Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rukmani Bai And Ors. vs Prahlad Singh And Anr. on 10 September, 2001
Equivalent citations: II(2002)ACC1, 2003ACJ461, 2002 A I H C 648, (2002) 2 ACC 1, (2003) 1 ACJ 461, (2002) 1 CIVLJ 348, (2001) 3 MPLJ 432, (2002) 1 TAC 204
JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. In the accident involving the offending motor vehicle, a bus of the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, which took place on 4.1.1994 Amritlal, the only son of the appellant No. 1 Rukmani Bai and the husband of appellant No. 2, Kamlesiya and the younger brother of husband (since deceased) of Kisraniya, appellant No. 3, the mother of appellant Nos. 4 to 8 had died. An application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act had been filed by the aforesaid appellants claiming them to be dependants of the deceased Amritlal which was disposed of by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal vide the impugned award whereunder adjudging a total amount of Rs. 35,000 as the just compensation payable to Rukmani Bai alone, and rejecting the claim of other appellants, they have now come up in appeal seeking redress praying for modification of the impugned award and grant of compensation to the extent of Rs. 4,00,000 along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.
2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants as well as the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondent and have carefully perused the record.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass: In the application filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act the appellants had urged that Amritlal at the time of his death was about 26 years of age and was hale and hearty young man who was employed in a wine factory situated at Sithouli Road. He used to get salary of Rs. 1,000 and house rent allowance to the tune of Rs. 300 per month. By doing overtime work he used to get an additional amount of Rs. 1,200 per month. He also received bonus twice a year. Out of his income the deceased Amritlal used to pay an amount of Rs. 1,500 per month on an average which was being utilised for meeting the living expenses by them. The husband of Kisraniya was the elder brother of the deceased and had died about two years ago and except Amritlal there was no other earning member and his family was also dependent on Amritlal. All the appellants claimed to be the legal representatives of deceased Amritlal. They claimed a compensation of an amount of Rs. 9,51,000 along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.
4. The application filed by the appellants was contested by Prahlad Singh, the driver of the offending vehicle, the bus, by filing a separate written statement. The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation contesting the claim of the appellants filed a separate written statement denying the allegations made in the application asserting that the applicants were not entitled to any compensation therefor.
5. The Tribunal after considering the evidence and the materials brought on record came to the conclusion that Amritlal had died in the accident involving the offending motor vehicle, the bus, as claimed which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner by the driver employed by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. The claim of Kisraniya and her sons and daughters was rejected holding that Kisraniya was earning her livelihood by working as labourer and meeting all her expenditures. It was further observed in this connection that Kisraniya had not turned up in support of her claim and had not examined even herself as a witness to assert that in fact she was dependent on the income of the deceased. A finding was returned by the Tribunal holding that the present appellant Nos. 3 to 8 were not dependent on the income of the deceased.
6. So far as the present appellant No. 2 Kamlesiya was concerned she had also not examined herself in support of her claim. Rukmani Bai on the other hand, had admitted that after the death of Amritlal Kamlesiya had remarried and had left the house of the deceased and her whereabouts were not known. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that on account of the remarriage of Kamlesiya she was not entitled to any compensation. So far as appellant No. 1 Rukmani Bai was concerned it was found that she was not able to establish that Amritlal the deceased was having an income as claimed. However, on the oral evidence led by the present appellant No. 1 the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the deceased was earning Rs. 1,000 per month towards salary and was getting a total amount of Rs. 300 per month as house rent allowance which must have been utilised towards payment of rent. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the extent of dependency could be only Rs. 500 per month. Out of Rs. 1,000 the deceased while living in a big city like Gwalior must have been spending Rs. 500 over himself. Out of this amount of Rs. 500 the Tribunal observed that the deceased must have been spending an amount of Rs. 250 per month for his wife and giving Rs. 250 per month to his mother. Thus out of an amount of Rs. 1,000 the extent of dependency so far as the mother was concerned was held to be Rs. 250 per month.
