Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Rajen Chhetri & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 14 February, 2017
Author: Md. Mumtaz Khan
Bench: Debasish Kar Gupta, Md. Mumtaz Khan
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
And
The Hon'ble Justice Md. Mumtaz Khan
CRA No. 294 of 2006
Rajen Chhetri & Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal
For the appellants : Mr. Biplab Mitra, Ld. Advocate
Ms. Trina Mitra, Ld. Advocate
For the State : Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury, Ld. Advocate
Heard on : 15.12.2016, 16.12.2016, 19.12.2016
Judgment on : 14.02.2017
Md. Mumtaz Khan, J. :
The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants assailing the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated March 31, 2006 and April 1, 2006 respectively passed by the Ld. Sessions Judge, Darjeeling in T.R. No. 2/1999 arising out of Sessions Case No. 16 of 1999. By virtue of the impugned judgment appellants were convicted for commissioning of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.) and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- each in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one year each with a direction to pay 75% of the entire amount of fine, if realised, to the parents of the victim towards compensation while the accused Bangsay Chhetri and Thuli Chhetri were found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 I.P.C and were acquitted under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C.
The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows:-
On October 13, 1997 at 17.45 hours P.W.1 lodged a written complaint at the Kurseong P.S., District Darjeeling to the effect that on that date at around 16.25 hours while he was returning home from Bazar after exchanging money just below Monteviet Factory near Farm he saw the appellants as also the accused Islamuddin, since deceased, Mohan Chhetri, since deceased, Thuli Chhetri and Bangsay Chhetri to assault the victim Robin Rai. On seeing this when he went towards them he saw the appellant Rajen Chhetri and Islamuddin to put down the victim and stab him with a long sharp cutting weapon while Bangsay Chhetri and her daughter were shouting to kill him. Accused Mohan Chhetri on seeing him attacked him but he fled away. Thereafter, he requested the villagers for help and when he returned back with the villagers he found the victim dead and accused persons were fleeing away through tea bushes.
On the basis of the above written complaint, P.W.16 started Karseong P.S. Case No. 112/97 dated October 13, 1997 under Section 302/34 I.P.C. against Rupam Chhetri, Rajen Chhetri, Islamuddin, Mohan Chhetri, Thuli Chhetri and Bangsay Chhetri and endorsed the case to P.W.23 for investigation who then investigated this case and after completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against all the FIR name accused persons under Section 302/34 I.P.C.
Charge was framed on April 26, 1999 against all the six charge sheet name accused persons namely Rupam Chhetri, Rajen Chhetri, Islamuddin, Mohan Chhetri, Thuli Chhetri and Bangsay Chhetri under Section 302/34 I.P.C. and when they denied their involvement in the crime, trial commenced. In course of trial accused Mohan Chhetri and Islamuddin died and as such case was filed against them and trial proceed against the rest accused persons.
Prosecution examined 24 witnesses and also produced and proved certain documents and thereafter on completion of trial and after examining the accused persons including the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C. learned court below passed the impugned judgement.
Mr. Biplab Mitra, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence cannot be sustained in law due to material discrepancies and contradictions in between the F.I.R and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the involvement of the appellants and the role played by them, the time and the manner of assault, trustworthiness of the evidence of P.W.7, P.W.8, P.W.9 and P.W.10 who claimed to be eye witnesses in the light of the evidence adduced by P.W.1, P.W.4, P.W.6, P.W.16, P.W.17 and P.W.18., failure to prove the FIR by examining the scribe in the light of the evidence adduced by P.W.1, omission to put any question to the appellants during their examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. over the evidence adduced by P.W.7 as also the statements of the witnesses recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., failure to prove the common intention of the appellants with regard to their involvement in the commission of the offence of murder amongst others.
According to Mr. Mitra, charge framed under Section 302/34 IPC was not proved against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. According to him learned court below did not take into consideration the aforesaid aspects of the matter for passing the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence.
Reliance is placed by the learned advocate for the appellants on the decisions of Badam Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 26.
It was submitted by Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury, learned advocate representing the state that the instant case was based mainly on the evidence of eye witness P.W.7 and the other post occurrence witnesses namely, P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10.
According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the injuries inflicted on the victim as narrated by P.W.7 have been fully corroborated by the doctor (P.W.12) as also the inquest report (Exbt.10) and the evidence of P.W.15 who saw quarrel between the victim and the accused persons including these appellants and pacified them led credence to the evidence of eye witness P.W.7 and other post occurrence witnesses.
