Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ram Phool Meena, Sub Inspector, Delhi ... vs Commissioner Of Police, Delhi Police, ... on 2 June, 2008
ORDER
V.K. Bali, J. (Chairman)
1. Ram Phool Meena, Sub Inspector in Delhi Police, has filed this Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, calling in question order dated 27.11.2007 (Annexure A-1) passed by Deputy Commissioner of Police (South District) directing holding of departmental enquiry against him under provisions of Rule 16 of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter to be referred as the Rules of 1980). By the said order, the enquiry has been entrusted to Shri Ramesh Chand Saini, ACP/Operations who is to conduct the enquiry on day-to-day basis and submit his findings expeditiously within the stipulated period of three months. Primarily, the case of the applicant is that on exactly the same allegations subject matter of departmental enquiry, he was tried by Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi and was acquitted on merits vide judgment dated 18.1.2007, and that being so, the departmental enquiry ordered against the applicant would be violative of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1980.
2. The facts that are not in dispute and on which the relief as indicated above is sought to rest, reveal that the applicant was selected for the post of Sub Inspector in Delhi Police by direct recruitment in 1994 and had put in more than eight years of service, when a trap was laid by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 14.5.2002 upon a complaint made by one Brij Lal that the applicant had demanded bribe of Rs. 55,000/- on 13.5.2002, pursuant to which a case was registered against him as RC No. DAI-2002-A-0027 dated 14.5.2002 under Sections 7 and 13 read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption of Act. Vide order dated 16.5.2002 he was placed under suspension from 14.5.2002. On 6.9.2003 charge was framed against him by the Special Judge, CBI under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On account of pendency of criminal proceedings, his result for promotion to the post of Inspector was kept in a sealed cover and in consequence thereof persons junior to him were promoted on 5.6.2006. Vide judgment dated 18.1.2007 passed by the Special Judge, CBI he was acquitted of the charges framed against him. That being so, Deputy Commissioner of Police (South District), third respondent herein, passed an order revoking suspension of the applicant on 15.6.2007 after he made four successive representations dated 20.1.2007, 29.1.2007, 9.5.2007 and 9.6.2007. After the order revoking suspension was passed, the applicant made three representations dated 27.6.2007, 16.8.2007 and 26.9.2007 to the third respondent seeking restoration of seniority and salary for the suspension period. He inter alia pleaded in the representations aforesaid that in view of the unequivocal acquittal on merits vide judgment dated 18.1.2007 and the fact that no departmental enquiry had been initiated till such time the judgment of the criminal court or even thereafter, no departmental enquiry could now be initiated against him. When the representation aforesaid evoked no interest with the third respondent, he made a representation to the Joint Commissioner of Police, second respondent, on 3.10.2007. The applicant instead received the order dated 27.11.2007 directing initiation of departmental enquiry against him. It is this order, as mentioned above, that has been challenged in the present Application.
3. Whereas, Shri Anshu Mahajan, learned Counsel representing the applicant, would contend that when there is specific provision in the Rules of 1980 for proceeding departmentally against a delinquent when he has been acquitted, and the circumstances under which alone departmental proceedings could be initiated are not available with the department, the order dated 27.11.2007 would be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, Ms. Jyoti Singh, learned Counsel representing the respondents, on the basis of pleadings made in the counter reply, would only contend that since the applicant was acquitted on technical grounds, there would be no bar for the department to proceed against him departmentally.
4. From the rival submissions of the learned Counsel representing the parties, as noted above, two pertinent questions would arise for adjudication. Whereas, the first question is a pure and simple question of law, the other question is based on facts. With a view to determine the first question, as spelled from the contention of the learned Counsel, as noted above, it would be appropriate to straightway refer to Rule 12 of the Rules of 1980 on which the contention of the learned Counsel rests. The same reads as follows:
12. Action following judicial acquittal.- When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds; or
(b) in the opinion of the court, or the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available.