7. In her deposition, the age of the mother was shown to be 50 years although in her application she had disclosed the same to be only 45 years. Taking into account the age of the mother of the deceased the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the multiplier of 10 could be safely applied. Calculating the dependency to be Rs. 250 per month and determining the amount of annual dependency on that basis to be Rs. 3,000 and applying the multiplier of 10 the amount of compensation was adjudged to be Rs. 30,000 adding to the said amount another amount of Rs. 5,000 towards shock and mental agony on account of losing a son and the only earning member of the family, the total amount found payable to the mother of the deceased was determined to be Rs. 35,000 which was directed to be paid along with an interest of 12 per cent per annum.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants has tried to assail the findings returned by the Tribunal not only on the question of the income of the deceased but also in regard to the choice of the multiplier. It has also been urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case the claim of the other appellants could not be rejected. It has also been urged that the Tribunal had erred in altogether omitting to consider the prospective increase in the income of the deceased who had met his untimely death at the young age of 26 years.
9. No cross-appeal or cross-objection has been filed by the contesting respondents. In the circumstances the findings returned by Claims Tribunal against them have attained finality. The learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents has,-however, asserted that in the facts and circumstances of the case no justifiable ground has been made out which may justify an interference in the findings returned in respect of the income of deceased or the extent of dependency or even in respect of the rejection of the claim of the wife of the deceased as well as the family members of the elder brother of the deceased.
10. Rukmani Bai had examined herself as PW 1. She had asserted that Kamlesiya, widow of Jiyalal, her second son along with his descendants the sons and daughters resided along with her. Kamlesiya, the widow of the deceased had been remarried after the death of the deceased and leaving his house had moved away and her whereabouts were not known. She claimed that Amritlal used to give her an amount of Rs. 1,500 per month which was being utilised for meeting her household expenses including the expenses of the family of Jiyalal, her other son, who had died. She, however, admitted in cross-examination that Kisraniya used to meet her expenses from the income received by her from working as labourer.
11. From what has been stated in para 7 of her cross-examination it stood admitted by her that by the time of the death of Amritlal he was aged about 30 years. She did not know as to in which wine factory her son was employed. He used to reside there in a rented house and must have been paying Rs. 300 to Rs. 400 towards rent. She did not know the amount of salary paid to her son, Amritlal. She further admitted that she had not been read over or explained the application filed by her and she had simply put her thumb impression thereon. In para 10 of her cross-examination she admitted that Amritlal did not send the money to her but used to give it to her whenever he came to the village. She in the same para had admitted that Amritlal did not send her the money. She used to reside in the village while Amritlal used to reside in the city of Gwalior. She also admitted that one way fare from Gwalior to the village was Rs. 200 for a single person.
12. Narayansingh was examined by the claimants as PW 2. He had stated that he knew Amritlal. This witness claimed to have been employed in the same factory where Amritlal was employed. He had stated that he used to get Rs. 1,000 as salary and house rent of Rs. 300 and by doing overtime work he used to earn Rs. 600 to Rs. 700 per month. Amritlal also used to get the similar amounts, that is, to say Rs. 1,000 as salary, Rs. 300 towards house rent and Rs. 600 to Rs. 700 per month for working overtime. He also claimed that he used to get bonus once a year. In para 6 of his deposition this witness asserted that Amritlal used to send Rs. 500 per month to his mother. It may be noticed that this statement was contrary to what had been asserted by the mother herself as noticed hereinabove. This witness failed to produce even the attendance card to establish that he was in fact employed in the factory. He could not disclose the name of the owner of the factory where he worked. He further admitted that every worker did not receive the bonus. He further stated that Amritlal did not send the money to his mother through bank draft or cheque but he used to send the money through money order. It may be noticed that this statement was also contrary to what had been stated by the mother herself. Apart from the aforesaid two witnesses no other oral or documentary evidence was led by claimants in support of their claim about the income of the deceased.
13. It may be noticed that 'just' compensation cannot be denied to a widow on the speculative plea that she may enter into a second marriage. Her claim for such a compensation, therefore, cannot be rejected where the contestants have failed to succeed in proving that the widow had remarried. However, where a widow got remarried soon after the death of her husband, she is not entitled to any amount of compensation as her dependency comes to an end. But in case a widow remarries herself after a lapse of sometime subsequent to the death of her husband, her claim for compensation cannot be forfeited at least for the period elapsing between the date of the death of her husband and the date of her remarriage on which the dependency ends.
14. What should be the 'just' compensation in such cases will, however, depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case taking into account various factors including the fact as to whether her loss of dependency has in fact been compensated on remarriage in full or part.