According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, discrepancies as also the contradictions as pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellants are not so vital going to the root of the case so as to discard the evidence of prosecution witnesses. According to him common intention of the appellants in causing the death of the victim has been proved by the eye witness who saw these appellants were present at the time and place of commission of the offence and even appellant No. 2, Rupam Chhetri, chased away P.W.1 when he went to stop incident.
According to Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury, learned advocate representing the state omission on the part of the court to put questions under section 313 Cr.P.C. can not ensure to the benefit of the accused.
According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, case against the appellants was proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
Reliance is placed by Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury on the decisions of Yakub Ismailbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2004 (12) SCC 229; Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2006(1) SCC 191; Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2015(1) SCC 496 and Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh reported in 2016(10) JT 332.
We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and have given our thoughtful consideration to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the materials on record for examining the propriety of the impugned judgement.
It was not in dispute that the victim Rabin Rai died on October 13, 1997 and his death was unnatural. It was also evident from the evidence of the doctor (P.W.12) and the PM report (Exbt.3) that during post- mortem examination, P.W.12 found the following injuries on the person of the victim:-
"1. Sharp cut injury obliquely left side of the chest about 2'' below left nipple. 1½'' long X 1'' breadth piercing the chest wall and entered into the left venticle.
2. Anterior aspect of the right elbow joint obliquely superficial cut injuries, 1''X½''X½''.
3. Sharp cut injury lateral side of the elbow joint 1'' X ½ X ½''.
4. Sharp cut injury superficial left scapular region.
5. Abrasion right knee joint ½'' X 1/3'' X 1/3''.
In the opinion of the doctor death was due to cardio- respiratory failure on account of stab injury into heart which is homicidal in nature. He also opined that such type of injury can be caused by sharp cutting weapon like knife, dagger and khukuri. He was cross-examined by the defence but his evidence remained unshaken. In the circumstances there was no reason to disbelieve the version of the doctor. With regard to the above injuries resulting in death of the victim, the version of the defacto-complainant (P.W.1) was that on the relevant date at about 4.25 P.M. while he was returning home from Bazar then just below Monteviet Factory near Farm he saw the appellants and other accused persons namely Islamuddin, Mohan Chhetri, Thuli Chhetri, Bangsay Chhetri were assaulting the victim and on seeing this when he went forward to stop it, he saw appellant Rajen Chhetri and Islamuddin to put down the victim and stab him with a long sharp cutting weapon and Bangsay Chhetri and her daughter were shouting to kill him.
Learned court below took into consideration the evidences of P.W.2, mother of the victim, P.W.3, elder brother of the victim, P.W.7, P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.18 besides the evidences of the doctor, P.W.12 and the I.O., P.W.23, to arrive at a conclusion that it was the appellants who along with other accused persons in furtherance of their common intention caused the death of the victim and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302/34 I.P.C.
Regarding question of contradictions and discrepancies in the depositions of witnesses, it is well settled that there are bound to be some discrepancies between the depositions of different witnesses when they speak in details, and unless the contradictions are of material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. But it has to be distinguished from contradiction. While minor discrepancy or variation in evidence will not make the prosecution case doubtful, contradiction in the statement of witness is fatal for the case. Reference may be made to the decision of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Lekh Raj & Anr., reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247.
The above principles of law have been elaborately discussed by us in the matter of Illias Mondal & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2016)1 CAL LT 281 (HC).
In the instant case from the evidence of P.W.1, made in course of his examination before court, it was evident that he did not corroborate the FIR. He had merely stated that on the relevant date at about 3.30 P.M. while he was returning home from market he saw the victim lying on the ground and accordingly went to the T.O.P. Kurseong and made statements to the police who wrote the same and he signed thereon. Though he identified his signature, Ext.1/1 on the complaint but went on to say that the contents of the document was not read over and explained to him. Even during cross-examination he admitted that seeing the body of his brother lying on the road, he did not inform the relatives and directly proceeded towards T.O.P. and therefrom went to the Kurseong hospital with police. He also admitted that he did not see any of his relatives near the body of his brother. So from the above it was apparent that he did not see the incident at all. Surprisingly, he was not declared hostile by the prosecution rather prosecution relied on his evidence. Thus, we find that FIR was not proved as the person who scribed the complaint was not examined by the prosecution nor any reason had been assigned for the same. In such circumstances, the claim made in the FIR that P.W.1 saw the incident of assault on the victim by the appellants is not believable.
