could it have been ignored. Admittedly no action was taken within one year after coming into force of the New Act. Therefore, it was held that the suit for declaration was not maintainable and it was misconceived and accordingly dismissed. Further, the suit should have been filed in the Civil Judge's Court and not in the District Court. Subordinate Judge being a person designated under Section 62 the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Therefore, it was held that the decree was without jurisdiction. From a reading of the entire judgement it is abundantly clear that the Division Bench of this Court had no occasion to deal with the fact that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. But only it was held that under Section 62 special suit had no competence to grant relief not contemplated therein. Judicial scrutiny is limited to find out correctness and modify or cancel order under Sections 57 and 61.
9. The learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention on the commentary on the Tamil Nadu Religious and General Endowments Act, 1959, written by Mr. Justice R. Sengottuvelan, Retired Judge of the High Court of Madras and also the Chairman, State Administrative Tribunal for Tamil Nadu at page 224 has observed:
"In a suit instituted under Section 70 it is not as if the Civil Court has no jurisdiction at all to grant any interim relief. What the Section prohibits is only the stay of the order of the Commissioner. If the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court is to be ousted by any special statute it must be by express words or by necessary intendment. The bar imposed by the Section can be applied only to the extent warranted by the language of the statutory provision. The rest of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, namely, those regulated by sub-rules (1) and (2) of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code remains intact. In a suit to set aside the order of the Commissioner and declare the plaintiff as the hereditary trustee the Court can, on the plaintiff's application grant an interim injunction restraining the newly appointed trustee from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the temple lands. Such an injunction will not amount to stay of operation of the order of the Commissioner within the meaning of the Section. Whether or not an injunction should be granted is a matter for the Court to decide on the facts of each case applying the normal rules of law".
10. The learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on several decisions to substantiate his argument that the language used in the sections should be given the simple meaning as used and understood. The true meaning of the section must be gathered from the express intention of the Legislature. Even if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application either of the doctrine of casus omissus or of pressing into service external aid, for in such a case the words used by the Constitution or the statute speak for themselves and it is not the intention of the Courts to add words or expressions merely to suit what the Courts think is the supposed intention of the legislature. Interpretative skill has to be applied when there is a genuine ambiguity in the statute in question. The Court must proceed on tbe footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. When there is a difficulty in phraseology it is not competent for any Court to proceed upon that the legislature has made a mistake. Recourse to rules of construction would be necessary only when a statute is capable of two interpretations. But when the language is clear and the meaning plain, effect must be given to it. As far as the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on these aspects are not in dispute.
11. Further, to emphasise that Court shall not make a legislation, the Full Bench of this Court has held in M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited v Contract Workers' Union, Steel Authority of India Limited:
"The job of ironing out the creases is quite different and distinct from tailoring work. The Court cannot add the material not used by the legislature while conveying its intention in enacting a particular provision. Interpretative skill has to be applied when there is a genuine ambiguity in the statute in question. The Court cannot assume that a particular intention was sought to be effectuated by the legislature while enacting the law even though the words needed to effectuate that intention were not used in fact".
With these principles in mind, it is now necessary to refer to sub-section (1) of Section 62 reads:
"Anypartyaggrievedbyanorderpassedbythe Commissioner.-
(i) under Section 61, sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), and relating to any of the matters specified in Section 57, 58 or 60; or
(ii) under Section 57, 58 or 60 read with sub-section (l)(a), (2) or (4)(a) of Section 19.
may, within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such order by him, institute a suit in the Court against such order and the Court may modify or cancel such order, but it shall have no power to stay the Commissioner's order pending the disposal of the suit".
12. The learned Counsel for the appellant further placed reliance on a decision in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Mafatlal Industries and Others , wherein their Lordships have held:
"Natural meaning -- Words must be given its natural meaning and must be understood in its ordinary or popular sense and each word must have its play -- Natural and ordinary meaning of the words should not be departed from unless it is shown that the context in which the words are used requires a different meaning".
13. With this background, it is now necessary to refer to the word 'stay' used in Section 57 of the Act. In another context, the Patna High Court had an occasion to discuss the meaning and scope of stay order and injunction in a decision in Subhas Kumar Singh and Others v Sheo Balak Singh and Others , wherein their Lordships have held:
"The difference between an order of injunction and order of stay are well known. In one case, it is an order against the person restraining him from executing a decree; in the other case, it is a direction to the Court to stay the proceeding".