It is not in dispute during the course of arguments that the charge against the applicant on which he was tried and acquitted is the same on which he is now being departmentally proceeded against. It is also not in dispute that if none of the situations dealt with in Clauses (a) to (e) extracted above would be applicable, the applicant cannot be departmentally tried. It is also not in dispute that insofar as Clauses (b) to (e) are concerned, the same are not available with the respondents to order departmental proceedings. The only contest is with regard to Clause (a). Whereas, counsel representing the applicant would contend that assuming the acquittal of the applicant is by way of giving benefit of doubt, the acquittal cannot be said to be on technical grounds, the counsel representing the respondents would contend that acquittal by giving benefit of doubt has to be treated as on technical grounds.
5. We have heard the learned Counsel representing the parties and with assistance examined the records of the case.
6. At the very outset, we may mention that when a particular situation is specifically dealt with in the rules, the same shall have to be given precedence over general provisions contained in any enactment, rules or instructions. Rules of 1980 have been made in exercise of powers conferred by Section 147(1) and (2) of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, by the Administrator of Delhi. By virtue of provisions contained in Rule 3, the same are applicable to all officers and men of subordinate ranks, i.e., Constable to Inspector. Rules 4 and 5 deal with definitions and authorised punishments, whereas Rule 6 deals with classification of punishments and authorities competent to award them. Whereas, Rule 15 deals with preliminary enquiries, Rule 16 deals with the procedure to be followed in departmental enquiries. Rules 11 and 12 which naturally precede the procedure to be adopted in preliminary and departmental enquiries, deal with punishment on judicial conviction and action following judicial acquittal, respectively. As per provisions contained in Rule 11, when a report is received from an official source that a subordinate rank has been convicted in a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude or on charge of disorderly conduct in a state of drunkenness or in any criminal case, the disciplinary authority would consider the nature and gravity of the offence and if in its opinion the offence is such as would render further retention of the convicted police officer in service prima facie undesirable, it may forthwith make an order dismissing or removing him from service without calling upon him to show cause against the proposed action, provided that no such order would be passed till such time the result of the first appeal that may have been filed by such police officer is known, and if such police officer is acquitted on second appeal or revision, he shall be reinstated in service from the date of dismissal or removal and may be proceeded against departmentally. Rule 12 reproduced above, as mentioned above, deals with action following judicial acquittal. A bare perusal of provisions of Rules 11 and 12 would manifest that when a criminal court may record finding of conviction and sentence and the offence is such as mentioned in Rule 11, a subordinate rank officer has to be dismissed or removed from service. In case, however, he has filed an appeal, the decision in the appeal has to be awaited. There is no manner of doubt that whether a person is acquitted in the first instance by the trial court or by the appellate court, departmental proceedings, if at all, have to be taken only in such circumstances as mentioned therein. The Rules of 1980 are admittedly applicable to the applicant as he was holding the post of Sub Inspector at the relevant time. The applicant has to be dealt with under the Rules of 1980. These special Rules, as mentioned above, have to be given precedence over general rules and precedents based upon such other rules.
7. The half-hearted contention raised by Ms. Jyoti Singh, learned Counsel representing the respondents, during the course of arguments that inasmuch as, there is no bar for holding departmental proceedings against a delinquent on his acquittal in a criminal case because the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is entirely different than the one required to establish a charge in departmental proceedings, has to be repelled in view of our observations made above. Rule 12 of the 1980 Rules came up for interpretation before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. v. Rajpal Singh . The Hon'ble Bench dealing with the issue held that in terms of Rule 12, a delinquent officer cannot be punished departmentally if on the same charge he has been acquitted by a criminal court. The Bench also referred to Section 21(3) of the Delhi Police Act and in terms thereof held that criminal prosecution is not barred even if the delinquent officer is departmentally proceeded with, though it was a case where the criminal court had acquitted the accused respondent. It was further observed that the power for initiation of departmental proceedings could be exercised by the appellants only when any of the exceptions as provided in Rule 12 is satisfied, and that there could be no two opinions to the fact that both departmental and criminal proceedings can be initiated simultaneously. But so far as a constable of Delhi Police is concerned, it was observed, there is a specific statutory rule which bars initiation of departmental proceedings after acquittal in a criminal case to which certain exceptions are provided in the nature of Clauses (a) to (e), and, therefore, under the substantive provision, no departmental proceedings could be initiated once the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court. This view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision dated 21.4.2005 in Writ Petition (C) No. 4431 to 4433 of 2005 in the matter of Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. v. Satya Dev Singh. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal filed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 21.11.2005.