From the evidence of P.W.2, mother of the victim, it was evident that she was also not the witness to the occurrence. According to her on the relevant day at about 4.15 P.M. when she came out from her house she saw the appellants with lathi, Islam with knife and Mohan with bag in their hands and when she asked them what they had killed to which appellant no.2 replied that they did not know whether her son was alive or not and thereafter they fled away. Surprisingly, she did not say all these to the I.O., P.W.23, during investigation nor to any other person and stated all these before court for the first time. Moreover, the above claim of P.W.2 also did not found corroboration from any quarter. So, this can hardly be relied on in holding the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder of the victim.
According to P.W.3, on the relevant day in between 4.00 P.M. and 5.00 P.M. while he was at his house his daughters Roshni (P.W.17) and Sony (P.W.19) came and reported him that a quarrel was going on at Khola at the junction of Monteviet road and Singel about ten minutes walking distance from his house. He then went to the khola and saw the appellants along with other accused persons and after his arrival at the place he was attacked by the accused Islam by a knife on his right palm as a result he fell down in khola. Within 2/3 minutes when he came out from khola he saw his brother lying in a pool of blood having sharp cut knife injury on his left chest and the accused persons were leaving the place. Thereafter, within a short time his wife (P.W.10), sister Urmila, (P.W.7), sister Ranju, (P.W.9) and sister-in-law Nargi (P.W.8) came there and took the victim to the hospital where he expired. During cross- examination he admitted that P.W.17, P.W.18 and P.W.19 did not name the persons involved in the quarrel and he also he did not see who actually caused hurt to the victim first. Surprisingly, not a single scrap of paper was produced in support of his claim of injury on his palm though treated in the hospital for his such injury nor this found corroboration from any quarter nor even from his daughters. However, from the evidence of this witness it was clear that he did not see the incident of assault on the victim and P.W7, P.W8, P.W.9 and P.W.10 arrived at the place of occurrence after his arrival there.
Interestingly, P.W.17 and P.W.19 have not whispered how the victim sustained injuries on his person nor about the presence of the appellants and/or their involvement in causing injury to the victim. P.W.18 though claimed in her examination-in-chief that on the relevant day while she along with P.W.17 and P.W.19 were returning home from market they found the victim lying on the road having blood over his body and the appellants and other accused persons were present there and appellant no.2 chased them but during cross-examination she admitted that she saw the dead body at the road side and no one else was there. Even the above claim of P.W.18 did not found corroboration from P.W.17 or P.W.19 who were with her nor from her father (P.W.1) or mother (P.W.8). On the other hand P.W.8 deposed that on the relevant day at about 4.20 P.M. her children were at the house. In such circumstances, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of P.W.18.
So, the claim of P.W.3 that on the relevant day in between 4.00 P.M. and 5.00 P.M. while he was at his house P.W.17, P.W.18 and P.W.19 came and reported him that a quarrel was going on at Khola at the junction of Monteviet road and Singel did not found corroboration from the above witnesses. His statements that he saw the appellants along with other accused persons and after his arrival at the place he was attacked by a knife also did not appear to be believable. Moreover, he did not whisper what part was played by the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder of the victim.
According to P.W.7, on the relevant day at about 4.30 P.M. while she was going back to her house from the house of her aunt (P.W.2) after Tika ceremony then she found the accused Islam to assault the victim by a knife near Khola and the appellants and other miscreants present there and when she asked them what they were doing then appellant no.2 chased her with a lathi. She then went back to the house of her aunt and reported the incident to her and P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.11 and thereafter they all went there and found the victim lying injured and he was not able to speak anything. They then took the victim to the hospital where he was declared brought dead. During cross- examination she admitted that she did not state to the police that after seeing the incident she went back to the house of her aunt(P.W.2) and narrated the incident to her and to P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.11 and thereafter again went back to the place of occurrence along with them. During recording of her statements under section 164 Cr.P.C. also she did not state all these to the Magistrate nor she stated that she was chased by appellant no.2. Interestingly, the above claim of P.W.7also did not find corroboration from P.W.2. Moreover, if the statements of P.W.2 is believed then the claim of P.W.7 did not appear to be believable. None of the above witnesses namely P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.11 have supported the claim of P.W.7 about her presence since morning at the house of P.W.2 for Tika ceremony or that at the relevant time she was returning to her house after Tika ceremony. Furthermore, if she had at all seen the assailants to quarrel with the victim and to cause injury on his person then why she did not say their names to P.W.2, P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10, P.W.11 and P.W.23, the investigating officer. All these put a question mark towards the veracity of the evidence of P.W.7 towards the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the alleged offence of murder.