14. Similarly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in Mulraj v Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, that order of stay is addressed to Court while that of injunction is passed against party. Under Section 62 of the Act, the word used is only 'stay' and not 'injunction'. The Civil Court ordinarily has the power of granting stay or injunction in any suit unless it is prohibited or barred under the special statute. If the legislature intended to prohibit the Civil Court while entertaining civil suits and petitions under the Act, it would have specifically mentioned that no injunction should be granted. On the other hand, the prohibition contained under the Act for the Civil Court is only not to stay the order of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, there is absolutely no prohibition as such under the Act for the Civil Court to grant injunction depending on the merits of the suit. Even otherwise, the Court has got inherent power in an appropriate case to grant injunction if the parties make out a good case. In addition to that, this Court itself, as referred to above in CRP No. 1110 of 1971 has granted injunction in favour of the appellant and that order has not been set aside. Further, injunction is sought only against defendant 1 and not against other defendants. Under those circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the Court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the Civil Court while entertaining a suit under this Act has power to grant injunction. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.
15. The learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that an appeal against an Interlocutory order cannot be interfered with by the appellate Court unless it is established that the order passed by the Court below is perverse, arbitrary and injudicious. Under those circumstances, it is necessary for this Court to find out as to whether the order suffers from any of these illegalities to entertain this appeal. The learned Court below has held whether the plaintiff has got heriditary right to perform the panchakajjaya seva or whether this right is entrusted in the trust of the 1st defendant temple is a question to be decided at the final disposal of the case. He also referred to the various proceedings in between these parties. This dispute started right from 1954 and the appellants have been agitating for their rights. It is no doubt true that trustees, are the persons who are having administrative control of the institution. However, as trustees they passed an order that all archakas have got a right to claim share in the offerings.
16. The learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that by practice and usage the Keelu Shanti Archakas are entitled to prepare panchakajjaya. Out of every one rupees 20% will go to the deity and 10% will go to Melu Shanti Archaka and the remaining 70% will be given to the Keelu Shanti Archaka to which the appellants are belonging. For the first time on 11-9-1969 the managing trustee issued the order which resulted in filing O.S. No. 237 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff, Kun-dapur. On 29-7-1970 injunction was granted in favour of the appellant. Subsequently it came to be vacated. M.A. No. 11 of 1970 was filed on the file of the Civil Judge, Udupi but the appeal was dismissed. As against it, Civil Revision Petition No. 1110 of 1979 was filed before this Court and this Court has granted injunction. Thereafter, the suit was dismissed. Once again R.A. No. 71 of 1973 was preferred. The matter was remanded holding that the suit is maintainable against which MSA No. 3 of 1974 was filed by the respondents. As it was held that the dispute comes under Section 57(e), the appellant approached the Deputy Commissioner and also the Commissioner. Since that application was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, the suit in question came to be filed. Even in this suit O.S. No. 64 of 1993, temporary injunction was granted which was vacated on 7-8-1996 holding that there is no prima facie case. In this Court also by order dated 11-10-1996, the interim injunction as prayed for was granted subject to the condition to comply with the Order 39, Rule 3(a), etc. That order still exists. With this background, it is now necessary to consider the impugned order.
17. The learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to 'parikhat'. This parikhat was executed on 2-1-1981 by Ramadiga, S/o Ishwar Bhat undertaking to perform the duties of Keelu Shanti Archaka. This document clearly discloses that there was an understanding between the trustees and Keelu Shanti Archakas to work as Keelu Shanti Archakas and it is understood that they have to do the duty for generations. Subsequently on 18-12-1952, Narayana Kamat, advocate has issued a reply notice to Sri G.K. Govinda Bhat, then advocate wherein it is clearly stated, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
"Sri M. Shankarnarayana Rao, Managing Trustee, Sri Maharajaswami Varahadeva Temple, Maravanthe Village, has requested me to send a reply to your notice dated 10-12-1952 sent on behalf of Linga Bhatta of Maravanthe Village.
It is admitted by my client that your client is an "Archaka" doing "Keelu Shanti" in the above temple. My client tells me that you have been misinformed regarding the "Panchakajjayam" to be supplied to the votaries. The trustees have no hand in the preparation and distribution of the "Panchakajjayam" except in recovering at the rate of Rs. 0-4-0 for every rupee of "Panchakajjayam" which is being issued for sale by the Temple Archakas, Naikadi Shesha Adiga, Naikadi Venkappa Adiga and your client. The said "Panchakajjayam" is prepared by the above people jointly and proceeds of the sale of the "Panchakajjayam" are divided between the three people by custom for the sake of convenience among themselves. When the Archakas give the "Prasadam" to the votaries when the "Panchakajjayyam" is sold to them, two counter foils are taken by the Archakas, one of which will be kept by them for the purpose of division among the persons who prepare the "Panchakajjayam" and the other to the votary and this system of preparing two counterfoils is for Karkataka Amavasya only and for the rest of the period only duplicate is maintained to be handed over to the Archaka for the delivery to the votary. The trustees therefore, are not receiving the value of the "Panchakajjayam" and as such your alleged claim for the alleged sale is false and therefore untenable. The management have no hand regarding preparation and distribution of "Panchakajjayam" to the votaries other tban that of collecting Rs. 0-4-0 Kanika for every rupee of Panchakajjayam.