8. As mentioned above, whereas there is no dispute that Clauses (b) to (e) of Rule 12 would not be applicable, the discord between the parties through the learned Counsel representing them is with regard to Clause (a). We may, at the very outset, mention that if the legislature intended that acquittal on benefit of doubt would be no bar for departmental proceedings, it would have said so and made that also as an exception in Rule 12. The legislature cannot be oblivious of a situation as mentioned above, particularly when most of the acquittals are by extending to the accused the benefit of doubt. The legislative wisdom only refers to acquittal on technical grounds as an exception for holding departmental proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadi and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. held as under:
26. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute.
In our considered view, acquittal on benefit of doubt cannot be termed as acquittal on technical grounds. Such grounds, i.e., technical grounds, would be, to illustrate a few, limitation which has now been prescribed by recent amendment in CrPC, or trial without obtaining sanction as required under Section 197 CrPC in cases where it is required and the trial being held without obtaining such sanction.
9. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that acquittal on benefit of doubt, per se, cannot be termed as acquittal on technical grounds. 10. Reverting to the factual aspect of the case, we would like to mention that the case against the applicant in the criminal court as also in departmental proceedings is that a criminal case was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by one Brij Lal on 14.5.2002 alleging that pursuant to a rape case pertaining to FIR No. 490/2001 Under Section 366/376/506/34 IPC, PS Srinivas Puri registered on 27.11.2001 against four persons, namely, Kuldeep,Vinod, Vikram and Mukesh, Mukesh being the brother of complainant Brij Lal, and the applicant being incharge of the investigation of that case, and the chargesheet of which had already been filed in Patiala House Courts, New Delhi and the evidence of the prosecutrix Ms. Praveen Mahazabin having been fixed for 15.5.2002, the applicant had contacted the complainant on 13.5.2002 on his cell phone and asked him to meet him at Andheria Modh on 14.5.2002 where the applicant had demanded bribe of Rs. 55,000/- to get the statement of the prosecutrix recorded in favour of the brother of the complainant in the court on 15.5.2002, which would lead to his acquittal in the case. It was alleged that the applicant had informed the complainant that in case the bribe money was not paid by 14.5.2002, the statement of the prosecutrix would be got recorded against Mukesh. Complainant did not want to pay the amount of bribe to the applicant and he lodged a complaint with CBI. A pre-trap team was constituted of SI Surinder Malik joined by two independent witnesses, namely, S.K. Sharma and S.K. Bhasin and the bribe money of Rs. 25,000/- in the form of 230 GC notes of Rs. 100/- denomination and four GC notes of Rs. 500/- denomination were produced by the complainant, numbers of which were recorded in the handing over memo Ex.PW1/B and the same were treated with phenolphthalein powder. The tainted money was kept in the right side pant pocket of complainant with the direction to hand over the same to the applicant on his specific demand for bribe or to some other on his direction. S.K. Bhasin was directed to act as a shadow witness. The complainant as per directions, contacted the applicant on his mobile phone, but the applicant disconnected the phone; after some time he himself called the complainant which was recorded on an audio tape (transcript of which was Ex.PW1/D), which revealed that the applicant had agreed to accept Rs. 25,000/- out of the demand amount of Rs. 55,000/- and directed the complainant to meet him. Thereafter the trap party along with the independent witness and the complainant reached the appointed place; the complainant and the shadow witness proceeded to Police Station S.N. Puri to contact the applicant; on the way the complainant contacted the accused and asked him to wait near tea shop; the other team members took suitable