According to P.W.8, on the relevant day at about 4.20 P.M. Urmila (P.W.7) was coming to their house and on coming she reported that there was quarrel among several persons by the side of the khola. Accordingly, she along with P.W.7, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.11 went there and found the victim lying on the ground having injury on his abdomen and also found the appellants and other miscreants were fleeing away therefrom. On her query, victim told her that accused Muslim assaulted him by knife.
According to P.W.9, on getting the news of quarrel from P.W.7 at about 4.00-4.30 P.M when they went there they found appellants and other accused persons there and victim was lying on the ground having bleeding injury on his abdomen and crying in pain and on being asked those miscreants waved their 'dandas' to them. According to him also, on their query victim told them that appellant no.2 assaulted him and accused Thuli was telling 'Maar' 'Maar. But during recording of his statements under section 164 Cr.P.C. he stated before the Magistrate that victim told him that accused Bangsay and Thuli assaulted him but he did not see anything in their hands.
According to P.W.10, on getting the news of quarrel from P.W.7 at about 4.30 P.M. when they went there they found appellants and other accused persons there and victim was lying on the ground in injured condition and on being asked victim told them that accused Islam caused injury by knife. Interestingly, during recording of her statements under section 164 Cr.P.C. she did not state before the Magistrate that victim told her that accused Islam caused him injury by knife.
According to P.W.11, on getting the news of quarrel from P.W.7 at about 4.15 P.M. when they went there they saw victim was lying on the ground in injured condition and on being asked victim told them that accused Thuli conspired to kill him and accused Islam caused injury by knife but he did not see any other person on the spot. So, if the statements of this witness is believed then claim of P.W.8, P.W.9 and P.W10 that they saw the appellants present at the place of occurrence did not appear to be believable.
Thus, we find contradictions in between the statements of P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.11 with regard to the disclosure of the name of the assailants by the victim in causing injury on his person and involvements of the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder of the victim. Furthermore, the above claim of those witnesses with regard to the reported dying declaration of the victim also did not appear to be believable in the light of the evidence adduced by P.W.7 who has specifically stated that after informing the incident when she again went to the place along with P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W10 and P.W.11 they found that victim was not able to speak. In our opinion the above discrepancies and contradictions are very fatal for the prosecution case which escaped the attention of the learned court below.
P.W.15, a tea stall owner, though claimed that one day there was an altercation in between the victim and the accused persons at his shop and he pacified them but he failed to say when that quarrel took place and what was the connection with that incident of murder. On being pressed further by the prosecution he clearly stated that he did not know anything about the incident of murder. So the evidence of this witness was of no help in drawing any inference towards the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the incident of murder of the victim.
P.W.16, grandfather of the victim, had also not stated anything about the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder of his grandson. He was reported to be the witness to the seizure of one bamboo stick from Singel Tea Estate as shown by appellant no.2 on October 15,1997 but according to him on October13, 1997 police called him at the P.S. and shown him two 'Dandas' which were supposed to had been seized from appellant no.2. Interestingly, the 'Dandas' in question were not produced during trial.
Thus, we find that learned court below completely overlooked the vital contradictions and was, therefore, in error in ignoring the above aspect of the matter.
Learned court below also put reliance on the inquest report (Ext.10) in arriving at a conclusion that name of the accused persons including the appellants was forthcoming. But interestingly, none of the witnesses to the above inquest namely P.W.4, P.W.6 and P.W.24 have stated about the presence of the appellants and/or their participation in the commission of the offence of murder of the victim.
Learned court below in convicting the appellants also took into consideration the circumstances which resulted in the death of the victim namely appellants were last seen together with the victim and after the incident they absconded and they failed to explain how the victim died. But from the evidence on record, as discussed above, we do not find that on the relevant date victim was seen alone in the company of the appellants only. Surprisingly, learned court below in convicting the appellants for their presence at the place of occurrence believed the evidence of prosecution witnesses but disbelieved them in so far as the involvement of other accused persons were concerned who were also reported to be present with them at the place of occurrence. Be that as it may, even assuming that the appellants were last seen with the deceased but this circumstances by itself does not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the appellants in furtherance of their common intention caused the death of the victim nor it can be presumed that the appellants were responsible for the murder, though grave suspicion arises against them. Circumstances of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the interference that it was the appellants who committed the crime. Reference may be made to the decision of Kanhaiyalal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 715 and the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:-
"12. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant.
