Allahabad High Court
Rajesh Maurya And Another vs State Of U.P. And Another on 24 April, 2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:74407 Court No. - 92 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 7946 of 2024 Applicant :- Rajesh Maurya And Another Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Karunesh Pratap Singh,Yakub Ali Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,M J Akhtar Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for opposite party No.2 and Sri Rajeev Kr. Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The instant application has been filed seeking quashing of the impugned order dated 16.10.2023 as well as entire proceeding of Special Sessions Trial No. 127 of 2017 (State vs. Rajesh Maurya and another), arising out of Complaint Case No. 21 of 2016 (Sadiya Khatoon vs. Rajesh Maurya and another), u/s 363, 366, 376/511 I.P.C. and Section 8 POCSO Act, P.S. Pharenda, District Maharajganj, pending before Special Judge, Exclusive Court (POCSO Act), Maharajganj.
3. The contention of learned counsel for the applicants is that both the parties filed cases against each other, including the present one. In the present case, initially an F.I.R. was lodged in the year 2016 as Case Crime No. 143 of 2016, u/s 363, 366, 376/511 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 POCSO Act, wherein the police after investigation, submitted the final report. Thereafter, opposite party No.2 filed a protest petition and that protest petition was registered as the impugned complaint case in which the applicants were summoned by order dated 30.9.2016. It is further submitted that both the parties have settled their dispute amicably and a written compromise was also entered into on 2.6.2023. A copy of the same is annexed at page No.29 of the paper book.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants also submitted that he had already approached this Court by way of Application u/s 482 No. 33079 of 2023, seeking quashing of the impugned proceeding on the basis of the aforesaid compromise. That application was disposed of by this Court by order dated 6.9.2023, directing the court below to verify the aforesaid compromise and a liberty was also granted to the applicants to file a fresh application u/s 482 for quashing the impugned proceeding on the basis of verified compromise. In pursuance of the order of this Court though the court below has verified the compromise on 16.11.2023 which has been annexed at page No. 37 of the paper book, but by order dated 16.10.2023, rejected the prayer for termination of the impugned proceeding on the basis of the compromise as the offence of the impugned proceeding was non compoundable.
5. Considering the fact that both the parties have lodged cases against each other and the impugned complaint proceeding was initiated on the basis of the protest petition filed against the final report, submitted by the police in the F.I.R., lodged by opposite party No.2 and even from the perusal of record, it appears that the offence of the impugned proceeding does not fall in the case of the aggravated form of sexual assault. As now both the parties have settled their dispute amicably and compromise between them has already been verified by the trial court by order dated 16.10.2023, permitting to continue the impugned proceeding will be travesty of justice.
6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:-
"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:-
"15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;"
8. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.
9. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the applicants, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.
10. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through compromise which has been duly verified by the court below as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another ; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the proceeding of Special Sessions Trial No. 127 of 2017 (State vs. Rajesh Maurya and another), arising out of Complaint Case No. 21 of 2016 (Sadiya Khatoon vs. Rajesh Maurya and another), u/s 363, 366, 376/511 I.P.C. and Section 8 POCSO Act, P.S. Pharenda, District Maharajganj, pending before Special Judge, Exclusive Court (POCSO Act), Maharajganj, is hereby quashed.
11. With the aforesaid direction, the present application is allowed.
Order Date :- 24.4.2024 Vandana