positions; two persons came in a Santro car who later on were revealed to be the applicant and Naresh Yadav. The complainant and the shadow witness S.K. Bhasin entered into the car. After some time the complainant and the shadow witness came out of the car and gave the pre-appointed signal, but before the trap party could reach near the car, it was driven away by Naresh Yadav and the applicant could not be apprehended. It was a case of full length trial where no witness turned hostile and endeavoured to support the prosecution case. The learned trial Judge, however, recorded a finding of acquittal. The concluding part of the order reads as follows:
In my view, there are inherent and unexplained discrepancies and contradictions which have appeared in the versions set up by different witnesses examined by the prosecution; PW-5, the shadow witness not supporting the prosecution on any count; PW1 to PW4 giving different disclosure made by Naresh qua the statement of IO PW10 and the proceeding as recorded in the recovery memo EX.PW1/F which are conflicting to this version of PW1 and PW4 for which there is no explanation, in my view, the case of the prosecution is highly shaky and not resting on any sound foundation; benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused and he is clearly entitled to an acquittal.
Some other findings leading to the conclusion aforesaid read as follows:
22. PW1 Brij Lal is the star witness of the prosecution in this case. He is complainant.
24. why the complainant came out of the car in a hurry and allowed Naresh and accused to drive away the vehicle when the accused and Naresh could have been held in conversation by the Complainant to enable the CBI to reach the car; this conduct of the Complainant appears to be questionable; why was he in such a hurry to get out of the car when the trap party which was just two minutes away, was not allowed to reach the vehicle which was driven away by Naresh and Accused.
25. In the entire gist of Ex.PW1/G, there is no demand made by the accused or acceptance of the tainted amount by Naresh on the asking of the accused as is the case set up by the prosecution.
27. This version of PW1 is not in conformity with the version of IO SI Surender Malik PW10 and is in fact total contrast to the same. This version of PW10 that after receiving the sum of Rs. 25,000/- on behalf of the accused from Brij Lal, he had gone to meet Bhupender and the accused had paid a sum of Rs. 1 lac i.e. Rs.75,000/- which he received from Naresh and Rs. 25,000/- which he received from Brij Lal to the prosecutrix, does not find mention in the statement of PW1 who has said that when CBI Officials had asked Naresh to where the money was, he had told him that this sum of Rs. 25,000/- was lying with the accused. These versions of PW1 and PW10 are clearly contradictory.
29. The version set up by the prosecution appears to be highly implausible and improbable. This contradiction is also not explained by the prosecution
30. ...This version as mentioned in Ex.PW1/F is not in conformity with the version of PW1 who has stated that when Naresh had been accosted, he had disclosed that Rs. 25,000/- are lying with the accused. These versions as recorded in the recovery memo Ex.PW1/F and the version of PW10 on the one hand is in total contrast to the version of PW1.
31. Even otherwise there is no explanation as to why Naresh and Bhupender have not been cited as witnesses; the entire version of PW10 SI surrender Malik is on the disclosure statement allegedly made to him by Naresh that the sum of Rs. 1 lac was paid to the prosecutrix on negotiation made by Bhupender in the presence of the accused; this is only hearsay testimony and in the absence of Naresh coming into the witness box to depose to the said effect, this is valueless. In these circumstances, why the IO did not think it fit to record the statements of Bhupender and Naresh and make them witnesses to this case is not explained and adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding this best evidence as if these witnesses would have been produced, they would have given evidence against the case of the prosecution.
32. PW1 is even otherwise not reliable witness and there are substantial improvement which have been made in his version.