Regarding the annual payment of Rs. 4-8-0 out of the Tasdik amount, such amounts which are found to be legally due will be paid to your client duly. Please inform your client of my client's contentions and any claim by your client will be equally dealt.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
K. Narayana Kamath, Advocate".
From this it is abundantly clear that the "Panchakajjayam" used to be prepared by Keelu Shanti Archakas and it is not disputed by the respondents. On the other hand, it is the clear case of admission so far as the respondent is concerned. In other words, the right of the appellant was recognised by the authorities. By virtue of the order passed by the trustees, the respondents are trying to take away the rights of the appellant. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and contended that it is mainly based on the Assistant Commissioner's report. The report of the Assistant Commissioner is not clear and it is not based on any of the materials. Though this was not considered by the Court, the learned Court below has come to the conclusion placing reliance on a decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, discussed supra. It is held by the Court that unlike the suits under general law, Court has no competence to grant relief other than the one contemplated by the Section. The limited power of the Court is to modify or cancel the orders of the Commissioner under Section 61. If the original Authority under Section 57 could not grant such a relief, it is obvious that the Court, under Section 62 cannot grant. It is also held that Court while deciding interim relief should not go into the merits of the case and also placed reliance on the decision of the Assistant Commissioner passed in the year 1993 and thereafter, holding that the plaintiffs have got no such right, he has come to the conclusion that it is outside the provision of Section 57. Therefore, he declined to grant injunction or to hold that prima facie case is made out. Further, it is held that the order could be modified or changed by the Court under Section 62 only while passing the judgment. On these grounds he held that there is no prima facie case. In other words, the learned Court below has not considered the documents placed before it to find out as to whether there is a prima facie case. Whether injunction could be granted or not is a different issue from considering the question of prima facie case in an application made under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the order passed by the Court below is not in consonence with the principles laid in regard to considering the application for injunction. Therefore, I hold that the order passed by the Court below on this point calls for interference.
18. From the perusal of the documents as indicated above, there has been a custom and practice in regard to preparation of Panchakajjayas by the appellants and it has been their right from 1882.
19. While considering the question of balance of convenience, the Court has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff will not suffer any loss or injury because they are being recognised as Keelu Shantis. Their income will be less but this can he compensated in terms of money. Had there been a denial of the plaintiff being Keelu Shanti then that would have caused a loss which could not have been compensated at all. From this it is clear that the learned Court below has not understood the claim of the appellants. With this, we have to consider with reference to the order passed by this Court in CRP No. 1110 of 1971 wherein His Lordship has held, at the cost of repetition, that the parties have a right to prepare and distribute 'panchakajjaya' in the suit temple and defendants 1 and 2 have no concern in that matter except to see that the seva is performed in the temple. The question is whether it is open to the Court below to declare that the right claimed was pertaining to the performance of seva in a temple and the disturbance of such a right even for a short duration could be compensated by costs. The plaintiffs are not performing seva for the money that they receive. The Court will be failing in its duty when it declines to protect their right. This order has not been set aside by this Court. This Court has come to the conclusion that the existing right of the plaintiffs cannot be taken away by the defendants. Therefore, it is not a question of loss of money but it is the question of exercising the right of the appellants which has to be protected by the Court.
20. The learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief which is not provided under the Act. Hence the final order will have to be set aside or modified under Section 62 of the Act and no Court has jurisdiction to grant the interim relief. This aspect has been discussed in detail and this argument cannot be accepted. There is no prohibition under the Section 62 to issue injunction orders but only a stay order could not be granted against the order of the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner. If injunction order is not granted, naturally the appellants would be losing their right which cannot be compensated by means of money. On the other hand, no inconvenience will be caused to the respondents. The respondents will be entitled for the percentage of amount payable as per the practice prevailing in the temple. Therefore, I hold that this appeal deserves to be allowed.
21. In the result therefore, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside, I.A. III is allowed restraining the 1st defendant temple, its trustees and all persons claiming through or under them from interfering in any way with the performance by them of the panchakajjaya seva in the 1st defendant temple, pending disposal of the suit.
Since the matter has been pending since a long time, the learned Court below is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, preferrably within a period of six months.