15. The theory of last seen--the appellant having gone with the deceased in the manner noticed hereinbefore, is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence available against him. The conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained merely on suspicion, however strong it may be, or on his conduct. These facts assume further importance on account of absence of proof of motive particularly when it is proved that there was cordial relationship between the accused and the deceased for a long time. The fact situation bears great similarity to that in Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan."
In such circumstances no presumption could be drawn on the issue of last seen together merely relying on such statements of above witnesses. There was also no evidence on record that appellants absconded after the incident. Even the I.O. had not stated that after the incident he attempted to apprehend the appellants but they absconded. On the other hand record shows that on the very date of incident they were apprehended by investigating officer. Furthermore, we find that even no such question was put to the appellants during their examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. thereby giving them any chance of explanation. Moreover, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilt of mind unless corroborated from other circumstances.
In the instant case thus, we find that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have not been fully established. Learned court below completely overlooked the above aspect. As such the decision of the learned court below on this score is not sustainable in law.
With regard to other contention as to the proof of criminal act of the appellants in furtherance of their common intention, we find that the appellants have been convicted for the offence of murder only with the aid of section 34 I.P.C. The cardinal principle of analysing the evidence to find out the answer to the question of a criminal act of the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention was laid down by Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. Emperor, reported in AIR 1915 PC
1. In Mahabub Shah vs. Emperor, reported in AIR (32) 1945 PC 118, the Privy Council repeated and reiterated the same view. The above proposition of law was adopted by a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia vs. State of Hyderabad, reported in AIR 1955 SC 216. The decisions in the matter of Joginder Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 178 and State of U.P. Vs. Atul Singh, Etc. Etc. reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2713 are also in the same line.
The above principles of law with regard to the common intention has been elaborately discussed by us in the matter of Gopal Chandra Das & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal reported in (2016)4 CAL LT 306 (HC).
In the instant case taking into consideration the totality of circumstances, we do not find any evidence on record that there was prearranged plan to kill the deceased and/or that appellants shared common intention with other accused persons to commit the offence under which they could be convicted.
As such the decision of the learned court below on this score also is not sustainable in law.
With regard to the validity of the statements of the accused recorded under the provisions of Section 313 of Cr. P.C., the provision is mainly intended to benefit the accused and as its corollary to the benefit of the court in reaching the final conclusion. If the court fails to put the needed question then no evidence, without affording the accused the opportunity to explain, can be used against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him that would no doubt be a serious infirmity. Reference may be made to the decision of Jai Dev vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1963) 3 SCR 489.
The above principles of law have been elaborately discussed by us in the matter of Fazlul Haque @ Lalu Sk. vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2016)2 CAL LT 222 (HC).
In the present case while convicting the appellants under Section 302/34 of I.P.C., no question relating to the part played by them to kill the victim in furtherance of their common intention as deposed by PW 7 was put forward to them during their examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. In view of the above, the aforesaid relevant facts and circumstances being not put to the appellants in course of recording their statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the same should not have been used against him.
Therefore, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case together with the discussions and observations made herein-above, we find failure on the part of the prosecution with regard to the proof of the contents of the FIR, material discrepancies and contradictions in between the F.I.R and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the involvement of the appellants and the role played by them in the commission of the offence of murder of the victim, the time and the manner of assault, trustworthiness of the evidence of P.W.7 who claimed to be eye witness and other witnesses namely P.W.3 P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.10 and P.W.18.
In view of the distinguishable facts and circumstances involved in this case, the decisions of Yakub Ismailbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat (supra), Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar (supra), Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana (supra) and Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh (supra) do not help the prosecution case.
Accordingly, the judgment, order of conviction and sentence can not be sustained in law due to the failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. As such, the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence are quashed and set aside.
This appeal is allowed and the appellants are set at liberty from this case.
Appellant No.2, Rupam Chhetri, is directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case.
The warrant of arrest, the proclamation and attachment issued against the appellant no.1, Rajen Chhetri, by the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darjeeling in view of the cancellation of the order granting bail by this Court vide order dated February 10, 2016 are treated to be recalled.
Copy of this judgement along with the lower court records be sent down to the trial court immediately by special Messenger for information and taking necessary action in view of the above direction of this Court.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard.
I agree (Md. Mumtaz Khan, J.) (Debasish Kar Gupta, J.)