All this so called facts have been stated by PW1 on oath in court do not find mention in his statement in Ex.PW1/DA and EX.PW1/DB recorded on 20.05.2002 and 22.07.2002, which in my view are material improvements on substantial points and cannot be overlooked. Thus, fortifying the submission of the learned Counsel for the accused that the credibility of PW1 is tarnished and he is suspect witness upon whom little reliance can be placed.
34. This version of PW4 is in conflict with the version of IO PW10 and recovery memo Ex.PW1/F. All these conflicting versions leave little room to doubt that the version of the prosecution is shaky and is not founded on any cogent evidence.
35. PW2, Dr. Rajinder Singh, Senior Scientific Officer, CFSL, has proved his report as EX.PW2/A i.e. the examination of specimen of voice of accused with the questioned voice Q-1(A) to Q-1(C) in the audio cassette which has been sent to him. In my view, it is not safe to rely upon the version of prosecution that the questioned voice in Q-1(A) to Q-1(C) in the Audio Cassette in fact had belonged to the accused.
36. As per Ex.PW1/F, this money had been delivered by the accused to Parveen, thereby clearly establishing that the accused had touched this money but when the hand of the accused was taken, the colourless solution in which his fingers were dipped, had not changed its colour, thus prima facie establishing that the accused had not come in contact with the tainted money. These conflicting versions are unexplained by the prosecution; little reliance can be placed upon the report Ex.PW6/A.
37. These versions are also conflicting tarnishing the credibility of PW1 and PW10.
From the findings and conclusions as reproduced above, it does not appear to be a case where the trial judge might have come to the conclusion that even though the prosecution version was plausible, but on analysis of evidence the accused deserved benefit of doubt.
11. A Single Bench of the Delhi High Court while dealing with the question whether judgment of the trial court under consideration by the learned single Judge should be construed as a case of clean acquittal or acquittal as consequence of benefit of doubt, relying upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , held that the case of the petitioner was squarely covered by the ratio of the said judgment. Reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was placed upon the following observations:
162. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh , this Court made the following observations:
Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.
In a recent decision in the matter of Sanjeev Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. OA No. 2429/2006 and other connected OAs decided on 24.4.2008, this Tribunal had an occasion to deal with acquittals on benefit of doubt when witnesses turn hostile and when the prosecution may lead no evidence or such evidence which may be wholly insufficient to connect an accused with the crime and yet acquittal is recorded on benefit of doubt. We have held that in the event when the prosecution may not lead evidence or wholly insufficient evidence, the same would stand on different footing. Such an acquittal would be clean acquittal and words like 'benefit of doubt' would be superfluous. For arriving at the conclusion mentioned above, we relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in OA No. 2640/2002 decided on 24.7.2003. The judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate revealed that the applicant therein was acquitted because there was no evidence produced to show that he in fact had appeared in the test and further the prosecution had not produced any witness including the complainant. Even though, it was recorded in the judgment of the learned CJM that prosecution had failed to produce any witness of the incident and even the complainant had also not been produced in the court for cross-examination, and that it could not be denied that the accused was falsely implicated on suspicion, the applicant (accused in the criminal case) was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. The learned Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 2640/2002 (supra) held that perusal of the judgment of the learned CJM revealed that acquittal of the applicant was not on technical ground and the court had come to the conclusion that relevant evidence had not been produced and, therefore, the charge was not proved. The decision was arrived at on the basis of evidence on record. The Bench observed that in such circumstances, it would be an "acquittal" rather than "acquittal on technical ground". Writ carried against the judgment of this Tribunal in OA No. 2640/2002 (supra) was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court in CWP No. 7021/2003 on 11.11.2003. In R.K.Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. 2005 (3) AISLJ 390 this Tribunal held that where, in a criminal trial an accused is acquitted for want of evidence, it would be treated to be an honourable acquittal. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhag Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank 2006 (1) SCT 175 held that where the acquittal is for want of any evidence to prove the criminal charge, mere mention of 'benefit of doubt' by the criminal court is superfluous and baseless and that such an acquittal is an honourable acquittal. Another Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam 2005 (1) ATJ 154 has taken the same view. We have further observed in Sanjeev Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (supra) that the same view was taken by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the very case in the first round when orders passed by this Tribunal were challenged before it. Present case appears to be standing on a better footing. It may be recalled that the learned trial Judge while arriving at the conclusion and acquitting the applicant held that there were inherent and unexplained discrepancies and contradictions which had appeared in the versions set up by different witnesses examined by the prosecution. The deposition made by the complainant, the star witness in the case, was not believed. In the entire gist of the audio tape (transcript of which was Ex.PW1/D), it was observed, there was no demand made by the applicant or acceptance of the tainted amount by Naresh on the asking of the applicant, as was the case set up by prosecution. Once again, version of the complainant was held not in conformity with the version of IO PW-10 and in fact was stated to be in total contrast to the same. The version of PW-10 that after receiving the sum of Rs. 25,000/- on behalf of the applicant from Brij Lal, he had gone to meet Bhupender and the applicant had paid a sum of Rs. 1 lac, i.e., Rs.75,000/- which he received from Naresh and Rs. 25,000/- which he received from Baij Lal to the prosecutrix, it was observed, did not find mention in the statement of PW-1 who said that when CBI officials had asked Naresh as to where the money was, he had told him that the sum of Rs. 25,000/- was lying with the applicant. Versions of PW-1 and PW-10 were held to be contradictory. Once again, the version of prosecution was held to be highly implausible and improbable. From the findings as extracted above, which we need not reiterate, it appears to be a wholesale rejection of the prosecution case. Even after so observing, if the learned trial Judge has mentioned that the applicant was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, the same would not be an acquittal on technical grounds. We find substance in the contention of the learned Counsel representing the applicant that the acquittal is on merits.
12. Both on law and facts, we are of the view that there is no justification for proceeding departmentally against the applicant. The concerned authority, i.e., Deputy Commissioner of Police, while passing the impugned order, it may be noted, did not even consider either the applicability of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1980 or the manner in which the applicant was acquitted. It is rather strange to note that even the factum of acquittal of the applicant has not been mentioned. We were at one stage thinking of quashing the impugned order with direction to the concerned authority to examine the issue of departmentally proceeding against the applicant keeping in view the provisions of Rule 12 and the manner in which the applicant was acquitted, but once, it is a written stand of the respondents that acquittal on benefit of doubt would be termed as if acquittal is on technical grounds, it would have been an exercise in futility to remit the case to the concerned authority for taking decision as mentioned above.
13. Before we may part with this order, in all fairness to Ms. Jyoti Singh, learned Counsel representing the respondents, we may mention that she placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh to urge that Rule 12 of the 1980 Rules applies in a case where a person was tried and discharged, and inasmuch as, in the present case the applicant was not discharged, Rule 12 would not be applicable. We find no merit in the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel. In fact, when confronted with the position that the accused in the said case was discharged from the criminal case by order dated 1.8.2001 as the concerned Magistrate had found that apart from confession of the accused, there was no other material on records and the confession was also not admissible and, therefore, he was not tried at all, the learned Counsel had nothing more to say. We may only mention that the reliance of the learned Counsel on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is only on the observations contained in paragraph 32, which reads as follows:
32. Reliance placed by Mr. Krishnamani on Rule 12 of the 1980 Rules is misplaced. The said rule applies in a case where a person was tried and discharged. The respondent herein was not tried and acquitted by a criminal court and, thus the said provision would not apply.
The only meaning of the extracted portion of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be that when there is no trial and accused is discharged, Rule 12 would not be applicable, and further that when there is a trial and acquittal, the said Rule will apply.
13. In view of the discussion made above, we allow this Application. Order dated 27.11.2007 (Annexure A-1) directing holding of departmental proceedings against the applicant is quashed and set aside. The applicant shall be entitled to consequential reliefs as admissible under rules. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.