15. A Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Anju Mukhi v. Satish Kumar Bhatia 1998 ACJ 400 (MP), after taking into consideration the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 had observed that when a wife cannot claim financial contribution from her husband on her remarriage on the same reasoning a widow cannot claim compensation on the basis of loss of the dependency after her remarriage. In the circumstances, it was held that to maintain an application to claim compensation for the death of her husband she must not only be widow at the time of the death of her husband but she should also continue as such to be the legal representative of the deceased husband until the final decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
16. In the aforesaid case, the Division Bench found that the widow entitled to the compensation only for a period from the date of the accident till the date of her remarriage which came to be a period of about 6 months 8 days. The contention that the second husband earned less and the marriage was performed for the purposes of safety and security and, therefore, the dependency should be assessed accordingly was rejected as unacceptable.
17. In another decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in the case of Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 ACJ 1 (MP), it was observed that the widow who remarried within a short time after the death of her husband would be entitled for compensation and the loss of dependency can be ascertained only during the period of her widowhood when she remained widow.
18. It may be noticed that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in its decision in the case of Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Chandrawati AIR 1983 All 174, had rejected the claim for compensation by a widow who had remarried soon after the death of her husband on the ground that her dependency had come to an end.
19. In the aforesaid case, the date of the death of the husband was 25.4.1973. The widow did not join the claim and had been arrayed as opposite party in the application for the award of compensation by the mother and son of the deceased. However, the claimants had set-up a case that the application was being filed for her benefit also. The widow had not appeared in the witness box. She was the second wife of the deceased and after the death of her husband, her father had remarried her at another place.
20. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that she was held to be not entitled to any amount towards the compensation.
21. It was observed by the Allahabad High Court that while in England prospects of remarriage of a widow was always considered to be a relevant consideration for assessing quantum of damages payable to her on the death of her husband in an accident, so far as the position in India was concerned, it was different as pointed by the Delhi High Court in its decision in the case of Jaimal Singh v. Jawala Devi 1976 ACJ 207 (Delhi), indicating that "So long as there is no legislative reform the possibility of the remarriage of the widow claimant must continue to hold the centre stage in India. The judges will continue to be engaged in the guessing game of sizing up the claimant's chances of finding a new husband and bringing the dependency to an end".
22. In the present case, the Tribunal has determined the extent of dependency to be 50 per cent of the earnings of the deceased which has been quantified to be Rs. 1,000 excluding Rs. 300 spent towards the rent for the residential accommodation. The total income of the deceased was found to be Rs. 1,300 per month and after excluding Rs. 300 to meet the expenses for the rent of the residential accommodation, 50 per cent of the remainder was found to represent the amount of dependency. Out of this 50 per cent, Tribunal has held dependency of the mother of the deceased to be 25 per cent and the remaining 25 per cent to be the amount of the dependency of the wife.
23. We are of the opinion that the calculation done by the Tribunal for ascertaining the extent of the dependency is erroneous. Out of the total income of the deceased, even if the amount of Rs. 300 paid by the deceased to meet the expenses regarding the rent for the residential accommodation is excluded even then out of the remaining amount of Rs. 1,000, an amount of 1/3rd thereof could be set apart for the deceased towards his personal expenses. The amount of dependency, therefore, ought to have been determined to be Rs. 670. Since the widow of the deceased had remarried and ceased to be a dependent, the aforesaid entire amount of Rs. 670 could be safely taken to represent the extent of dependency so far as the mother of the deceased was concerned. The annual dependency calculated on this basis would have come to Rs. 8,040. The age of the mother of the deceased was determined to be 50 years at the time of the death of the deceased although she had come up with the case that her age was only 45 years. In the circumstances, the deceased fell in the category of persons between the age group of 45 and 50 for whom the multiplier as indicated in the Second Schedule contemplated under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is indicated to be '13'. This figure should have been taken to be indicative of the years of purchase.
24. Calculating on the aforesaid basis, the figure of Rs. 30,000 adjudged as the compensation by the Tribunal deserves to be enhanced to Rs. 88,020 which may be rounded to a figure of Rs. 88,000. Adding to it, an amount of Rs. 5,000 for shock and mental agony as found payable by the Tribunal itself, the total amount of compensation would come to Rs. 93,000.
25. In the result this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned award is modified providing that the figure of Rs. 35,000 determined as the just compensation in the impugned award by the Claims Tribunal shall stand substituted as an amount of Rs. 93,000. In other respects, the impugned award shall remain intact.
26. There shall however be no order as to the costs of this appeal.